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ABSTRACT 
MODELS OF CONVERSION IN AMERICAN EVANGELICALISM: 
JONATHAN EDWARDS, CHARLES HODGE AND OLD 
PRINCETON, AND CHARLES FINNEY 
 
 
Mark B. Chapman, B.A., M.Div., M.Th. 
 
Marquette University, 2015 
 
 
The most commonly referenced definition of evangelicalism, David Bebbington’s 
‘quadrilateral,’ includes conversionism as one of four key definitive features, and most 
other definitions also reference conversion as characteristic of evangelicalism. This 
dissertation examines the adequacy of the use of conversion in such a defining role 
through a careful consideration of a variety of dimensions of conversion among three key 
representatives of evangelicalism: Jonathan Edwards, Charles Finney, and Old Princeton 
Seminary (as represented by its first professor, Archibald Alexander, and especially by his 
protégé Charles Hodge).  
One cannot talk about conversion as a key to evangelicalism without 
understanding what is meant by conversion, and what has been meant by it historically. 
How one views conversion both reflects and affects significant features of one’s theology 
and assumptions. If conversion is indeed linked in vital ways to so many other central 
theological concerns, would not divergent views of conversion indicate fundamental 
divergences in any resulting forms of Christian belief that would make such a union of 
divergent figures or movements under the one banner of evangelicalism untenable? How 
can conversion be used to define evangelicalism if conceptions of conversion have varied 
considerably over evangelicalism’s history?  
The primary work of this dissertation is the identification and analysis of models of 
conversion among these representatives. What key elements are involved in these various 
perspectives on conversion and how might they give insight into assorted theological 
perspectives and alignments within evangelicalism? This study concludes that the use of 
conversion to define evangelicalism is overly simplistic and inaccurate. Not only does 
conversion fail to define evangelicalism, at times it even appears to divide it. When one 
reflects theologically and historically on the notion of conversion, one realizes that the 
answers one gives to the meaning of conversion represent varying interpretations of the 
gospel message itself. Thus the variations among the figures of this study, all of whom are 
commonly placed within the bounds of what is termed evangelicalism, reveal a 
classification that is in many respects incoherent as a theological classification, and thus 
reveal the inadequacies of conversion in defining evangelicalism.  
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Introduction 
 
 
Conversion marks the beginning of the life of a Christian in the Anglo-American 
evangelical Protestant tradition. As such, conversion itself can become definitive of what it 
means to be a Christian, of what is at the very core of the New Testament gospel. How 
one understands conversion is related to most, if not all, other major categories of 
systematic theological reflection, from soteriology to the doctrine of God to pneumatology 
to ecclesiology. 
If conversion is central to a number of primary theological conceptions in 
Christianity, it has also been considered a key, defining feature of American 
evangelicalism. Although there are no agreed upon definitions of evangelicalism, most 
common definitions emphasize its stress on conversion. The definition cited more than 
any other is provided by David Bebbington in his now classic book on evangelicalism, 
Evangelicalism in Modern Britain.1 In it Bebbington suggests four central defining features. 
One of these is what he terms conversionism (centrality of conversion, along with 
biblicism (priority of/attention to the Bible), crucicentrism (centrality of Christ’s work on 
the cross), and activism (involvement in various movements for change). A multitude of 
scholars have adopted this to some degree in defining evangelicalism, among them 
prominent evangelical historian Mark Noll.2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 David W. Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s (1989; rpt. Grand 
Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1992), 2-17. 
2 See Mark A. Noll, America’s God (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5. Also see Noll’s American 
Evangelical Christianity (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 185. Among others also endorsing the quadrilateral, see 
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However, this leads to a troublesome point. How can conversion be used as a 
defining feature of evangelicalism if conceptions of conversion have varied considerably 
over evangelicalism’s history? One cannot talk about conversion as a key to 
evangelicalism without understanding what is meant by conversion, and what has been 
meant by it historically. How one views the process of conversion both reflects and affects 
significant features of one’s theology and assumptions. If conversion is indeed linked in 
vital ways to so many other central theological concerns, would not divergent views of 
conversion indicate fundamental divergences in any resulting forms of Christian belief 
that would make such a union of divergent figures or movements under the one banner of 
evangelicalism untenable? These are the questions that will be considered as we explore 
the views of some representative figures in evangelical history on conversion. And the 
answer that will be discovered is that the use of conversion to define evangelicalism is 
overly simplistic and inaccurate. It is a much too complex web of theological conceptions 
to be used this way, a web that has been weaved in significantly different ways by various 
historical figures considered to be within evangelicalism. Conversion fails to define 
evangelicalism and at times even appears to divide it. 
The primary work of this dissertation is the identification and analysis of models 
or understandings of conversion that have been present in various segments of American 
evangelicalism over its history. What key elements are involved in conversion in these 
various perspectives and how might they give insight into assorted theological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Barry Hankins. American Evangelicalism: A Contemporary History of a Mainstream Religious Movement (New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008), 1-3. Timothy Larsen notes that “it would be tedious to list all 
of the works that have used Bebbington’s definition to explain their own use of the term ‘evangelical’ – not 
to mention the fact that any boast that such a list was exhaustive would in all likelihood quickly be 
disproved by other scholars who identified additional titles.” “The Reception Given Evangelicalism in Modern 
Britain since its Publication in 1989,” in The Advent of Evangelicalism, Michael A. G. Haykin and Kenneth J. 
Stewart, eds. (Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 2008), 27. He adds that “Bebbington has developed a near 
monopoly position” among those needing a definition to limit the scope of their work. 26. 
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perspectives and alignments within evangelicalism? What strengths and weaknesses do 
they offer and can they shed light on the directions and difficulties in contemporary 
evangelicalism? When one reflects theologically and historically on the notion of 
conversion, one realizes that the answers one gives to the meaning of conversion 
represent varying interpretations of the gospel message itself. 
The perspective of three vital sources in the history of American evangelicalism 
will be examined in the pages that follow: Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758), Charles Finney 
(1792-1875), and the Princeton School of Archibald Alexander (1772-1851) and Charles 
Hodge (1797-1878). They each represent a significant influence on American 
evangelicalism by virtue of their theological acumen, representation of a significant 
evangelical tradition, and/or influence on evangelicalism through their popularity and 
success as revivalists. Jonathan Edwards is at the fount of American evangelicalism, and 
the greatest theological mind this continent has produced. Through him are channeled 
into evangelical thought aspects of Puritanism, Calvinism, the Enlightenment, and other 
philosophical and theological streams present during Edwards’ lifetime. Charles Finney 
represents a later revival tradition that was of enormous significance in the early to mid-
nineteenth century. He exemplified at least some forms of the Second Great Awakening 
and Edwardsean adaptations that continued to be influential for later revival traditions, 
and he continues to be a model for many evangelical groups today. Princeton Seminary 
was the bastion of orthodox scholastic Reformed thought in nineteenth century America 
and represents many strains of evangelicalism that have also continued to the present. 
By surveying their views on several aspects of conversion, this study is sensitive to 
several different ways in which views on conversion among these figures display both 
continuities and contrasts, some of them expected and some of them unexpected. All of 
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their views share certain commonalities, and all of them have distinctive differences. And 
all of them, in both varied and common ways, contribute to the forms in which 
evangelicalism is found today. 
Depending on what one sees as critical to the process or event of conversion, one 
will employ different strategies to bring it about. Views on conversion often reveal deeper 
differences in theological and philosophical assumptions. For example, Edwards’ view of 
revival as a surprising work of God reflects significant differences from Finney’s view of 
revival as a rather unsurprising and predictable work of humanity. These differences lead 
evangelicalism down quite different paths. And since often those converted are imbued 
with the views and assumptions of those who have evangelized them, these are passed 
down and modified through generations of converts. 
Edwards offered an integrated view of the will and the understanding, and their 
interaction with God’s gracious activity in bringing about the conversion of the believer. 
Though Edwards wrote against Arminians he raised the ire of some Calvinists as well, 
since his conception of God’s free grace undermined some of the authority of the Old 
Calvinist covenantal, societal church. By the time of Charles Finney in the early to mid-
nineteenth century, Edwards’ conception of the will had been rejected for a will that 
allowed the convert a greater role in his or her own conversion. 
The erosion of the dominance of Calvinism in the nineteenth century and toward 
Arminian notions, especially the priority of human freedom, is a relatively well known 
story in the world of church history. Finney’s and others’ modifications of Edwards’ views 
in this area won the day, in spite of any rear-guard Calvinist defense coming from Old 
Princeton. However, is this paradigm adequate in assessing the various changes and 
continuities in conceptions of conversion over this period? Can changing views of 
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conversion be explained (1) merely in terms of a move from Calvinist to Arminian 
theological leanings, (2) as a result of ongoing interactions between Calvinist and 
Arminian views, or (3) are there other significant elements of change at work within the 
history of evangelicalism that must be understood? If so, what do these other elements 
demonstrate about the direction of evangelicalism, and about its faithfulness to the 
historic gospel and to its biblical and Reformation roots?  What is there that might be 
recovered in older views of conversion as a corrective to current evangelical trajectories or 
weaknesses? And is it finally meaningful to speak of evangelicalism at all? At the close of 
the dissertation some of these questions will be explored further, and especially the 
problems that seem inherent in any adequate definition of evangelicalism. 
In his book, The Change of Conversion, Alan Kreider argues that changing notions of 
conversion tell a story of changing theology in the early church.3 I am attempting a 
similar strategy in exploring models of conversion in evangelicalism. I will explore and 
define models of conversion used in evangelicalism and evaluate their strengths and 
weaknesses. I seek to frame models in ways that might perhaps supersede typical 
theological boundaries or historical classifications, e.g. Arminian vs. Calvinist. I seek to 
approach the models of conversion in such a way as to expand and rewrite some of the 
relationships, the unities and diversities, within it. Examining these models may show the 
limitations of some common classificatory schemes for evangelicalism, and show 
unexpected diversity among groups considered similar, and commonalities across groups 
considered diverse, as in, for example, Hodge’s openness to Horace Bushnell’s views on 
raising children in the faith.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Alan Kreider, The Change of Conversion and the Origin of Christendom (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press 
International, 1999). 
 	  
6 
Out of the views of our three major figures come three models of conversion. 
These models are named for the key emphases found in each view. The first, supernatural 
affective vision, represents Jonathan Edwards’ understanding of conversion. The second, 
immediate, ongoing human decisionism, is representative of Charles Finney. The last, 
transformative spiritual knowledge, represents the views of Old Princeton Seminary as found in 
Charles Hodge, and in his mentor Archibald Alexander. 
This dissertation suggests that a Calvinist to Arminian shift fails to account fully 
for many different dimensions of conversion that have varied over time. Therefore it 
peers at conversion through several different lenses, examining conversion through a 
consideration of various factors or categories. In doing so, the dissertation uncovers a rich 
and varied theological landscape for conversion, a landscape that includes a movement 
away from Calvinist thought that is dramatic in its effects on conversion and view of the 
gospel, but also a number of other changes and trajectories in other aspects of conversion 
– some of which work across any Calvinist/Arminian theological divide. After 
considering their relation to revivalism (which typically is revealing of how they 
understand conversion), the study examines each major figure’s views on conversion as a 
supernatural event, the role of the human and the Holy Spirit in conversion, the nature of 
the change that occurs at conversion, the respective roles of the intellect and knowledge, 
the emotions, and the will in conversion and the degree to which these are seen to be 
unified or distinct in the self, the means of conversion, its relation to baptism, the 
timeframe of conversion (immediate or gradual), the authentication of conversion, the 
permanence of conversion (perseverance of the saints), how the process of conversion and 
salvation is ordered, and finally the location of conversion (to what extent, for example, is 
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the church a necessary context for conversion). The consideration of these various factors 
creates a fuller description of conversion than a Calvinist/Arminian paradigm.  
There have been a variety of studies of conversion, for example, in the early 
Church (by Alan Kreider), in Puritanism (by Bruce Hindmarsh), and in contemporary 
systematics and biblical scholarship (by Walter Conn, Ronald Witherup, and Beverly 
Gaventa).4 Conversion has also been examined more recently from a sociological 
viewpoint, of which Louis Rambo’s book is most important.5 No significant studies exist, 
however, which address the varied theological conceptions of conversion in the history of 
American evangelicalism, or provide a comparative analysis of those different conceptions. 
This project seeks to fill that gap. 
The methodology to be used will be one of comparative historical and theological 
analysis. The primary concern will be to understand the differing theological conceptions 
of conversion represented by several representative figures in their historical contexts, and 
the interrelationships of these models with the figure’s understanding of the gospel and its 
theological framework. As a work of historical theology, the focus of this work will not be on 
social or contextual history, but on the history of the theological ideas that have 
accompanied notions of conversion. While an examination of conversion through 
sociological or other lenses certainly has value, my lens is overtly theological, and I leave 
this other valuable work for others. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Kreider, Change of Conversion; Bruce D. Hindmarsh, The Evangelical Conversion Narrative: Spiritual Autobiography 
in Early Modern England (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Walter E. Conn, ed., Conversion: 
Perspectives on Personal and Social Transformation (Staten Island, NY: Society of St. Paul, 1978); Ronald D. 
Witherup, Conversion in the New Testament (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1984); Beverly R. Gaventa, 
From Darkness to Light: Aspects of Conversion in the New Testament (Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1986). Also 
worthy of note is another book released after most of this dissertation was already written. See Lewis R. 
Rambo and Charles E. Farhadian, eds., Oxford Handbook of Religious Conversion (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014). 
5 Lewis R. Rambo, Understanding Religious Conversion (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993). See also 
Rambo, “Theories of Conversion,” Social Compass 46 (1999), 259-271. 
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Chapter One – Jonathan Edwards 
 
 
In the history of American evangelicalism, Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) towers 
over the landscape. Thus appropriately it is here that this dissertation begins.1 What we 
will come to see in examining Edwards is that conversion represents a central core of his 
theology, and is of primal importance to his understanding of Christian theology and 
Christian life. I am employing the phrase, supernatural affective vision, to classify his model of 
conversion. Although any model name is inadequate as a description of the breadth of 
Edwards’ thoughts on conversion, this captures some of his key and distinctive emphases. 
It describes the way in which conversion, for Edwards, involves a kind of vision of God – 
an opening of the heart to the true sight of God and divine things that transform those 
granted such a sight. To see and taste truly the utter goodness, the loveliness, even the 
sweetness of God overwhelms one’s being and gives one a passion for God. It is because 
the unconverted do not see God as God truly is that they are not transformed by God. To 
see God truly is also to love and follow God. This vision is affective, which is to say it is 
not merely some form of intellectual knowledge gained about God, but a kind of unified 
spiritual understanding that is both known and felt in all of one’s being – and is not to be 
parsed out to one or another supposed faculties of a human person. Rather one’s passions, 
will, emotions, and intellect are all engaged in this vision. Edwards’ word for this unity is 
the ‘heart.’ It is the seat of one’s being, one’s disposition or orientation toward or against a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Portions of this chapter are taken or modified from a Master of Theology thesis written for Luther 
Seminary in St. Paul, MN, “Affective Knowledge: Jonathan Edwards on the Will, the Understanding, and 
Their Place in Conversion,” completed in 2008. 
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given object or person. In conversion one comes to know God with “a sense of the heart,” 
to use Edwards’ phrase. In such an encounter, if it truly takes place, one is overwhelmed 
and enraptured by God – like a jeweler might be enraptured with a most glorious 
diamond, or better, as a lover is enraptured by the beauty of her beloved. Such a vision 
cannot be brought about by human effort, but instead is the result of God’s supernatural 
activity. When God opens the human heart and his divine and supernatural light shines 
in, then and only then can one see truly God’s true character, and it is this that results in 
one’s conversion. At the same time, such an encounter reveals the sinfulness of one’s own 
heart in contrast to God, and the need for repentance, which drives one to Christ as both 
the revelation of God and one’s deliverer from sin. 
Edwards represents, in many respects, the seminal figure in American 
evangelicalism. “No American theologian of the era,” writes Brooks Holifield, “matched 
Edwards in either the breadth of his undertakings or the subtlety of his arguments.”2 One 
could argue that the roots of American evangelicalism lay even further back, and one 
would not be wrong. History is a never-ending succession of what came before and what 
followed after. For every stage one examines one can always go back yet another step to 
that which preceded it. There are few, if any, real beginnings or endings. Even the 
starkest historical shifts maintain extensive threads with the periods preceding them.3 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Brooks E. Holifield, Theology in America: Christian Thought from the Age of the Puritans to the Civil War (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 101. 
3 There is considerable debate about when to date the origins of evangelicalism. Bebbington has argued 
provocatively that evangelicalism was a creation of the eighteenth century in response to and in concert 
with Enlightenment concerns. This assertion has provoked a fair amount of debate. Largely on this point 
alone a whole book of essays has recently appeared, with a mixture of viewpoints on the adequacy of 
Bebbington’s contention. See Michael Haykin and Kenneth Stewart, eds., The Advent of Evangelicalism 
(Nashville, TN: B&K Academic, 2008). This is an Americanized edition (with slight alterations and different 
pagination) of an edition previously published in Britain titled The Emergence of Evangelicalism (Nottingham, 
England: Inter-Varsity Press, 2008). Some, like Tim Larsen, agree with Bebbington. “Bebbington regards 
the 1730s as the decade that launched the evangelical movement, and his judgment is accepted here.” 
Timothy Larsen, ed., Biographical Dictionary of Evangelicals (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 1. 
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Nevertheless Edwards represents, more than any other figure, the most significant 
contributor to early American evangelicalism – through his historical significance and 
role in the Great Awakening, through his gifted and creative intellect, through his 
extensive writings, and through his abiding influence on so much of the American 
Protestantism that followed, in all its forms – but especially in its evangelical expressions. 
Douglas Sweeney goes so far as to suggest that “since the eighteenth century, Jonathan 
Edwards’s legacy and the fate of evangelicals in America have been symbiotically linked. 
As Edwards’s reputation has fared, so has the evangelical movement.”4 Michael 
McClymond and Gerald McDermott consider evangelicalism to be the “sizable legacy” 
left by Edwards as the “leading theological interpreter” of the Great Awakening.5 This 
legacy is such that, not only is Edwards a key influence on evangelicalism, but 
evangelicals today have become key contemporary interpreters of Edwards.6 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
W. R. Ward, on the other hand, finds evangelicalism rooted more fundamentally in the previous century’s 
German pietism. See W. Reginald Ward, Early Evangelicalism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
Others look further back to the Puritans, to the Reformation, and beyond – even to the early church. See, 
for example, Joel R. Beeke, What is Evangelicalism? (Darlington, England: EP Books, 2012), and his essay, 
“Evangelicalism and the Dutch Further Reformation,” in Advent of Evangelicalism. 146-68. At times this 
debate on the emergence of evangelicalism hinges on debates over its definition. Depending on how one 
defines evangelicalism one will encounter those defining features at various times in the history of 
Christianity.  
4 Douglas A. Sweeney, “Evangelical Tradition in America,” in The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards, 
ed. Stephen J. Stein (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 217-38, 217.  
5 “From a retrospect of three centuries, the transatlantic revivals of the 1730s and 1740s–with Edwards as 
their leading theological interpreter–left a sizable legacy. It is called evangelicalism.” Michael J. 
McClymond and Gerald R. McDermott, The Theology of Jonathan Edwards (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2012), 447. A dissenting view that emphasizes Edwards’ discontinuity with later American religious 
history can be found in an essay by Henry May, who writes, “Edwards is not really ancestral to any of the 
major kinds of nineteenth or twentieth century American religion.” Henry F. May, “Jonathan Edwards and 
America,” in Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience, ed. Nathan O. Hatch and Harry S. Stout (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 19-33, 30. In an earlier book, The Enlightenment in America, May 
suggests that Edwards was not “a founder of the American religious way of life” because “American society 
needed a religion which would control behavior as well as belief. Edwards’s inscrutable God could not be 
drafted into the task of social control, and no society could have based its existence on his idealist 
metaphysics and absolutist ethics.” His intellectual empire “proved transitory.” Henry F. May, The 
Enlightenment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), 49-50. 
6 McClymond and McDermott note that “an important dimension of the Edwards renaissance has been the 
involvement of evangelical scholars. Kenneth Minkema has shown that evangelicals now produce the bulk 
of scholarship on Edwards’s theology.” 647. See Kenneth P. Minkema, “Jonathan Edwards in the 
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This has not always been the case among evangelicals in particular or among 
academic scholarship generally. Edwards’ star has risen, fallen, and risen again in 
influence since his own day. Although in the first half of the nineteenth century Edwards’ 
influence perhaps reached its peak in America, late in that century and into the twentieth 
views on Edwards sank to new lows among many in the academy and culture.7 One 
interpreter “charged Edwards with believing in the worst God, preaching the worst 
sermons, and having the worst religion ‘of any human being who ever lived on this 
continent.’”8 
Among evangelicals Edwards’ legacy as expressed in the form of the ‘New 
England Theology’ movement was in the nineteenth century embraced by some, and 
bitterly reviled by others. But later in the twentieth century Edwards returned as a 
formidable force among evangelicals, and also as a key player among the scholars of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Twentieth Century,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 47, no. 4 (Dec 2004), 659-687, 677 n.55. 
Douglas Sweeney also observes, “more than any other thinker, Edwards has aided evangelicals in gaining 
credibility and in furthering their agenda in American public life. Not surprisingly, then, evangelicals have 
usually championed Edwards more wholeheartedly – less hesitantly, and often much less critically – than 
has any other group.… All have shared in Edwards’s passionate pursuit of ‘true religion,’ the kind of vital 
Christian piety that stems from regeneration (spiritual rebirth) and sets its subjects apart from nominal 
Christianity.” “Evangelical Tradition,” in Cambridge Companion to Edwards, 217. Sweeney further describes 
the Edwards renaissance among evangelicals, especially since the 1990s, and describes some leading 
contemporary Edwardsean figures, such as R. C. Sproul, John Piper, Iain Murray, and a segment of the 
Southern Baptist Convention (Founders Movement). 229-232. Finally, David  W. Bebbington considers the 
ebbs and flows of Edwards’ reputation outside of America from his own lifetime into the end of the 
twentieth century in his chapter, “The Reputation of Edwards Abroad,” in Cambridge Companion to Edwards, 
239-61. The twentieth century is dealt with on 255f., where the Welch Presbyterian Martyn Lloyd-Jones 
proves instrumental in introducing Edwards to a number of individuals, such as J. I. Packer and Iain 
Murray, who will mediate his influence into contemporary evangelicalism. 
7 Sweeney writes that “by the early 1830s, Edwards’s legacy grew so large that he might well have been 
dubbed ‘America’s evangelical.’” “Evangelical Tradition,” in Cambridge Companion to Edwards, 220. See also 
Philip F. Gura, Jonathan Edwards: America’s Evangelical (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005), esp. 222-38. Of his 
declining influence, see McClymond and McDermott who note that “in the last third of the nineteenth 
century, most authors treated Edwards as an ‘anachronism.’ They cited him as an ‘important’ thinker, but 
few intellectuals paid serious attention to his work. Few seemed to notice when the New England Theology 
slipped away.” Theology of Edwards, 634. They add that “in the first third of the twentieth century, American 
intellectuals continued to treat Jonathan Edwards with the contempt and disinterest he received at the end 
of the nineteenth century.” 637. 
8 See Marilla M. Ricker, Jonathan Edwards: The Divine Who Filled the Air with Damnation and Proved the Total 
Depravity of God (New York: American Freethought Tract Society, 1918), as quoted in McClymond and 
McDermott, Theology of Edwards, 637.  
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academy in their views on the religious and intellectual history of America. In the 
aftermath of Perry Miller’s landmark book on Edwards, and into the twenty-first century, 
a small industry has grown around Edwards scholarship that has only mushroomed 
further with the release over the past few decades of the Yale series of works of Edwards.9  
The extent of the primary and secondary material on Edwards is at this point 
daunting, such that no one but the most dedicated specialists can be familiar with all of it. 
While proving a rich resource for this study of Edwards’ views on conversion, the 
abundance of resources makes it effectively impossible to review or incorporate all of the 
relevant material into a dissertation chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, the primary 
source material used will focus on major works of Edwards’ including Religious Affections, 
Freedom of the Will, and to a lesser extent The Nature of True Virtue and portions of The Great 
Awakening.10 Other selections from Edwards’ works will also be utilized, especially key 
sermons such as “A Divine and Supernatural Light,” and his “Treatise on Grace” – 
which grew out of a sermon series, as well as a variety of selections from his Miscellanies, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards (1949; rpt. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1973). How big is this 
industry? McClymond and McDermott record that “by 2010, more than four thousand secondary books, 
dissertations, and articles on Edwards had shot off the press, and most had been published since Miller’s 
landmark monograph. As a result, Edwards has become one of the most studied thinkers in the history of 
Christian thought and by far the most deeply scrutinized American thinker before 1800.” Theology of 
Edwards, 643. M. X. Lesser has provided an annotated bibliography materials on Edwards. See Reading 
Jonathan Edwards: An Annotated Bibliography in Three Parts, 1729-2005 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008). 
Much of this work has been driven by the new Yale editions of Edwards’ works (listed in citations as WJE), 
now in 26 volumes (1957-2008). 
10 Jonathan Edwards, Religious Affections, Vol. 2 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards, John Smith, ed. (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1959);  Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, Vol. 1 of The Works of 
Jonathan Edwards, Paul Ramsey, ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1957); Jonathan Edwards, The 
Nature of True Virtue (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1960); Jonathan Edwards, The Great 
Awakening, Vol. 4 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards, C. C. Goen, ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1972); The Great Awakening, the fourth volume in the Yale series of Edwards’ works includes much of 
Edwards’ reflections prior to his book, Religious Affections, on the revivals of his time, including A Faithful 
Narrative, The Distinguishing Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God, and Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival of 
Religion in New England. I have attended primarily to the former two of these. 
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and other works.11 Religious Affections offers Edwards’ most mature reflections on the events 
and aftermath of the First Great Awakening and the issue of true conversion. Freedom of the 
Will offers the most thorough look at the place of the will in Christian conversion and life, 
and is a major landmark of the American Protestant landscape.12 “A Divine and 
Supernatural Light” is an excellent crystallization of Edwards’ understanding of the 
process of transformation involved in conversion and the role of knowledge in such a 
process. Other works complement and/or clarify these key writings. 
As we proceed in this chapter the meaning and substance of conversion will be 
examined from a number of angles, but perhaps in opening we might offer this 
description by Edwards himself. Conversion “is that great change by which we are 
brought from sin to Christ, and by which we become believers in him,… the sinful, 
alienated soul’s closing with Christ.”13  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The “Divine Light” sermon is found in Jonathan Edwards, Sermons and Discourses 1730-1733, Vol. 17 of 
The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Mark Valeri, ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999); “Treatise on 
Grace” is in Jonathan Edwards, Writings on the Trinity, Grace, and Faith, Vol. 21 of The Works of Jonathan 
Edwards, Sang Hyun Lee, ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003); the Miscellanies in Jonathan 
Edwards, The “Miscellanies” a-500, Vol. 13 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Thomas A. Schafer, ed. (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), Jonathan Edwards, The “Miscellanies” 501-832, Vol. 18 of The 
Works of Jonathan Edwards, Ava Chamberlain, ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), Jonathan 
Edwards, The “Miscellanies” 833-1152, Vol. 20 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Amy Plantinga Pauw, ed. 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), Jonathan Edwards, The “Miscellanies” 1153-1360, Vol. 23 of 
The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Douglas A. Sweeney, ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004). 
12 The recognition of the place of Freedom of the Will in Edwards’ canon is near universal. Paul Ramsey 
declares, “This book alone is sufficient to establish its author as the greatest philosopher-theologian yet to 
grace the American scene.” Introduction, WJE 1:2. Writing in 1889, Alexander Allen’s assessment was 
much the same; this is “the work on which, more than on any other of his writings, his world-wide 
reputation has rested.” Alexander V. G. Allen, “The Freedom of the Will” (1889), repr., in William J. 
Scheick, ed., Critical Essays on Jonathan Edwards (Boston, MA: G. K. Hall & Co., 1980), 89-96, 89. Sweeney 
comments that the book “exerted the greatest force on evangelical theology.” “Evangelical Tradition,” in 
Cambridge Companion to Edwards, 218. 
13 Jonathan Edwards, Sermons and Discourses 1734-1738, Vol. 19 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards, M. X. 
Lesser, ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 224. 
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Edwards and Revivalism  
 
Edwards will forever be associated with the revivals of the First Great Awakening, 
both for his active participation in it, and for the extensive writings he left reflecting on 
the revival phenomena. Michael McClymond and Gerald McDermott observe that 
“since the mid-1700s, no author has had a greater impact on the theology and practice of 
Protestant revival than Jonathan Edwards.”14 Engaging revival necessarily entails serious 
consideration of conversion’s definition, significance, operation, and authentication. Thus 
it is important for this study to understand Edwards’ focus on the revivals and their 
aftermath. Issues related to revival will arise throughout this chapter, so I will here only 
briefly review Edwards’ relation to the revivals and his views regarding them.  
It should be noted first of all that the revivals of Edwards’ day were not an entirely 
new and unknown occurrence. Edwards’ revival context, even though termed the First 
Great Awakening, had precedents in Puritan New England. Thomas Kidd notes that “the 
clearest antecedents to the revivals of the 1720s to 1740s were the periodic covenant 
renewals in New England.”15 Kidd goes on to describe several examples of Puritan 
renewal covenant activity and preaching that anticipated later revivals, especially a 
covenant renewal in 1705 by Samuel Danforth, Jr. in Taunton, MA.16 “Taunton's 
renewal was only one of many 'revivals' before the 'First' Great Awakening. In the 1710s 
and 1720s, these occurrences became more frequent in New England.” Kidd also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 McClymond and McDermott, Theology of Edwards, 675. The authors write furthermore that “more than 
three centuries after his birth, Edwards has continued to be cited as an authority on revival and might be 
regarded as the most influential author of all time on this theme.” 424. Harry S. Stout suggests that “in a 
profound sense, revivals were in Jonathan Edwards’s genes.” “Edwards as Revivalist,” Cambridge Companion 
to Edwards, 125. 
15 Thomas S. Kidd, “‘Prayer for a Saving Issue’: Evangelical Development in New England Before the 
Great Awakening,” in Emergence of Evangelicalism, 132.  
16 Kidd, “‘Prayer for a Saving Issue,’” Emergence of Evangelicalism, 134f. 
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considers the impact of Edwards’ grandfather, Solomon Stoddard (1643-1729), whose 
pulpit Edwards took upon Stoddard’s death. Kidd asserts that “Stoddard developed the 
most extensive evangelical theology of conversion prior to Edwards,” which could not 
have failed to influence his grandson.17 But Edwards was not to remain following the 
footsteps of his grandfather in lockstep, as we shall find below. 
Kidd also observes that “compared to Puritanism, evangelicalism in New England 
carried a heightened emphasis on conversion as the raison d’être of the movement and the 
defining experience of a believer's life.”18 This shift is noteworthy as it was to become a 
central feature of evangelicalism in America. 
Edwards was attempting to find a path amidst the extremes of the revivals, both 
defending its legitimacy as a work of God against its detractors and critiquing harmful 
expressions of revival that denied key aspects of a proper view of faithful, biblical 
Christian life and practice.19 On the one hand, he sought to defend the key place of the 
affections – of the will, the heart, one’s internal guiding disposition and passions – against 
those who believed reason alone to be an adequate guide to the Christian life.20 On the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Kidd, “‘Prayer for a Saving Issue,’” Emergence of Evangelicalism, 136, 137. Kidd continues, “As an orthodox 
Calvinist, Stoddard firmly believed that the Spirit of God drew sinners to salvation, but he also believed that 
powerful preaching was often the means that God used to draw people. Thus Stoddard promoted a 
Calvinist view of evangelism by powerful preachers who warned of the threat of damnation on one hand 
and offered the hope of salvation through Christ's grace on the other. This view no doubt heavily 
influenced his grandson Edwards. Stoddard argued that the dread of damnation was the most, and perhaps 
the only, effective means to lead sinners to true 'humiliation', or a sense that their sin was grievous and 
awful in the light of God's holiness.” 137. Kidd also discusses Jonathan Edwards’ father, Timothy Edwards, 
and his role in revivalism, as well as other significant New Englanders of his generation. 141f. 
18 Kidd, “‘Prayer for a Saving Issue,’” Emergence of Evangelicalism, 145. He also notes a greater emphasis on 
the outpouring of the Holy Spirit in revival activity in evangelicalism. 
19 In his classic work, The Enlightenment in America, Henry May noted that “in his own day, though Edwards 
provided the most powerful defense of revivalism, the defense was a qualified and discriminating one.” 50. 
20 This will be more apparent in discussions of the intellect, emotions, and will later in this chapter. But it is 
very clear that Edwards considers it a great error to discard all the religious affections in response to the 
extremes of the revivals. He acknowledges the extremes, and the temporary nature of the change in many 
of those who had been through revivals. “The high affections of many seem to be so soon come to nothing, 
and some who seemed to be mightily raised and swallowed with joy and zeal, for a while, seem to have 
returned like the dog to his vomit.” WJE 2:119. While for a time such temporary extremes were too easily 
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other hand, he also sought to preserve a place for reason against those enthusiasts who 
laid it aside in favor of the direct leading or illumination of the Spirit, and denigrated the 
place of reason.21 In this way he often ended up, especially in his most mature reflections 
on revival, being attacked both by friends and opponents of revival. 
Edwards’ positions on revival issues were not entirely static. Clearly he was more 
inclined in his earlier assessments of the revivals to judge more generously as the actions 
of the Holy Spirit the emotional responses and exuberant, earnest embrace of gospel 
truths. But as the years passed and he saw the lack of lasting change among many of those 
thought to be truly converted, he became more skeptical and discerning in his assessment 
of a variety of phenomena that previously might have been seen as indicators of the 
activity of the Holy Spirit.22 However, he was fairly consistent in opposing those 
responding at the extremes of the continuum on revival. He consistently insisted, as will 
be seen, that there was in revival something of the work of God’s Spirit, and that revival 
criticisms founded in a reduction of Christianity to a form of rationalism or moralism 
could not be tolerated.23 But on the other extreme, enthusiasm, understood as the Spirit’s 
direct communication or bringing to mind God’s will to individuals, “Edwards always 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
accepted as of the Holy Spirit, the pendulum swung back to the other extreme such that Edwards is 
concerned about the tendency of many to reject out of hand all such occurrences as not of God. 
21 Edwards is very much aware of the damage done to the reputation of revivals by some of their most 
vigorous supporters. He writes how the devil “brings in, even the friends of religion, insensibly to themselves, 
to do the work of enemies, by destroying religion, in a far more effectual manner, than open enemies can 
do, under a notion of advancing it. By this means the devil scatters the flock of Christ, and sets ‘em one 
against another, and that with great heat of spirit, under a notion of zeal for God; and religion by degrees, 
degenerates into vain jangling; and during the strife, Satan leads both parties far out of the right way, 
driving each to great extremes, one on the right hand, and the other on the left, according as he finds they 
are most inclined, or most easily moved and swayed, till the right path in the middle, is almost wholly 
neglected.” WJE 2:88. 
22 The relevant major works in this progression include A Faithful Narrative (1737), The Distinguishing Marks 
(1741), Some Thoughts Concerning the Revival (1742), and Religious Affections (1746). The first three are all found in 
WJE 4, and the last is WJE 2. 
23 Edwards’ general attitude toward the revivals can be seen in this comment from Distinguishing Marks in 
1741. “Certainly we must throw by all the talk of conversion ad Christian experience; and not only so, but 
we must throw by our Bibles, and give up revealed religion, if this be not in general the work of God.” WJE 
4:268. 
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opposed… as strenuously as anyone.”24 Edwards would never allow one’s personal 
experience to supersede or add to the content or authority of Holy Scripture.25 One’s 
experience of the Holy Spirit might open one to deeper understanding of gospel truths, 
but never undermined them.26 
 
Conversion as Supernatural  
 
Crucial to Edwards’ response to some revival criticisms is his insistence that true 
conversion is a supernatural act of God. He wastes no time moving to this point in 
Religious Affections; it is the first positive sign he provides for the authenticity of affections. 
“Affections that are truly spiritual and gracious, do arise from those influences and 
operations on the heart, which are spiritual, supernatural and divine.”27 Scripture 
counterposes natural and spiritual man, and this term spiritual is meant to signify not 
some part of the person, but God’s supernatural act through the influx of the Holy Spirit 
upon him or her, and in saving and not common fashion.28 The regenerative actions at 
the core of conversion are not natural actions or processes; “those gracious influences 
which the saints are subjects of, and the effects of God’s Spirit which they experience, are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 WJE 4:75 (Editor’s Introduction). See also Edwards’ criticisms against immediate revelations of the 
enthusiasts in WJE 2:285f. 
25 Thus he writes, “We see it to be common in enthusiasts, that they depreciate this written rule [Scripture], 
and set up the light within, or some other rule above it.” WJE 4:254. Later in the same treatise he writes, 
“Some of the true friends of the work of God’s Spirit have erred in giving too much heed to impulses and 
strong impressions of their minds, as though they were immediate significations from heaven to them of 
something that should come to pass, or something that it was the mind and will of God that they should do, 
which was not signified or revealed anywhere in the Bible without those impulses.” 278. 
26 In answering the question of how to distinguish true from counterfeit works of God, Edwards makes clear 
the position of authority that Scripture holds. “We are to take the Scriptures as our guide in such cases: this 
is the great and standing rule which God has given to his church, to guide them in all things relating to the 
great concerns of their souls; and ‘tis an infallible and sufficient rule.” WJE 4:227. See also 234. One can 
find similar appeals to biblical authority throughout Edwards’ writings. 
27 WJE 2:197. 
28 See, for example, WJE 2:198-99. 
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entirely above nature, altogether of a different kind from anything that men find within 
themselves by nature, or only in the exercise of natural principles.”29 Thus, as will 
become even more clear in the following two subsections, conversion is never the result of 
the elevation or enhancement of natural human qualities or of human effort or decision. 
Although God may work in natural man in enhancing natural capabilities, 
assisting in political affairs, clarifying reason on secular or religious things, etc., God does 
not do this in a redemptive, spiritual sense. Edwards writes that although the Arminians 
speak of supernatural assistance, “the Calvinists suppose otherwise. They suppose that 
divine influence and operation, by which saving virtue is attained, is entirely different 
from and above common assistance, or that which is given in a course of ordinary 
providence, according to universally established laws of nature.” In the salvific act of 
regeneration Calvinists “suppose a principle of saving virtue is immediately imparted and 
implanted by that operation which is sovereign and efficacious in that respect, that its effect 
is not from any established laws of nature.”30 God’s action at the heart of conversion stands 
entirely on its own as a supernatural act. Thus “special or saving grace in this sense is not 
only different from common grace in degree, but entirely diverse in nature and kind.”31 
Why this must be so becomes more apparent when one understands how Edwards 
sees the workings of the conversion process. This, too, will become clearer in the 
subsection below considering the role of the intellect and knowledge, but suffice it to say 
at this point that there is a close relation of spiritual light to faith for Edwards.32 It is in the 
reception of spiritual light that one has the capacity for faith. Human depravity leaves a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 WJE 2:205. 
30 WJE 21:301 (emphasis mine). 
31 WJE 21:154. 
32 In Religious Affections Edwards writes, “Men not only can’t exercise faith without some spiritual light, but 
they can exercise faith only just in such proportion as they have spiritual light.” WJE 2:176. 
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person lacking the capacity to receive this spiritual light. Unregenerate persons are blind 
to it. Apart from a supernatural act of God they will never receive it. But it is this very 
light that illuminates the knowledge of God in such a manner as to provide to the receiver 
transforming affective knowledge – that is, knowledge that, when truly received and 
understood, changes one’s feelings, one’s heart, one’s character as one is allowed to gain a 
glimpse of God’s true goodness and glory. 
It is this divine light that is at the heart of the conversion process. It is a spiritual 
knowledge, that “God is the author of, and none else: he reveals it, and flesh and blood 
reveals it not. He imparts this knowledge immediately, not making use of any 
intermediate natural causes, as he does in other knowledge.”33 And it is in giving an 
individual the eyes to see and the sense of the heart to taste that the Lord is good that one 
is transformed by this spiritual knowledge. Providing that capacity and spiritual light is 
the very act of regeneration, from which transformation necessarily follows. For to see 
God’s goodness and glory with a sense of the heart is to be so moved that one is 
reoriented toward God and divine things. Edwards makes clear that while common grace 
assists nature, the revelation and divine light of redemptive grace is above nature.34 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 WJE 17:409. In “A Divine and Supernatural Light,” from which this quote comes, Edwards puts forth 
the following as his statement of doctrine for the sermon: “Doctrine. There is such a thing, as a spiritual and 
divine light, immediately imparted to the soul by God, of a different nature from any that is obtained by natural means.” WJE 
17:410. 
34 WJE 17:410. Against deist objections to God’s supernatural activity in creation, Edwards writes, “Upon 
what account should it seem unreasonable, that there should be any immediate communication between 
God and the creature? ‘Tis strange that men should make any matter of difficulty of it. Why should not he 
that made all things, still have something immediately to do with the things that he has made? Where lies 
the great difficulty, if we own the being of a God, and that he created all things out of nothing, of allowing 
some immediate influence of God on the creation still?” WJE 17:421. 
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The Role of the Human and the Holy Spirit in Conversion 
 
If conversion is at its core a supernatural act of God, then what role, if any, does 
the human play and what role does the Holy Spirit play in conversion? It should be 
apparent that in such changes as are wrought in a person by this light, the Holy Spirit 
plays the key role, for if by grace alone one is saved then the initiative for this change 
must come from outside the person. “Regeneration is by the Spirit.”35 Unregenerate 
persons cannot bring this conversion about, being inclined against God. Thus “what is 
done in conversion is nothing but conferring the Spirit of God, which dwells in the soul 
and becomes there a principle of life and action.”36 It is only this that makes possible any 
subsequent role for an individual in conversion.37 
The Spirit is at work in the process of conversion, but Edwards does not limit the 
activity of the Spirit to the regenerate. Rather he argues that the type of the Spirit’s 
activity differs between the regenerate and unregenerate individual. The Spirit can on 
occasion raise the natural abilities or principles of unregenerate persons, sharpening their 
thought, or giving them a greater awareness of their sinfulness, but the Spirit does not 
dwell in the unregenerate. Rather it acts on them just as it might act upon an inanimate 
object, as it moved across the waters during creation.38 By contrast, in the life of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 WJE 21:176. 
36 WJE 13:462 (Misc. 397). 
37 In his “Treatise on Grace,” Edwards examines the Jn. 3:6 discussion of regeneration, in which what is 
born of the flesh is flesh, and of the Spirit is spirit. By this is indicated a great divide between flesh and spirit. 
“By flesh and spirit, Christ here intends two things entirely different in nature, which cannot be one from 
the other. A man cannot have anything of a nature superior to flesh that is not born again.” WJE 21:154. 
38 Edwards expresses his thoughts on this, for example, in his “Treatise on Grace,” where he writes, “The 
Spirit of God may operate and produce effects upon the minds of natural men that have no grace, as he 
does when he assists natural conscience and convictions of sin and danger. The Spirit of God may produce 
effects upon inanimate things, as of old he moved on the face of the waters [Gen. 1:2]. But he 
communicates holiness in his own proper nature only, in those holy effects in the hearts of the saints. And 
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regenerate person, the Spirit sets up house, as it were, “takes him for his temple” and 
becomes an “indwelling vital principle” that changes the individual in fundamental ways, 
and that provides light that could never have been arrived at through any natural 
means.39 “The Holy Ghost influences the godly as dwelling in them as a vital principle, or 
as a new supernatural principle of life and action. But in unregenerate men, he operates 
only by assisting natural principles to do the same work which they do of themselves, to a 
greater degree.”40 
To put it differently, for Edwards common grace signifies actions or influences of 
the Holy Spirit and their fruits that are common to both saints and the unregenerate. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
therefore, those holy effects only are called spiritual; and the saints only are called spiritual persons in sacred 
Scripture.” WJE 21:192. 
39 See WJE 17:410-11. William Breitenbach notes, “according to Edwards, the common grace available to 
all men can do no more than aid existing natural principles in the soul, whereas the Spirit’s gift of saving 
grace infuses entirely new supernatural principles or habits into the soul.” “Piety and Moralism: Edwards 
and the New Divinity,” in American Experience, 177-204, 180. Likewise Conrad Cherry comments, “the Holy 
Spirit in his saving operation or in his creation of saving faith does not move simply ‘upon’ or ‘toward’ the 
human faculties of intellect and will; he is united with them as their new principle of operation. Here lies the 
difference between ‘natural man’ and the recipient of grace.” The Theology of Jonathan Edwards: A Reappraisal 
(Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1966), 28. 
40 WJE 13:512-513 (Misc. 471). In Religious Affections Edwards also discusses the indwelling of the Spirit. 
“The Spirit of God is given to the true saints to dwell in them, as his proper lasting abode; and to influence 
their hearts, as a principle of new nature, or as a divine supernatural spring of life and action. The 
Scriptures represent the Holy Spirit, not only as moving, and occasionally influencing the saints, but as 
dwelling in them as his temple, his proper abode, and everlasting dwelling place.” WJE 2:200. The Spirit of 
God “becomes a principle of life… dwelling as a vital principle in their souls.” It may influence natural men, 
but not as “an indwelling principle.” WJE 2:201. “Not only the manner of the relation of the Spirit, who is 
the operator, to the subject of his operations, is different; as the Spirit operates in the saints, as dwelling in 
them, as an abiding principle of action, whereas he doth not so operate upon sinners; but the influence and 
operation itself is different, and the effect wrought exceeding different.” WJE 2:202. Edwards also addresses 
this issue in his “Divine and Supernatural Light” sermon. “He [the Spirit of God] may indeed act upon the 
mind of a natural man; but he acts in the mind of a saint as an indwelling vital principle. He acts upon the 
mind of an unregenerate person as an extrinsic occasional agent; for in acting upon them he doth not unite 
himself to them… they are still ‘sensual, having not the Spirit’ (Jude 19). But he unites himself with the 
mind of a saint, takes him for his temple, actuates and influences him as a new, supernatural principle of life 
and action…Holiness is the proper nature of the Spirit of God. The Holy Spirit operates in the minds of the 
godly, by uniting himself to them, and living in them, and exerting his own nature in the exercise of their 
faculties. The Spirit of God may act upon a creature, and yet not in acting communicate himself.” WJE 
17:411. 
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Special or saving grace involves operations of the Holy Spirit on the godly in a salvific 
manner and the fruits of that activity.41 
In the twelfth sermon of the series on “Charity and Its Fruits,” Edwards expands 
on this work of the Spirit in the regenerate individual. There is an essential unity in the 
work of the Spirit in the converted. “The graces of Christianity,” he writes, “are all from 
the Spirit of Christ sent forth into the heart, and dwelling there as an holy principle and 
divine nature. And therefore all graces are only the different ways of acting of the same 
divine nature, as there may be different reflections of the light of the sun.… They are all 
communicated in the same work of the Spirit, viz. the work of conversion.”42 One must 
not lose sight of the oneness of conversion amidst the diverse results effected from it. 
The nature of the relationship of the Spirit to the regenerate person is a complex 
issue. Edwards is careful to distinguish this indwelling from a merging of the divine with 
the individual. The Spirit dwells within the regenerate individual but is still free and 
distinguished from that individual. Conrad Cherry argues that for Edwards “the Divine 
Light is not identical with the human faculties; it is not collapsed into human being. The 
Light or Spirit is rather a new foundation laid in the human being in which man 
participates and from which the human powers operate. Edwards insists that the saint is 
not ‘Godded with God’ or ‘Christed with Christ’ through the Spirit’s becoming in some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 See WJE 21:153. McClymond and McDermott put it this way. “Edwards believed that grace is not just 
from the Spirit but of the Spirit.” Although natural men may be affected in their natural faculties by the 
Spirit, “the saints actually possess the Spirit, and the Spirit’s activity within the saints is what Edwards 
meant by special or saving grace.” Theology of Edwards, 360-61. See also WJE 21:194-97. 
42 He continues, “there is not one conversion to bring the heart to faith, and another to infuse love to God, 
and another humility, and another repentance, and another love to men. But all are given in one work of 
the Spirit. All these things are infused by one conversion, one change of the heart; which argues that all the 
graces are united and linked together, as being contained in that one and the same new nature which is 
given in regeneration.” Jonathan Edwards, Ethical Writings, Vol. 8 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Paul 
Ramsey, ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 332. 
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way identical with the human agent.”43 Upon this new foundation the regenerate 
individual can know with a sense of the heart the truth and excellence of divine things.44 
If this key work of the Holy Spirit is central to conversion, does this leave the 
individual passive in its wake? Certainly not according to Edwards. The regenerative 
work of the Spirit enables works by the regenerate individual, to the extent that even 
though works are not the cause of justification, they do become a condition of justification, 
in the sense that in some form they always accompany it in the lives of the regenerate. 
Rhys Bezzant puts it incisively. Edwards “allowed no room for either salvation through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Cherry, Reappraisal, 29. Cherry here uses the term light as analogous to the Spirit, but this is not always 
how it is used in Edwards or his interpreters. My sense of Edwards’ use of the term is that the light proceeds 
from and is given by the Spirit, but is not analogous to it. Michael McClymond comments, “if there is a 
mystical dimension to Edwards’s teaching on illumination, it lies in his insistence that the divine light not 
only gives knowledge but also becomes one with the knower and transforms him or her.” Encounters With 
God: An Approach to the Theology of Jonathan Edwards (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 19. See also 
25, and 37f. It is a spiritual knowledge that illumines and works on the person as subject and perceiver. But 
Cherry’s point here, regardless of his use of the term light, is certainly right, as is indicated by his reference 
to Edwards in Religious Affections. “Not that the saints are made partakers of the essence of God, and so are 
‘Godded’ with God, and ‘Christed’ with Christ, according to the abominable and blasphemous language 
and notions of some heretics.”WJE 2:203. There is a mystical union of humanity, not with the essence of 
God, but with the spiritual knowledge and light of him. 
44 There is some controversy regarding the nature of the Spirit’s work in the regenerate. Some suggest that 
Edwards, who at times uses the term “infusion” to describe the Spirit’s redemptive work in an individual, 
has in mind something similar to a Catholic notion of infused grace. McClymond and McDermott, for 
example, follow this line, suggesting that “infusion seemed to Edwards to be a fitting description of the 
Spirit’s pouring himself into the human soul and taking up residence there.” Theology of Edwards, 382. See 
also WJE 21:165; 13:246, 512-13. Anri Morimoto suggests a similar interpretation. See Jonathan Edwards and 
the Catholic Vision of Salvation (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). Josh Moody, 
on the other hand, argues that when Edwards uses the term, he has in mind not a Roman Catholic view, 
but rather regeneration. See his chapter, “Edwards and Justification Today,” in Josh Moody, ed., Edwards 
and Justification (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2012), 17-43, 21. He also considers it highly unlikely that in 
Edwards’ historical context he would in fact be attempting to move toward Roman Catholic theology. 
Instead he is attacking deists and others who suggest that reason alone, outside any action of the Holy Spirit 
on an individual in regeneration, is sufficient in allowing for God’s activity in one’s life. It is the infusion of 
the Holy Spirit in regeneration that brings about the change of conversion, and not any reasoned efforts, 
etc. 20-24. “When Edwards talks about infusion and the like, what he is referring to is not the infusion of 
righteousness that the Westminster divines spoke against, but rather the experience of the new creation, the 
experience of having Christ in us, and us being in him. This supernatural event takes place when someone 
becomes a Christian–that is what Edwards is describing–and it is what rescues justification from the dusty 
tomes of the law court exegesis to the living entity that is in biblical thought, and in the experience of 
millions.” 14. See WJE 13:171, 242; 20:328, 366. I believe Moody’s criticisms of a Catholic reading of the 
term infusion in Edwards are merited. It is difficult to see how Edwards would have arrived at such an 
understanding of infusion, given his context. 
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works or salvation without works.”45 The gracious, unmerited work of the Spirit is that 
which empowers an individual to faith and good works. Conrad Cherry points out that 
although based solely on God’s grace, faith is “a leap into new manhood provided by the 
Holy Spirit who gives old human powers new or faithful exercises.”46 To suggest that this 
view of the work of the Spirit results in passivity is to miscomprehend the nature of the 
Spirit’s work of renewal and recreation. This will be explored in more detail in the section 
below on the authentication of conversion. 
As Samuel Logan puts it, for Edwards, in the tradition of Luther and Calvin, 
“there is only one cause of justification and that is the sovereign grace of God. But there 
are numerous conditions of justification, including faith and evangelical obedience.” For 
Edwards “it is faith alone by which the individual is united to Christ” but it is God alone 
who causes justification.47  
 
The Nature of the Change of Conversion 
 
For Edwards, the crucial element in the nature of the change that takes place at 
conversion is the disposition, or the tendency of one’s central orientation and habits. 
There is a fundamental change in the disposition of the individual. “Hence we learn that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Bezzant’s words are worth quoting in their entire context. “If those dubbed ‘Arminian’ or ‘Latitudinarian’ 
were prone to collapse the transcendent into the immanent without remainder, and thereby to highlight 
natural capacity within human subjectivity and to marginalize the ability of divine grace to intrude upon an 
individual’s life, those known as ‘antinomian’ were more likely to fall into the opposite error of assuming 
that spiritual ends could never be achieved through physical or natural means, stressing the arbitrariness of 
divine initiative and consequent human passivity. Edwards railed against both movements and their 
theological underpinnings, and through his sermons, discourses, and miscellanies, promoted justification by 
grace, the righteousness of Christ, and the sovereign sanctifying work of the Spirit, which cumulatively 
allowed no room for either salvation through works or salvation without works, a summation of the Arminian 
and antinomian challenges respectively.” Rhys Bezzant, “The Gospel of Justification and Edwards’s Social 
Vision,” in Edwards and Justification, 81. 
46 Cherry, Reappraisal, 33. 
47 Samuel T. Logan, Jr., “Justification And Evangelical Obedience,” in Edwards and Justification, 95-127, 100. 
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the prime alteration that is made in conversion, that which is first and the foundation of 
all, is the alteration of the temper and disposition and spirit of the mind…the nature of 
the soul being thus changed, it admits divine light.”48 
As Gerald McDermott observes, “For Edwards, the essence of all being is 
disposition or habit.”49 This dispositional change, then, is central.50 It is not merely a 
matter of the understanding, but reflects the heart and will – the whole orientation of the 
person.51 In somewhat Augustinian fashion, Edwards sees the disposition as either 
oriented toward God or against God. As his treatise The Freedom of the Will illustrates, he 
sees every individual in the unregenerate state as being both free and inclined against 
God. Only grace can intervene in such a situation. 
If one’s disposition is inclined against God, then it is only by God’s gracious 
activity that it can be turned toward him. It is only by God’s supernatural influence that 
one can gain what Edwards terms a “sense of the heart” and come to taste and know in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Jonathan Edwards, WJE 13:462. 
49 Gerald R. McDermott, Jonathan Edwards Confronts the Gods (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
133. 
50 E. Brooks Holifield writes, “Like the Puritan Thomas Shepard, whom he often cited, Edwards thought of 
saving grace as the indwelling and activity of the Spirit issuing in the formation of a new habit or 
disposition.” “Edwards as Theologian,” in Cambridge Companion, 144-61, 151. 
51 There is disagreement as to whether the disposition should be understood in ontological terms, as part of 
the very being of a person. Sang Hyun Lee argues that “habit or disposition, for Edwards, is not mere 
custom or regularity of events. Habit is an active and ontologically abiding power that possesses a mode of 
realness even when it is not in exercise. Habit, for Edwards, is also a relational principle–that is, a general 
law that governs the manner or character of actual actions and events.” The Philosophical Theology of Jonathan 
Edwards (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), 7. Lee asserts that this dispositional ontology 
replaces traditional metaphysics in Edwards, and provides the central unity of his thought. For a dissenting 
view, see Stephen R. Holmes, “Does Jonathan Edwards Use a Dispositional Ontology? A Response to Sang 
Hyun Lee,” in Jonathan Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, ed. Paul Helm and Oliver D. Crisp (Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), 99-114. Holmes argues that Lee’s book “is simply wrong in its main 
thesis.” 99. He adds, “My fundamental problem with Lee’s position is that I find his account of God, or 
rather his account of Edwards’s doctrine of God, very difficult to believe in… for reasons of history: I 
cannot imagine Edwards, with the theological commitments he held to, coming up with anything like the 
doctrines that Lee tells us were at the heart of his system, and I believe that most if not all of the evidence 
Lee offers for his reconstruction can be explained as, or more, adequately by a less implausible account of 
what Edwards thought. Lee pays great attention to the Edwards’s text, but little to his context, and if the 
reconstruction he offers is adequate to the former, it is my contention that it is wholly inadequate to the 
latter.” 100. Both, however, would concur that the disposition involves more than simply the will, but some 
combination of elements that involve fundamental aspects of one’s being. 
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deeper, salvific way God’s “excellencies.” We are powerless to bring about this conversion 
of ourselves. For Edwards, the rationalists, the Arminians, and the enthusiasts are 
mistaken, as the rationalists look to their reason, the Arminians to their works, and the 
enthusiasts to their personal experiences, but none involve a change of the heart or 
disposition.52 Conversion is the change in the disposition from one oriented against God 
to one oriented toward God. In conversion one becomes “quite another man… born 
again, created over a second time,”53 resulting in both humility and great joy. 
A central metaphor used by Edwards to describe how this change in disposition is 
wrought is that of light.54 “This light is such as effectually influences the inclination, and 
changes the nature of the soul… It will turn the heart to God as the fountain of good, and 
to choose him for the only portion.”55 This light is not derived through any natural means, 
but is “of a different nature” and “immediately imparted to the soul by God.”56 It is not derived 
from the imagination, nor does it result in new truths outside of Scripture, but rather it 
deepens one’s understanding of the Word of God. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 See Edwards’ 1752 sermon, “True Grace Distinguished from the Experience of Devils,” in Sermons and 
Discourses 1743-1758, Vol. 25 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards, ed. William H. Kimnach (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2006), 608-40. William Breitenbach notes, “in it he continued his attempt to reduce 
Arminianism and Antinomianism to a common denominator by showing that all the attainments of legal 
and evangelical hypocrites fall short of true grace because they do not involve a change of heart.” “Piety 
and Moralism,” in American Experience, 184. 
53 Jonathan Edwards, Sermons and Discourses 1723-1729, vol. 14 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards, ed. Kenneth 
P. Minkema (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 81. From the sermon “A Spiritual 
Understanding of Divine Things Denied to the Unregenerate.” 
54 Edwards writes in his sermon “A Spiritual Understanding of Divine Things Denied to the Unregenerate” 
that “of all the similitudes that are made use of in Scripture to describe to us this spiritual understanding, 
light is that which doth most fully represent it and is oftenest used.” WJE 14:77. George Marsden also 
notes, ”the central theme for understanding Edwards… is encapsulated in his phrase, ‘the divine and 
supernatural light.’ The hub around which all his thought and action revolves is the question of whether 
people–himself and others–have been given the regenerating grace to see that light.” Marsden, “The Quest 
for the Historical Edwards” in Jonathan Edwards at Home and Abroad, ed. David Kling and Douglas Sweeney 
(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2003), 3-15, 13. 
55 WJE 17:424. Mark Valeri also notes in his introduction to the “Divine Light” sermon, “This [divine] 
light is not only morally pleasing and joyful but the means of conversion and salvation.” WJE 17:405. See 
also 40-44. 
56 WJE 17:410. 
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It is thus through the Spirit, and not through any natural capacity, that this 
change in disposition and new awareness occurs.57 However, according to Conrad 
Cherry, for Edwards “new faculties are not given in illumination, but a new basis is given 
to the mind from which the natural faculties operate in a new way. The new operation of 
the faculties is none other than the affective knowledge characteristic of the ‘sense of the 
heart.’”58 This is a point on which there is considerable range of opinion, from Perry 
Miller on the one extreme, to Cherry, to Paul Helm.59 
For Miller “conversion is a perception, a form of apprehension.”60 “In Edwards’ 
‘sense of the heart’ there is nothing transcendental; it is rather a sensuous apprehension of 
the total situation.”61 The spiritual sense is contiguous with and built upon everyday 
sensing and experience; it is a sensible grace of deepening awareness of the faculties 
common to all people, an extension of the natural. 
Cherry was the first to take significant issue with Miller’s view, arguing that 
Edwards’ sense of the supernatural in divine illumination, and his doctrinal Calvinism, 
had been ignored in Miller’s interpretation. The spiritual sense cannot be arrived at 
naturally, but only given by the Holy Spirit. It is beyond natural abilities and not under 
natural powers. As Michael McClymond observes, “the divine light is always a gift of 
grace and never a simple human power or prerogative.”62 Others, like Paul Helm and 
James Hoopes, argue in even stronger terms than Cherry that this sense is not only not 
arrived at naturally, but requires other than our natural faculties or senses, a “sixth sense” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 “The same Spirit who supplies the divine truth to be known simultaneously provides the possibility for 
knowing it.” Cherry, Reappraisal, 29. 
58 Cherry, Reappraisal, 30. 
59 See McClymond, Encounters, 13-14 for more on this. 
60 Perry Miller, Jonathan Edwards, 139. 
61 Perry Miller, “Jonathan Edwards on the Sense of the Heart,” Harvard Theological Review 41 (1948), 127-28, 
as quoted in McClymond, Encounters, 12. 
62 Encounters, 13. 
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given by God resulting in a different type of knowledge.63 The epistemological base of the 
believer is then fundamentally different than that of the unbeliever. 
In analyzing the nature of this change Edwards can be difficult to parse. What is 
clear is that a view of this change as an extension of the natural understanding such as 
Miller undertakes does not adequately reflect Edwards’ thought on the matter. The 
changes wrought by the Spirit in conversion “not only differ from what is natural, and 
from everything that natural men experience, in degree and circumstances; but also in 
kind; and are of a nature vastly more excellent.”64 Clearly for Edwards a supernatural 
change is occurring in the process of conversion. “The special work of the Spirit of God, 
or that which is peculiar to the saints, consists in giving the sensible knowledge of the 
things of religion, … not by assisting natural principles, but by infusing something 
supernatural.”65 
What is less clear is the precise nature of that change. At times Edwards can use 
very strong language regarding this change that seems to indicate the notion of a sixth 
sense or change of faculties. Edwards insists that a change of nature occurs, as can be seen 
in the seventh positive sign of Religious Affections.66 In his “Treatise on Grace,” he notes 
that in Scripture conversion is compared to resurrection, and is “represented as a work of 
creation. When God creates, he does not merely establish and perfect the things which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Hoopes comments that “in Edwards’s theory the new willful feeling or sense of the heart in conversion 
also constitutes new understanding, new intellectual knowledge.” James Hoopes, “Jonathan Edwards’s 
Religious Psychology,” Journal of American History 69, no.4 (March 1983), 849-865, 857. Hoopes is careful, 
however, not to oversimplify the notion of a sixth sense. In Edwards support for this view can be seen in 
Religious Affections in a number of places where Edwards seems to see in conversion a supernatural 
experience that entails a kind of sixth sense. For examples see WJE 2:197f., 206, 210, 259f., 271. 
64 WJE 2:205. 
65 WJE 18:464 (Misc. 782). Elsewhere he writes, “it plainly appears, that God’s implanting that spiritual 
supernatural sense which has been spoken of, makes a great change in a man.” WJE 2:275. 
66 That sign reads, “Another thing, wherein gracious affections are distinguished from others, is, that they 
are attended with a change of nature.” WJE 2:340. “They make an alteration in the very nature of the soul.” 
340. See also 2:395f. 
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were made before, but makes wholly and immediately something entirely new, either out 
of nothing, or out of that which was perfectly void of any such nature.”67 In conversion 
“there is no medium between being dead and alive.” There is no continuum. It is a 
radical change. Conversion as “new birth” and as the restoration of sight to the blind 
points to the same biblical reality.68 At one point in Religious Affections he even suggests 
directly that the change wrought by the Spirit “is often in Scripture compared to the 
giving a new sense.”69 
Perhaps the confusion comes from equating the notion of a new or sixth sense 
with that of a new faculty. Edwards distinguishes between these options, arguing for the 
former but not the latter. In spite of the strong language above, he says as much directly 
at one point in Religious Affections. “This new spiritual sense, and the new dispositions that 
attend it, are no new faculties, but are new principles of nature. I use the word ‘principles,’ 
for want of a word of a more determinate signification.”70 Rather than a new faculty, he 
calls it “a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul” that provides for “a new kind of 
exercises” of the existing faculties.71 The change then involves more than the elevation of 
the natural faculties, as it allows them to be used in ways entirely unlike those of the 
unregenerate. But at the same time, the metaphysical or substantial structure of an 
individual is not superseded, but rather reoriented to divine things. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 WJE 21:159. 
68 WJE 21:160. 
69 “The spiritual perceptions which a sanctified and spiritual person has, are not only diverse from all that 
natural men have, after the manner that the ideas or perceptions of the same sense may differ one from 
another, but rather as the ideas and sensations of different senses do differ. Hence the work of the Spirit of 
God in regeneration is often in Scripture compared to the giving a new sense.” WJE 2:206. See also 210, 
259f., 271. 
70 WJE 2:206. 
71 WJE 2:206. The quotes in their contexts read as follows: “This new spiritual sense is not a new faculty of 
understanding, but it is a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the 
same faculty of understanding. So that new holy disposition of heart that attends this new sense, is not a 
new faculty of will, but a foundation laid in the nature of the soul, for a new kind of exercises of the same 
faculty of will.” 206. 
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Kyle Strobel suggests that this change should be understood primarily in 
relational rather than metaphysical terms. By conversion the individual is brought into 
communion with the divine life through the work of Christ by the Spirit. “This 
participation is not mediated in a metaphysical register, as if humanity were somehow to 
merge into the essence of God, but is fundamentally a relational notion.”72 This provides 
the context for Edwards’ language of partaking in the life of Christ and the Father that he 
uses in Religious Affections and elsewhere, such as when he writes that those outside of 
Christ are not “partakers in the divine nature” since “being partakers of the divine nature 
is spoken of, not only as peculiar to the saints, but as one of the highest privileges of the 
saints.”73 
If the change of conversion does not result in a new faculty in the regenerate 
individual, then does the change, as Helm and others contend, still result in a new 
epistemological basis for that individual? Edwards certainly seems to suggest this, for 
example, in Religious Affections. “There is a new inward perception or sensation of their 
minds, entirely different in its nature and kind, from anything that ever their minds were 
the subjects of before they were sanctified.”74 Stephen Yarbrough and John Adams 
support this reading. They write, “What, to Edwards, was the difference between the 
regenerate and unregenerate?… For Edwards, the question was absolutely fundamental. 
Saints did not simply disagree with sinners: they saw differently, the felt differently, they 
thought differently. In short, they lived in a different world altogether.”75 McClymond and 
McDermott arrive at the same conclusion, noting that “the experience of conversion is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Kyle C. Strobel, “By Word and Spirit: Jonathan Edwards on Redemption, Justification, and 
Regeneration,” in Edwards and Justification, 48. 
73 WJE 21:155-56. 
74 WJE 2:205. 
75 Stephen R. Yarbrough and John C. Adams, Delightful Conviction: Jonathan Edwards and the Rhetoric of 
Conversion, Great American Orators, No. 20 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993), xiii. 
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foundational to Edwards’s religious epistemology. Believers are able to perceive a holy 
beauty in God that is invisible to nonbelievers, and in this sense believers and 
nonbelievers live in two different universes.”76  
One can see an illustration of how this new epistemology works itself out in 
Religious Affections, where Edwards discusses how God’s grace can appear lovely to a 
person in two ways, good for oneself, or good in itself. Only the saints perceive the latter. 
The spiritual sense of the heart discussed in the first sign is concerned particularly with 
the ability to detect God’s holiness, whereas natural man only seems to comprehend 
God’s natural attributes.77 Furthermore, not everything experienced by a spiritual person 
is new and entirely different from the experiences of a natural man. For example, two 
persons might both love a fruit, but one lacks taste. While the one loves the fruit for its 
beauty, color, etc., the other can taste its sweetness as well. So there are aspects of their 
love that are common, but the person with taste has also a sort of experience and 
knowledge of the fruit entirely absent from the person without taste.78 A natural man may 
have new and unusual experiences, even extraordinary ones, but these will still be 
influences based on natural principles, and quite different from those insights and 
experiences gained through a renewed, spiritual sense.79 
In my view of the best reading of Edwards, McClymond and McDermott 
probably get it right when writing, contra Helm, that “the mental breakthrough of grace, 
or ‘divine and supernatural light,’ operates in and through the natural sense faculties, and 
so grace does not destroy or bypass nature but perfects it.”80 The new epistemological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Theology of Edwards, 317. 
77 WJE 2:262-63. 
78 WJE 2:208-209. 
79 WJE 2:209-10. 
80 Theology of Edwards, 318. 
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basis is built not on the replacement of or addition of faculties, but by their perfection. It 
is indeed a supernatural change, as fallen individuals lack any natural path to the 
regeneration of their fallen faculty. It could never come about without the work of the 
Holy Spirit. One might say that what is involved is the supernatural use of the natural 
senses by the activity of the Holy Spirit within regenerate individuals. “‘Tis the Spirit itself 
that is the only principle of true virtue in the heart. So that to be truly virtuous, is the 
same as to be spiritual.”81 
It is important to note that the changes that result from conversion are not only 
initiated by the Holy Spirit, but also constantly maintained by the Spirit.82 The very 
essence of the change is in some respects only the addition of the life of the Spirit dwelling 
within the person, transforming the use of that person’s faculties to new ends and 
capacities. The Spirit does not make a change in a person and then it is done. The Spirit’s 
activity is ongoing, and the new sense of the heart is founded in the Spirit’s activity and 
dwelling within the regenerate individual’s heart. It is not a static condition or change; it 
is always and ever dependent on this Spirit. “All succeeding acts of grace, must be as 
immediately and to all intents and purposes, as much from the immediate acting of the 
Spirit of God on the soul as the first; and if God should take away his Spirit out of the soul, 
all habits and acts of grace would of themselves cease as immediately as light ceases in a 
room when a candle is carried out.”83 This, too, is consistent with the notion that there is 
no actual change of substance or of faculties within the regenerate person. One’s changed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 WJE 21:197. “There is no other principle of grace in the soul than the very Holy Ghost dwelling in the 
soul and acting there as a vital principle.” WJE 21:196. 
82 “All grace and goodness in the hearts of the saints is entirely from God: and they are universally and 
immediately dependent on him for it.” WJE 2:342. 
83 WJE 21:196. He continues, “and no man has an habit of grace dwelling in him any otherwise than as he 
has the Holy Spirit dwelling in him as his temple, and acting in union with his natural faculties after the 
manner of a vital principle. So that when they act grace, ‘tis, in the language of the Apostle, ‘not they, but 
Christ living in them.’” WJE 21:196. 
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disposition in conversion is only the dynamic reality of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, 
and not a new disposition in the sense of an ontological change in one’s nature apart from 
the Spirit.84 Through this indwelling the believer is brought to union with the living 
Christ and the divine life.85 
Finally, also noteworthy is that for Edwards this new, radical, vital spiritual 
principle brought by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit into the regenerate soul at 
conversion is “radically but one… but one in its root,” regardless of the various 
manifestations of it (repentance, humility, etc.). This holy principle “is the essence and 
sum of all grace… the grand Christian virtue.” The principle is that of “divine love.”86 It 
is for Edwards the “essence of all Christianity.”87 This principle is, as Peter Toon 
describes it, “the summary of all grace, holiness, and virtue, and a complete change from 
everything that is inherent in the soul.”88 It fundamentally reorients one’s disposition 
toward a “relish of the supreme excellency of the divine nature, inclining the heart to God 
as the chief good.”89 It reflects the simplicity of God’s very essence. 
In sum, the nature of the change of conversion is, simply, the Holy Spirit living 
within the believer. I will let Edwards himself summarize in closing this section. The 
saints 
are not only partakers of a nature that may in some sense be called 
divine, because ‘tis conformed to the nature of God; but the very 
Deity does in some sense dwell in them. That holy and divine love 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 “He gives his Spirit to be united to the faculties of the soul, and to dwell there after the manner of a 
principle of nature; so that the soul, in being indued [sic] with grace, is indued with a new nature.” WJE 
2:342. 
85 “In the soul where Christ savingly is, there he lives. He don’t only live without it, so as violently to actuate 
it; but he lives in it; so that that also is alive.” WJE 2:342. 
86 WJE 21:166. 
87 WJE 21:168. 
88 Peter Toon, Born Again: A Biblical and Theological Study of Regeneration (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 
1987), 147. 
89 WJE 21:173.  
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dwells in their hearts, and is so united to human faculties that ‘tis 
itself become a principle of new nature. That love, which is the 
very native temper and spirit of God, so dwells in their souls that it 
exerts itself in its own nature in the exercise of those faculties after 
the manner of a natural or vital principle in them.90  
 
 
The Role of Knowledge and the Intellect in Conversion  
 
Edwards speaks to the subject of knowledge often and substantively. One can, in 
fact, be overwhelmed by the mass of references to knowledge spread throughout his 
corpus of writings. Clearly, the role of knowledge and the intellect are of special 
importance to Edwards. In general, while Edwards holds to conversion as a supernatural 
experience, and that in it there comes a sort of sixth sense providing perceptions of God’s 
glory, and an actual change in one’s nature, he also holds strongly to a necessary role for 
the understanding and knowledge in the process of conversion. In this section I explore 
the complex and at times ambiguous relation of knowledge and the understanding to 
conversion, together with some related themes, with particular reference to Edwards’ 
sermon “A Divine and Supernatural Light.”91 I also consider Edwards’ views on the 
understanding and knowledge in relation to his Puritan predecessors. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 WJE 21:194-95. 
91 Unlike the will, in approaching Edwards’ view of the understanding no one great work of Edwards 
clarifies all his thought. A variety of primary works will be referenced in this section, but Edwards’ sermon, 
“A Divine and Supernatural Light” (WJE 17:408-26) will have a prominent place as a summary of his 
thought in this area. Many acknowledge its representations of Edwards’ central foci. On its importance, 
Harold Simonson writes, “No sermon contains more of the essential Edwards than does ‘A Divine and 
Supernatural Light.’ Perry Miller does not exaggerate in saying that within this sermon ‘the whole of 
Edwards’ system is contained in miniature.’” Theologian of the Heart (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing 
Co., 1974), 37. Mark Valeri notes that “in A Divine and Supernatural Light, Edwards condensed much of a 
decade of preaching, rumination, and private writing on the nature of spiritual knowledge into a single, 
remarkable effort.” WJE 17:405. He notes that themes from this 1733 sermon appear as early as 1723 in 
sermons, and also later in Religious Affections. “In sum, his expression of the nature of spiritual knowledge in 
this 1733 lecture became an integral part of his theology.” 406. 
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First one must consider the range of meanings in Edwards’ use of the term 
understanding. It is important to recognize that for Edwards there are two types of 
understanding or knowledge, “there is a twofold understanding or knowledge of good… 
merely speculative or notional” and “the sense of the heart.”92  There is speculative or 
natural knowledge (he sometimes terms this ratiocination) and there is sensible or spiritual 
knowledge. “There is a distinction to be made between a mere notional understanding, 
wherein the mind only beholds things in the exercise of a speculative faculty; and the 
sense of the heart, wherein the mind don’t only speculate and behold, but relishes and 
feels.”93 Knowledge that is merely propositional is of the former type. To know in the 
spiritual sense always involves the latter, affective type of knowledge. It is in this latter 
sense that we perceive beauty. Further consideration of this latter form of knowledge, or 
sense of the heart, will be taken up below. Here I will reflect more carefully on the place 
of this first, speculative form of knowledge. 
For Edwards the role of the understanding in the speculative or notional sense in 
conversion is limited. The merely speculative reason of rationalism is inadequate as a 
source for divine knowledge. Edwards finds it important to stress this point against the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 WJE 17:413. In the sermon “The Importance and Advantage of a Thorough Knowledge of Divine 
Truth,” he writes, “There are two kinds of knowledge of the things of divinity, viz. speculative and practical, or 
in other terms, natural and spiritual. The former remains only in the head. No other faculty but the 
understanding is concerned in it.” Jonathan Edwards, Sermons and Discourses 1739-1742, ed. Harry S. Stout 
and Nathan O. Hatch, with Kyle P. Farley, Vol. 22 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2003), 87. “The latter rests not entirely in the head… but the heart is concerned in it: it 
principally consists in the sense of the heart. The mere intellect, without the heart, the will or the inclination, 
is not the seat of it.” 87. See also 81. This twofold view is seen again in Religious Affections. “There is a 
distinction to be made between a mere notional understanding, wherein the mind only beholds things in the 
exercise of a speculative faculty; and the sense of the heart, wherein the mind don’t only speculate and 
behold, but relishes and feels.” WJE 2:272. Adding to the confusion in Edwards’ use of the term 
understanding is that he uses it and other occasional synonyms in different ways at different times. In the 
above quote the word knowledge better represents what is meant by the broader category of understanding, 
and the word understanding is equivalent more to ratiocination (see below). Elsewhere the term understanding is 
used more broadly to reflect both a process of rational thought and a deeper, heartfelt understanding. 
93 WJE 2:272. 
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encroaching British deism of John Toland, Matthew Tindal, and others who argue that 
by natural reason alone we can discover how to do what God requires for this life 
(morality) and the next (salvation), as well as some New England clergy such as Charles 
Chauncy who elevate the role of reason to unjustified levels.94 
Edwards also, against the deists, claims reason independently fails to provide the 
knowledge of the true God based on the history of the world. Reason has never succeeded 
in reforming the world, even in periods such as ancient Greece when reason was lifted 
highest. Proof of this is also found in the religions and idols of the heathens, including the 
Greeks, who even at their highest points of reason failed to discover and worship the true 
God. Important as well is that reason never showed humanity how to be reconciled to 
their Creator. And reason has not demonstrated God’s excellency or beauty, seen in 
Christ.95 Even when reason obtains propositionally correct knowledge, it is a knowledge 
that lacks power and inwardness. It is, as Gerald McDermott comments, “too shallow.”96 
He adds, “Edwards came to the conclusion that while fallen reason can prove religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 George Marsden notes, “Underlying the differences between Edwards and Chauncy on the awakening 
was a crucial philosophical issue. ‘ The plain truth is,’ wrote Chauncy, ‘an enlightened mind, and not raised 
affections, ought always be the guide of those who call themselves men; and this, in the affairs of religion, as 
well as other things.’” George M. Marsden, Jonathan Edwards: A Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2003), 281. McDermott argues that deism is Edwards’ central opponent. “I argue in these chapters that 
Edwards considered deism to be Christianity’s most formidable opponent, and that the better part of his 
theological project was a direct or indirect response to it.” Edwards Confronts the Gods, 7. He writes that deism 
“was the religion of the Enlightenment” (34), and for Edwards “a major, perhaps the principal, ideological 
enemy of Reformed Christianity in the eighteenth century.” 51. Edwards “recognized, perhaps more 
acutely than any other American thinker in the eighteenth century, that if Christian thinking seriously 
entertained the most elemental deist presumptions, the Reformed faith would collapse. To him deism 
epitomized the most pernicious philosophical and theological trends of his day.” 34. He also believed it to 
be a serious temptation for colonialists. So he set his entire career against it. But though his arguments were 
powerful and sophisticated, deism often set the agenda. 
95 “By this sight of the moral beauty of divine things, is seen the beauty of the way of salvation by Christ: for 
that consists in the beauty of the moral perfections of God.” WJE 2:274. 
96 “While for deists knowledge was no more than a matter of the intellect, for Edwards it reached down to 
the most basic drives of the human self… it [the deist view of knowledge] was too shallow, he charged, 
because it too easily divorced head from heart, reason from the affections, and understanding from 
experience.” Edwards Confronts the Gods, 56. 
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propositions to be true, it cannot make them seem real.”97 Furthermore, reason fails even 
in arriving at propositionally correct knowledge of God, as such spiritual knowledge is, at 
its roots, a knowledge imparted as a free gift of God in revelation.”98  
Thus this speculative form of understanding is inadequate for two reasons. First, 
quantitatively it is inadequate because it cannot gather enough information critical to 
Christian life and divine realities. Divine truths rely on God’s self-disclosure. Mark Valeri 
writes in his introductory comments on the “Divine Light” sermon, “Because revelation 
comes only from God’s self-disclosure to the elect, natural reason or any other human 
means alone cannot be said to convey spiritual knowledge.”99 Reason never truly 
comprehends the divine or gives true spiritual knowledge. So Edwards writes, “Christian 
divinity, properly so called, is not evident by the light of nature; it depends on 
revelation.”100 
Second, qualitatively reason or speculative understanding is inadequate because of 
the quality of the information that it does provide. Speculative reason fails when it works 
independently because it is always only a partial knowledge, as that of one on the outside 
looking in, and not an affectional, willful knowledge. “The light of nature teaches no truth 
as it is in Jesus.”101 Divine knowledge cannot be accessed from without. The study of 
Christian divinity is “the doctrine of living to God by Christ.”102 It is heart-felt, willful, and 
relational. One’s assent to orthodox Christian doctrines does not make one a Christian. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 McDermott, Edwards Confronts the Gods, 65. He later adds, “all knowledge of God short of regeneration, 
though that knowledge is propositionally correct, is nevertheless fundamentally distorted. For without a 
vision of Christ’s beauty, which comes in regeneration, nothing is seen truly.” 66. 
98 Simonson describes Edwards’ view this way. “Despite a finely-honed speculative faculty, natural man 
cannot ‘achieve’ spiritual knowledge for the profoundly simple reason that such knowledge, instead of being 
reached by man, is given, imparted, revealed by God.” Theologian of the Heart, 39. 
99 WJE 17:405. 
100 WJE 22:86. 
101 WJE 22:86. 
102 WJE 22:86. 
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Honey is not known fully by a description of its sweetness but must be tasted. Likewise 
describing the face of one’s beloved does not compare with seeing one’s beloved through 
loving eyes. One’s relationship to truths critically affects one’s ability to know them with a 
sense of the heart. One’s involvement in these truths fundamentally affects one’s 
understanding of them. The Christian life does not consist of the head alone. William 
Breitenbach notes that Jonathan Edwards “asserted [in Distinguishing Marks] that holiness 
has its seat in the heart or will rather than in the understanding, and that holy affections 
are therefore the substance of true religion… conversion is more than just the 
enlightenment of the reason by doctrinal truth.”103 Edwards argues that it is not the 
extent of one’s speculative knowledge, but the intensity with which they are known that is 
critical. This intensity is only present as one experiences the truth.104 
The notional sense of reason, or what Edwards sometimes terms “ratiocination,” 
cannot stand alone and do the necessary work of grace in changing the disposition of the 
heart. Assenting to the truth of doctrines is not analogous to a deeper, heart conviction of 
the truth of those doctrines. It is in that deeper sense of the heart that saving faith lies. 
Such a faith can only be wrought by God’s supernatural activity in opening the heart to 
the divine light. The resulting knowledge is “entirely different in nature and kind” from 
speculative knowledge.105 “‘Tis not a thing that belongs to reason, to see the beauty and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 Breitenbach, “Piety and Moralism,” in American Experience, 181. 
104 In his sermon on I Cor. 2:14, “A Spiritual Understanding of Divine Things Denied to the Unregenerate, 
likely composed in the fall of 1723, Edwards writes, “The knowledge of a thing is not in proportion to the 
extensiveness of our notions, or number of circumstances known, only; but it consists chiefly in the 
intensiveness of the idea. Thus it is not he that has heard a long description of the sweetness of honey that 
can be said to have the greatest understanding of it, but he that has tasted.” WJE 14:76. The editor of this 
volume, Kenneth Minkema, notes that this sermon “anticipates in nearly every aspect A Divine and 
Supernatural Light,” originally given in 1733. 67. Edwards’ thoughts regarding ideas are likely influenced by 
John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, with which Edwards was familiar. 
105 WJE 17:417. “Though natural men may have considerable knowledge in divinity, yet it has not this 
effect upon them. They may read and study, for hours together, and leave off with the same heart as they 
had when they began, and carry the same temper and disposition.” WJE 14:81. “The knowledge of the 
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loveliness of spiritual things; it is not a speculative thing, but depends on the sense of the 
heart.”106 This deeper knowledge is a life-changing knowledge, “above all others sweet 
and joyful,” bringing about holiness in ways speculative knowledge never can.107 “This 
spiritual knowledge transforms the heart, the other doth not.… The knowledge that he 
has is so substantial, so inward, and so affecting, that it has quite transformed the soul and 
put a new nature into the man.”108 
Given these limitations for the speculative form of reasoning one must be clear 
that for Edwards conversion is not a matter of persuasion. Speculative reasoning cannot 
of itself transform one’s heart or disposition, or open an individual to the power even of 
truths which it may describe accurately. Edwards resists any reduction of conversion to 
some kind of moral transformation via persuasive rational arguments. Rational 
persuasion is not in and of itself transformative in the manner previously described by 
which conversion changes an individual. The central thesis of Stephen Yarbrough’s and 
John Adams’ book, Delightful Conviction and the Rhetoric of Conversion, argues this very point. 
“Edwards never intended for his sermons to persuade their audiences, if persuasion 
means the process, described since antiquity, by which rhetors seek common ground with 
their audiences and then work from that base toward mutually affirmable goals, ideas, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
natural man about spiritual things, is very much like the knowledge of those that are born blind have of 
colors from the descriptions of them, or one born deaf has of sounds: but the spiritual understanding, of 
those who have their eyes open and their ears unstopped. ‘Tis a sight of spiritual things.” WJE 14:77. 
106 WJE 17:422. 
107 “This light, and this only, has its fruit in an universal holiness of life. No merely notional or speculative 
understanding of the doctrines of religion, will ever bring to this,” which “reaches to the bottom of the 
heart.” WJE 17:424. 
108 WJE 14:81. 
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and attitudes. Edwards’ primary assumption – that an absolute difference separated the 
regenerate from the unregenerate – prevented his seeking to persuade in this sense.”109 
Edwards’ views on the two-fold role of the understanding were not novel. He was 
drawing on a Puritan heritage that had come before him. John Smith, in his introductory 
essay to Religious Affections, notes Edwards’ extensive use of the writings of Thomas 
Shepard (1605-1649). Shepard held that ordinary understanding was not adequate for 
saving faith. Knowledge of the Bible and theology was contrasted to a living knowledge 
from the enlightenment of the Spirit.110 “The stress placed upon direct apprehension 
through the understanding by Edwards and Shepard places them in the company of 
Sibbes, Owen, Goodwin, and other seventeenth-century English Puritans. Shepard held 
that the decisive difference between the wise and foolish virgins lay in the nature of their 
understanding; the wise owe their wisdom to divine illumination.”111 
A further example of this distinction is seen in Thomas Hooker, whom Brooks 
Holifield paraphrases in noting that “to know God was not merely to entertain correct 
thoughts; the true knowledge of God was a passionate knowledge, a form of knowing that 
embraced the heart and will.”112 Holifield goes on to note the role of the Spirit in Calvin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Delightful Conviction, xiv-xv. A number of scholars make similar points. Norman S. Fiering notes that for 
Edwards “regeneration was not solely or even primarily a matter of intellectual persuasion.” “Will and 
Intellect in the New England Mind,” William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series 29, no. 4 (October 1972), 556. 
McClymond and McDermott write that the change of regeneration “was not a mere persuasion of the will. 
Instead, the self’s alteration commenced with a change of nature.” Theology of Edwards, 270. E. Brooks 
Holifield argues that “Edwards aligned himself with Catholic Thomists and earlier Calvinists [e.g. Petrus 
van Mastricht] who contended that grace moved the will ‘physically,’ that is, immediately rather than 
through moral suasion directed at the intellect.” “Edwards as Theologian,” in Cambridge Companion to 
Edwards, 150. 
110 Brooks Holifield expands on this further. “Thomas Shepard in Cambridge argued that a speculative 
knowledge alone–or a ‘notional’ or ‘discursive’ knowledge that satisfied the understanding without altering 
the will–remained insufficient. The aim of divinity required the enlightening of the understanding, but it 
served ‘chiefly’ as ‘the art and rule of the will.’ It taught how ‘to live to God.’” Theology in America, 26. 
111 John E. Smith in WJE 2:55. 
112 Theology in America, 34. For more see Hooker, The Unbelievers Preparing for Christ (London: John Mocock, 
1654), 42. 
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in making the Scripture the Word, and John Cotton’s distinguishing of two types of 
theological knowledge – believing that God exists compared to believing “on” God. The 
former was an act of the understanding, the latter the act of the will that required an 
altered disposition by the Spirit. 
Early New England Puritan ministers “agreed that the deepest knowledge of God 
came only through the motions of the Spirit that elicited a true faith. A true knowledge of 
God was no simple matter of the understanding.”113 Though Edwards’ views are often 
more nuanced and use these traditions critically, for Edwards, as for his predecessors, not 
reason nor even the Bible, in and of themselves, are sufficient for this deeper 
understanding.114 
If reason is not adequate in its role in conversion, Edwards typically still argues 
that it plays a necessary and positive role. “Holy affections are not heat without light; but 
evermore arise from some information of the understanding, some spiritual instruction 
that the mind receives, some light or actual knowledge. The child of God is graciously 
affected, because he sees and understands something more of divine things than he did 
before, more of God or Christ and of the glorious things exhibited in the gospel.”115 One 
of Edwards’ concerns is, of course, to preserve a role for reason in the face of the extremes 
of the revivals.116 Against the excesses of those who claimed direct revelations of God, 
casting reason and Scripture aside, Edwards says that God’s revelation does not occur in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 Holifield, Theology in America, 33-34. 
114 “A person can’t have spiritual light without the Word. But that don’t argue, that the Word properly 
causes that light… That notion that there is a Christ, and that Christ is holy and gracious, is conveyed to 
the mind by the Word of God: but the sense of the excellency of Christ by reason of that holiness and grace, 
is nevertheless immediately the work of the Holy Spirit.” WJE 17:416-17. Without a sense of the heart 
Scripture becomes a dry, dead letter. 
115 WJE 2:266. 
116 Edwards was even critical of Whitfield in this regard, as Marsden demonstrates. “For Edwards these 
ecstatic experiences had to be disciplined by the rational mind, informed by Scripture. The point was 
crucial. If everyone who had intense spiritual experiences could claim special messages from God, there 
would be no way of checking all sorts of errors and delusions.” Life, 212. 
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a vacuum. “There can be no love without knowledge… The heart cannot be set upon an 
object of which there is no idea in the understanding.”117 For this reason not all affections 
are to be trusted. “Now there are many affections which don’t arise from any light in the 
understanding. And when it is thus, it is a sure evidence that these affections are not 
spiritual, let them be ever so high.”118 
Even the unregenerate may benefit from the use of reason. For while there is no 
way to control the operation of grace, the use of reason in obtaining speculative 
knowledge of God can be a means of grace, “to give opportunity for grace to act, when God 
shall infuse it.”119 It provides content that may be illumined by the divine light into 
spiritual knowledge. It can prepare an individual for grace such that “when grace has 
removed prejudices and given eyes to see, they will see the connection and relation of the 
ideas, and the force of the arguments.”120 Scripture and preaching can provide notions of 
God to the understanding, that God may later by grace in conversion give a sense of the 
heart of their excellency. Such knowledge can cause people to sin less, thus reducing 
God’s wrath against them. Conversely, having wrong notions of divine things can hinder 
grace.121 So while it is clear that rational arguments alone do not bring about conversion, 
it is also clear that for Edwards they may play a very positive role in preparing a person 
for grace.122 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 From “Knowledge of Divine Truth,” WJE 22:88. In the Affections Edwards writes, “such is the nature of 
man, that it is impossible his mind should be affected, unless it be by something that he apprehends, or that 
his mind conceives of.” WJE Vol. 2, 267. See also WJE 18:83f. (Misc. 539). 
118 WJE 2:266-67. Here Edwards notes Shepard approvingly. 
119 WJE 18:85 (Misc. 539). 
120 WJE 18:87 (Misc. 539). 
121 “A false notion gives no opportunity for grace to act, but on the contrary, will hinder its acting.” WJE 
18:86 (Misc. 539). 
122 Marsden terms learning a “handmaid to religion,” and notes that Edwards’ “passion for scholarship and 
his passion for awakening were of one piece.” Life, 200. The depth of his public preaching and writing was 
supported by this belief. 
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Here again Edwards draws on his predecessors. Holifield comments that for first 
generation New England preachers “regeneration usually began through an appeal to the 
understanding, since the will could ‘imbrace nothing but what the understanding presents 
to it.’ But the point of exhortation was to reach the will; the understanding was only the 
‘underling of the will.’”123 
Clearly in this process of conversion the disposition and affections are essential for 
Edwards. What also seems clear, however, is that Edwards continues to hold to the 
necessity of rationality or understanding. The understanding and the will or heart are 
subsumed in a higher unity in Edwards’ conception of the individual.124 So he can write, 
“Neither of these is intended in the doctrine exclusively of the other: but it is intended 
that we should seek the former in order to the latter.”125 
Finally, it is important to note that the spiritual knowledge gained in conversion 
specifically and in the sense of the heart generally is not new doctrinal knowledge. Rather 
it is a deepening, an intensification by the Holy Spirit of notional knowledge already 
obtained through reason and revelation of God and existing doctrine. As such, as 
Edwards understands it, this spiritual knowledge should never usurp the place of 
Scripture or add doctrinal content to it. Scripture remains the standard by which the 
regenerate must judge their experiences and any such spiritual knowledge. “The Word of 
God certainly should be our rule in matters so much above reason and our own 
notions.”126 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Holifield, Theology in America, 38. Holifield continues to review more closely early New England views 
(especially Hooker and Norton) of the will and understanding, and the role of the inclination in the will, in 
ways that parallel quite closely how Edwards thought on such things (see 38-39). 
124 More discussion of this higher unity is found later in this chapter. 
125 WJE 22:87. Marsden notes, “Edwards’ exaltation of the affections was never at the expense of reason.” 
Life, 282. 
126 WJE 21:180. 
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The Role of Emotions in Conversion 
 
In examining the second form of knowing, the sense of the heart, we are brought 
into something broader than the intellect, something that encompasses the emotions. In 
true conversion one’s emotions are always impacted by this latter form of knowing. If 
people are not affected by the great truths of the Christian faith, it is because on some 
level they are still blind to them, but “if the great things of religion are rightly understood, 
they will affect the heart.”127 Thus Edwards states boldly in Religious Affections that “true 
religion, in great part, consists in the affections.”128 These authentic religious affections 
are a mark of the regenerate. They arise in the heart out of the transformation wrought 
by the vision of God and divine things. When one is no longer blinded to spiritual realities 
and sees with true vision the goodness and beauty of God, this spiritual knowledge 
transforms one’s heart and emotions. One cannot not be moved by the sight of divine 
things. The sight of the beauty of the Lord overwhelms and captivates the seer. “It would 
be impossible, and utterly inconsistent with human nature, that their hearts should be 
otherwise, than strongly impressed, and greatly moved by such things.”129 Conversion is 
marked by changed and elevated emotions because one cannot have true sight of these 
things and have a passive response, any more than a lover encounters his beloved with 
passivity or some neutral affirmation.130 These elevated emotions are not the basis or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 WJE 2:120. 
128 WJE 2:99. 
129 WJE 2:120-21. The imagery of conversion as that of being captivated by the sight of God’s beauty and 
divine truths can be found throughout many of Edwards’ writings, especially in Religious Affections (WJE 
2:247, 250, 252-53, 300, 302). See also, for example, “Treatise on Grace,” WJE 21:156, 173; “Divine and 
Supernatural Light,” WJE 17:413-14, 422. 
130 “Who will deny that true religion consists, in a great measure, in vigorous and lively actings of the 
inclination and will of the soul, or the fervent exercises of the heart. That religion which God requires, and 
will accept, does not consist in weak, dull and lifeless wouldings, raising us but a little above a state of 
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substance of conversion, but rather the necessary response to an encounter with divine 
realities. 
Thus the spiritual knowledge discussed in the previous section is the ground of 
religious affections, and the reason for the resulting love that fills the hearts of the 
regenerate as they see God for who God is. Edwards makes clear that such feelings are 
not groundless emotions; emotions that flow out of authentic conversion are not irrational, 
but based in evidence and actual knowledge. Truly gracious affections “arise from the 
mind’s being enlightened, rightly and spiritually to understand or apprehend divine 
things.”131 This enlightenment, this opening of the mind, is – as previously discussed – 
wrought by the supernatural work of the Holy Spirit. Through that work God’s divine 
glory is made known to the regenerate, especially through the gospel – its doctrines, 
words, acts, and works – in Christ, “full of grace and truth,” the sight of which ravishes 
our minds and overcomes any objections. But such evidence is only discerned by those 
whom God influences through his Spirit.132 All who are truly converted have at least 
some degree of this spiritual sight of divine truths, this heart knowledge.133  
For Edwards knowing in this way becomes affectional. The term “affections” is 
critical to an understanding of Edwards’ views of conversion and authentic faith, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
indifference: God, in his Word, greatly insists upon it, that we be in good earnest, fervent in spirit, and our 
hearts vigorously engaged in religion… ‘Tis such a fervent, vigorous engagedness of the heart in religion, 
that is the fruit of a real circumcision of the heart, or true regeneration, and that has the promises of life.” 
WJE 2:99. 
131 WJE 2:266. They are “attended with a reasonable and spiritual conviction of the judgment, of the reality 
and certainty of divine things.” 291. “If the religious affections that persons have, do indeed arise from a 
strong persuasion of the truth of the Christian religion; their affections are not the better, unless their 
persuasion be a reasonable persuasion or conviction. By a reasonable conviction, I mean a conviction 
founded on real evidence, or upon that which is a good reason, or just ground of conviction. Men may have 
a strong persuasion that the Christian religion is true, when their persuasion is not at all built on evidence, 
but altogether on education, and the opinion of others; as many Mahometans are strongly persuaded of the 
truth of the Mahometan religion, because their fathers, and neighbors, and nation believe it.” 295. 
132 Edwards references Jn. 1:14 in his discussion of this in WJE 2:300. 
133 See, for example, WJE 2:306-307. 
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these affections of which Edwards speaks are not a synonym for emotions. There is an 
emotional element to the affections, but affections are deeper and broader than emotions 
as typically understood. Edwards defines the affections as “no other, than the more 
vigorous and sensible exercises of the inclination and will of the soul.”134 What he means 
by this is that the affections are those things that drive us, that direct our actions and 
engage our passions, as well as raise our emotions – those things at the center of our life’s 
desires. As Samuel Logan puts it, Edwards argues that “we identify a person solely by 
what she ‘seeks first’ (Matt. 6:28-33). And what that person ‘seeks first,’ Edwards calls that 
person’s ‘affections.’”135  
Therefore, although the affections have a significant emotional element, it would 
be wrong to equate them directly. In contrast to some emotions, authentic religious 
affections are never self-centered, but always focused outward. Rather than talking of 
one’s own experiences, “a true saint, when in the enjoyment of true discoveries of the 
sweet glory of God and Christ, has his mind too much captivated and engaged by what 
he views without himself, to stand at that time to view himself, and his own attainments: it 
would be a diversion and loss which he could not bear, to take his eye off from the 
ravishing object of his contemplation, to survey his own experience.”136 The affections 
may even be in conflict with the emotions, such as when Christ faces great fear in the 
Garden of Gethsemane, and yet follows God’s will – the driving force in his life. Christian 
affections are also not rooted in self-interest, but in the inherent goodness of divine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 WJE 2:96. 
135 “Evangelical Obedience,” in Edwards and Justification, 111. 
136 WJE 2:252-53. They are also never self-satisfied. – “Another great and very distinguishing difference 
between gracious affections and others is, that gracious affections, the higher they are raised, the more is a 
spiritual appetite and longing of soul after spiritual attainments, increased. On the contrary, false affections 
rest satisfied in themselves.” 376. 
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realities themselves.137 “A love to divine things for the beauty and sweetness of their moral 
excellency, is the first beginning and spring of all holy affections.”138 It is this 
transformative love that is at the core of Christian affections; love is “the chief of the 
affections, and fountain of all other affections.”139 
The affections are in some respects more similar to one’s ‘passions’ than one’s 
‘emotions,’ but even the passions cannot be equated with them. Edwards distinguishes 
between passions and affections, the former being more sudden and more overpowering 
of the mind and spirit, and the latter “more extensive than passion; being used for all 
vigorous lively actings of the will or inclination.”140 The affections are those things that 
one feels so strongly as to drive a person to action and that determine in what directions 
those actions are taken. They at times encompass the emotions and greatly influence the 
emotions, but are not to be directly equated with them. They are at the center of a 
person’s motivations, and at the center of authentic Christian conversion and life. 
Edwards deems them so central as to write that “without holy affection there is no true 
religion: and no light in the understanding is good, which don’t produce holy affection in 
the heart; no habit or principle in the heart is good, which has no such exercise; and no 
external fruit is good, which don’t proceed from such exercises.”141 The affections flow 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 “The first objective ground of gracious affections, is the transcendently excellent and amiable nature of 
divine things, as they are in themselves; and not any conceived relation they bear to self, or self-interest.” 
WJE 2:240. 
138 WJE 2:253-54. 
139 WJE 2:106. “It is doubtless true, and evident from these Scriptures, that the essence of all true religion 
lies in holy love; and that in this divine affection, and an habitual disposition to it, and that light which is the 
foundation of it, and those things which are the fruits of it, consists the whole of religion.” 107. The religion 
of heaven also consists “chiefly in holy love and joy, consists very much in affection: and therefore 
undoubtedly, true religion consists very much in affection.” 114. Edwards offers a definition of divine love 
in his “Treatise on Grace.” “Divine love, as it has God or its object, may be thus described: ‘tis the soul’s 
relish of the supreme excellency of the divine nature, inclining the heart to God as the chief good.” WJE 
21:173. 
140 WJE 2:98. 
141 WJE 2:119. 
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out of the basic reorientation of the regenerate as the Spirit opens their eyes to the beauty 
of divine things. The affections bring us to a transition to a discussion of the will, as they 
are in some respects not essentially distinct from, but exercises of, the will.142 
 
The Role of the Will in Conversion 
 
Can one not will to be different, will to be converted, choose God and turn to his 
grace? In approaching Edwards’ view of the will, we come to a centerpiece of his thought 
and legacy, and a subject of considerable importance to the conception of conversion. 
The role and nature of the will has been a central question for theology and philosophy 
since time immemorial. Among those major figures of the Christian tradition finding 
reason to delve into the subject are Augustine, Pelagius, Aquinas, Scotus, and Luther. 
Jonathan Edwards stands among them in the significance of his contribution to the 
discussion, and stands alone on the North American continent in the breadth and depth 
of his reflections on the will. Unlike many of the topics here being considered in relation 
to conversion, when one comes to a discussion of the will in Edwards, one must address a 
central text of Edwards dedicated to the issue, his 1754 treatise Freedom of the Will.  
Because issues surrounding the will play such a pivotal role in Edwards’ thought 
and his interactions with theological opponents of his time, in undertaking a 
consideration of the relation of will to conversion specifically, I will first describe the 
broader issues at stake for Edwards in the will as expressed in that work. Edwards does 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 In both Religious Affections and Freedom of the Will Edwards links affections to the will. In the latter he 
describes affections as being “only certain modes of the exercise of the will.” WJE 1:309. In Religious 
Affections see, for example, WJE 2:96-100. 
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not deny freedom of the will but has a particular understanding of it that renders 
“Arminian” notions of that freedom illusory and impossible.  
The significance of the will for Edwards’ broader theological project is difficult to 
overstate. McClymond and McDermott write that “Jonathan Edwards thought a 
misunderstanding of the human will was at the root of nearly all that had gone wrong in 
theology.”143 In the conclusion of Freedom of the Will, Edwards shows how central the 
conception of freedom is to a number of key issues in the Arminian and Calvinist debate, 
including all five points of Dortian Calvinism.144 “‘Tis easy to see how the decision of 
most of the points in controversy, between Calvinists and Arminians, depends on the 
determination of this grand article concerning the freedom of the will requisite to moral agency; 
and that by clearing and establishing the Calvinistic doctrine in this point, the chief 
arguments are obviated, by which Arminian doctrines in general are supported.”145 The 
nature of the will is the key. 
For Edwards, that nature is a determined one. One must pause here to clarify the 
definitions of several terms. Edwards defines the will as “that faculty or power or principle 
of mind by which it is capable of choosing: an act of the will is the same as an act of 
choosing or choice.”146 Unlike Locke, who distinguished between the two, Edwards is 
quite content to collapse desire into will, insisting that they never run counter to one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 McClymond and McDermott, Theology of Edwards, 339. They note further, “at the end of his treatise on 
original sin, written in his last full year of life, he declared ‘there is no one thing more fundamental [then 
their view of the will] in [Pelagians’ and Arminians’] schemes of religion: on the determination of this one 
leading point depends the issue of almost all controversies we have with divines.’ The view of the will that 
he had set out in Freedom of the Will three years before was what makes the moral world go round.” 339, 
quoting from Jonathan Edwards, Original Sin, Vol. 3 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards, ed. Clyde A. Holbrook 
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), 375. 
144 Total depravity, unlimited election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, perseverance of the saints. See 
WJE 1:430-439. 
145 WJE 1:431. 
146 WJE 1:137. Edwards is quite happy to substitute “soul” for mind. 
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another.147 To do as one wills is to do as one pleases. Throughout the treatise it is also 
important to bear in mind that Edwards’ consideration of the will is of the will in its 
immediate act of willing, the very act of the will at the moment of willing, and not other 
factors removed from this decision. So he notes, “it must be carefully observed, to avoid 
confusion and needless objection, that I speak of the direct and immediate object of the 
act of volition; and not some object that the act of will has not an immediate, but only an 
indirect and remote respect to.”148 One’s reflections on past or future acts and objects of 
the will are not his concern. 
What Edwards means by a determined will is, “in consequence of some action, or 
influence, its choice is directed to, and fixed upon a particular object.”149 The various 
influences or actions that energize the mind’s power of volition are termed motives. Necessity 
is a term commonly meaning what will occur despite any opposition, but used in Edwards’ 
philosophical sense it means essentially “certainty,” not as a subjective experience but as 
an objective reality. And so it is “in this sense I use the word ‘necessity,’ in the following 
discourse, when I endeavor to prove that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty.”150 
Critical to a proper understanding of Edwards’ thought is distinguishing between 
moral and natural necessity. Paul Ramsey writes that “there can be no distinction more 
crucial for understanding this treatise.”151 Moral necessity refers to the certainty of acts 
from forces internal to the will, one’s inclination or disposition and motives. Natural 
necessity refers to the certainty of acts due to forces external to the will, acts for which we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 “A man never, in any instance, wills anything contrary to his desires, or desires anything contrary to his 
will.” WJE 1:139. 
148 WJE 1:143. And again, “the choice of the mind never departs from that which, at that time, and with 
respect to the direct and immediate objects of that decision of the mind, appears most agreeable and 
pleasing, all things considered.” 147. 
149 WJE 1:141. 
150 WJE 1:152. 
151 “Editor’s Introduction,” WJE 1:39-40. 
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have no choice. Moral and natural inability refers to the inverse of these.152 Acts denied or 
forced upon one against one’s will are acts of compulsion (Edwards also here will use the 
term “coaction”).153 Though Edwards may speak of causes, by them in this context he 
means not some metaphysical assertion of force by the cause on the effect, but rather a 
clear and certain, “infallible connection” between subject and predicate. If A then B, 
regardless of how B is accomplished.154 
Liberty for Edwards means “that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct 
as he will, or according to his choice.”155 Freedom of the Will is in many respects less 
concerned with the nature of the will than the nature of true freedom or liberty. This is 
why Edwards is throughout the book responding to Arminian notions of liberty. For 
Edwards we are free in the sense that we are free to do what we want; the will in fact does 
carry out our inclinations. But to speak of the will itself as being free is to speak of the will 
as if it has its own will, that the will is free to choose or will whatever it wishes. This is 
nonsensical to Edwards. Nor are the influences that bring about one’s will properly to be 
considered in a discussion of liberty, only that one can in fact carry out his or her will. 
“Let the person come by his volition or choice how he will, yet, if he is able, and there is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 Notice how careful Edwards is in his application of the term inability. One misuses the term inability 
when one uses it to refer to one who habitually does something as being unable to do otherwise. “In the 
strictest propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election: and 
a man can’t be truly said to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will… And in this case, not only 
is it true, that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing; when once he 
has willed, the thing is performed; and nothing else remains to be done. Therefore, in these things to ascribe 
a nonperformance to the want of power or ability, is not just; because the thing wanting is not a being able, 
but a being willing. There are faculties of mind, and capacity of nature, and everything else, sufficient, but a 
disposition; nothing is wanting but a will.” WJE 1:162. Natural necessity involves inability; moral necessity 
does not. “No inability whatsoever which is merely moral, is properly called by the name of ‘inability.’” 
WJE 1:308. This usage is in concert with Edwards’ definition of liberty below. It is inability, and not 
necessity, that is the opposite of liberty for Edwards. 
153 Contrary to liberty is constraint, “the same is otherwise called force, compulsion, and coaction; which is 
a person’s being necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is restraint; which is his being 
hindered, and not having power to do according to his will.” WJE 1:164. Restraint is merely the inverse form 
of compulsion. 
154 See WJE 1:152, 180-185. 
155 WJE 1:164. 
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nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is fully and 
perfectly free, according to the primary and common notion of freedom.”156 This notion 
of liberty is founded in the nature of one’s ability to carry out choices, not in the causes of 
those choices. This is an important point that will come into play in Edwards’ dialogue 
with Arminian notions of liberty. 
Edwards’ central thesis in the book is that the Arminian157 notion of freedom of 
the will is not only unnecessary for moral agency, but also destructive of it as regards both 
humanity and God. Therefore it is also destructive of God’s sovereignty. Edwards is 
arguing for a form of freedom in the book, but not a freedom of the will. He does not 
deny the latter so much as insist that such a notion cannot exist by definition. Important 
to his argument is a correct notion of liberty as described above, as the freedom to do 
what one pleases or wills. How one comes to make choices is beside the point. 
Edwards is responding to, among other things, certain notions of indifference as put 
forth by various Arminians. By indifference is meant a state of neutrality or equilibrium 
regarding one’s options at the time of an act, and many of his Arminian opponents have 
argued that this is necessary for a right conception of freedom. For Edwards the problem 
with such a view is that the requirement of indifference removes the very grounds on 
which one assesses acts as virtuous or vicious. The very way in which we acknowledge the 
virtue of others is not in their indifference to good or righteous decisions, but by their 
decided orientation toward and even passion for that which is right. The Arminian notion 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 WJE 1:164. And again, “if a man is not restrained from acting as his will determines, or constrained to 
act otherwise; then he has liberty, according to common notions of liberty.” WJE 1:359. 
157 Edwards’ use of the term Arminian connotes not just those who, strictly speaking, follow the perspective of 
Jacob Arminius, but rather any parties that oppose Calvinist teachings. Undoubtedly Edwards has the Deist 
threat to Calvinism especially in mind in Freedom of the Will. He believes that the movement to an Arminian 
position on freedom establishes a trajectory that moves beyond it to Deism. “I suppose this notion to be a 
leading article in the Arminian scheme, that which, if pursued in its consequences, will truly infer, or 
naturally lead to all the rest [of a deist position like Thomas Chubb].” WJE 1:132.  
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operates precisely opposite the way that we would normally assess virtue. “To have a 
virtuous heart, is to have a heart that favors virtue, and is friendly to it, and not one 
perfectly cold and indifferent about it.”158 As Edwards sees it, the further from 
indifference, the greater the possibility of virtue. Virtuous actions are “actions which 
proceed from a heart well disposed and inclined; and the stronger, and the more fixed and 
determined the good disposition of the heart, the greater the sincerity of virtue.”159 A deeply 
honest woman may be unable, due to her orientation toward honesty, to lie her way out 
of a difficult situation, and for this she is thus commended. She is not faulted for lack of 
indifference.  
Indifference is also not logically compatible with willing, which reflects preference 
in the very act. It is “to assert that the mind chooses without choosing.”160 Or as he says, 
“choice and preference can no more be in a state of indifference, than motion can be in a 
state of rest.”161 Here again one must bear in mind that Edwards is speaking of the act 
itself, and not some advance reflection on an act, which is not itself willing. 
One reason for these difficulties in the Arminian notion of indifference is that of 
the confusion (illustrated primarily by Daniel Whitby in the text) of natural and moral 
necessity. Whitby does not distinguish between moral and natural necessity relative to the 
question of agency and responsibility. In his view both make one free of responsibility for 
one’s actions. Edwards responds that, logically, if we are to excuse acts of moral necessity 
just as we do natural necessity, then we must also excuse in part those acts that are in part 
morally necessitated, just as we do in part those acts that are naturally necessitated. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 WJE 1:321. 
159 WJE 1:321. 
160 WJE 1:198. 
161 WJE 1:207. 
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Virtually everyone accepts the limitations involved with natural necessity. One would not 
consider a lame man working in a field to be lazy because he does not accomplish the 
work of another who is whole. Natural necessity excuses some of his responsibility for 
productivity. But applied to moral necessity this brings us to the position of excusing one’s 
sinful acts all the more as the person is more inclined to sin. And at the same time, it 
excuses the virtuous acts of a person oriented toward virtue. By such logic the more 
virtuous one’s orientation, the less possible it is for that person to act virtuously. The more 
sinful the person, the less that person should be held accountable for his or her actions. 
Or as Edwards puts it, “then wickedness always carries that in it which excuses it.”162 So 
for the Arminian, our habits and disposition excuse us, but for Edwards it is largely in 
these that our greatest responsibility lies and the need for God’s gracious activity.  
One of the most egregious examples of the problems inherent with the Arminian 
notion of indifference is its impact on one’s doctrine of God. If this notion not only 
excuses one’s responsibility for one’s sin, but also for one’s virtue, then there is no being 
more affected by such a concept than a being who by his very nature is perfectly virtuous. 
If God’s character necessitates his acting in a virtuous manner, then such necessity 
eliminates the grounds for his virtuousness. God, above all, is by his character 
necessitated in doing what is right, good, and holy. By an Arminian view such necessity 
empties God of his holiness. In such an approach, virtue cannot flow out of necessity. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 “If merely that inability will excuse disobedience, which is implied in the opposition or defect of 
inclination, remaining after the command is exhibited, then wickedness always carries that in it which 
excuses it. ‘Tis evermore so, that by how much the more wickedness there is in a man’s heart, by so much is 
his inclination to evil the stronger, and by so much the more therefore has he of moral inability to the good 
required. His moral inability, consisting in the strength of his evil inclination, is the very thing wherein his 
wickedness consists; and yet according to Arminian principles, it must be a thing inconsistent with 
wickedness; and by how much the more he has of it, by so much is he the further from wickedness.” WJE 
1:309. “From all [the Arminian confusion of moral and natural necessity] which it follows, that a strong 
bent and bias one way, and difficulty of going the contrary, never causes a person to be at all more exposed 
to sin, or anything blamable: because as the difficulty is increased, so much the less is required and 
expected.” 298. See also 308. 
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Thus an Arminian notion of liberty denies the possibility of persons being virtuous or 
vicious by means of their character. 
Indifference also destroys any purpose in God’s laws or precepts, the teaching of 
the church, the influences and examples of those of upright character, or anything else 
meant to sway an individual. Indifference, then, is problematic in two ways. First, as 
regards the will it is illusory.163 The will is never indifferent in the act of willing. Second, 
were it to be considered possible, it would be destructive of that very moral agency it seeks 
to establish.164 
Like indifference, the Arminian requirement of contingency in one’s free choices 
is meant to preserve moral responsibility but is actually destructive of it. Contingency, the 
idea that acts must have “absolutely no previous ground or reason,”165 eliminates moral 
agency and liberty because it makes for a will that cannot be influenced and is hence 
arbitrary. It removes from the will any sense of a willing self, separating the will from all 
motives, reason, or moral suasion, leaving the subject with randomness rather than 
intention. Such a will is not responsive to God’s calling, promises, warnings, or 
commands, or the needs of others, etc. The very moral responsibility the Arminians seek 
to establish vanishes. On the contrary, Edwards says that our decisions are caused, but 
this, rather than reducing their significance as moral agents, enhances them.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 Edwards asserts that “no liberty which the soul is possessed of, or ever uses, in any of its acts of volition, 
consists in indifference; and that the opinion of such as suppose, that indifference belongs to the very 
essence of liberty, is to the highest degree absurd and contradictory.” WJE 1:208. 
164 “If we pursue these principles, we shall find that virtue and vice are wholly excluded out of the world; 
and that there never was, nor ever can be any such thing as one or the other; either in God, angels or men. 
No propensity, disposition or habit can be virtuous or vicious, as has been shewn; because they, so far as 
they take place, destroy the freedom of the will, the foundation of all moral agency, and exclude all capacity 
of either virtue or vice.” WJE 1:326. 
165 WJE 1:155. Contingency as used by Edwards in Freedom of the Will means that which is a completely 
undetermined choice. 
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Contingency also results in a denial of God’s sovereignty and foreknowledge. 
Edwards argues that any notion of God’s foreknowledge demands necessity for future acts, 
and therefore denies contingency. If God has foreknowledge, as Edwards says even most 
Arminians admit, then future events are necessary.166 
Essentially, Edwards’ argument is that we act in accordance with who we are and 
what we want. This is what is commonly understood as freedom and we have that 
freedom. The idea that one might act with an entirely indifferent will takes any notion of 
character or understanding out of the act of choosing. 
How does all of this relate to conversion? In response one might say that, 
according to Edwards, unregenerate sinners are not denied the freedom to choose to 
follow God. It is not that the unregenerate are not free, but that they are free to do what 
they want, and thus they do so. The problem lies not in freedom but in desire, and in the 
affections. Sinners do not choose God because they do not want to follow God, but rather 
their own paths and desires, which are contrary to God’s will. This is the fallen state that 
all are in naturally apart from a work of grace. That is our being, our will. It is not until 
God’s supernatural action through the Holy Spirit opens our hearts to the divine light 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166 Edwards discusses extensively the necessity intrinsic in God’s foreknowledge of future events in WJE 
1:239-56. Paul Ramsey writes, “For Edwards as a theologian the issue is a simple one: either contingency 
and the liberty of self-determination must be run out of this world, or God will be shut out.” WJE 1:9. Note 
that Edwards’ concern here is also to defend Calvinism against the Arminian charge of fatalism. Edwards 
demonstrates that the Arminian position fares no better in the face of such a charge. “The doctrine of the 
Calvinists, concerning the absolute decrees of God, does not at all infer any more fatality in things, than will 
demonstrably follow from the doctrine of most Arminian divines, who acknowledge God’s omniscience, 
and universal prescience.” WJE 1:269. And this is the case because of the nature of the relationship 
between event and knowledge. Necessity means certainty. “Whether prescience be the thing that makes the 
event necessary or no, it alters not the case. Infallible foreknowledge may prove the necessity of the event 
foreknown, and yet not be the thing which causes the necessity. If the foreknowledge be absolute, this proves 
the event known to be necessary, or proves that ‘tis impossible but that the event should be, by some means 
or other, either by a decree, or some other way, if there be any other way.” 263. The last phrase hints at 
Edwards’ view of the matter, though without his planned but never completed volume on predestination his 
full views on that matter may never be fully known. 
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that our being is transformed. In conversion one becomes a new person, with a different 
set of desires and affections. We then want to follow God and hence do so. 
The choice of whether or not to repent and follow God in conversion is the choice 
of the most monumental consequence for any human being. The ramifications for 
choosing or denying God are eternal. But this is only the case if one can be held 
accountable, if one is free to choose God. From an Arminian perspective, if one’s only 
choice from birth is to reject God, than one cannot be held accountable for that choice. 
The only way to gain responsibility and freedom to choose God for the Arminian view of 
the will is to deny total depravity, which has major implications both for one’s theological 
anthropology, one’s conception of sin, and one’s conception of grace – and more 
particularly, that central tenet of Reformation faith, of salvation by grace alone. In fact, 
such a conception indeed undermines all five of the central tenets of Calvinism expressed 
in the Synod of Dort as popularly conceived by the TULIP acronym. They largely stand 
or fall together. The ramifications of one’s view of the will are central to one’s entire 
theological system, and the Arminian moves undermine the entire Calvinist theological 
enterprise. 
 
Voluntarism vs. Intellectualism 
We have seen thus far both the great importance of knowledge and the intellect, 
and of the will in Edwards’ thought. But which of these takes priority for Edwards? Is 
Edwards an intellectualist or a voluntarist? 
In Edwards’ day the most popular sermons read in America were from the famous 
Anglican preacher and Archbishop of Canterbury, John Tillotson (1630-1694), who 
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reduced faith to assent to propositions.167 Charles Chauncy and other rationalist-leaning 
Calvinists of Edwards’ time also stressed intellectualist aspects. Certainly Edwards would 
have them in mind as he examined these issues, but he would likewise have the 
“enthusiasts” of the Great Awakening who at their extremes could hold to a faith 
seemingly devoid of any intellectual content. Thus when one reads Edwards one sees 
support for both views. 
In support of the view of Edwards as intellectualist, it must be said that Edwards 
often certainly sounds like one. He clearly places much confidence, and perhaps even 
overconfidence, in the capacity of intellectual argument to bring about change. Consider 
his handling of his own congregation in Northampton in the midst of difficulties late in his 
pastorate. He seems to have thought that rational arguments might resolve the 
breakdown of his relationship with his parishioners. As Marsden observes, Edwards 
“believed that through observation and logic one should be able to settle almost any 
question. His own logical powers increased his sense that he could settle an issue by 
argument. Even after he had faced the force of his people’s animosities, he still remained 
hopeful that he might convince them if only they would read his treatise.”168 He 
demonstrated in his own actions a confidence in rational arguments to persuade and 
change. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Tillotson argued that nothing that clearly contradicts the principles of natural religion could be held in 
doctrine. The goal of religion was to provide divine sanction for morality, and revelation aided in this task. 
Faith consisted in rational assent to truth of religious propositions. Henry May notes that Tillotson, with 
Samuel Clarke and Philip Doddridge, were the most widely read divines in the colonies. The Enlightenment in 
America, 18-19. “Liberty, to these Enlightened readers of [Samuel] Clarke and Tillotson, was associated 
above all with rationality.” 94.  
168 Marsden, A Life, 349. Marsden later adds, “For someone who is known for his analysis of the centrality 
of affections in religion, Edwards retained remarkably high confidence in the power of well-argued principle 
to prevail.” 374. 
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Edwards also seems to indicate an intellectualist orientation in his demand for 
knowledge as a key part of faith. As we have seen above, knowledge plays a necessary role 
in conversion, and in the affections. Knowledge provides the object to which one might 
be oriented, the means or opportunity for God’s grace to act. “If there could be a 
principle of grace in the heart without these notions or ideas there, yet it could not act, 
because it could have no matter to act upon.”169 
In arguing in Freedom of the Will that “the will always follows the last dictate of the 
understanding,” Edwards also clearly seems to be in the intellectualist camp, with the will 
only carrying out the instructions provided it by the intellect.170 This statement of 
Edwards is strikingly similar to axiomatic statements of the intellectualist position that 
“the will is determined by the last judgment of the practical intellect,” as found in 
numerous Harvard theses of the seventeenth century described by Norman Fiering.171 
Some interpreters of Edwards have also argued that he takes an intellectualist position. 
James Carse, for example, writes that Edwards holds to the notion that “the cause of a 
man’s action is the same as his reason for that action.”172 
This apparent intellectualism, however, must be questioned. Edwards is best 
understood as a voluntarist in the Augustinian mold rather than an intellectualist. Closer 
examination of the seemingly axiomatic expression of intellectualism (on the will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 Edwards, WJE 18:85 (Misc. 539). 
170 WJE 1:148. Later in the book he writes, “The determinations of the will must evermore follow the 
illumination, conviction and notice of the understanding.” 220. “For if the determination of the will, 
evermore, in this manner, follows the light, conviction and view of the understanding, concerning the 
greatest good and evil, and this be that alone which moves the will, and it be a contradiction to suppose 
otherwise; then it is necessarily so, the will necessarily follows this light or view of the understanding, not only 
in some of its acts, but in every act of choosing and refusing.” 220. 
171 “The commencement theses and quaestiones from early Harvard summarized the intellectualist theory in 
the form of a Latin axiom that was constantly repeated: ‘Voluntas determinatur ab ultimo Intellectus practici Judicio’  
(The will is determined by the last judgment of the practical intellect). These words appear in some form in 
1666, 1671, 1678, 1686, and 1692, and we have only a remnant of what may have existed.” Fiering, “Will 
and Intellect,” 525. 
172 James Carse, Jonathan Edwards and the Visibility of God (New York: Scribner, 1967), 60. 
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following the last dictate of the understanding) in Edwards’ Freedom of the Will supports this 
contention. Edwards qualifies this statement and expands on it. He says the will follows 
the understanding “in some sense,” and that by understanding one cannot mean merely 
reason or judgment, but understanding “in a large sense, as including the whole faculty of 
perception or apprehension.” Furthermore, “if by the dictate of the understanding is 
meant what reason declares to be best or most for the person’s happiness, taking in the 
whole of his duration, it is not true, that the will always follows the last dictate of the 
understanding.” Finally, what reason contributes is in fact only “one thing that is put into 
the scales” by which one wills, only one of the pieces in “the compound influence which 
moves and induces the will.” Edwards even admits forthrightly that an act of the will may 
be “determined in opposition to it.”173  
One must remember too what is meant when Edwards refers to knowledge. Often 
references to knowledge in Edwards can be to a kind of affective heart knowledge that 
moves beyond the bounds of ratiocination or intellectual reasoning alone, and involves an 
orientation to and vision of the reality of that knowledge and not simply questions of truth 
or falsehood. The knowledge Edwards demands is a kind of affective knowledge. It is not a 
speculative knowledge that one can simply hold, but a knowledge that creates a change 
and activity in the person. It is a knowledge of God that implies a relationship, that 
involves a disposition toward God that creates a willing spirit. Finally for Edwards there 
seems to be a form of knowing that involves the will. One could even say that the will 
functions with a certain kind of apprehension itself. When Edwards distinguishes between 
a speculative knowledge and a sense of the heart, Fiering suggests that what he is talking 
about “is not a conative function of intellect so much as a cognitive function of the will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 WJE 1:148. 
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conceived of in the broadest possible sense, that is, where it verges into the meaning of 
‘heart.’”174 The capacity of the will only seems to expand upon conversion, since it is on 
the disposition and will that the Spirit works. Pauw notes that “the redemptive work of 
the Spirit is to indwell the soul and create a new habit of love and holiness. As a new 
active principle seated in the will, the Holy Spirit elicits holy love for God and acts of love 
toward others, culminating in the saint’s glorification.”175 Thus one sees signs of 
conversion best not in agreement with doctrines, but in willing actions. Actions (or more 
precisely, acts of charity) are the surest sign of a regenerate person, as is indicated in the 
final and most important sign of conversion considered in Edwards treatise, Religious 
Affections.176 
Edwards also suggests that a regenerate person may undertake activity from a 
gracious disposition founded on errors of the intellect, which also indicates the priority of 
the will over the intellect. Edwards suggests that such activity may still be of the Holy 
Spirit. He illustrates this by considering Paul’s thoughts in Romans 14 on the weak in 
faith. Since some eat and some refrain, both cannot be right, but both are praiseworthy in 
doing it as to the Lord, i.e., with a right disposition. “By this it is exceeding evident that 
there may be true exercises of grace, a true respect to the Lord and particularly a true 
thankfulness that may be grounded on an error, that which is not agreeable to the truth, 
and that the erroneous practice founded on that error may be the occasion of those true 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Fiering, “Will and Intellect,” 553 (emphasis mine). 
175 Amy Plantinga Pauw, “The Supreme Harmony of All”: The Trinitarian Theology of Jonathan Edwards (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 155. 
176 The twelfth and final sign given by Edwards is as follows: “Gracious and holy affections have their 
exercise and fruit in Christian practice.” WJE 2:383. Of this sign, Edwards says, “Christian practice or a 
holy life is a great and distinguishing sign of true and saving grace. But I may go further, and assert, that it 
is the chief of all the signs of grace, both as an evidence of the sincerity of professors unto others, and also to 
their own consciences.” 406. For more on this, see the section on the authentication of conversion below. 
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and holy exercises which are from the Spirit of God.”177 Regardless of the accuracy of 
Edwards’ interpretation of the passage, it does make clear his priority of will over intellect.  
One can also see an indication of Edwards’ voluntarism in the language of 
“consent” he often uses in contrast to “assent”. The latter term is overtly rational, while 
the former is willful or dispositional. One makes knowledge basic, the other makes willing 
basic – or even something like love. As Terrence Erdt puts it, “Edwards used the word 
consent to designate the new relation the mind has to God and creation after regeneration 
enables it to sense and to love holiness.”178 Thus when Edwards considers the nature of 
true virtue in his book of the same name, he finds it to be an activity rooted in the 
disposition and will, or “to use a general word I suppose commonly well understood,… 
the heart.”179 One should always be cognizant when reading Edwards that “heart” 
language is primarily language of the will and disposition. Edwards defines true virtue as 
“consent, propensity and union of heart to being in general, which is immediately exercised 
in a general good will,” because the center of one’s being and decision-making does not 
occur in the intellect, but the will or heart.180 One can see similar language at work in 
Edwards’ discussion of the covenant in his arguments over standards for church 
membership in Northampton. Assent was the way of the Half-Way Covenant, a method 
by which people could become partial church members and baptize their children 
without an indication of a changed disposition. In changing the membership 
requirements Edwards desires consent to the covenant, a movement at the center of the 
person involving their will and indicating a change of heart and a credible profession of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Edwards, WJE 20:326 (Misc. 999). 
178 Terrence Erdt, Jonathan Edwards, Art, and the Sense of the Heart (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1980), 35. He adds, “ultimately, the sense of the heart is the perception of what Edwards called the 
consent to being in general; it is a glimpse of the harmony that binds the entire system of creation.” 36. 
179 Nature of True Virtue, 2.  
180 Edwards, Nature of True Virtue, 3. 
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faith. “To own this covenant, is to profess the consent of our hearts to it; and that is the 
sum and substance of true piety. ‘Tis not only a professing the assent of our 
understandings, that we understand there is such a covenant, or that we understand we 
are obliged to comply with it; but ‘tis to profess the consent of our wills, it is to manifest 
that we do comply with it.”181 His insistence on consent finally cost him his pastorate. 
A variety of commentators concur in the assessment of Edwards as a voluntarist. 
Pauw writes, “Because the affections were for Edwards ‘the very life and soul of all true 
religion,’ he gave the will primacy over the intellect in conversion and sanctification.”182 
Fiering adds, “Like St. Augustine and Ames, Edwards emphasized that our loves and 
hates, which are the basic actions of the will, are beyond rational control.”183 Guelzo too 
locates Edwards in the camp of Augustinian voluntarism.184 Breitenbach also agrees, as 
we have seen above.185 Edwards himself seems to support this conclusion when he writes, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 From An Humble Inquiry, in Jonathan Edwards, Ecclesiastical Writings, ed. David D. Hall, Vol. 12 of The 
Works of Jonathan Edwards (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994), 205. Edwards expresses a similar 
thought in a letter regarding the church controversy in 1850 to fellow minister Peter Clark, a portion of 
which is found in the editor’s introduction to this volume. In it Edwards objects to those coming for church 
membership “publicly assenting to the form of words rehearsed on occasion of their admission to the 
communion, without pretending thereby to mean any such thing as an hearty consent to the terms of the 
gospel covenant, or to mean any such faith or repentance as belong to the covenant of grace.” 59. 
182 Supreme Harmony of All, 155. Pauw is quoting from Edwards, WJE 4:297. She adds, “works traditionally 
ascribed to the Spirit, such as conversion and sanctification, would on the terms of Edwards’s Trinitarian 
logic be a matter of the will more than the intellect.” 155. 
183 “Will and Intellect,” 552. 
184 Allen C. Guelzo, Edwards on the Will (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989), 5. Guelzo in 
fact suggests that the entire notion of covenantal churches found in colonial New England is suggestive of 
the will’s importance. “The ‘covenant’ theology upon which so much of New England’s clergy was built was 
itself a will-oriented theory, as was the word covenant itself… The ‘covenant’ theology of the Puritans was 
simply another way of recognizing that to cross the gap separating the human being and God requires a 
voluntary, gracious transaction–an effort of will. Similarly, the ‘covenanted’ churches of the New England 
Puritans were also a recognition that sin divides people from people, as well as people from God. They 
testified that the comprehensive, parish-type organization of the Church of England was as ineffective in 
bridging the human gap as Thomism had been in bridging the divine gap. Accordingly, the ‘covenanted’ 
church embodied the same principle as the covenant theology, that true union could not be had on natural 
terms but only by a conscious consent–again, an effort of will. Thus, the Puritan Calvinism of New England 
found itself absorbed in the need to understand and control the activity and freedom of the will.” 14. 
185 William Breitenbach writes that “in response to the Old Lights’ allegation that new Light conversions 
were merely high transports of the passions, Edwards committed himself to a voluntaristic interpretation of 
the psychology of conversion. He asserted that holiness has its seat in the heart or will rather than in the 
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“the knowledge of ourselves consists chiefly in right apprehensions concerning those two 
chief faculties of our nature, the understanding and will. Both are very important: yet the 
science of the latter must be confessed to be of greatest moment; inasmuch as all virtue 
and religion have their seat more immediately in the will, consisting more especially in 
right acts and habits of this faculty.”186 
 
Will, Understanding, and Conversion 
Why consider the question of Edwards’ intellectualism or voluntarism at all? What 
difference does it make for how one understands conversion? It seems, finally, that it 
makes quite a bit of difference. The priority of will may lead to a notion of conversion 
that involves one’s orientation toward God and submission to God, even while basing 
such an orientation on error or incomplete knowledge. The priority of intellect can lead 
to faith as assent to propositions, and to particular apologetic orientations that attempt to 
convince one of faith. Differing notions of conversion were at the center of many disputes 
stemming from the controversies of the Great Awakening, and past controversies over will 
and intellect help to explain at least some of the rancor that occurred in the midst of and 
following those disputes over the nature of conversion. Fiering argues that “all of the 
disputants in the Great Awakening debate were relying on well-established older 
arguments, some of which we have not exposed here; but of them the voluntarist/ 
intellectualist debate of the seventeenth century was possibly the most central.”187 
Understanding some of the history of the debates over will and intellect clarifies the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
understanding, and that holy affections are therefore the substance of true religion.” “Piety and Moralism,” 
in American Experience, 177-204, 181. Also see pages 37-38 above. 
186 WJE 1:133. 
187 Fiering, “Will and Intellect,” 556. “The Great Awakening issue was not one between old and new, but 
rather a recurrence of the perennial opposition of head and heart, both sides of which have found able 
supporters in every age.” 558. 
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positions of the participants in the Great Awakening controversies. “By extending these 
arguments a little it will be seen that the divisions in American thought during the Great 
Awakening of the 1740s between evangelicals, so-called ‘old Calvinists,’ and incipient 
liberal ‘Arminians’ were partly a carry-over from the debates of the seventeenth century 
and in some respects continuous with them.”188 Though there were other developments 
such as those in a theory of passions that happened after the seventeenth century, “it is 
remarkable how close the correspondence is between the seventeenth-century 
Augustinian voluntarist position and the ideas of Jonathan Edwards, and the seventeenth-
century intellectualist position and the ideas, for example, of Edwards’s opponent, 
Charles Chauncy.”189 
 
The Essential Unity of the Self 
 
It should be apparent at this point what the nature of the will is in many respects, 
as well as a number of ramifications that follow from one’s conception of the will. Yet in 
this discussion, as well as in a work such as Freedom of the Will that considers the will in 
such an extended fashion, there is a temptation to think of the will as an entity unto itself. 
This would reflect a serious misunderstanding of Edwards’ view of the will.  
Throughout much of his writings Edwards stresses the unity of the self. Edwards 
rejects a faculty psychology that sees the will and the intellect as two faculties of the mind, 
instead stressing the unity of the mind as will and intellect. A person is not made up of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
188 Fiering, “Will and Intellect,” 551. He adds, “this connection has not been observed before to my 
knowledge.” 551. 
189 Fiering, “Will and Intellect,” 552. “Edwards completely identified the will with the affections or passions, 
that is, treated the will as though it were itself simply a generalized name for the affections of the heart. This 
was also Ames’s position and that of a number of others in the seventeenth century and before.” 552. 
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distinct faculties somehow bonded together, but is a unified being. This can be seen in the 
relation of the will to the understanding. At times categories such as these may obfuscate 
rather than clarify Edwards’ thought. There is always a sort of artificiality in speaking of a 
“will” over and against the “understanding” for Edwards. For Edwards these two faculties 
cannot ultimately be differentiated, and in this regard he moves beyond even Locke in his 
rejection of faculty psychology.190  
Previously we noted Edwards’ comment that “the knowledge of ourselves consists 
chiefly in right apprehensions concerning those two chief faculties of our nature, the 
understanding and will.”191 Edwards’ use of the term faculty here does not imply faculty 
psychology, as the following discussion should make clear. Rather it means a power of the 
self. The will is that power of choosing, as we have seen above. “Every act of the will is 
some way connected with the understanding.”192 Why? Because the will can only act on 
what the understanding perceives.193 As we have seen previously, one must take care here 
not to view the understanding in too narrow a fashion.194 The role of reason, strictly 
considered, is limited to one among many motives weighted for or against a particular 
object. Often the habits or inclination overrule the reason.  
The integration of the will and the understanding is just one more reason for 
Edwards to deny an Arminian notion of the will that somehow acts independently. The 
will follows the broad perceptions of the understanding and the disposition of the 
individual. It is always determined, which is to say that it is moved by causes, and by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 See Paul Ramsey’s comments in the introduction to Freedom of the Will, WJE 1:49-50. 
191 WJE 1:133. 
192 WJE 1:217. 
193 “The will always follows the last dictate of the understanding.” WJE 1:148. 
194 “The understanding must be taken in a large sense, as including the whole faculty of perception or 
apprehension, and not merely what is called reason or judgment. If by the dictate of the understanding is 
meant what reason declares to be best or most for the person’s happiness, taking in the whole of his 
duration, it is not true, that the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding.” WJE 1:148. 
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definition is not indifferent.195 Though one is tempted to offer a more distinct clarification 
of the operation of these faculties, this typically results in a return to a conception of the 
divided self. That Edwards resists such a view accounts for what appears to be blurriness 
at times in his differentiation of terms like heart, affections, inclinations, understanding, 
and will. 
Edwards’ dispositional approach in some respects illustrates this. The disposition 
is more than will, but certainly encompasses it. And it is oriented toward real content; an 
intellectual component cannot be denied. Will and intellect require one another and 
finally are one in the mind. Similarly, when Edwards describes understanding with a 
‘sense of the heart’ this unity is also seen. In knowing with a sense of the heart “there is a 
sense of the beauty, amiableness, or sweetness of a thing; so that the heart is sensible of 
pleasure and delight in the presence of the idea of it” in a way that complements the 
knowledge of the speculative understanding. Such a two-fold knowing encompasses the 
speculative understanding as well as “the will, or inclination, or heart.”196 All of these 
elements combine into a heartfelt experience of truth with all of one’s being. 
Thus Edwards demands a unity of self. Guelzo is especially helpful in making this 
clear. “Edwards proposed to treat understanding, perceiving, and willing as aspects, or 
descriptions, of the mind’s unitary operation, not as quarreling subdepartments within it. 
The mind’s activity is a complex at any given moment of intellection, perception, and 
volition. Accordingly, the understanding is inseparable from the will, and the will from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 “If it be possible for the understanding to act in indifference, yet to be sure the will never does; because 
the will’s beginning to act is the very same thing as its beginning to choose or prefer… So that this wholly 
destroys the thing supposed [the will choosing from state of indifference].” WJE 1:197. 
196 WJE 17:413-14. 
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the understanding.” Since Edwards “embraced a strikingly unified image of the mind and 
heart,” we must take care in how we choose to describe them distinctly.197 
 
The Means of Conversion 
 
If God is sovereign, and the sole initiator of conversion through the supernatural 
activities of the Holy Spirit, then are all means of conversion, of grace, to be disparaged 
and rejected for a kind of quietism? While it may appear to some that such is the case, 
Edwards was certainly no quietist. Even a passing awareness of his life and writings makes 
this abundantly evident. He was neither passive nor encouraged passivity among those in 
his congregation or elsewhere. On what basis did he encourage the use of means by the 
clergy to promote conversion, or the active response of unregenerate listeners to such 
activities if they were powerless to bring about conversion? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 Guelzo, Edwards on the Will, 34. John Smith comes to the same conclusion in his introductory essay to the 
Yale Works volume of Religious Affections. “Edwards, for all his ability to draw clear distinctions, nevertheless 
struggled to preserve the unity and integrity of the self and to avoid compartmentalizing the human 
functions and powers. This means that despite his rather sharp distinction between understanding, 
affections, and will, we must not overlook the extent to which these initial distinctions are overridden in the 
course of the argument.” WJE 2:11. McClymond and McDermott also stress the theme of unity in their 
reflections on Edwards. “By ‘soul’ Edwards meant the confluence of two faculties–the ‘understanding’ that 
perceives and judges, and the ‘inclination or will’ that moves the human self toward or away from things in 
liking and disliking, loving and hating, approving and rejecting. This brief definition of the affections rooted 
in the faculties of the soul is often misunderstood in two related ways: commentators either ignore the 
intellectual component or reduce the affections to ‘emotions,’ thus missing Edwards’s insistence on the unity 
of the human person.” Theology of Edwards, 312. “If the soul is warmed toward God, it will be drawn to 
certain understandings of God. All inclination already involves perception of the mind because of the unity of 
the soul and self. Edwards rejected all dichotomies that set the mind against the heart–even while such 
dichotomies were common during the Great Awakening debates.” 313. They continue, “At the center of all 
Edwards’s thinking about affections and religious experience was his conviction of the unity of the human 
person. He rejected the three-fold distinction of mind, will, and emotions that was common in nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century discussions of human psychology and went back to Plato. Edwards declared that the 
will and affections ‘are not two faculties, but different expressions of the inclination that already has 
intellectual judgment contained within it.” 314 (see WJE 2:97). Thus, it is “a basic mistake to interpret 
Edwards in terms of any dichotomy of intellect versus affect, or head versus heart–although some 
interpreters have wanted to claim him for one side of the other.” 314. See also Robert W. Jenson, America’s 
Theologian (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 65-67; Holmes, “Dispositional Ontology?,” in 
Edwards: Philosophical Theologian, 103; McDermott, Edwards Confronts the Gods, 223. 
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The answer to these questions lies in a proper understanding of what constitutes 
means of grace and their proper purpose. Edwards makes very clear what the means of 
grace are not. They are not a sure path to salvation, or avenues by which grace can be 
controlled or dispensed. The supernatural grace which brings about conversion is 
wrought by God alone. Edwards’ doctrinal statement in “A Divine and Supernatural 
Light” leaves little room for doubt on this point. “Doctrine. There is such a thing, as a spiritual 
and divine light, immediately imparted to the soul by God, of a different nature from any that is obtained 
by natural means.”198 With this light comes the transformative spiritual knowledge which we 
have discussed previously, spiritual knowledge of which “God is the author of, and none 
else: he reveals it, and flesh and blood reveals it not. He imparts this knowledge 
immediately, not making use of any intermediate natural causes, as he does in other 
knowledge.”199  No human being can control this activity. Against deists and others who 
may object to this perspective, Edwards argues that this is not an unreasonable notion, 
but well within the bounds of reasonableness for a God who creates out of nothing to 
choose to communicate directly with that creation if he so chooses. “‘Tis strange that men 
should make any matter of difficulty of it. Why should not he that made all things, still 
have something immediately to do with the things that he has made?”200  
Nevertheless, Edwards still, with most all Puritans, believes that there are means of 
grace through which God might work. Robert Jenson describes these means. “The word 
‘means’ had a very exact sense for Puritans: ‘means’ were the natural events ordained by 
God as the necessary but insufficient conditions of supernatural grace.”201 Just as we 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 WJE 17:410. 
199 WJE 17:409. 
200 He continues, “where lies the great difficulty, if we own the being of a God, and that he created all 
things out of nothing, of allowing some immediate influence of God on the creation still?” WJE 17:421. 
201 America’s Theologian, 48. 
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determined that in conversion God makes supernatural use of natural faculties or 
functions within a person, so too God is able to make supernatural use of natural means 
of grace. Means of grace “have no influence to produce grace, either as causes or 
instruments, or any other way,” but may still be an “opportunity” for grace; they offer 
“matter” to the soul “for grace to act upon, when God shall be pleased to infuse it.”202 
Edwards suggests this use of means is akin to Elijah putting fuel on the altar, providing 
the opportunity for God to act when he chose to, even though such an act had no power 
to require God’s action. Edwards notes further that just as the fuel being placed must be 
flammable to be useful, so too the means of grace must reflect true notions of God and 
spiritual things to provide an opportunity for grace. Means of grace that use false notions 
will actually discourage the activities and effectiveness of grace.203  
The means of grace includes such things as the hearing and reading the Word 
through preaching and study of Scripture, the sacraments, proper doctrinal knowledge, 
Sabbath-keeping, prayer, and parental guidance. Through such means one might wait 
upon God’s grace, and be better prepared for it through the reduction of sins and their 
harmful effects on one’s life. Later in this chapter we will examine this notion of 
preparation for grace more extensively, and some of the tensions inherent in it when held 
together with a Reformed notion of justification by grace alone. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 WJE 18:84, 85. Although Edwards says such means have “no influence to produce grace,” he is not 
always entirely consistent on this point. In his Misc. 538, the one just prior to that quoted above, he suggests 
that “there must be a greater probability of their conversion” for those “who seek–though not after a gracious 
manner, though they are not thorough and sufficiently resolved in seeking–than of others who wholly 
neglect their salvation.” WJE 18:83 (emphasis mine). Or he writes later in Misc. 542 that those who seek 
grace diligently through means “are the more prepared to concur with grace.” WJE 18:89. 
203 WJE 18:85-86. 
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The Relation of Conversion to Baptism 
 
Edwards does not write or preach about the theology of baptism extensively.204 
Often when the issue of baptism does arise Edwards is not addressing the nature of 
baptism itself. Instead he is considering how to determine which children should be 
baptized amidst the controversies of standards for church membership and the Half-Way 
Covenant. In general, however, as with other Puritans of his day, Edwards supports a 
covenant theology that places infant baptism at the entrance to the covenantal 
community, a sign and seal to elect infants of the covenant of grace. It is an outward, 
material sign of an inward, spiritual reality, an accommodation of God to human 
capacities. 
Baptism, as with the Lord’s Supper, is seen as a means of grace. However, 
Edwards certainly disdains any notion of ex opere operato regarding the sacrament. Baptism 
no more brings about conversion than any other means. God’s grace cannot be brought 
about by any secondary causes; it is for God alone to decide, in baptism as in other 
means.205 As with those other means, baptism is an “opportunity” for grace. Thus there is 
no direct link of baptism with regeneration, and Edwards comments that there are a 
variety of examples even in the New Testament of individuals who were baptized that 
were clearly found to be hypocrites, e.g. Simon Magus. Likewise, experience shows 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204 Notable entries by Edwards on baptism are found in the “Miscellanies,” nos. 539, 577, 595, 694, 911 
(WJE 18:84-88, 114-16, 129-30, 276; 20:911). 
205 McClymond and McDermott write that “Edwards protected the Reformed insistence on God’s 
sovereignty in baptism by a kind of occasionalism: baptism is a sign and seal of regeneration only on those 
occasions when God calls a person by the Spirit. Therefore the church is not constituted by individualistic 
faith decisions but by the Father’s mysterious election.” Theology of Edwards, 492. They later point out that 
“Edwards taught more clearly than Calvin did that the baptismal rite does not by itself effect regeneration. 
Edwards followed the lead of the Westminster Confession of Faith and early Congregationalists in teaching that 
not all children of the covenant are elect, and therefore parents and the church should seek the 
regeneration and conversion of children by use of the means of grace.” 667. 
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Edwards that the baptized children of godly parents are also often found later in their 
lives in an unregenerate state.206 Holifeld writes that “although Edwards thought that 
God used outward means of grace, he had always been cautious about saying that the 
means functioned as causes of faith.”207  
Edwards is not wholly unambiguous in his thoughts on baptism, however. The 
ambiguities arise primarily in his consideration of the state of baptized infants. He clearly 
denies that all baptized infants are saved.208 But he is less clear as to whether some may be 
saved, particularly those infants whose parents “do sincerely, believingly and entirely, 
with a thorough disposition, will and desire, dedicate their child to God.” For such a child 
as this, “if that child dies in infancy, the parents have good grounds to hope for its 
salvation.”209 Because, in the fashion of covenantal theology, the faith of the parents stand 
in for the faith of child, Edwards compares the baptism of a child of sincere believers 
acting in faith to that of a sincerely believing adult. “If the adult person does sincerely and 
believingly give up himself to God, baptism seals salvation to him: so if the parent 
sincerely and believingly dedicates the infant to God, baptism seals salvation to it.”210 
Even accepting this qualification does not demand that one find Edwards to intend that it 
is baptism that provides salvific grace, as Edwards himself never says as much directly. 
Indirectly also, Edwards tends to point to other factors as much as baptism itself that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 See, for example, Misc. 577. WJE 18:114-16. 
207 Holifield, “Edwards as Theologian,” in Cambridge Companion to Edwards, 157. Holifield goes on to quote 
Edwards: “‘There are not truly any secondary causes of it; but it is produced by God immediately.’” 157, 
quoting from ”Wisdom of God Displayed,” Sermons on Various Important Subjects (Boston: S. Kneeland, 1765), 
246. See also Edwards, Humble Inquiry, WJE 12:196; Divine Light, WJE 17:417. 
208 “Whether or no all the children of godly or believing parents, that are baptized, are regenerated? Ans. 
No. Because experience shows, that multitudes of such show no signs of grace at all, as they come to be 
capable of acting in the world; and prove wicked when they grow up.” WJE 18:115. 
209 WJE 18:115. Furthermore the parents then “have also good grounds to hope, that if the child don’t die 
in infancy, that the blessings of God will attend their thorough care and pains to bring up their child in the 
nurture and admonition of the Lord. So that by that means they may be brought to salvation.” 115-16. 
210 WJE 18:129. 
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render such a conversion likely, such as the faith of the parents, and their consistent and 
thorough care in raising the child in the faith with constant prayer to God on their behalf. 
Even then, the result is not sure, but “ordinarily” such parents “shall obtain success.”211  
Perhaps the most that can be claimed regarding these other statements is that 
Edwards suggests that children may be saved at baptism, though he never states that they 
will be saved through baptism. Baptism shares the same tension as other means of grace in 
Edwards’ theology as mentioned above, in that Edwards makes a place for it as an 
opportunity for grace which seems to affect the probability of regeneration even while 
also demanding that God’s salvific and gracious activity is completely free of any outside 
influence.212  
 
The Timeframe of Conversion 
 
Is conversion an immediate event, a gradual process, or could there be elements 
of each? In considering the timeframe of conversion one must also take extra care, as 
confusion on this point can arise as to whether one is speaking of becoming a Christian, 
broadly speaking, or of regeneration specifically. Furthermore, one must differentiate 
between what is believed to be true theologically versus what can be known practically.  
Speaking of regeneration specifically – that supernatural change wrought by the 
Spirit that moves one from being an unregenerate, condemned sinner to a regenerate, 
new creation and a redeemed child of God in a state of grace, and speaking in a strictly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 WJE 18:129. Edwards suggests further that in the millennium the probability for infants to be 
regenerated will be much greater. In that time, “when parents will truly give up their children, and so fully, 
…they shall generally be accepted, and their children will be sanctified in their infancy.” WJE 20:163. 
212 As mentioned previously, this fundamental tension will be touched on again further below when the 
question of Puritan preparation for conversion arises. 
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theological sense – regarding regeneration as it is believed to be as revealed through 
Scripture by God – Edwards believes regeneration to be an instantaneous act, a specific 
moment in which God acts upon a sinner. There can be no process involved in such a 
change. One cannot be both dead and alive at the same moment. Like Lazarus being 
raised from the dead, “conversion is wrought at once.”213 There is “a last moment of his 
being in a state of damnation and a first moment of his being in a state of salvation.”214 
This view of the instantaneous nature of regeneration is somewhat at odds with 
Edwards’ Arminian opponents, who have a tendency to view conversion as a more 
gradual process by which natural abilities are raised to bring about change. Edwards is 
completely opposed to such a view. “It is impossible for men to convert themselves by 
their own strength and industry, with only a concurring assistance helping in the exercise 
of their natural abilities and principles of the soul, and securing their improvement.”215 
Such a gradual process would require abilities not present in the unconverted 
individual.216 
Even though, theologically speaking, regeneration actually happens in an instant, 
practically speaking, the awareness of this change and the response of individuals to it is 
likely to appear more as a process. As an act of God upon the heart, there is a hiddenness 
to regeneration that can make identifying a particular moment in which a change occurs 
difficult. It is, as Edwards calls it, “a holy seed, a divine principle,… a small thing.” This 
seed of regeneration is only “a very small part of the plant, …its first principle.” Even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 WJE 21:161. Also WJE 13:173. 
214 WJE 13:168-69. In his “Treatise on Grace” Edwards is especially clear on this point. See especially WJE 
21:161-64. “Almost all the miracles of Christ that he wrought when on earth were types of his great work of 
converting sinners; and the manner of his working those miracles holds forth the instantaneousness of the 
work of conversion.” 162. 
215 WJE 21:164. 
216 WJE 21:164-65. 
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though this “plant of true holiness cannot be in the heart of a sinner,” it is also 
nevertheless in its beginnings often hidden from the conscious view of a regenerate 
individual.217 The grace implanted “does more gradually display itself in some than in 
others. Thus in “fixing on the precise time when they put forth the very first act of grace, 
there is a great deal of difference in different persons; in some it seems to be very 
discernible when the very time of this was; but others are more at a loss.”218 The outward 
view of regeneration then may not mirror the inward reality of its immediacy.219 Because 
of this Edwards does not insist that those professing faith provide a specific moment of 
their conversion.220 
If Edwards stresses the immediacy of regeneration, at the same time he also 
stresses the broader, more gradual processes involved with conversion, both in preparing 
for conversion and especially in the sanctification that surely follows any true conversion. 
Although the change of regeneration is immediate, “that knowledge, that reformation 
and conviction that is preparatory to conversion may be gradual, and the work of grace 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217 WJE 21:159. 
218 WJE 4:177. 
219 Also see, for example, Misc. 241, where Edwards writes, “it may be in the new birth as it is in the first 
birth. The vivification of the fetus in the womb is exceeding gradual; the vital operations of it arise from the 
most imperfect to the more perfect by an insensible increase, so that there is no determining at what time it 
first begins to be [a] living creature and to have a rational soul. Yet there is a certain moment that an 
immortal spirit begins to exist in it by God’s appointment; so that if the fetus should be destroyed before 
that moment, there would be an end to its existence; but if at any time after, there would remain an 
immortal spirit, that would be translated into another world. I don’t see why it may not be sometimes so [in 
the new birth also], though at other times there is doubtless a remarkable and very sensible change made at 
once when the soul is newborn.” WJE 13:357. He continues later: “In the new birth there is certainly a very 
great change made in the soul: so in the first birth there is a very great change when the rational soul is first 
infused, for the fetus immediately upon it becomes a living creature and a man, that before had no life; yet 
the sensible change is very gradual. It likewise seems reasonable to me to suppose that the habit of grace in 
adults is always begun with an act of grace that shall imply faith in it, because a habit can be of no manner 
of use till there is occasion to exert it.” 358. 
220 Edwards’ own conversion was itself outwardly more of a process than an event. Harold Simonson 
describes it not as “an instantaneous happening but rather a succession of deepening disturbances that 
relentlessly quickened in him both the sense of his natural weakness, even wretchedness, and the sense of 
divine grace.” Theologian of the Heart, 21. 
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after conversion may be gradually carried on.”221 Other gradual processes of 
sanctification necessarily follow any authentic conversion.222 God is active in the hearts of 
the truly regenerate, and this must finally become apparent in their maturation in the 
faith, in their changing character, and in their works. This leads us to the topic of our 
next section, the authentication of conversion. 
 
The Authentication of Conversion 
 
There is perhaps no more critical question for Edwards in the years during and 
following the Great Awakening than that of how one might differentiate between true 
and false conversion. The question of the authentication of conversion is at the heart of 
many of the controversies surrounding the revivals. How does one recognize true 
conversion? What signs are valid indicators? Are the extreme experiences of individuals in 
the revival context indicators of a salvific work of God in their hearts, or only of 
emotional excesses and self-deception? Questions about what constitutes proper evidence 
of regeneration are also central to other issues of Edwards’ time, such as controversies 
over standards for church membership and participation in sacraments. Therefore 
establishing the credibility of conversion is a difficulty that Edwards faced throughout his 
ministerial life. 
It was necessary for Edwards to address these concerns not only due to practical 
concerns of church membership or ecclesiological controversies, but also out of deeply 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 WJE 21:161. 
222 Kyle Strobel writes, “For Edwards, the Spirit’s presence is the primary vehicle for redemption, while the 
secondary focus is union, illumination, and infusion–union leading to justification, illumination to faith, and 
infusion to sanctification (sanctification depending on the other two). Edwards stresses the one action of 
conversion–but while there is a single moment of conversion, there is also a gradual work of grace 
postconversion in sanctification.” “By Word and Spirit,” in Edwards and Justification, 65-66. 
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pastoral concerns. His flock needed guidance on how to evaluate their own spiritual state. 
Therefore this is not only about determining the credibility of conversion in others, but 
also determining one’s own spiritual state – a question of the greatest spiritual importance 
that was only magnified in this societal and revival context.223 It could be a great burden 
and source of angst for some of his listeners.  
It is fairly clear in reading the works of Edwards that there is some progression 
and movement in his views on how true conversion is best authenticated. As mentioned 
previously, Edwards’ views on revivals and their results change over time. As a variety of 
commentators have also noted, Edwards moves from a position that is more affirming of 
conversion experiences, especially as related to revival activity, to one that is considerably 
more discerning and skeptical of such experiences. He is more inclined earlier in his 
career to see the results of revival more generously as works of new birth wrought by God, 
but later becomes more skeptical of those results because of their lack of permanency. In 
his later extended reflections on revivalistic conversion experiences he is much more 
insistent that such experiences in any number of forms are not self-validating indicators of 
God’s supernatural, salvific activity. C. C. Goen writes, “we know that on several 
occasions Edwards confessed that for all his caution he had been too hasty in 
pronouncing many conversions genuine. Such doubts found expression as early as May 
1737, when he declared in a sermon: ‘I do not know but I have trusted too much in men, 
and put too much confidence in the goodness and piety of the town.’”224  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 Goen writes that “one of the most vexing problems in the Great Awakening was the doctrine of personal 
assurance: how does a convert know he is truly saved, and how does he prove it to others?” WJE 4:47 
(Editor Intro). 
224 WJE 4:42 (Editor Intro), quoting an excerpt of an Edwards sermon on II Sam. 20:19 found in Perry 
Miller, “Jonathan Edwards’ Sociology of the Great Awakening,” New England Quarterly, 21 (1948), 61. 
Charles Hambrick-Stowe similarly comments that “over the course of the 1730s, as Ava Chamberlain has 
shown, Edwards moved only gradually to the position that the believer’s ‘new spiritual sense’ by itself was 
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Edwards’ most complete and mature reflections on these questions, and those 
most relevant to the question of the authentication of conversion, are to be found in 
Religious Affections, and thus it is this work that will be front and center in this section. 
Nowhere does Edwards consider the role of experience and other means in the 
authentication of one’s faith more fully than in this lengthy volume. Nowhere does he cast 
more doubt on a variety of experiences commonly thought to indicate the validity of 
one’s conversion and spiritual standing than in this book. Edwards spends as much time 
refuting many commonly asserted signs of conversion as he does describing positive or 
reliable signs of conversion. In the book he provides twelve negative signs of conversion – 
signs that are no indicator either way that one’s conversion is authentic – followed by 
twelve positive signs or indicators of conversion. 
 
No Certainty in the Authentication of True Conversion  
At the outset it is important to note that both in this work and elsewhere Edwards 
points out that there can be no certainty in determining who is truly converted.225 “What 
an indecent, self-exaltation, and arrogance is it, in poor fallible dark mortals, to pretend 
that they can determine and know, who are really sincere and upright before God, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
an unreliable indicator of grace and that the spiritual fruits of sustained godly behavior were the best means 
of assurance.” “The ‘Inward, Sweet Sense’ of Christ in Jonathan Edwards,” in The Legacy of Jonathan Edwards, 
ed. D. G. Hart, Sean Michael Lucas, and Stephen J. Nichols (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003), 
89. Likewise, Samuel Logan, Jr. considers Edwards’ “mature” perspective on these questions, especially 
post-Great Awakening. He notes the progression of Edwards’ thought from the earlier Narrative of Surprising 
Conversions through other books to his Religious Affections. In the earlier works he is much more affirming of 
external signs of grace as evidence of conversion than he is later, e.g. having Scriptures come to mind. He 
suggests that although Edwards never varies in his belief that God alone is the cause of justification, there is 
considerable movement in how Edwards believes conversion is best authenticated as he becomes more 
skeptical of external signs. “Evangelical Obedience,” in Edwards and Justification, 99-109. 
225 Goen considers it Edwards’ “settled conviction” that “no man can know with certainty the spiritual state 
of another.” WJE 4:43 (Intro). 
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who are not!”226 Edwards makes this point on numerous occasions. “No external 
manifestations and outward appearances whatsoever, that are visible to the world, are 
infallible evidences of grace.”227 External signs oblige us to treat such professors as 
brothers and sisters in Christ, and are good enough for use in this world, but are no 
certain sign of faith.228 “Nothing that appears to them in their neighbor, can be sufficient 
to beget an absolute certainty concerning the state of his soul: for they see not his heart, 
nor can they see all his external behavior.”229  
One can be certain neither in ruling any person truly converted nor declaring any 
person unconverted. For Edwards one of the worst results of the enthusiasts and more 
radical revivalists is the declaration or judgment of particular church members (or clergy) 
as unconverted. As Goen describes it, “censorious judging is beyond the pale of all 
Christian propriety, and should not be allowed even against the revival’s worst enemies. 
God alone has the right and the ability to judge opposers.”230 
If there are no certain signs of the conversion of others, nor are the signs Edwards 
provides adequate in declaring certainly one’s own status before God. “I am far from 
pretending to lay down any such rules, as shall be sufficient of themselves, without other 
means, to enable all true saints to see their good estate, or as supposing they should be the 
principal means of their satisfaction.”231 The obstacles of self-interest and self-deception 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 WJE 2:183-84. 
227 WJE 2:420. 
228 For one discussion of the limitations of external signs of grace, see WJE 2:181f. 
229 WJE 2:420. 
230 WJE 4:76 (Editor’s Intro). “Inasmuch as a later controversy over discerning visible sainthood would 
mark a sharp turn in Edwards’ career, it is important to note that neither here nor ever did he advocate the 
practice of attempting to judge the inward spiritual state of another person.” WJE 4:76. Although the 
church indeed must make judgments as to the standing of individuals, “it was the visibility of discipleship 
that should be subject to charitable judgment by the church, he thought, not one’s interior spiritual 
condition.” WJE 4:76. 
231 WJE 2:196. 
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run so deep as to render such judgments unreliable. Whether in oneself or in others, signs 
of conversion can be difficult to ascertain – grace is mingled with corruption.232 
 
Negative Signs of Conversion 
Edwards proceeds to describe a variety of negative signs in Religious Affections, that 
is – signs that are no indicator either way that one’s heart is truly converted. They could be 
an indicator of the Spirit’s supernatural activity in the regenerate heart, but they are not 
necessarily so; they may be a non-spiritual phenomenon. Among these negative signs are 
affections that are highly raised, affections having great bodily effects, being inclined to 
much talk of spiritual things, having experiences of humiliation, comfort, and joy in a 
certain order, being inclined to praise God, spending much time in the external activities 
and duties of worship, having confidence through one’s affections that their experiences 
are of divine origin and leave them in good standing with God, or having texts of 
Scripture “remarkably brought to the mind.”233 In his time many of these signs were 
thought to indicate the activity of the Holy Spirit and God’s supernatural renewal of the 
heart, and still are in evangelicalism today. But Edwards produces counterexamples of 
each sign that indicate that it is not necessarily of the Spirit, and could just as easily be 
counterfeit. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 WJE 2:194-95. McClymond and McDermott observe, “Edwards believed that piety needed to be 
rationally scrutinized. This was for the purpose of discriminating true religion from hypocrisy and self-
deception.” Theology of Edwards, 315. However, “during his later years, Edwards became skeptical about 
definitive judgments on one’s own or others’ spiritual condition. Hypocrites mimicked saints, and saints 
resembled hypocrites. The heart was deceptive both to others and to itself.” 316. Edwards acknowledged 
that “pastors and elders could never know with certainty whether someone was regenerate. It followed that 
all such judgments were based on probability rather than certainty.” 332. 
233 WJE 2:142. The other signs here described, and some additional negative signs, are described in Part 
Two of Religious Affections, 125-90. 
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The sudden bringing to mind of scriptural passages is only one example for 
Edwards of experiences one might expect (especially in the evangelical tradition) to be 
indicators of God’s saving activity.234 However, it is only one example of the exciting of 
the imagination, an occurrence that has no unique spiritual aspect, and one that can be 
used by Satan as well as God. One must be careful here to understand what Edwards has 
in mind. His point is that if we have affections on the basis of the way in which the 
Scripture is brought to mind, then these affections are not spiritual, but if we have 
affections based on a greater spiritual understanding or view of God and his glories then 
they are true religious affections. The difference is that the former is a trust in the manner 
of communication (a baseless trust in a common form that may give false assurance), 
while the latter is a spiritual sense coming from the content of those words and not the 
means of their transmission. For the former group “that the sudden and extraordinary 
way of the Scriptures coming to their mind, is plainly the first foundation of the whole; 
which is a clear evidence of the wretched delusion they are under.”235 No new spiritual 
knowledge results from such an encounter. 
Edwards applies the same mode of thinking to experiences of conversion in which 
one claims that a sudden voice or insight thought to be of God gives one a blessed 
promise or assurance of one’s standing before God. Given the self-love and self-interest at 
stake in such experiences, any number of other causes may account for a person’s 
interpretation of such events. For Edwards, it is the content, and not the form, of supposed 
spiritual experiences that is key to their evaluation as authentic. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 WJE 2:218-22 and elsewhere. 
235 WJE 2:221. 
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In all these areas Edwards demands that one reject the self-interpretation of 
experiences, and instead interpret experience through the lens of Scripture, thus also 
illustrating his view of the authority of Scripture.236 How does one distinguish true from 
counterfeit works of God? “We are to take the Scriptures as our guide in such cases: this is 
the great and standing rule which God has given to his church, to guide them in all things 
relating to the great concerns of their souls; and ‘tis an infallible and sufficient rule.”237  
Edwards’ view of Scripture, for example, underlies his discussions of the place of 
personal revelations of Scripture.238 Edwards asks where in Scripture will one find such a 
rule as would show such experiences to indicate saving grace?239 Instead he sees counter-
examples in Scripture where the devil can also use Scripture, and thus questions these 
experiences. His whole point rests in the role and authority of Scripture, over which a 
special trust in the manner in which a revelation comes to mind is only a diversion away 
from the truth of the Scripture itself. One can put faith in the form of transmission of a 
scriptural text instead of the content of Scripture, which is a mistake.240 
 
Positive Signs of Conversion and the Single Best Indicator 
In Part III of Religious Affections Edwards turns to a discussion of positive signs of 
conversion. He describes twelve positive signs, among them that true spiritual affections 
are brought about by supernatural, spiritual influences on the heart rather than natural 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 WJE 2:143-44. 
237 WJE 4:227 (Distinguishing Marks). 
238 See, for example, WJE 2:219-29. 
239 WJE 2:143. 
240 “If a sinner be once convinced of the veracity of God, and that the Scriptures are his Word, he’ll need 
no more to convince and satisfy him that he is invited; for the Scriptures are full of invitations to sinners, to 
the chief of sinners, to come and partake of the benefits of the gospel: he won’t want any new speaking of 
God to him, what he hath spoken already will be enough with him.” WJE 2:223. Even then, accurate 
knowledge brought to mind does not demonstrate conversion indubitably, unless such knowledge involves a 
spiritual understanding, a sense of the heart. WJE 2:220. 
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ones, that one’s affections are grounded not in self-interest but in the nature of divine 
things themselves, in which one perceives their reality, beauty, and sweetness, and that 
this involves the spiritual enlightenment of the mind and actual knowledge – known with 
a sense of the heart, and brings about a true humility and awareness of one’s position 
before God and a responsiveness to his will rather than one’s own – producing a soft 
heart and spirit of love, mercy, and forgiveness, and a desire of the soul for greater 
spiritual attainments rather than self-satisfaction.241 
The best sign of conversion, however, the sign which much of the book (and other 
writings of Edwards) points to, and the twelfth and final sign upon which Edwards 
devotes considerable space, is that the authenticity of one’s conversion is best seen in the 
fruit of one’s life over time, or as Edwards puts it, “gracious and holy affections have their 
exercise and fruit in Christian practice.”242 Edwards returns to this again and again. He 
terms it “the chief of all the signs of grace, both as an evidence of the sincerity of 
professors unto others, and also to their own consciences.”243 A person may have all 
manner of supposed spiritual experiences that may be difficult to discern as indicators of a 
salvific, transformative work of God in their hearts, but the one indicator that rarely leads 
one astray is the presence of gracious works or actions in the person’s life over time. 
Edwards believes this to be the case because he sees a necessary and close link 
between justification and sanctification. Although he most certainly affirms that 
justification is through faith alone, the transformation that is a part of such a process in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 WJE 2:191-383. 
242 WJE 2:383. Edwards spends almost eighty pages in closing Religious Affections discussing this twelfth sign. 
WJE 2:383-461. 
243 WJE 2:406. He later writes more expansively, “Now from all that has been said, I think it to be 
abundantly manifest, that Christian practice is the most proper evidence of the gracious sincerity of 
professors, to themselves and others; and the chief of all the marks of grace, the sign of signs, and evidence 
of evidences, that which seals and crowns all other signs.”443. It is, in many respects, the summation and 
fruition of the other positive signs, as they all lead to it. 
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the converted individual must necessarily lead to works. If those works do not save, they 
are nevertheless the best indicator or evidence of such a transformation.244 Douglas 
Sweeney comments that Edwards “emphasized that true faith will always bear good fruit–
that justification comes by faith alone but saving faith is never alone. He preached that 
genuine faith is always marked by acts of love. It always leads to good works.”245  
Edwards also argues for his final sign on the basis of Scripture. He refers to Matt. 
7:16, which explicitly states that individuals will be known by their fruits, and to Matt. 
7:20, 12:33, Luke 6:44, and James 2:18 among others. All refer to the relevance of the 
fruit of one’s life as an indicator of one’s inner condition. He contrasts this with the 
insufficiency of this inner condition being known by one’s talk, or experiences, or 
expressiveness, or feelings.246 “The Scripture plainly teaches that practice is the best 
evidence of the sincerity of professing Christians.” He likewise appeals to reason, which 
“teaches the same thing.”247 
Although emphasized strongly in Religious Affections, the importance of the fruit of 
one’s life as evidence of a regenerated heart is also a point made by Edwards throughout 
his writings. It can be found, for example, in his 1733 sermon, “Divine and Supernatural 
Light.” “This light, and this only, has its fruit in an universal holiness of life.”248 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Logan suggests that the nature and the signs of the operation of the Holy Spirit are intertwined, and so 
for Edwards there is “an essential unity between justification and sanctification” that many both in Edwards’ 
time and our own have lost sight of. “Evangelical Obedience,” in Edwards and Justification, 109. 
245 Sweeney, “Justification by Faith Alone? A Fuller Picture of Edwards’s Doctrine,” in Edwards and 
Justification, 140. He adds that Edwards “even went so far as to say that only holy people are saved, that final 
justification is granted only to those who persevere in the faith and love that they profess. For 
understandable reasons, some interpret these claims as echoes of Roman Catholic teaching–but Edwards 
never did.” Rather Edwards gave these views “in terms of traditional Calvinism.” 140.  
246 WJE 2:407f. On scriptural arguments, see also 429f., 436f. Good works as portrayed in Scripture are not 
merely external acts, but indicate the involvement of the person’s understanding and will. 422f. 
247 WJE 2:409. “Reason shows that men’s deeds are better and more faithful interpreters of their minds, 
than their words.” 409-410. On reason see also 426f. 
248 WJE 17:424. 
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another sermon from 1751 he writes, “all whose hearts come to Christ will be good.”249 
Sweeney suggests that one of Edwards’ best descriptions of the close relation of faith and 
works of love and holiness is to be found in his sermon series, Charity and Its Fruits, from 
1738 – especially in the twelfth sermon of that series.250 Edwards is never content for his 
hearers to rest in some particular experience or point of supposed conversion while 
ignoring the necessity for the fruits of that conversion in one’s life. Those fruits confirm 
the reality of any given experience or belief of one’s converted state or those of others.251 
If works are a key evidence of conversion, one should not conclude that Edwards 
believes that the truly converted will focus on self-contemplation of them. “Although self-
examination be a duty of great use and importance, and by no means to be neglected; yet 
it is not the principal means, by which the saints do get satisfaction of their good estate. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 “He That Believeth Shall Be Saved,” in The Sermons of Jonathan Edwards: A Reader, ed. by Wilson H. 
Kimnach, Kenneth P. Minkema, and Douglas A. Sweeney (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 
115. 
250 See WJE 8:326-38. 
251 Other examples of the presence of this important point are found throughout Edwards’ writings, and 
across the span of his life. See, for example, as an early example, WJE 21:471, 474, 476. These three 
references are to a previously unpublished notebook of Edwards called “Signs of Godliness” that probably 
dates back to around 1729, when he was an assistant to Stoddard. It represents an early attempt to discern 
signs of conversion. The focus is similar to later works, with an emphasis on the fruit that comes out of one’s 
life as a sign of godliness. True faith leads to actual works, not just intentions. “The fruits of grace in the life 
must needs be the proper evidences of it.” WJE 21:476. Sam Logan examines Edwards’ views here 
especially through the lens of his “Treatise on Justification by Faith Alone.” Here Edwards, in response to 
Arminian claims, “has no doubt that both faith and obedience are critically important in the lives of those 
whom God redeems, but he also has no doubt that neither of these causes justification.” “Evangelical 
Obedience,” in Edwards and Justification, 99. Misc. 412, “Justification,” (WJE 13:471-74) contains similar 
material to Edwards’ later treatise on “Justification by Faith Alone.” Although in one important sense 
justification has no basis or condition outside of faith in Christ, “in another sense, an universal and 
persevering obedience, and bringing forth the fruits of love to God and our neighbor, are conditions of 
salvation; as they may be put into a conditional proposition, and often are so in Scripture (if we have them, 
we shall have eternal life; and if we have them not, we shall not have eternal life), by reason of their 
necessary and immutable connection with faith, as immediately flowing from the nature of it.” WJE 13:472. 
In a sermon from August of 1740, “The Subjects of a First Work of Grace May Need a New Conversion” 
(WJE 22:183-202), one can again see the close bond between justification and sanctification. The 
development of the latter indicates true conversion. Here Edwards stresses that one must not stop with a 
first experience of grace or conversion;  he asserts that a new or second conversion is needed, by which he 
means essentially sanctification, or the ongoing work of God in one’s life. This continuing, gradual change 
over time indicates that true conversion has taken place and grace is at work in one’s life, which also leads 
to greater assurance and comfort for the believer. 
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Assurance is not to be obtained so much by self-examination, as by action.”252 Although 
one might find that the twelfth sign brings with it the appearance of a sort of self-centered 
project, that would be missing an important perspective of Edwards. When one actually 
comes to know God’s glory with a sense of the heart – when one tastes and sees that the 
Lord is good, one forgets about oneself, one’s experiences, the degree of one’s pride or 
humility, one’s works – even though this experience produces works. Rather than talking 
of one’s own experiences, “a true saint, when in the enjoyment of true discoveries of the 
sweet glory of God and Christ, has his mind too much captivated and engaged by what 
he views without himself, to stand at that time to view himself, and his own attainments: it 
would be a diversion and loss which he could not bear, to take his eye off from the 
ravishing object of his contemplation, to survey his own experience.”253 God’s beauty and 
holiness, once perceived, are overpowering.254 
 
The Permanence of Conversion 
 
One of the implications of the twelfth positive sign in Religious Affections is that a 
true saint demonstrates the fruit of Christian practice that is a result of true conversion 
and “persists in it to the end of life.”255 In fact, one could say that this perseverance is 
itself an evidence of true conversion – an indicator of the fruits of conversion over time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 WJE 2:195. 
253 WJE 2:252-53. 
254 McClymond and McDermott provide a nice summary statement of the ideas of this section. Eschewing 
any reliance on inward feelings of assurance, Edwards “was convinced that faith is more important than 
feelings about faith. Like other Calvinist theologians, Edwards believed that the performance of good works 
was the most reliable path to finding assurance of one’s salvation. He affirmed that the Spirit works in the 
believer’s heart, but always to change the will and the inclination. Over time this change of will and of 
inclination would manifest itself in a life of holy practice.” Theology of Edwards, 371. 
255 WJE 2:383. 
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Thus for Edwards true conversion is always permanent. Perseverance is indivisible from 
conversion; it is a necessary result of it. This Edwards makes clear on many occasions. In 
the Miscellanies he writes, “by their being already converted ‘tis certain they shall 
persevere.”256 Or again, “‘Tis evident that the saints shall persevere because they are 
already justified.”257 In his treatise, “Justification by Faith Alone,” he writes that 
perseverance is “virtually contained in that first act of faith; and ‘tis looked upon and 
taken by him that justifies, as being as it were a property in that faith that then is.”258 
“True faith perseveres, he [Edwards] said: ‘The Love of true saints to J[esus Christ] is 
such that nothing can extinguish or overcome.’”259 This being the case, perseverance can 
serve – in its way as an expression of Edwards’ final twelfth positive sign above – as a 
form of comfort and assurance to a believer.260 
If perseverance in the faith is a necessary attribute of conversion, for Edwards the 
inverse is also the case. “The want of perseverance is as much an evidence of the want of 
true conversion, as the want of conversion is a sign of the want of election.”261 If one falls 
away from the faith, this is evidence that one was never truly converted. “They that fall 
away, and cease visibly to do so, ‘tis a sign they never were risen with Christ. And 
especially when men’s opinion of their being converted, and so in a safe estate, is the very 
cause of their coming to this, it is a most evident sign of their hypocrisy.”262 True saints 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 WJE 13:474 (Misc. 415). 
257 WJE 18:340 (Misc. 711). He adds, “That a believer’s justification implies not only deliverance from the 
wrath of God, but a title to glory, is evident by Rom. 5:1-2, where the Apostle mentions both these as joint 
benefits implied in justification.” 340. 
258 WJE 19:203. “It being by divine constitution connected with that first faith, as much as if it were a 
property in it, it is then considered as such, and so justification is not suspended; but were it not for this it 
would be needful that it should be suspended, till the sinner had actually persevered in faith.” 203. 
259 Sweeney, “Justification by Faith Alone?,” in Edwards and Justification, 149, quoting Edwards from ms. 
Sermon on Cant. 8:7 (Dec 1746), L. 1r., box 4, f. 268, Beinecke Library. 
260 WJE 19:205. 
261 WJE 13:475 (Misc. 415). 
262 WJE 2:391. 
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may evidence some forms of backsliding, but will not completely fall away.263 “They that 
are truly converted are new men, new creatures.… They walk in newness of life, and 
continue to do so to the end of life.”264  
Such a change cannot be mimicked by the unregenerate. Just as a pig may be 
washed clean for a time but will return to the mire without a change in its nature, a 
natural man may fight against his nature and appear for a time to live a religious life, but 
the force of one’s nature is too strong and this cannot be maintained. Thus an 
unregenerate person may, like Pharaoh, before God’s strivings and in one’s own battles 
between desires and lusts and conscience, humble oneself, but it is not lasting. “Sinners 
are sometimes, by thunders and lightnings [sic], and great terrors of the law, brought to a 
seeming work of humiliation, and to appearance to part with their sins; but are no more 
thoroughly brought to a disposition to dismiss them, than Pharaoh was to let the people 
go.”265 Like Pharaoh, “so it oftentimes is with sinners: they are willing to part with some 
of their sins; but not all: they are brought to part with the more gross acts of sin; but not 
to part with their lusts, in lesser indulgences of ‘em.”266 Real change requires a change in 
one’s nature that can only be wrought by God.267 Left to human effort alone, “without 
the mortification of the inward principle of sin, they will not persevere in it: but will 
return as the dog to his vomit; and so bring on themselves dreadful and remediless 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 “True saints may be guilty of some kinds and degrees of backsliding, and may be soiled by particular 
temptations, and may fall into sin, yea great sins: but they can never fall away so, as to grow weary of 
religion, and the service of God, and habitually to dislike it and neglect it; either on its own account, or on 
account of the difficulties that attend it: as is evident by Gal. 6:9; Rom. 2:7; Heb. 10:36; Is. 43:22; Mal. 
1:13.” WJE 2:390. 
264 WJE 2:391. 
265 WJE 2:404. 
266 WJE 2:405. 
267 WJE 2:395-96. 
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destruction.”268 Perseverance is then, like conversion itself, ultimately rooted in Christ’s 
work and sustained by the ongoing work of the Spirit.269 
 
A Morphology of Conversion and the Ordo Salutis 
 
Can one prepare for conversion? Are there any steps that may be taken to aid in 
bringing it about, and if so, are these the work of humans or of God? How does one’s 
view of preparation for conversion affect one’s understanding of the order of salvation, or 
ordo salutis? If there is some role for the human in preparing for conversion, does this put 
repentance and/or some form of sanctification before regeneration? How are the various 
theological aspects involved in conversion (election, regeneration, repentance, justification, 
sanctification) best ordered? In what order does the process of salvation occur? These are 
questions to be asked of Edwards in this section. First the idea of preparation for 
conversion will be examined, followed by a discussion of the order of salvation. 
 
Preparationism and a “Morphology of Conversion” 
A few decades back Edmund S. Morgan coined the phrase, “a morphology of 
conversion,” to describe the steps suggested by Puritans that take place in preparing for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 WJE 2:405. 
269 In addition to the above texts, see Misc. 695 on perseverance, in which the security/stability of 
perseverance is made clearly to rest in God’s work through Christ, the second Adam, who – unlike the first 
Adam – indeed persevered in his faith to the death. WJE 18:276-81. Sweeney writes, “Edwards taught that 
only those who persevere in faith and love will go to be with God in heaven. But he also said that faith 
alone unites such people to Christ, whose perfect righteousness alone can satisfy the law’s demands. Human 
righteousness is necessary, but only as a sign that one is savingly converted, united to the Savior–and only as 
the fruit of the Spirit’s presence in one’s life. All other righteousness, for Edwards, is counterfeit and vain.” 
Sweeney, “Justification by Faith Alone?,” in Edwards and Justification, 150. 
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conversion.270 His student, Norman Pettit, extended this study of “preparationism” in his 
book, The Heart Prepared.271 Puritan preparationism, the teaching that one must prepare 
for grace by passing through various recognizable stages of contrition and humiliation 
before conversion, had played a part in New England religious life throughout its history. 
For most Puritans previous to Edwards preparation for conversion had been thought 
necessary, even if – given their other theological doctrines on conversion – it was also 
logically incoherent. Pettit writes, “if in theory there was nothing one could do to bring on, 
or even to anticipate, regeneration, piety in New England demanded that the heart be 
put in order for the coming of the Spirit.… It was possible and indeed necessary to 
prepare the heart for salvation.”272  
The difficult relation of human agency to divine sovereignty found in the notion of 
preparation for a gracious conversion had often been a source of conflict within the 
Reformed tradition and beyond. As Norman Pettit noted, “the concept of a preparatory 
period before saving grace in which man is assigned a part to play of his own had long 
been a matter of dispute in orthodox Christianity.”273 Augustine argued against Pelagius 
and some early Fathers, and with Paul, that preparation was a work of grace and not of 
the will.274 However, the notion of preparation was especially prominent in the Puritan 
community, and not always expressed as a work of grace.275 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 See Morgan’s book, Visible Saints: The History of a Puritan Idea (1963; rpt. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1965). 
271 Norman Pettit, The Heart Prepared (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966). 
272 Pettit, Heart Prepared, 2. 
273 Pettit, Heart Prepared, p.22. 
274 Pettit, Heart Prepared, p.23. 
275 More recently than Pettit these “preparationist” characteristics of the Puritans have been discussed in a 
work of Joel R. Beeke and Paul M. Smalley. See Prepared by Grace, for Grace: The Puritans on God's Ordinary Way 
of Leading Sinners to Christ (Grand Rapids, MI: Reformation Heritage Books, 2013). Although this book was 
not yet available when preparing this chapter, their basic position is that the Puritans “consistently opposed 
any notion of preparation based upon the exercise of human free will or any supposed merit in the actions 
of sinful men.” 4. “We authors believe that the doctrine of preparation generally received among the 
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Early Puritans often described several stages in conversion. William Perkins (1558-
1602) suggested ten, of which the first four were preparatory. 
1. Ministry of the word 
2. Knowledge of the law, of good and evil 
3. This led to awareness of one’s own sinfulness, generally and particularly 
4. Legal fear, or what was later termed conviction of sin or humiliation.  
 
In the fourth “crucial stage the individual perceived his helpless and hopeless 
condition and despaired of salvation.”276  The later stages that followed were the result of 
a work of grace. As Morgan describes it, “This was the constant message of Puritan 
preachers: in order to be sure one must be unsure… The surest earthly sign of a saint was 
his uncertainty; and the surest sign of a damned soul was security.”277 
Later Thomas Hooker (1586-1647) emphasized the preparatory stages even more 
than most other preachers of his day. Pettit suggests that “the preparatory phase was by 
far the most important single activity in Hooker’s conception of conversion. Rarely did he 
preach to his covenant community without exhorting the unconverted to prepare for 
grace. Seldom did he turn to the regenerative process without initial concern for the 
‘heart prepared.’”278 Hooker held to “the absolute necessity of preparatory activity. ‘Nay, 
there is no faith can be infused into the soul before the heart be prepared,’ he says. ‘No 
preparation, no perfection. Never humbled, never exalted.’”279 Contrition and 
humiliation were necessary steps to conversion. Most of the New England preachers 
agreed that preparation was necessary, but Hooker thought perhaps a saving work could 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Puritans is biblical, evangelical, and Reformed (though we will point out cases where some individual 
Puritans have carried certain aspects of this doctrine beyond biblical boundaries).” 7. 
276 Morgan, Visible Saints, 68. 
277 Visible Saints, 70. 
278 Pettit, Heart Prepared, 100-101. 
279 Pettit, Heart Prepared, 96. 
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even come through the preparatory stages before faith. Thomas Shepard (1605-1649), 
John Cotton (1584-1652), and most others did not follow him in this.280  
John Cotton sought to counter the prevailing preparationist tendencies of his 
fellow Puritans. Rather than seeing any preparatory steps before conversion as pre-
gracious human acts, Cotton believed them to be acts made possible only by God’s 
previous gracious work within those individuals. As Pettit puts it, “In reasserting the 
doctrine of human helplessness, [John] Cotton refused to allow for preparation in the 
sense of a personal turning toward God. Man is brought to salvation, he insisted, only by 
divine constraint.”281 Cotton wrote, “‘I confess I do not discern that the Lord worketh 
and giveth any saving preparations in the heart till He give union with Christ. For if the 
Lord do give any saving qualifications before Christ, then the soul may be in the state of 
salvation before Christ; and that seemeth to be prejudicial unto the grace and truth of 
Jesus Christ.’”282  
In moving closer to Edwards, one finds that his own father, Timothy Edwards 
(1668-1759) followed the mainstream of New England Puritanism in seeing three steps to 
conversion: conviction, humiliation, and receiving God’s regenerating ‘light.’283 The first 
two steps were merely steps of preparation, as salvation was God’s gracious act alone, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 Holifield, Theology in America, 43. 
281 Pettit, Heart Prepared, 129. He notes further, “To strict predestinarians preparation was a veritable 
doctrine of works, elevating natural abilities and cheapening grace. Contrition and humiliation, they 
maintained, were not antecedents to conversion but consequents of the conversion experience.” 19. In New 
England, Anne Hutchinson, John Wheelwright, and Rev. John Cotton argued that the teaching of 
preparation was a covenant of works. All but John Cotton were banished from the colony, though not 
merely for this teaching but for, in Anne Hutchinson’s case at least, believing that this was revealed to her 
directly by the Holy Spirit, rather than relying on Scripture to interpret her experience. “The critical 
charge against the antinomians was not that they denied preparation as such, but that they denied it on the 
basis of immediate revelations. This meant that they scorned not only the necessity of the Word–the basis of 
Christianity, the foundation of the Christian community–but the necessity of the Law, by which man is 
made conscious of his sins.” Pettit, Heart Prepared, 151. 
282 As quoted in Pettit, Heart Prepared, 139. 
283 See Marsden, Life, 26-28. 
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not the result of works. Holifield writes that Edwards’ grandfather and predecessor to his 
pulpit in Northampton, Solomon Stoddard, had as “cornerstones” to his theology “the 
doctrines of preparation and conversion, and his life task was to show that both were 
necessary and that human effort could accomplish neither.”284 
The revivals of the First Great Awakening only expanded debates over 
preparationism. Holifield writes that “no topic recurred more often in revivalist preaching 
and polemics.”285 For most of the pro-revivalists, it was thought that the Spirit must 
prepare the heart for regeneration through awareness of sin and guilt, humiliation and 
conviction. “It became a New Light truism that conviction preceded regeneration.”286 All 
of this formed the backdrop for Edwards’ perspectives. 
Edwards’ relation to the preparationism of the earlier New England and English 
Puritans is an interesting and somewhat debated topic, and commentators are divided in 
their assessment. On the one hand one finds this position: “Edwards from his earliest days 
was intensely critical of the ‘morphology of conversion.’” which “fits neither Edwards’ 
experience nor his theology. He repeatedly denied that such an idea is to be found in the 
Bible.”287 Josh Moody argues that Edwards does not “follow William Perkins or other 
full-blown ‘preparationists,’ nor even the concertinaed distinctions of his grandfather 
Solomon Stoddard.”288 Rather Edwards insists that “any kind of preparation is 
supernatural or gracious in origin.”289 Holifield goes further, suggesting that not only for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Theology in America, 66. 
285 Theology in America, 97. 
286 Holifield, Theology in America, 98. 
287 From the “Editors’ Introduction” in A Jonathan Edwards Reader, ed. John E. Smith, Harry S. Stout, and 
Kenneth P. Minkema (1995; rpt. New Haven, CT: Yale Nota Bene, 2003), xxi. 
288 Moody, “Justification Today,” in Edwards and Justification, 29. He argues this more fully in an earlier book, 
Jonathan Edwards and the Enlightenment (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), 32-33. 
289 Moody, “Justification Today,” in Edwards and Justification, 30. 
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Edwards, but for most Puritans preceding him, preparatory steps are always a reflection 
of God’s grace rather than any human act.290  
On the other hand Mark Valeri writes, “Edwards maintained that the 
performance (or, more properly, attempted performance) of religious and moral 
disciplines prepared people for regeneration by revealing to them the depth of their own 
iniquity, culpability, and need for grace. Here he appropriated and modified the standard 
Puritan paradigm of conversion, which located humiliation as a work of preparation.”291 
Robert Jenson expresses his dismay over Edwards’ preparationism, and the lack of 
“ontological weight” given for the gospel word spoken in the church.292 McClymond and 
McDermott write that “Edwards maintained the preparationist perspective of his New 
England forbears.”293 He “agreed with his Puritan predecessors’ basic premise. 
Preparation comes before conversion ‘except [in] very extraordinary cases.’”294 And 
further, “as John Gerstner showed, Edwards not only held to preparationism but made 
the concept integral to his homiletic, evangelistic, and pastoral practice. He clearly 
rejected a do-nothing, resigned, or fatalistic form of Calvinism. Instead he prodded the 
unconverted to intense efforts toward their own salvation and the converted to a 
continual quest for more grace.”295 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 “Neither Hooker nor the other ministers ever meant to suggest that sinners could prepare their own 
hearts. The doctrine of preparation referred to divine activity, not to natural human effort.” Holifield, 
Theology in America, 44. As Hooker commented, the saving preparations “‘are wrought in me, not by me.’” 
As quoted in Holifield, Theology in America, 44. Anything else would reflect Arminanism. 
291 WJE 17:37. Valeri refers to the 1730 sermon, “God Makes Men Sensible of Their Misery Before He 
Reveals His Mercy and Love,” as an example. 
292 America’s Theologian, 62. 
293 Theology of Edwards, 679. 
294 Theology of Edwards, 374. They also note, however, that it is the Holy Spirit that stimulates such a process. 
295 Theology of Edwards, 679. See also John H. Gerstner, Steps to Salvation (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1960), John H. Gerstner and Jonathan Neil Gerstner, “Edwardsean Preparation for Salvation,” Westminster 
Theological Journal 42 (1979), 5-71. McClymond and McDermott waffle a bit on this issue in various parts of 
the book. Generally they stress the theme of preparationism, although they also at times qualify it, as in the 
previous footnote. Even then, however, it is not clear if the Spirit’s work is that of common or special grace. 
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What accounts for this diversity of opinions. How have commentators failed to 
come to anything like a unified view of Edwards in this area? The blame most likely is 
best assigned to Edwards himself. In turning to his own thoughts and writings on 
preparationism there are times when one is prone to ask, “Will the real Jonathan 
Edwards please stand up?”  
For example, consider the following statements that seem to affirm preparationism. 
“As to preparatory work before conversion, there is undoubtedly always, except [in] very 
extraordinary cases, such a thing.… Now who can believe that the Spirit of God takes a 
man in his career in sin, without any forethought, or foreconcern or any such thing, or 
any preparatory circumstances to introduce it? We have no instance of such a thing 
without something preparatory, either preparatory thought or circumstances which 
prepared in some measure his thoughts.”296 Or again, “that argument to prove that God’s 
usual method is to make sinners very sensible of their misery, and bring them to a despair 
of help from themselves or any other creature before he converts them,… has certainly 
some force in it. For it seems by the Scripture, that he does regard a disposition of the 
heart whereby it is prepared thus to receive his benefits before he bestows them.”297 At 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
They note that, “if the Puritan divines believed in preparatory steps, so did Edwards. God’s ‘method’ is to 
‘first’ reveal ‘his dreadful majesty and justice before he reveals his grace.’” 374. For Edwards, “God’s usual 
manner in preparing people for grace is a three-fold process. A person sees her ‘danger of eternal misery,’ 
which is ‘conviction.’ Then she is given the ability ‘to see the absolute necessity of a savior’ (‘humiliation’), 
and only after that ‘see[s] the sufficiency and excellency of the Savior that is offered’ (‘conversion’).” 375-76. 
“Stripped down to its essentials, preparationism included two key points–that God is free and sovereign in 
dispensing grace, and that human beings may prepare themselves to receive grace.” 678. They add, 
however, that “Edwards was impatient with teachings about preparation that implied these steps were 
universal or always followed a prescribed order.” 376. 
296 WJE 13:173 (Misc. r). 
297 WJE 13:365 (Misc. 255, emphasis mine). Or consider also the following from Misc. 337. “This being the 
method God takes with the world, first to make a revelation of his dreadful majesty and justice before he 
reveals his grace, as in this instance–and so he first revealed the law with thunders and lightnings from 
Mount Sinai before the full revelation of his grace by Jesus Christ, to prepare the more for the reception of 
that grace… so ‘tis but reasonable to suppose that this is his common method with particular persons, first 
to awaken them to a sense of the dreadful justice of God and his displeasure against sin, and then to give 
them a sense of his grace.” WJE 13:412. 
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times Edwards clearly describes the commonly acknowledged preparatory steps. “There 
are these three things necessary: (1) to see our danger of eternal misery, (2) to see the 
absolute necessity of a savior, and (3) to see the sufficiency and excellency of the Savior 
that is offered. The first is given in conviction, the second in humiliation, the third in 
conversion.”298 Edwards’ own preaching often seems to reflect a desire to prepare his 
audience. For example, his most famous sermon, “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry 
God,” demonstrates this notion of preparation for grace by preaching judgment and law. 
Conversely, Edwards can be quite pointed in criticizing preparationist schemes. 
He writes, for example, that a person’s state should not “be judged of by any exactions of 
steps, and method of experiences, in what is supposed to be the first conversion.”299 In 
Faithful Narrative, Edwards even catalogs the enormous variety of processes, experiences, 
and steps by which individuals experience conviction and conversion.300 He there 
concludes that “there is an endless variety in the particular manner and circumstances in 
which persons are wrought on, and an opportunity of seeing so much of such a work of 
God will shew that God is further from confining himself to certain steps, and a particular 
method, in his work on souls, than it may be some do imagine.”301 In Religious Affections he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 WJE 13:400 (Misc. 317). In the next and final paragraph he writes, “it seems very congruous, that God 
should prepare the heart [of the sinner] for the receiving of Christ by a sense of his sin and misery, and a 
despair of help in himself and in all others.” 400. Other examples of Edwards’ endorsement of preparation 
in some form could also be cited. For example, “Earnestly seeking and taking pains for grace, prepares the 
heart highly to prize it, and make much of it when obtained; and their natural powers and principles are 
hereby already awakened, and got into such a way of acting, that they are the more prepared to concur 
with grace.” WJE 18:89 (Misc. 542). 
299 WJE 4:556. 
300 See WJE 4:160-90. 
301 WJE 4:185. Similarly he writes in Distinguishing Marks that “we ought not to limit God where he has not 
limited himself.” WJE 4:229. 
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warns that “no order or method of operations and experiences is any certain sign of their 
divinity.”302  
A careful reading of the above, however, reveals that Edwards nowhere directly 
insists either that preparatory efforts toward conversion are human works, or that such 
preparatory steps must always be rejected as a part of the process of conversion. What he 
does insist on is that the requirement or strict use of preparatory steps to distinguish 
authentic from false conversion is illegitimate. “The thing that I speak of as unscriptural, 
is the insisting on a particular account of the distinct method and steps, wherein the Spirit 
of God did sensibly proceed, in first bringing the soul into a state of salvation, as a thing 
requisite in order to receiving a professor into full charity as a real Christian.”303 
One can see clearly in the Religious Affections both Edwards’ use of the Puritan 
preparationist tradition and Edwards’ modification and critique of it. Edwards first 
defends a more typical Puritan pattern of conversion preceded by humiliation, etc., as a 
common method of God in dealing with sinners, but then notes that such a pattern is also 
not required, nor does its presence necessitate that grace is present. “Experience plainly 
shows, that God’s Spirit is unsearchable and untraceable, in some of the best of Christians, 
in the method of his operations, in their conversion. Nor does the Spirit of God proceed 
discernibly in the steps of a particular established scheme, one half so often as is 
imagined.”304 
The appearance of steps commonly acknowledged to be preparatory to 
conversion do not in and of themselves prove anything either way about one’s spiritual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 WJE 2:159. His eighth negative sign reads, “Nothing can certainly be determined concerning the nature 
of the affections by this, that comforts and joys seem to follow awakenings and convections of conscience, in 
a certain order.” 151. 
303 WJE 2:418. 
304 WJE 2:162. 
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state or possible conversion. Such steps may or may not be part of a work of saving grace. 
Thus in discussing the preparatory step of humiliation Edwards suggests that there can be 
legal and evangelical humiliation, the former of which is a purely natural state stemming 
from increased knowledge of the things of religion and/or common grace influences by 
the Spirit. The legal form may give persons a sense of their smallness and insufficiency, 
but not a heartfelt responsiveness and deep moral sense of their odiousness. “They have 
not an answerable frame of heart, consisting in a disposition to abase themselves, and 
exalt God alone.… In a legal humiliation, the conscience is convinced; as the consciences 
of all will be most perfectly at the Day of Judgment: but because there is no spiritual 
understanding the will is not bowed, nor the inclination altered.”305 With evangelical 
humiliation comes, by contrast, “a sense that a Christian has of his own utter insufficiency, 
despicableness, and odiousness, with an answerable frame of heart.”306 The disposition is 
changed “by overcoming the heart, and changing its inclination, by a discovery of God’s 
holy beauty.”307 
The discussion is similar to the earlier discussion of forms of knowing God. 
Natural man can see God’s natural attributes of greatness and respond in kind to them, 
but only spiritual man can see the excellencies of God’s moral attributes and hence one’s 
own sinfulness in its fullness. What is most essential to true religion is the bringing about 
of this true humility before God, such that one can live for and by God’s righteousness 
and glory rather than one’s own. 
Whether or not a particular conversion experience mirrors the typical Puritan 
preparationist paradigm, Edwards – in spite of some ambiguous expressions at times – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 WJE 2:312. 
306 WJE 2:311. 
307 WJE 2:312. 
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seems to point to all the activity being gracious activity, founded not on human effort but 
springing from divine initiative. “There is a vast difference, as has been observed, in the 
degree, and also in the particular manner of persons’ experiences, both at and after 
conversion; some have grace working more sensibly in one way, others in another.”308 
Even though experiences vary, in all of them it is “grace working more sensibly” at their 
root. Even if not all preparatory signs are authentic, all that are authentic reflect the 
saving work of the Spirit. 
Thus Norman Pettit seems to be accurate in his assessment that Edwards sees the 
preparatory steps not as preparation for but signs of conversion and election. “Religious 
sorrow and brokenness of heart were not, in his mind, preliminary steps to conversion but 
distinguishing marks in the character of a Saint. Where the earliest Puritan divines had 
looked to ‘conversion’ as the beginning of ‘hope,’ as the start of a process leading toward 
possible assurance of election, Edwards saw conversion as one of the many ‘signs’ of 
election.”309  
 
The Order of Salvation 
One’s view of preparationism can influence one’s understanding of an order of 
salvation. If there is a role for humans in preparing for saving grace through their own 
efforts, this then shifts attention toward the human condition. Ultimately it could have a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
308 WJE 4:185. 
309 Heart Prepared, 210. He continues, “In brief, he distinguished between the nature of true piety and the 
process whereby that piety is revealed. Only those to whom the sense of the heart already belonged could 
possibly exhibit the signs.” 210. This point is confirmed by James Moorhead, who notes that “although 
scholars used to emphasize that this oscillation between anxiety and hope characterized the Puritan 
understanding of conversion, we now know that it is a serious misunderstanding to confine the dialectic to a 
single period in the Puritan saint’s life. The drama of conversion, with its alternating rhythm of abasement 
and exaltation, was to be reenacted time and again as the saint moved toward holiness.” “The Quest for 
Holiness in American Protestantism,” Interpretation 53, no. 4 (October 1999), 365-379, 367. 
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significant impact on one’s view of God’s election, of justification, sanctification, and 
grace – a shift toward human works as a part of the basis for who is justified and who is 
not.  
Some, in fact, have suggested that Edwards’ views in some of these areas indeed 
bear greater resemblance to a Catholic soteriology than a Protestant one. McDermott, for 
example, argues that Edwards understands justification to be a gradual process in which 
sanctification is mixed, much like the Roman Catholic view. He suggests that “Martin 
Luther’s salvation by faith alone becomes for Edwards salvation by faith primarily.”310 He 
argues further that Edwards’ “emphasis on disposition as primary and faith as secondary 
and the dispositional structure of his soteriology undermine the Reformation contention 
that salvation is the justification of the ungodly.”311 Bruce McCormack also suggests “that 
even Luther and Calvin were unable to escape a certain ‘Catholic’ focus on God’s work 
in us because the priority they gave to faith (Luther) and union with Christ (Calvin) 
placed regeneration before justification in logical order, and so required attention to the 
religious condition of the believer.”312 
For these interpreters, this shift toward the believer’s condition (as reflecting works, 
or love, or obedience) is believed necessary if regeneration is thought to be logically prior 
to justification. In such a reading, sanctification in some form or another would precede 
or be concurrent to justification in the order of salvation. In supporting such an ordering 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310 Edwards Confronts the Gods, 136. 
311 Edwards Confronts the Gods, 136. See also Misc. 218, 793, 315, 412, 712, 847, and Morimoto, Edwards and 
the Catholic Vision. While McDermott notes that Edwards often qualifies these types of statements, he still 
argues forcefully that this is the correct understanding of Edwards. This perspective is in fact critical to 
McDermott’s project. 
312 As described in McClymond and McDermott, Theology of Edwards, 399-400. In his own words, 
McCormack writes, “where regeneration is made–even if only logically–to be the root of justification, there 
the work of God ‘in us’ is, once again (and now on the soil of the Reformation!) made to be the ground of 
the divine forgiveness of sins.” Bruce L. McCormack, “What’s At Stake in Current Debates Over 
Justification?: The Crisis of Protestantism in the West,” in Justification: What’s At Stake in the Current Debates, ed. 
Mark Husbands and Daniel J. Treier, InterVarsity, 2004, 102. 
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Edwards then is moving toward a soteriology more similar to Roman Catholicism that 
undermines the sharp distinctiveness of classic Reformation theology. McClymond and 
McDermott go so far as to suggest that for Edwards “the ground of justification is 
twofold.” Referring to a later work of Edwards, the “Book of Controversies,” they note 
that it is based primarily on Christ’s righteousness but “‘the believer’s inherent holiness is 
a secondary dependent and derivative worthiness.’”313 Thus they believe that “Edwards 
also blurred the sharp boundary that many of the Reformers had constructed between 
justification and sanctification,” as Edwards argues that “‘obedience is the most proper 
condition of the covenant of grace,’” and that other conditions such as love, repentance, 
and perseverance are necessary.314  
A number of other scholars take issue with the above reading of Edwards. Josh 
Moody, for example, confronts it directly. Moody examines some specific passages used 
to support such a view, and insists that in their context this is not a proper reading. In 
discussing one of these passages, from “Justification by Faith Alone,” Moody asserts that 
“Edwards is not arguing that what is ‘real’ in the believer is their personal sanctification, 
either in a works righteous semi-Pelagian way or in a Roman Catholic sense (which, for 
many Reformed theologians, would be similar). Instead he is arguing that what is ‘real’ in 
the believer is the real person of Jesus Christ himself. It is his merits, his righteousness, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
313 Theology of Edwards, 400, quoting WJE 21:367. They continue, “In sum, Edwards truly believed that 
Christ’s righteousness was the primary ground for justification, but he also believed that what occurs in the 
believer is a secondary ground. With this assertion, he seems to have broken Reformation strictures against 
placing any dependence for justification– even ‘relatively or indirectly’–on faith and its related virtues.” 400. 
See WJE 19:154, 156, 199, 214-15; 21:367. They also refer to George Hunsinger, “Dispositional 
Soteriology: Jonathan Edwards on Justification by Faith Alone,” Westminster Theological Journal 66 (2004), 
107-20, 110. 
314 Theology of Edwards, 401. “This means that all ‘the fruits of love to God and our neighbor’ are conditions 
as well. Edwards also included repentance, ‘the first closing with Christ,’ and lifelong perseverance as 
conditions of justification. Perseverance is particularly important because justification has a future 
dimension making it provisional until the full term of perseverance has been completed.” 401. See WJE 
13:471, 396; 23:517; 13:472; 18:51-52, 150-51. 
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Christ himself that is ‘real’ and the ‘foundation of what is legal’ [the particular phrase 
here suggesting an alternate reading].”315 In “Justification by Faith Alone,” for example, 
Edwards is simply trying to show “how obeying God comes out of a doctrine when you 
are justified by faith alone,” since that is the ever constant objection to justification by 
faith alone.316 
Moody argues that when Edwards uses the term ‘sanctification,’ he often intends 
“a more broadly defined word meaning ‘that which is holy,’ and certainly Christ in the 
soul (the ‘union,’ remember?), the regeneration, is holy in this sense.”317 It is not being 
used in some narrowly defined, Reformation, order of salvation sense. Thus he believes 
that Edwards supports an order of regeneration-justification-sanctification.318 Moody 
argues further that a view of justification rooted in Scripture, Luther, Calvin, and the 
Westminster Confession is foundational to Edwards and other New England Puritans, 
and that everything else Edwards says has this as its background.319 He points to Edwards’ 
discussion of Romans 4.5 in “Justification by Faith Alone,” where Edwards calls it 
“absurd” that any would conclude from it that one’s own goodness or righteousness can 
be in any way involved in our justification.320 
Like Moody, Kyle Strobel is also critical of these views. For Strobel they 
undermine to some extent the position and importance of justification to Edwards’ 
theology. Strobel calls Edwards’ doctrine of justification “thin” in that it holds a narrow 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
315 “Justification Today,” in Edwards and Justification, 26-27. The passage he refers to is WJE 19:158-59. 
316 “Justification Today,” in Edwards and Justification, 33. 
317 “Justification Today,” in Edwards and Justification, 28. 
318 Moody notes that Conrad Cherry suggests that when finding the word ‘sanctification’ in Edwards one 
should read it as ‘regeneration.’ Although Moody is not sure that Cherry is right, he thinks it closer to the 
right reading than some other options. “Justification Today,” in Edwards and Justification, 28. 
319 “Justification Today,” in Edwards and Justification, 35-39. McClymond and McDermott, however, note 
that what some of the Reformers, including Luther and Calvin, thought about justification and its relation 
to sanctification was not as clear cut and aligned to some later Reformed thought on justification by faith 
alone. See Theology of Edwards, 401-404. 
320 “Justification Today,” Edwards and Justification, 39-40. 
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theological space that is nonetheless a critical hinge in Edwards’ thought. “The doctrine 
of justification is the hinge on which all true religion turns for Edwards, regardless of early 
or late material, or his emphasis upon grace, infusion, or sanctification.”321 Strobel is 
critical of a variety of interpreters here, including McDermott, Schafer, Chamberlain, 
and McClymond.322 Strobel argues for the close relation of justification to union with 
Christ. As he puts it, “Edwards’s doctrine of justification stands and falls with his concept 
of union.”323 In Strobel’s view, believers do not receive Christ as a reward for faith. 
Rather, faith is the act or condition that produces a union.324 And it is in that union that 
one is justified and made righteous. So “for Edwards, the question is not, ‘How can I 
become righteous and therefore justified?’ but is instead, ‘How can I become united to 
Christ, where righteousness and justification reside:’”325 For Edwards, the Reformed 
position on justification by faith does not create a ‘legal fiction.’ “Rather than opting for a 
declaration from God that makes the sinner righteous in justification, Edwards addresses 
both faith in and union with Christ as the reality which makes the declaration of 
righteousness true.”326 God declares the believer righteous because in Christ the believer 
is truly righteous before God. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
321 Strobel, “By Word and Spirit,” in Edwards and Justification, 49, n.13. 
322 Strobel is also later critical of Morimoto’s reading of Edwards. “By Word and Spirit,” in Edwards and 
Justification, 67, n. 77. 
323 Strobel, “By Word and Spirit,” in Edwards and Justification, 61. 
324 See WJE 19:158. 
325 Strobel, “By Word and Spirit,” in Edwards and Justification, 58. Therefore, “faith is a mode of relation and 
union whose telos is not justification, but Christ. It is not a moral quality, but a relational one.” 54-55. 
326 Strobel, “By Word and Spirit,” in Edwards and Justification, 55. He adds, “Edwards reconceives the nature 
of the declaration of justification. Instead of a gratuitously gracious declaration that constitutes a reality 
which is not (making righteous the unrighteous), God qua judge simply declares what is true: believers are 
righteous through the legal union they have with Christ.” 58. “Edwards continually pushes questions 
concerning redemption back to Christ’s person and work, using participation and regeneration as ways to 
bypass attacks against the Reformed position as promoting ‘legal fictions.’ In doing so, Edwards attempts to 
keep hold of a constituting declaration (located in the efficacious call), faith preceding justification and an 
unwavering bond between justification and sanctification by focusing the ordo salutis on Christ’s gracious 
giving over the purchase made–the Holy Spirit of God.… For Edwards, the only true ground for 
forgiveness is Christ himself. Because salvation, in its entirety, is found in Christ, union, we could say, 
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From my own reading of Edwards, I believe that Moody and Strobel are largely 
correct. Although, as noted earlier in the chapter, Edwards does hold justification and 
sanctification together closely, justification does precede sanctification logically and 
temporally, and Edwards is often careful to point out that justification has no basis in any 
human work. For example, he writes, “goodness or loveliness is not prior in the order of 
nature to justification, or is not to be considered as prior in the order and method of 
God’s proceeding in this affair.”327 Or again, “when it is said that we are not justified by 
any righteousness or goodness of our own, what is meant is that it is not out of respect to 
the excellency or goodness of any qualifications, or acts, in us, whatsoever, that God 
judges it meet that this benefit of Christ should be ours; and it is not, in any wise, on 
account of any excellency, or value that there is in faith.”328 It is instead, as Strobel claims, 
fundamentally about the relation to Christ found in faith. As Edwards says, it is “purely 
from the relation faith has to the person in whom this benefit is to be had, or as it unites 
to that Mediator, in and by whom we are justified.”329 Faith involves the actual union of 
the believer with Christ. “Faith is the soul’s active uniting with Christ, or is itself the very 
act of unition.”330 Righteousness is not a reward for faith, but rather what results from the 
union of the believer with Christ, which happens by faith.  
Some of the difficulty in arriving at clarity among Edwards’ readers may stem 
from a certain amount of confusion over what is meant in describing something as a 
‘condition’ of justification. It is important to distinguish between condition and cause. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
grounds the application of redemption. The work of God ‘in us’ is for the reception of that gift through 
union. Edwards is concerned to uphold human faculties in salvation, such that they can receive Christ’s free 
gift, but this move does not somehow relocate forgiveness to the human side of the equation.” 69. 
327 WJE 18:341 (Misc. 712). 
328 WJE 19:155. 
329 WJE 19:155. 
330 WJE 19:158. See also 160. 
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latter does not follow necessarily from the former. As Rhys Bezzant points out, “Edwards 
makes the distinction between faith rightly viewed as a condition of our justification, even 
when it will never be the cause of our justification.”331 Edwards is really asserting nothing 
different here than what was previously covered in our discussion of the authentication of 
conversion. The best indicator of authentic conversion is that of changed actions over 
time. Works are a condition that accompanies true faith. They indicate the presence of 
regeneration, but they are not the cause of it. Rather they are the result of it. In the same 
way sanctification may be a condition of justification rather than its cause – in whole or in 
part. 
There is no doubt that Edwards has serious concerns for sanctification. Even 
though one may find occasional statements that muddy the waters in this area, taking his 
writings as a whole and his context, there can also be no doubt that he taught the 
justification of the ungodly. One should not confuse the evidence of one’s justification, as 
shown by one’s good works, with the basis of justification, which is to be found in Christ’s 
work alone. “It is not suitable that God should give the sinner an interest in Christ’s 
merits, and so a title to his benefits, from regard to any qualification, or act, or course of 
acts, in him, on the account of any excellency or goodness whatsoever therein, but only as 
uniting to Christ.”332 Edwards makes clear throughout his treatise on “Justification by 
Faith Alone” that believers are not saved by their works in any way, or any form of 
keeping the law in whole or in part, but only through faith in Christ. “We are not justified 
by any of our own goodness, virtue, or righteousness or for the excellency or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331 “Gospel of Justification,” in Edwards and Justification, 75. 
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righteousness of anything that we have done in religion.”333 Upon justification believers 
become one legally with Christ, and he is their head. They receive the benefits of both his 
passive obedience (atoning death on the cross paying their penalty) and active obedience 
(his complete righteousness in keeping all of the law providing their righteousness).334 But 
this legal standing is based on a real union of Christ with believers, and not vice versa.335 
As Douglas Sweeney aptly notes, Edwards “insisted to the end that justification in the 
sight of God had always been by grace alone through faith alone in Christ.”336  
Edwards is so committed to salvation as an entirely gracious work of God, apart 
from any human act (which is also to say that regeneration precedes faith in the order of 
salvation), that he argues against those who suggest that there can be no salvation before 
the act of receiving Jesus and exercising faith. He notes that there is a sanctification (or 
what could here be better understood as a regeneration) of the sinner before faith can be 
expressed or holiness exercised. “There must be the principle before there can be the 
action, in all cases; there must be an alteration made in the heart of the sinner before 
there can be action consequent upon this alteration; yea, there must be a principle of 
holiness before holiness is in exercise. Yea, this alteration must not only be before this act 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
333 WJE 19:179. See also 201f. 
334 See WJE 19:190-99, esp. 190-91. 
335 “They only, that are one with Christ by their own act, should be looked upon as one in law: what is real 
in the union between Christ and his people, is the foundation of what is legal; that is, it is something really 
in them, and between them, uniting them, that is the ground of the suitableness of their being accounted as 
one by the Judge.” WJE 19:158. 
336 Sweeney, “Justification by Faith Alone?,” in Edwards and Justification, 140. He adds, “faith is set forth in 
the Bible as a condition of justification.… It is not itself a work, however, that earns justification. Rather, 
faith is a gift of God by which a sinner clings to Christ, relying on Jesus and his work for justification.” 136. 
E. Brooks Holifield concurs. “Edwards continued to insist on the doctrine of justification through faith.” 
“Edwards as Theologian,” in Cambridge Companion to Edwards, 152. “Justification resulted from the excellency 
of the relation [of the believer with Christ], not of the faith. And although he always thought that a genuine 
faith was united with love, he could still say that faith alone made justification suitable. He opposed New 
England liberals who contended that faith justified because it included moral obedience in its essence.” 152. 
See “Justification,” WJE 19:163, 168-77, 180, 232; “Miscellaneous Observations,” Leeds edition, 8:517-524. 
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of faith in nature (as the cause before the effect) but also in time.”337  Edwards’ assertions 
regarding justifying faith are “the reverse of the scheme of our modern divines, who hold 
that faith justifies only as an act, or expression of obedience; whereas in truth, obedience 
has no concern in justification, any otherwise than as an expression of faith.”338  
From all that we have seen both in this section and throughout this chapter on 
conversion, Edwards’ understanding of the order of salvation moves in the following 
order: 
Election 
Illumination/regeneration 
Faith 
Union with Christ 
Justification 
Sanctification 
 
God’s free and gracious election leads to the opening or illumination of the heart 
to divine realities, which is regeneration. It is sight to the blind. From this follows faith by 
which the believer is united with Christ and declared justified before God on the basis of 
Christ’s righteousness alone. As a result of this personal revolution, this unity with Christ 
through the work of the Holy Spirit, the believer grows in grace and becomes more and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337 WJE 13:245 (Misc. 77). With this Edwards seems to support McDermott’s suggestion that “if some are 
‘good’ because they have a regenerate disposition before they are outwardly converted to Christ, then 
perhaps conversion in those cases comes after they are already regenerate.” Edwards Confronts the Gods, 135. 
See also WJE 20:68-74 (Misc. 847), WJE 13:455-59 (Misc. 393). 
338 WJE 19:208. This runs directly counter to McCormack’s concerns. 
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more sanctified in ways both hidden and public – which are evidences of, though not 
causes of, one’s regenerate state.339 
There is here, as there was above when discussing Edwards’ views on the role of 
various human ‘faculties’ in conversion – intellect, emotions, will – a certain degree of 
artificiality in the ordering or division of the components of conversion for Edwards. As 
he puts it, “the graces of Christianity depend one on another. There is not only a 
conjunction whereby they are always joined together, but there is a mutual dependence 
of one grace and another, so that one cannot be without another.”340 There is a unity and 
interrelatedness to many of these steps such that an order of salvation, while in a certain 
logical sense technically correct, is still only of limited value. Some of his followers were 
later inclined to manipulate this order, and in a sense break apart what should not be 
broken. For example, as Holifield points out, “some of Edwards’s disciples would later 
conclude that his views of infused grace and the necessity for love in the regenerate heart 
implied that love must precede both faith and justification in the order of salvation. They 
were willing to redefine what had been the cardinal Protestant doctrine of justification 
through faith alone.” Even though Edwards at times suggests that love and faith are 
closely linked, Holifield writes that “he avoided, however, the revisions that his disciples 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
339 For more on the role of the Spirit as the agent in this process, see also WJE 21:194 (“Treatise on Grace”). 
“That holy, divine principle, which we have observed does radically and essentially consist in divine love, is 
no other than a communication and participation of that same infinite divine love, which is God, and in 
which the Godhead is eternally breathed forth and subsists in the third person in the blessed Trinity. So 
that true saving grace is no other than that very love of God; that is, God, in one of the persons of the 
Trinity, uniting himself to the soul of a creature as a vital principle, dwelling there and exerting himself by 
the faculties of the soul of man, in his own proper nature, after the manner of a principle of nature.” 194. 
340 WJE 8:329. He adds, “faith promotes humility. For the more entirely anyone depends on God’s 
sufficiency, the more it will tend to a humble sense of their own insufficiency. And so humility tends to 
promote faith. For the more a person has of an humble sense of his own insufficiency, the more will his 
heart be prepared to trust alone in God, and depend entirely on Christ.. So love promotes humility… And 
humility promotes love.… And so it might be shown how all the graces do depend one upon another, by 
mentioning many other particulars. Humility cherishes all grace, and all other graces promote humility. So 
faith promotes all grace, and all grace cherishes faith. And the like might be shown of every one.” 329-30. 
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found necessary.”341 In the end what is most critical for Edwards in the order of salvation 
is that conversion is God’s gracious act, and his alone.342 
 
The Location of Conversion 
 
Edwards inherited a view of conversion that was grounded in the church and 
corporate in nature. This is to say that conversion was a churchly activity, and was sought 
and verified within the body of believers of a given church, rather than some kind of 
solitary activity or event that may or may not require the church or verification and 
invigoration within its community. Solomon Stoddard, Edwards’ predecessor at 
Northampton and grandfather, did see the spirit as a special means of grace. But “notice 
that in Stoddard’s model, the Spirit poured through the ministers. His was still very much 
a church and community-based theology of conversion, different from some of the more 
individualistic and anti-clerical tendencies some evangelicals would later embrace.”343 
Edwards, in many respects mirrors Stoddard’s views, but there is also a certain dichotomy 
or paradox in his understanding of or at least his impact on the location of conversion. 
The paradox lies in the contrast between Edwards’ explicit views of conversion, which 
tend more toward a corporate, churchly location, and the impact of Edwards’ broader 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
341 “Edwards as Theologian,” in Cambridge Companion to Edwards, 152. Edwards writes that “faith promotes 
love, and love is the most essential ingredient in a saving faith.” WJE 8:329. 
342 Strobel summarizes issues with the order of salvation in Edwards well. “While it is possible to make 
logical and semantic delineations between regeneration, conversion, justification, and adoption, they are in 
fact wrought through one act of Christ upon the soul of the unregenerate through a giving of his Spirit. 
This Spirit, as love and grace itself, unites to Christ, illumines Christ, and works the very love of Christ (that 
is, love to Christ and Christ’s own love) into the heart of this person.” Strobel, “By Word and Spirit,” in 
Edwards and Justification, 64. 
343 Kidd, “‘Prayer for a Saving Issue,’” in Emergence of Evangelicalism, 138.  
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views on and role in revivals, which in some respects enhanced a more individualistic 
view of conversion that pushed its location away from the church. 
 
A Corporate, Churchly Location for Conversion 
On the one hand, it must be stated that Edwards’ sees conversion as part of a 
corporate or communal church experience rather than in an individualistic and isolated 
manner. Like other Puritans of his time, Edwards is a covenant theologian, and an 
emphasis on community is inherent in his understanding of the faith. Later evangelical 
notions of a detached individual experiencing conversion and a form of Christian life 
largely outside of the church, one who does not need organized religion or the institution 
of the church, is foreign to him. In his context one cannot talk about conversion in a 
purely (or perhaps even in a primarily) individualistic sense. Conversion is so closely 
linked with significant social institutions and structures that any discussion of it is 
necessarily also corporate in nature.344  
This can be seen in Edwards’ Religious Affections. The kind of testing of one’s faith 
for authenticity that Edwards suggests is meant not only for confirmation to oneself of 
one’s conversion, but also as a process that is to be undertaken within the context of the 
church. The entire discussion of authenticity assumes a churchly context in which to 
carry out such measured testing of the faith. Thus in his description of the final (and chief) 
positive sign of authentic faith, that “Christian practice or a holy life is a great and 
distinguishing sign of true and saving grace,” Edwards notes that the sign is not only for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
344 Rhys Bezzant notes that “from a philosophical perspective, in the Age of Enlightenment, it is tempting to 
read back into the individuality of those awakened a newfound autonomy and appreciation of individual 
experience, which reflected a paradigm shift in Western culture. It behooves us well therefore to pause and 
remind ourselves of the profoundly corporate mind-set and social location of Edwards, his audience, and 
those whom he opposed.” “Edwards’s Social Vision,” in Edwards and Justification, 87. 
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one’s own conscience, but “as an evidence of the sincerity of professors unto others.”345 It 
is a “manifestation and sign of the sincerity of a professing Christian, to the eye of his 
neighbors and brethren.”346 Edwards later qualifies the use of the sign as being for use in 
judging the sincerity of Christians desiring to be part of the community of believers, 
rather than for any outside the faith.347  
Moreover, Edwards goes beyond Stoddard in raising the standards by which a 
person joins the Christian community. Rejecting the Half-Way Covenant, Edwards 
finally loses his pastorate over his insistence that conversion be a serious standard by 
which one joins the church community. Conversion is then submitted to a standard 
enforced by that church community and its pastoral leadership, rather than having it 
determined authentic by the private judgment of the individual. Such judgments 
necessarily have significance not only individually, but also corporately, as one’s standing 
in the church community in Edwards’ time affects one’s social standing.348 
Edwards also sees conversion as part of the broader renewal of society. As Rhys 
Bezzant puts it, “Edwards’s gospel was not an attenuated theory of atonement” but rather 
was “necessarily social in its outworkings.”349 He argues that “in Puritan New England, 
espousing certain theological confessions was intricately connected to communal values 
and norms,” and that revivals were “understood not merely as the awakening of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345 WJE 2:406. 
346 WJE 2:407 (emphasis mine). 
347 WJE 2:412. 
348 Logan comments that “the doctrine of justification is not… simply a matter of abstract theology. The 
doctrine of justification is directly involved in the definition of the nature and the purpose of the church.” 
“Evangelical Obedience,” in Edwards and Justification, 105. Edwards’ conclusions on the matter led to his 
dismissal from his church as he steered a different direction than his grandfather on grounds for church 
membership. 
349 Bezzant, “Edwards’s Social Vision,” 93. “Edwards maintained that sponsoring the regeneration of 
individuals would not necessarily lead to the fissiparous disordering of the community, as some feared, but 
the moral transformation of the community as it rediscovered its corporate moorings and thereby its social 
vision.” 87. 
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slumbering individuals, but ultimately as the reformation of families and communities, 
perhaps even of the nation.” He notes that “in New England, revival was intricately 
linked to the renewal of the covenant,” which was intrinsically corporate in its nature.350 
Edwards was supportive of such efforts, and in his own Northampton community sought 
corporate covenantal renewal through an external covenant of public profession of faith 
by church members, just as the Old Testament Jews did as part of their covenant 
community. Such a renewal of one’s profession of faith and willingness to follow God is 
termed ‘owning the covenant.’ McClymond and McDermott write that this ‘owning’ 
suggests “a corporate rather than individualistic model of how God related to Christian 
people.”351 In all these various ways then, Edwards moves conversion beyond an 
individualistic experience into something necessarily corporate and churchly in nature. 
 
The Great Awakening and a Shift in Location 
If in these various ways Edwards’ views on conversion placed it squarely in the 
church community, on the other hand there is a case to be made that other aspects of 
Edwards’ thought and role resulted to some degree in the promotion of a more 
individualistic location for conversion much less bound to the church. The support for 
such a case tends to be found less in specific assertions on the nature of conversion, and 
more in broader perspectives on revival, and the direct or often indirect support lent 
through Edwards’ actions and role as revival leader for practices that lead toward a more 
individualistic setting for conversion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 Bezzant, “Edward’s Social Vision,” in Edwards and Justification, 72, 88.  
351 Theology of Edwards, 428 (see also chapters 21, 32). 
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For example, the rise in itinerant preaching as a result of the Great Awakening 
had a significant impact on the location of conversion. Although Edwards later became 
more critical of many of the practices of itinerant preachers, his early support for and 
participation in this practice opened the door to the devaluation of parish clergy and 
churches. In fact, Edwards’ most famous sermon, “Sinners in the Hands of an Angry 
God,” provoked a tumultuous result not in his home church at Northampton, but away 
from his parish at Enfield, Connecticut. He was also a strong supporter of George 
Whitefield, who itinerated across the entire colonial seaboard, even if at some points 
Whitefield gave him cause for concern.352 As McClymond and McDermott have noted, 
“the New Light proponents were challenging ministerial authority and the standing order 
of churches by offering parishioners their own choice of which preachers to hear and 
churches to attend.”353  
Edwards also gave his qualified support to the Presbyterian minister Gilbert 
Tennent, who – in a sermon from 1740, “The Danger of an Unconverted Ministry,” 
“declared that it was ‘lawful and expedient’ for awakened parishioners to leave behind 
their regularly appointed synod parishes ‘to hear Godly Persons’ instead.”354 The idea 
that one might choose one’s church, rather than be tied to the local community of 
Christians, and this not on the basis of theological disagreement as much as a judgment 
about the spiritual standing of the clergy of the church, was a new innovation in the 
colonial religious landscape. Although Edwards was in fact critical of some of these ideas, 
his broad support for revivals and writings disseminating the effects and methods of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 Edwards was uncomfortable at times with Whitefield’s encouragement to parishioners to question the 
faith or regenerate standing of their ministers, and cautioned Whitefield against such teaching. See 
Marsden, Life, 211-15. 
353 Theology of Edwards, 439. 
354 McClymond and McDermott, Theology of Edwards, 437, quoting Tennent’s sermon as found in The Great 
Awakening, ed. Richard L. Bushman (New York: Atheneum, 1970), 88, 93. 
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revivals played an indirect role in the rising popularity of those ideas, ideas which were 
undermining the parish ministry that was standard at this time, and threatening the 
powers of the colonial churches and clergy. Thus, in both teaching and methods, the first 
Great Awakening initiated a movement away from a church-centered, corporate model 
of conversion toward a more individualistic and isolated one. Although this shift did not 
all fall on the shoulders of Edwards, his was a prominent role in the First Great 
Awakening, a movement that initiated this shift that would only accelerate in the decades 
following. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Due both to the pressing concerns of his time, and to his own theological 
understanding of Scripture and the gospel, Edwards makes conversion a central concern 
of his theology and his preaching. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to find a major 
theological figure in American church history who emphasizes conversion more than 
Edwards. There is an utter seriousness in his consideration of conversion and the vastness 
of its role. 
Although no moniker is perfect, it should be clearer at this point why I have 
termed Edwards’ model of conversion “supernatural affective vision.” For Edwards, 
conversion begins with the electing God’s illumination of the heart through the Holy 
Spirit, by which one is regenerated and faith initiated. It is this vision of divine realities, of 
God’s goodness and holiness and beauty, that moves a person beyond any merely 
intellectual understanding to heart knowledge that moves and orients one’s affections, the 
core of one’s being, toward the triune God. Conversion is not a matter of persuasion, 
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even if reason still plays a necessary part in conversion. Reason can prepare for grace, 
rational knowledge becoming a means of grace, but a sense of the heart finally is needed –
 an affectional knowledge. All of one’s being is involved in true conversion; there is no 
division of into human faculties – some of which are involved with conversion and some 
not. Further, conversion can never be accomplished by human effort, whether will or 
intellect, but only by a supernatural, gracious process wrought by God. Thus preparation 
for conversion in any of its various possible forms is ultimately a work of the Holy Spirit. 
Some suggest difficulties in Edwards’ views on conversion. Among those 
expressing concern is Robert Jenson, who argues that Edwards ends with an emphasis on 
one’s subjective experience that tends to push away a reliance on an objective Word of 
God and its relevant promises of God’s grace to those who put their faith in him, 
regardless of their experience. Jenson critiques the efforts of the Puritans generally, and 
Edwards particularly, to probe the inner realities of the converted life. “It is an infinite 
interiority of wheels within wheels into which Edwards here plunges. Puritans were adepts 
of its depths; Edwards was among the masters. Not all who entered found their way out 
again; one has frequent fears also for Edwards.”355 He argues that Edwards’ 
phenomenological exploration of conversion has resulted in “a dead end of its original 
purpose.”356 It is both unable to indicate with probability, much less certainty, those who 
are truly versus falsely converted, and it makes consciousness of grace reliant upon a form 
of experience in which one can have no confidence, rather than the assured presence of 
grace to the believer in Word and sacrament.357 He concludes, “If true religion is to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
355 Jenson, America’s Theologian, 84. 
356 Jenson, America’s Theologian, 85. 
357 For Edwards, “especially in sermons it becomes apparent that so far as either observation or 
introspection can take us, false religion and true are indistinguishable.” America’s Theologian, 86. Since in 
Puritanism, “where the spoken godpel [sic] and the sacraments are held to be ambiguous, if the authenticity 
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enraptured beyond myself by God’s beauty, then the very act of asking ‘Do I have true 
religion?’ is an abandonment of it. The egocentric predicament cannot be overcome 
within standard Puritanism; it can only be driven to self-refutation.”358  
It does seem that Edwards’ theology necessarily shifts focus somewhat to one’s 
experience, but in essence this is only due to Edwards’ evangelistic concern that one not 
be self-deceived by one’s state. If anything, Edwards himself – at least in his later writings 
– provokes a skepticism regarding one’s own experiences that would tend to drive one to 
the gospel. Yet for Edwards, trusting in salvation by grace alone does not result in any 
kind of quietistic reliance on gospel promises, but should result in action, in change over 
time, in sanctification, in works of love. If this shifts the emphasis in part to one’s own life, 
then this for Edwards is the price that must be paid to avoid a form of assenting religion 
without a living affective knowledge of gospel truths that invariably produces works. For 
Edwards, adoption of the gospel involves consent rather than assent. Heart language is 
language of the will and disposition, and one consents such that actions result. It is more 
than a change in intellectual knowledge or belief. There are equally dangerous risks to 
moving toward a different direction of trust in God’s Word and covenant objectively, 
without any subjective verification of the reality of that trust. Even though it is uncertain, 
it is no less uncertain than a confidence in God’s promises that is not reflected in change 
in both the heart and the actions of a given Christian professor.  
If the conundrum resulting from the elevation of subjective versus objective factors 
in conversion is difficult to avoid, so too is another conundrum occurring when requiring 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the experience of grace is not itself experienceable, grace disappears from consciousness altogether. For 
any descendent of Augustinian faith, this is disaster.” 86. One can have no confidence of the presence of 
grace outside of one’s experience. 
358 Jenson, America’s Theologian, 86. 
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a certain degree of any kind of knowledge be present for conversion to take place. How can 
one ever define successfully the quantity and quality of knowledge required for conversion, 
once one makes it essential to one’s paradigm of conversion? What of those who lack 
intellectual capacity? These are questions that will continue to arise in this dissertation. 
As this chapter illustrates, there are many ways to consider conversion and its 
various aspects. There are many more possibilities for variation in one’s view of 
conversion than simply considering a view to be Arminian or Calvinist, for example. 
While those are categories that can reflect distinct differences in one’s view of conversion, 
they certainly cannot flesh out the numerous other variations possible in one’s 
understanding of conversion – variations in which the typical Calvinist versus Arminian 
paradigm breaks down. There are other features of conversion in which Calvinists and 
Arminians will be united in support or opposition. This dissertation will continue to 
revolve around this matrix of features resulting in a fuller picture of the development and 
changing features of evangelical conversion. 
If Edwards will forever be indelibly linked to the First Great Awakening, we turn 
next to a figure similarly linked to the Second Great Awakening, Charles Finney. As we 
shall see, Finney illustrates a shift in the mainstream of evangelicalism reflected in quite 
different forms of revivalism in the Second Great Awakening – which was itself a much 
more diverse and elongated affair than the First.359 For by the later awakening theological 
perspectives on revival – and conversion itself – were becoming much more varied, and 
although Edwards reflected the center of a movement chiefly debated across a spectrum 
of Old Lights and New Lights, the battle lines over the Second Great Awakening ran in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
359 Certainly a part of the shift from Edwards to Finney involves a shift away from Calvinism and toward 
Arminianism, but this is hardly adequate in assessing the various developments and changing views in the 
understanding of conversion that were to occur in the Second Great Awakening and the nineteenth century. 
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several directions with greater diversity among its proponents and antagonists than its 
eighteenth century predecessor. Finney represents, then, only one perspective in support 
of these later revivals. Some other supporters would find as much reason to oppose 
Finney as to oppose the opponents of revival. This we shall see later in considering 
Charles Hodge and Princeton Seminary. 
 
 
 	  
119 
 
Chapter  Two – Charles Finney 
 
 
Charles Grandison Finney (1792-1875) was born into another world than that of 
Jonathan Edwards. In moving from Edwards to Finney one crosses into a dramatically 
different theological orientation and historical period. Finney has a different personality, a 
different history, a different context, and a different theology. 
Edwards lived as a colonial citizen of Great Britain, whereas Finney lived as a 
citizen of a young but expanding and strengthening American nation and culture. This 
post-revolutionary context saw not only the expansion and diversification of the nation’s 
population, but also the growth of those distinctly American cultural traits such as 
individualism, notions of freedom and liberty, common sense, and pragmatism, as well as 
the development of democratic political processes that were not even on the horizon 
during Edwards’ lifetime. Furthermore, this period encompassed increasing strains over 
various social issues, the greatest of which (slavery) was to fracture the nation. 
Finney was also at the forefront of a changing tide in American evangelicalism 
and culture. His significance in this period, theologically and historically, is difficult to 
question. Keith Hardman terms him “the key figure in American religion for the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century” and “the chief ‘prophet’” of the period.1 L. G. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1Keith J. Hardman, Charles Grandison Finney 1792-1875: Revivalist and Reformer (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 1987), ix, xiv (further citations as Finney). He adds, “It is impossible to have a full-orbed 
understanding of the middle period of American history without some inclusion of his role in it.” ix. He 
“captured the spirit of the age, gave it voice, and shaped and reshaped its spiritual institutions in ways that 
have endured.” xiv. 
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Parkhurst, Jr. calls him “the greatest revivalist to ever grace the American scene.”2 Harry 
Conn considers him “the greatest evangelist since apostolic times.”3 His significance for 
evangelicalism in particular was enormous. Douglas Sweeney calls him “the single most 
influential evangelical of his day.”4 John H. Gerstner states, “No one in the second 
quarter of last century had the ear of America in the spreading of what went by the name 
of evangelicalism as did Finney.”5 On a personal level, “it was widely acknowledged that 
Charles Finney was dynamic, magnetic, and arresting,” hardly the language one would 
use to describe Edwards, who typically read his long sermons from manuscripts.6 Given 
his importance to this period, and some of the theological changes we will see ushered in 
through him, his inclusion in this study was vital. 
Finney’s essential theological framework was well-suited to the self-made man of 
western expansion, and to the activist social mentality of many in the eastern cities. His 
form of revivalism found fertile ground across a broad spectrum of American religious 
and cultural life. Many also link Finney to the rise of Jacksonian democracy. 
In studying Finney, a number of initial questions arise. What was Finney’s relation 
to Edwards? What was his relation to his own historical context? Are there one or many 
different Finneys – to what extent did Finney’s views change or develop over his career? 
Moving from study of Edwards to Finney seems akin at times to moving from a 
skillful theoretician to a somewhat brash practitioner. Reading Finney is quite a different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Charles G. Finney, Finney’s Systematic Theology: New and Expanded 1878 Edition, ed. Dennis Carroll, Bill 
Nicely, and L. G. Parkhurst, Jr., Introduction by Rev. L. G. Parkhurst, Jr. (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany 
House Publishers, 1994) Introduction, xiii (further citations as LST). 
3 From his Preface to the 1976 edition, found in Appendix C of LST, 573. 
4 Douglas A. Sweeney, “Evangelical Tradition in America,” in Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards, ed. 
Stephen J. Stein (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 217-238, 221. 
5 John H. Gerstner, “The Theological Boundaries of Evangelical Faith,” in The Evangelicals, eds. David F. 
Wells and John D. Woodbridge (New York: Abingdon Press, 1975), 21-37, 27. 
6 Hardman, Finney, 36. 
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experience from reading Edwards, as they were two individuals of different times and gifts. 
That both were gifted individuals is very clear. But Edwards was gifted in the life of the 
mind first of all, this gift spilling over into his many other roles as pastor, leader, evangelist, 
preacher, and the like in a rich diversity of expression. Finney, on the other hand, was 
first and foremost gifted as an evangelist, and it was by way of this gift that he came also 
to establish his career as a pastor, professor, and writer. They wrote in different times 
with different goals. In fact one cannot exactly speak of them both writing their works; 
many of Finney’s major works were either put to print from notes of his lectures and 
sermons taken by others, or dictated by him. One will find no writing desk filled with 
thirty years of transcripts and notes for Finney as one did with Edwards. 
But compare one must, for these two figures dominate their respective eras, and 
Edwards’ shadow looms large over Finney’s era as well, both by the presence of his 
published works and the teaching and influence of such followers as Timothy Dwight and 
Nathaniel William Taylor at Yale, or Edwards Amasa Park at Andover.7 The relationship 
of Finney’s thought to Edwards is a matter of some dispute. Theologically, there are 
drastically different assessments of Finney’s theology and his relation to and transition 
from Edwards and the earlier Calvinist tradition.  
On the one hand, one can find an argument for the discontinuity of Finney with 
Edwards, and for some even his undermining of essentials of evangelicalism and 
Reformation theology. John Gerstner considers Finney to be a Pelagian at his core, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Finney certainly read several of Edwards’ works. Hardman discusses specifically the impact of Finney’s 
reading of Religious Affections and Thoughts on the Revival of Religion. Finney evidently read them both while 
staying in Pastor Samuel Aikin’s home for a few months in 1826-27. Hardman notes that these works had a 
moderating, restraining effect on Finney’s preaching style against previous excesses, and he began to quote 
Edwards often in his teaching. Finney, 83-84. Finney was also almost certainly at least familiar with Edwards’ 
Life of David Brainerd, which was very popular during Finney’s lifetime, and the most reprinted work of 
Edwards in the nineteenth century. 
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argues that “his Pelagianism subverted the Reformation's understanding of grace 
precisely because it denied the Reformation's view of man.”8 In fact, according to 
Gerstner, “to this extent Finney, the greatest of nineteenth-century evangelists, became 
the greatest of nineteenth-century foes of evangelicalism.”9 The dominant tone of 
historians in describing the relationship of Edwards and Finney has also been one of 
contrast and opposition. William McLoughlin, historian and editor of Finney’s Lectures on 
Revivals, exemplifies this approach. He calls Lectures on Revivals “more than a destructive 
attack upon ‘the traditions of the elders,’ as Finney scornfully referred to the old 
Calvinistic doctrines. It is a positive, ringing statement of the new religious, social, and 
intellectual philosophy that came to dominate popular American thought until well into 
the twentieth century.” It was Finney who “brought the Presbyterian and Congregational 
churches to their great schism of 1837 and completed the downfall of Calvinism.” 
McLoughlin terms Finney a Jacksonian with “little use for Calvinism,” representative of 
the times with a great faith in progress and the common man, who “was so far from 
Edwards in his philosophical outlook that it may seem odd that he frequently quotes 
Edwards to buttress his views on specific aspects of revival preaching.”10 
While it may seem odd to McLoughlin, Charles Hambrick-Stowe finds this only 
to be expected for one who he sees as continuing largely within an Edwardsian tradition. 
Hambrick-Stowe sets out on a somewhat revisionist project in providing what he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The charge of Pelagianism is not new, and even in Finney’s own lifetime his critics raised this issue. 
9 Gerstner, “Theological Boundaries,” in The Evangelicals, 27. 
10 Finney, Lectures on Revivals of Religion, ed. William G. McLoughlin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1960), x, xiv, viii, xi (further citations as LOR). He adds, “Unlike the majority of his clerical colleagues, 
Finney was a child of his age, not an enemy of it.… the basic philosophical and social principles underlying 
his thought were essentially the same as those associated with Jacksonian democracy. Like the Jacksonians, 
Finney had an ardent faith in progress, in the benevolence of God, and in the dignity and worth of the 
common man. Like the Jacksonians, he believed that the restrictive clerical and aristocratic traditions of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were out of date and that they must give way to a new and more 
liberal outlook if the nation was to continue to grow in peace, liberty, and prosperity under God.” viii. 
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considers a more accurate and balanced view of Finney. He argues that Puritan language 
was engrained in the very culture of Finney’s day and sounded very natural to Finney’s 
listeners.11 As to Finney’s relation to Edwards, he writes that “while Finney modified 
some aspects of Edwards’s Calvinism, such as the doctrine of limited atonement, his 
theological language from the start was thoroughly Edwardsian.” He notes the “vast 
amount of common ground shared by Finney, Nettleton, Beecher, and all the New 
School Presbyterians and Congregationalists who stood in the evangelical Edwardsian 
tradition.”12 Finney adopts wholeheartedly Edwards’ notion of benevolence, he agrees 
with Edwards that the elect are known by their works,13 and he self-consciously refers to 
Edwards when relating his personal experiences of God’s sweetness.14 In similar fashion 
to Edwards, “rejecting both antinomianism and legalism in traditional Calvinist fashion, 
he pleaded for the centrality of Jesus Christ and the Bible in evangelical preaching. 
Religion has to do not with excited feelings but with a holy will and benevolent action” 
that results from seeing God’s truths from one’s heart.15 And as to Finney being 
Jacksonian, Hambrick-Stowe writes that “in 1828 Charles Finney was definitely no 
Jacksonian,”16 providing solid evidence to support his case both in Finney’s general 
emphases and in specific stands Finney takes against Jackson’s party.17 
Hambrick-Stowe’s revisionist effort is further supported by Allen Guelzo, who 
writes in the foreword, “in startling contrast to his reputation as an anti-Calvinist, Finney 
did not hesitate to speak of himself as a disciple and admirer of Edwards and the New 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Charles E. Hambrick-Stowe, Charles G. Finney and the Spirit of American Evangelicalism (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1996), 18 (further citations as Charles Finney). 
12 Hambrick-Stowe, Charles Finney, 29, 65. 
13 Hambrick-Stowe, Charles Finney, 154. 
14 Hambrick-Stowe, Charles Finney, 183. 
15 Hambrick-Stowe, Charles Finney, 217. See also 218. 
16 Hambrick-Stowe, Charles Finney, 93. 
17 See Hambrick-Stowe, Charles Finney, 88-93, 177-78, 200. 
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England Theology.”18 Guelzo elsewhere argues even more persuasively on these very 
points, concluding that, “in the final analysis, Finney’s connections to the New England 
theology, both through Edwardseanism and Nathaniel William Taylor, underscore how 
persistent the direct influence of Edwards and New England were on American religion 
in the nineteenth century.”19 
For reasons that should become more apparent in reading this dissertation, on this 
debate I would give a qualified affirmation to McLoughlin and others. Although initially I 
found Hambrick-Stowe and Guelzo compelling, the more of Finney I read, the more I 
found contrast over continuity with Edwards, both more broadly and in his views on 
conversion. 
To what extent did Finney’s theological views change or develop over his career? 
Are there many different Finneys? An early revivalist Finney? A later revivalist? A 
Presbyterian vs. a Congregational Finney? Finney the professor? I would venture to argue 
that changes and developments in his theological positions related to conversion and 
other central Christian tenets over his lifetime are incremental rather than paradigm-
shifting. His views on perfectionism, for example, become more explicit later in his career, 
but are not inconsistent with and are also strongly hinted at in his earlier writings. They 
are, in a sense, a natural development of his views of sanctification, of the moral law, and 
of human ability. And while, like Edwards, he is somewhat more circumspect later in his 
career about the lasting effects of revival and its methods on apparent converts, he also 
makes clear late in his career that he is unwilling to reverse himself on any significant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 In Hambrick-Stowe, Charles Finney, viii. 
19 Allen Guelzo, “An Heir or a Rebel? Charles Grandison Finney and the New England Theology,” Journal 
of the Early Republic, vol. 17, no.1 (Spr 1997), 61-94, 93-94. 
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points.20 Even the fairly early (1835) Lectures on Revivals should be seen as representative of 
his views.21  
This dissertation will be focused primarily on the period of Finney’s life from 
roughly 1821-1850 – as a revivalist, as a preacher, and as a professor during the early 
period of his teaching career at Oberlin College. This was the period of his greatest 
influence, both within his context and also historically in terms of his lasting impact. 
While Finney’s time at Oberlin College was significant and is in many ways insightful – 
especially in his more developed views of perfectionism, there was also a sense in which 
his later time at Oberlin was more isolated from his social and theological context, and 
less remembered in terms of his impact on history, at least in terms of the theological 
interests of this dissertation.22 For primary source materials this chapter mostly will draw 
on Lectures on Revivals and Lectures on Systematic Theology, supplemented by some sermon 
material and Finney’s Memoirs.23 These first two longer works represent Finney earlier in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 In the Preface to his Memoirs Finney writes, “On the strictly fundamental questions in theology, my views 
have not, for many years, undergone any change, except as I have clearer apprehensions of them than 
formerly, and should now state some of them, perhaps, in some measure, differently from what I should 
then have done.” Charles G. Finney, The Memoirs of Charles G. Finney: The Complete Restored Text, eds. Garth M. 
Rosell and Richard A. G. Dupuis (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1989), 4 (further citations as Memoirs). 
21 McLoughlin writes that Finney “did not, however, offer to retract any of his basic theological doctrines 
nor reverse any of the basic principles for promoting revivals that he had formerly espoused. But he did 
admit that some of the new measures and methods he had sanctioned were liable to grave abuse.” Still, “in 
spite of these frank acknowledgments of the shortcomings and misplaced emphases in the Lectures on Revivals, 
Finney by no means repudiated his earlier work.” LOR, l, li. 
22 Were one to consider his relation to social reforms of the day, it would be essential. 
23 Finney’s Memoirs present some difficulties as a source. It is biographically somewhat unreliable. On this 
point Hardman, Hambrick-Stowe, and Finney’s modern day editors of the Memoirs are agreed. Hardman 
notes, “It is apparent that Finney read back into his Memoirs his elderly reactions and positions, and we shall 
see how unreliable his Memoirs are at times, granting their charm.” Finney, xiii. Hardman consistently favors 
George Gale’s autobiographical accounts of various Finney experiences over Finney’s own self-description, 
e.g. the circumstances of his training and ordination, or when he departed from his training and developed 
his own theological strain (George Gale, a Presbyterian pastor, was a mentor to Finney when he entered the 
ministry). Hardman writes that Finney often “interjected his later theological positions into” his accounts in 
the Memoirs. 53. Hambrick-Stowe concurs, and gives numerous examples of this in his biography (for some 
of those mentioned, see Charles Finney, 24, 10-11, 25, 32, 43, 50, 53, 64, 78, 124, 148). Rosell and DuPuis 
also agree, although they qualify their statement more carefully. "The reliability of Finney's memory has 
troubled many readers of his Memoirs.… The evidence from these and other sources shows that Finney 
was often incorrect in his statements. At other times, however, he was surprisingly accurate. His ability to 
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his career primarily as a revivalist, and then in his later, more developed theological 
reflections as a professor.24  
As with Edwards, it will be found that conversion plays a central role in Finney’s 
theology. Indeed it plays such a central role at times that it becomes a point of criticism 
from his opponents. This is best captured in Mercersburg theologian John Nevin’s 
expression that for Finney “Conversion is every thing [sic], sanctification nothing.”25 
Whether this is a fair criticism remains to be seen. While it is not the pithiest expression, 
to capture best the distinctive emphases found in Finney’s conception of conversion I use 
the phrase immediate ongoing human decisionism. As we will find, this encompasses several key 
points. It is termed immediate for Finney’s emphasis on the necessity of immediate 
conversion at the hearing of the gospel without delay, without process, without any 
waiting on God. It is ongoing in the sense that this decision for God is one that essentially 
is constantly repeated, and it is in this repetition that one remains a Christian. As Finney 
emphasizes strongly the human’s role in conversion over God’s role, it is human. God 
influences, but humans choose. Thus finally, at its core, conversion for Finney is the result of 
a human decision, an ability every human has to embrace the gospel and turn to God. 
These points will be clarified as we proceed. Let us hear from Finney himself what might 
serve as a summary of this model of conversion. 
 
The truth is, Regeneration [sic], or conversion, is not a progressive 
work. What is regeneration? What is it but the beginning of 
obedience to God? And is the beginning of a thing progressive? It 
is the first act of genuine obedience to God – the first voluntary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
remember, in minute detail, scenes that had transpired forty years earlier is due in part to his frequently 
repeating them in sermons, lectures, and conversation." Memoirs, xxvii. In any case, while not always as 
accurate as it might be historically, Memoirs still has value in providing an amalgamated theological perspective 
of Finney from late in life. 
24 Finney’s Systematic Theology was first published in 1847, with new editions in 1851 and 1878. 
25 John W. Nevin, The Anxious Bench (Chambersburg, PA: Office of the “Weekly Messenger,” 1843), 27. 
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action of the mind that is what God approves, or that can be 
regarded as obedience to God. That is conversion. When persons 
talk about conversion as a progressive work, it is absurd.26 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning at the outset that Finney denies the common 
Reformed theological distinction between regeneration as a work of God and conversion as a 
work of humanity. For Finney regeneration does not signify some initial work of God. He 
uses regeneration simply as a synonym for conversion. As he puts it, the distinction 
between conversion and regeneration “inculcates a false philosophy of depravity and 
regeneration,” and “it leads the sinner to wait to be regenerated, before he repents or 
turns to God,” which is of a “most fatal tendency.” Therefore Finney concludes that he 
will “discard the distinction.” He will “use regeneration and conversion as synonymous 
terms.”27 This again illustrates the immediacy of Finney’s view of conversion. 
 
Finney and Revivalism  
 
One cannot consider Finney’s views on conversion without also discussing 
revivalism. Revivalism is the greatest reason for Finney’s prominence historically and 
theologically. Finney’s other activities only followed and grew out of his work as evangelist 
and revivalist, which would always be at the center of his orientation – if not always his 
outward activities.28 This impulse was active within twenty-four hours of his dramatic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Finney, LOR, 338-39. 
27 Finney, LST, 271.  
28 Finney’s activities as a revivalist were curtailed in the mid 1830s due to health concerns. Part of the 
impetus to publish his Lectures on Revivals was to transfer his methods and successes to others, as he could no 
longer strenuously toil in the field himself. Even after becoming a professor, however, his continued 
commitment to evangelism was apparent. He was allowed considerable time off from Oberlin to pursue 
other activities. An example of this is his work in England from 1849-51, where he found considerable 
success in the conducting of revivals. Finney also set out to write his Memoirs (which, more properly, would 
 	  
128 
conversion in 1821. Finney also both exemplified and furthered a shift in the theology of 
revivals, from the focus on God-centered activity of the First Great Awakening to the 
focus on human-centered activity in (especially the later portion of) the Second Great 
Awakening. Thus, more than any of the other primary subjects of this dissertation, Finney 
is most closely associated with revivalism. Edwards certainly is associated with revivals, 
although he is also regarded for his broad and creative theological acumen and writings. 
Finney, however, does to some degree represent a shift from revivals to revivalism, to a 
more systematic methodology designed to produce specific effects and largely under 
human control.29 William Clebsch notes, “While Edwards’ preaching had been the 
occasion for the surprising work of converting souls, his successors preached with the aim of 
inducing conversions.”30  
This transition, however, did not suddenly appear with Finney. He was both a 
product and a purveyor of revivalism. While his ‘new measures’ brought his share of fame 
and controversy, not even all of these originated with him, and as Hardman notes, “he by 
no means initiated mass evangelism.”31 But he did represent the most important figure 
first to demonstrate this shift. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
be named a history of his revival experiences and thoughts; it was not primarily biographical in any general 
way) to correct misapprehensions of his early revivals, methods, and doctrines. Even at this point in his later 
life he recognized his primacy in regard to revivals. The opening lines of Memoirs read, "It has pleased God 
in some measure to connect my name and labors with an extensive movement of the church of Christ, 
regarded by some as a new era in its progress. Especially has this been supposed to be true in respect to 
revivals of religion.” Memoirs, 1. 
29 The exploration of this distinction is the focus of Iain H. Murray’s book, Revival and Revivalism (Carlisle, 
PA: Banner of Trust Publishing, 1994), which is highly critical of the tendencies of the later development of 
revivalism, which Murray distinguishes sharply from the idea of revival.  
30 American Religious Thought: A History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), 60. 
31 Hardman, Finney, xii. He adds, “It could be argued that his illustrious predecessor, George Whitefield, 
reached as great and, at times, greater audiences, and his impact, though much compressed in time, 
equaled or surpassed Finney’s.” xii. Regarding the new measures, Hardman writes that “very few, if any, of 
the new measures originated with Finney; many of them had been used previously by the Methodists.” 84. 
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It should be noted that for Finney revivals are not solely tied to conversion; 
revivals bring not only conversion, but also the renewal of existing Christians and the 
church. “Nothing else will restore Christian love and confidence among church 
members.”32 Only revival will save the church from “annihilation.” This being said, 
Finney’s thoughts on revival remain vitally important for understanding his views on 
conversion. Because he sees revivals not as an exceptional, but rather the expected usual 
state of affairs for a healthy church, most of his reflections on conversion are set into a 
revival context. Furthermore, the word, reflections, belies a certain theological detachment 
that typically is not present for Finney in discussing revivals and conversion. As he says in 
Lectures on Revivals, “I have no idea of preaching about revivals. It is not my design to 
preach so as to have you able to say at the close, ‘We understand all about revivals now,’ 
while you do nothing.”33 Finney wants his hearers to put his words into practice, and go 
out and make revivals. And for such work he finds most ministers woefully unprepared. 
In his view “there is vast ignorance among ministers” regarding revivals. “Many get the 
idea that they already understand all about revivals, when in reality they know next to 
nothing about them.”34 This ignorance extends to the entire church, in spite of the 
numerous revivals it has experienced.35  
For Finney revivals begin with the conviction of sin, repentance, and renewal of 
those within churches. These awakened churches then extend the revival outward to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Finney, LOR, 26. See also 27-30. 
33 LOR, 22. 
34 He adds that the church “should be trained and disciplined like an army” for revival. LOR, 329. 
35 “There is vast ignorance in the churches on the subject of revivals. After all the revivals that have been 
enjoyed, … there are very few who have any real consistent knowledge on the subject.” Finney, LOR, 328. 
“There are multitudes in the church who never seem to suppose that the work of promoting revivals of 
religion is one that requires study, and thought, and knowledge of principles, and skill in applying the word 
of God, so as to give every one his portion in season. And so they go on, generally doing little or nothing 
because they are attempting nothing, and if they ever do awake, go headlong to work, without any system 
or plan, as if God had left this part of our duty out of the reach of sound judgment and good sense.” 329. 
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sinners outside the church.36 Churches failing to do this bear an “awful guilt.” There are 
“multitudes of sinners going to hell in all directions,” while supposed Christians of the 
church slumber.37 It is the “duty” of both its ministers and its members to work for 
revivals.38 Revivals stop because the church stops advancing. “If the means could be 
made to bear upon the church, and upon the young converts, to keep them out of the 
way of sinners, and to keep them continually advancing in holiness, the revival would 
never cease.”39 
The practical character of Finney’s instructions on revival are well-suited to the 
rising pragmatism of the day. Often ideas on revival were evaluated not in terms of their 
theological import, but rather by whether they produced results. For example, in 1829 a 
group of New England Congregationalists who had relocated to New York City desired 
to have Finney come and lead a revival. “They understood that revival, and numerous 
conversions, was not something that [Gardiner] Spring [leading Presbyterian minister in 
New York City who leaned toward Old School] could promise. On the other hand, the 
possibilities of Finney’s sweeping in with his aggressive, time-tested program that was 
almost sure to produce results in the form of many converts, was an allurement difficult to 
resist.”40 Often the desire for success became the definitive criterion, and theology moved 
to the background.  
There is development in Finney’s views on revival. Early in Finney’s revivalist 
career he employed more emotional practices, and employed language that was “coarse, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 LOR, 15-16. 
37 LOR, 332. 
38 “We see the awful guilt of this church, who come here and listen to lectures about revivals and then go away 
and have no revival, and also the guilt of members of other churches who hear these lectures and go home and 
refuse to do their duty.” LOR, 331. 
39 Finney, LOR, 470. 
40 Hardman, Finney, 182. Later in 1829 Finney promised a group of lay leaders, mostly leading businessmen, 
that he would come to NYC. 183. 
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vituperous, and extremely inflammatory.”41 Later he appealed more strongly to the 
intellect of his hearers, and became more and more refined as his audience changed from 
a backwoods crowd to a more educated group.42 Also, as previously mentioned, he 
mirrors Edwards to some degree in becoming more wary of the potential for abuses in 
revivals. More particularly, he recognizes the potential for the misuse of some of his new 
measures.43  
Still, when Edwards considered the revivals, and their excesses and failures as well 
as successes, there was a careful form of theological and self-reflection present. This was 
much less prevalent in Finney’s writings. One could account for it in part in the different 
nature of their ministries. Edwards, while doing some itinerant preaching, was fixed in 
one community for most of his career and could observe more easily the long-term effects 
of revivalism. This gave a greater opportunity for critique. One could see more clearly 
what percentage of people maintained their change of character and practices after 
revivalistic conversion experiences. But during the peak revival years Finney was always 
moving, never even in one community for a year, much less a number of years, and so 
was less able to observe (at least firsthand) the long term implications of the revivals in the 
lives of those affected. Nevertheless, Finney was much less disposed than Edwards to 
wonder about some of these topics. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Hardman, Finney, 82. On his more emotional practices, see Hardman, 65-67. Hardman notes that none 
of this, however, approached the wildness of the Cane Ridge tradition and Kentucky camp meetings. 57. 
42 As I will argue more later, Finney still was always intellectually oriented. At this early period he just used 
more emotional tools to make his points. Hardman notes that Finney himself tried to stress this intellectual 
character of even his early sermons. “Finney later portrayed his sermons at that time as somewhat 
intellectual, emphasizing that his debates with opponents were indeed contests of wits. In his Memoirs Finney 
suggested frequently that logic and appeal to the intellect were indispensable parts of his evangelistic 
technique at this stage of his career [~1825]. This is very doubtful.” Finney, 65. 
43 There were many so-called ‘new measures,’ but Hardman lists six which were the most controversial: 
public prayers of women amidst mixed audiences, protracted (daily) meetings, the preacher’s use of 
colloquial language, the anxious seat, praying for people by name, and immediate acceptance of converts 
into church membership. Finney, 84. 
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Perhaps the most significant difference between Finney and Edwards was in 
Finney’s emphasis on human free will and his corollary belief that revivals were not, in 
fact, surprising works of God, but instead predictable works of human instrumentality in 
bringing sinners to a decision to turn to God. To explore this topic more fully, we now 
turn to the question of the supernatural nature of conversion. 
 
Conversion as Supernatural 
 
Looking at the history of revivals, Finney is deeply concerned because too many in 
the church have misunderstood the nature of revivals. “There has long been an idea 
prevalent that promoting religion has something very peculiar in it, not to be judged of by 
the ordinary rules of cause and effect; in short, that there is no connection of the means 
with the result, and no tendency in the means to produce the effect. No doctrine is more 
dangerous than this to the prosperity of the church, and nothing more absurd.” The 
church has been “persuaded that promoting religion is somehow so mysteriously a subject 
of Divine sovereignty, that there is no natural connection between the means and the end” 
with grave results. “No doubt more than five thousand millions have gone down to hell, 
while the church has been dreaming, and waiting for God to save them without the use of 
means.”44 
Finney seeks to correct this dangerous misperception. To suggest the 
indispensable need for revivals “would be strange preaching, if revivals are only miracles, 
and if the church has no more agency in producing them, than it has in making a thunder 
storm.” He states very clearly in his Lectures on Revivals that a revival “is not a miracle, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 LOR, 14. 
 	  
133 
dependent on a miracle, in any sense.” It involves no suspension of the laws of nature 
(although Finney says it does involve the special work of the Holy Spirit). This is 
evidenced by the very success of revivals in his day, which show that “God has 
overthrown, generally, the theory that revivals are miracles.” And although one cannot 
automatically equate revival with conversion, Finney states explicitly that the same is true 
of conversion. "Miracles have sometimes been employed to arrest the attention of sinners. 
And in this way, miracles may become instrumental in conversion, although conversion is 
not itself a miracle, nor do miracles themselves ever convert any body.”45 
So how are revivals brought about? For Finney, a revival “consists entirely in the 
right exercise of the powers of nature. It is just that, and nothing else… It is a purely 
philosophical result of the right use of the constituted means–as much so as any other 
effect produced by the application of means.”46 Revival happens when one effectively 
carries out the correct procedures for bringing it to pass. It is then within the control of 
those working in the church to bring it about. While it may be based on miracle, 
including Christ’s resurrection or other works of God, in and of itself it is to be compared 
with a farmer planting grain. While like all things, this requires God’s blessing, we do not 
find in the growth of crops from that grain a miracle, nor do we find miracles in the 
results of seeds sown in revival.  
Finney argues against those who propose the sovereignty of God is violated by 
such teaching by using the same farmer analogy. A farmer does not wait idly by for God 
to miraculously produce his crops, but plants crops using his own strength. Doing so does 
not interfere with God’s sovereignty. So too in revival there is cause and effect, means and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 LOR, 27, 13, 20, 140. 
46 LOR, 13. 
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end. God uses appropriate means. “Every thing goes to show, that God has connected 
means with the end through all the departments of his government–in nature and in 
grace. There is no natural event in which his own agency is not concerned.”47 Revivals “are 
brought about by the use of means like other events.” Although “some people say God can 
carry on revival without means,” Finney has “no faith in it. For there is no evidence of 
it.… God never did and never can convert a sinner except with the truth. What is 
conversion? Obeying the truth.… The sinner’s own agency is indispensable, for 
conversion consists in the right employment of the sinner’s own agency.”48 
Such a view is quite different from Edwards’ Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Work 
of God and his emphasis on God’s surprising, supernatural activity being behind successful 
revivals rather than human activity. Revivals, as well as conversions, are not supernatural 
occurrences, but natural occurrences that are brought about by the same type of 
appropriate, God-given, natural means as sowing crops from a field. If this is the case, 
then what role does God play, if any? 
 
Role of the Human and the Holy Spirit in Conversion 
 
Finney suggests that God works for the conversion of individuals through both the 
Holy Spirit and through his providence, by which “he so arranges events as to bring the 
sinner’s mind and the truth in contact.”49 Acknowledging this, let us turn to the role of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 He continues, “He [God] has not built the creation like a vast machine, that will go on alone without his 
further care. He has not retired from the universe, to let it work for itself. This is mere atheism. He exercises 
a universal superintendence and control. And yet every event in nature has been brought about by means. 
He neither administers providence nor grace with that sort of sovereignty, that dispenses with the use of 
means. There is no more sovereignty in one than in the other.” LOR, 21. 
48 LOR, 318. 
49 LOR, 17. 
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the Holy Spirit specifically in Finney’s understanding of conversion. Finney insists that the 
action of the Holy Spirit is absolutely necessary to conversion. He goes so far as to say 
that “no praying or preaching will be of any avail without him. If Jesus Christ were to 
come down here and preach to sinners, not one would be converted without the Spirit.”50 
Furthermore, “if you die without the Spirit, you will fall into hell. There can be no doubt 
of this.”51 
The work of the Holy Spirit, however, is not transformative in the sense of 
constitutionally or physically changing any aspect of a person in conversion. The Holy 
Spirit never supersedes our natural faculties. Neither can the Holy Spirit’s action be felt in 
the manner of some outside physical force on us. We do not feel “that some external 
influence or agency is applied to us. We are not to expect to feel our minds in direct 
physical contact with God. If such a thing can be, we know of no way in which it can be 
made sensible.”52 This being said, Finney suggests that we still can know that the Spirit is 
at work in us. “You can always know whether your feelings are produced by the Spirit’s 
influences, by comparing your desires with the spirit and temper of religion, as described 
in the Bible.”53 
The role of the Holy Spirit is to teach us and to influence us. “We need the light of 
the Holy Spirit to teach us the character of God, the nature of His government, the purity 
of His law, the necessity and fact of atonement–to teach us our need of Christ in all His 
offices and relations, governmental, spiritual, and mixed.”54 The Holy Spirit can bring 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 He adds, “I want you to have high ideas of the Holy Ghost, and to feel that nothing good will be done 
without his influences.” LOR, 102. 
51 LOR, 122. 
52 He continues, “We are not to expect a miracle to be wrought, as if we were led by the hand, sensibly, or 
like something whispered in the ear, or any miraculous manifestation of the will of God.” LOR, 95. 
53 LOR, 96. 
54 LST, 413. 
 	  
136 
truths to bear on each individual in unique ways because of the Spirit’s access to our 
minds, our history, and our present condition (internal and external). The Spirit then 
“employs that truth which is best adapted to his particular case, and then sets it home 
with Divine power.… Under his influence, the truth burns and cuts its way like fire.”55 
The Spirit can bring the appropriate truths to mind for any given circumstance, and thus 
have the greatest power of influence over an individual. It is this power of persuasion 
which is most basic to the power of the Holy Spirit in conversion of individuals. 
Finney calls his view the Divine Moral Suasion scheme of regeneration. God acts 
through the Holy Spirit on persons in regeneration solely by moral suasion, by presenting 
the truth in such a way that they are persuaded of it and turn to God. According to 
Finney, this view is clearly seen in the Bible, in it truth is a sanctifying force, and the 
human consciousness is aware of no other force than this. “The Bible,” he writes, “has 
settled the philosophy of regeneration. That He [God] exerts any other than a moral 
influence, or the influence of divine teaching and illumination, is sheer assumption.”56 
This power, however, cannot overwhelm an individual, or force an individual to 
make a certain choice or action. “God calls effectually, but not irresistibly.” Through the 
Holy Spirit God extends to the saints “so great and powerful a drawing, as not to force, 
but to overcome his reluctance or voluntary selfishness, and as to induce him to turn to 
God and to believe in Christ.” Because of this, Finney says, “every person who was ever 
truly converted knows, that his conversion is not to be ascribed to himself, in any other 
sense, than that he finally consented, being drawn and persuaded by the Holy Spirit.”57  
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56 LST, 284. 
57 LST, 513. 
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We have a dependence on Christ and the Holy Spirit in responding to the gospel 
and obeying God, but this dependence “does not consist in a proper inability to will as 
God directs.”58 Rather this dependence lies in the ability of the Holy Spirit to show and 
persuade us of truths that might overcome our sinful habits and “the great darkness of our 
souls in respect to Christ and His mediatorial work and relations.”59 Were this force 
irresistible, it would be in conflict with our capacity as moral agents, and would not allow 
for an explanation for the biblical injunction against resisting the Holy Spirit.60 One 
obviously could not resist God’s omnipotent force physically, so it must be in the form of 
resistible moral persuasion. 
The Holy Spirit cannot, by his own power alone, bring about conversion. God 
never operates in conversion apart from human agency. Both are vital, he claims. “Human 
agency is just as indispensable to a revival as divine agency. Such a thing as a revival of religion, I 
venture to say, never did occur without divine agency, and never did occur without 
human agency.”61 So what is the role of the human in conversion? 
All commands found in the Bible are, according to Finney, within our power to 
do. “When God commands us to do a thing, it is the highest possible evidence that we 
can do it. For God to command, is equivalent to an oath that we can do it. He has no 
right to command, unless we have power to obey.” This being the case, and even though 
“God induces him to do it,” and God “influences him by his Spirit,” it is a fundamental 
truth for Finney that “Religion is the work of man. It is something for a man to do. It consists 
in obeying God.”62 What God commands, we must do. We are commanded to be filled 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 LST, 341. 
59 LST, 341. 
60 Charles G. Finney, Sermons on Important Subjects, 3rd ed. (New York: John S. Taylor, 1836), 31.  
61 LOR, 318. 
62 LOR, 108, 9. 
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with the Spirit. We are commanded to repent. We are commanded to obey. We are 
commanded to live a holy life. We are commanded to have a new heart. All these things 
we can do and should do. We are both able and obliged. 
Therefore, when it comes to conversion, we are to turn to God, to repent, to make 
a new heart. Such commands we must actually do. In this venture we work together with 
God. “The conversion of a sinner consists in his obeying the truth. It is therefore 
impossible it should take place without his agency, for it consists in his acting right. He is 
influenced to this by the agency of God, and by the agency of men.”63 
Previously we mentioned that Finney does not distinguish between the terms 
regeneration and conversion. This dual activity of human and divine is clarified somewhat 
through a further description of Finney’s understanding of these terms.  
For Finney, “regeneration is, in the Bible, the same as the new birth.” And to be 
regenerated implies being made holy. “Certainly, a sinner is not regenerated whose moral 
character is unchanged.” Rather, for Finney the term regeneration expresses “primarily 
and principally the thing done, …the making of a sinner holy, and expresses also the fact, 
that God’s agency induces the change. Throw out the idea of what is done, …the change 
of moral character in the subject, and he would not be born again, he would not be 
regenerated, and it could not be truly said, in such a case, that God had regenerated him.” 
Finney’s emphasis is on what results from God’s agency, a change in the sinner, and so he 
objects to restricting the term regeneration to God’s agency or activity. It “implies the 
turning or activity of the subject,” and therefore the subject’s agency. “Passive holiness is 
impossible.” Regeneration then is dependent not only on God but on human activity.64 
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“Both conversion and regeneration are sometimes in the Bible ascribed to God, 
sometimes to man, and sometimes to the subject,” Finney argues. This “shows clearly 
that the distinction under examination is arbitrary and theological, rather than biblical. 
The fact is, that both terms imply the simultaneous exercise of both human and Divine 
agency.”65 
As Finney sees it, in regeneration the subject is both passive and active. The 
subject is active in choosing the gospel, but at the same time passive in that “he acts only 
when and as he is acted upon.” He is passive in perceiving “the truth presented by the 
Holy Spirit.” This perceiving is distinct from regeneration, but also simultaneous with it. 
“It induces regeneration. It is the condition and the occasion of regeneration.”66 Finney 
also uses a courtroom scene to describe the mutual participation of Spirit and sinner. “A 
sinner, under the influence of the Spirit of God, is just as free as a jury under the arguments of an 
advocate.”67 The Spirit is an advocate for the truth; the sinner hears the Spirit’s arguments 
(passive), and then weighs them and comes to a decision (active). In sum, as Finney puts it, 
“the saints convert not themselves, in the sense that they turn or yield, until persuaded by 
the Holy Spirit. God converts them in the sense, that He effectually draws or persuades 
them. They turn themselves, in the sense that their turning is their own act.”68 
Although the above description would seem to ease any tension one might find 
between divine and human activity in conversion, this is not the case. Finney constantly 
returns to the same point in discussing our failure to obey God’s commands, necessary for 
our conversion and holiness. It is not that we cannot, but that we will not obey God. “Men 
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are wholly indisposed to obey; and unless God interpose the influence of his Spirit, not a 
man on earth will ever obey the commands of God.”69 This seems to be consistent with 
what we found above. But then we find statements such as these: “obligation to perform 
duty never rests on the condition, that we shall first have the influence of the Spirit, but 
on the powers of moral agency. We, as moral agents, have the power to obey God, and 
are perfectly bound to obey, and the reason we do not is, that we are unwilling.”70 So at 
times Finney specifically denies the need for any activity of the Holy Spirit in being 
obedient to God. The obligation of sinners to repent “rests, not upon the Spirit’s 
influences, but upon the powers of moral agency which they possess; upon their ability to 
do their duty. And while it is true that not one of them ever will repent without the 
influences of the Spirit, still they have power to do so, and are under obligation to do so, whether the 
Spirit strives with them or not.”71 Apparently, then, we have the capacity to ‘go it alone’ in 
conversion, though we never do. We will discuss this notion further below.  
On the other hand, Finney at times seems to imply that the Holy Spirit is, in fact, 
needed for this capacity for obedience, that we cannot do what we are commanded to do 
in our natural state. Already above, as we have seen, he insists on the necessity of the 
Holy Spirit in conversion. Additionally, he writes “It is true indeed that God requires of 
men, especially under the gospel, what they are unable to do directly in their own 
strength.” He then qualifies the statement, suggesting that God tells them to take 
advantage of his strength and grace to meet his requirements. Therefore, he concludes, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 LOR, 9. 
70 LOR, 107-108. “When you tell sinners that without the Holy Spirit they never will repent, they are very 
liable to pervert the truth, and understand by it that they cannot repent, and therefore are under no 
obligation to do it until they feel the Spirit. It is often difficult to make them see that all the ‘cannot’ consists 
in [is] their unwillingness, and not in their inability.” LOR, 107. 
71 LOR, 101 (emphasis mine). 
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“with strict propriety, it cannot be said that in this, or in any case, He requires directly 
any more than we are able directly to do.”72 
The one position Finney never defends is that this regeneration and obedience 
can be wrought by the action of the Holy Spirit alone. “Several theologians have held 
that regeneration is the work of the Holy Spirit alone. In proof of this they cite those 
passages that ascribe it to God. But I might just as lawfully insist that it is the work of man 
alone, and quote those passages that ascribe it to man, to substantiate my position.”73 For 
Finney, the human is never passive in regeneration. A person never ought simply to wait 
for God to change him or her.74 Finney argues that a sinner in this position will never 
respond or act on the gospel message. “He stands and waits for God to do what God 
requires him to do, and which no one can do for him. Neither God, nor any other being, 
can regenerate him, if he will not turn. If he will not change his choice, it is impossible 
that it should be changed.”75 The human subject has a necessary and active role in 
conversion. On this Finney shows no lack of clarity.  
What can we conclude about Finney’s view of the role of the human and Holy 
Spirit in conversion? First, we would suggest that whichever conflicting position of Finney 
on the matter we adopt, the role of the Holy Spirit is greatly minimized. His role is not 
unlike the role of a preacher, in Finney’s view. In the process of conversion he says there 
are three agents and one instrument at work. The agents are God, a human messenger 
who brings the gospel message and promotes conversion, and the sinner. The instrument 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 LST, 321. 
73 LST, 274. He suggests in this context I Peter 1:22 as an example. 
74 As he puts it in his sermon, “Sinners Bound to Change Their Own Hearts,” “Sinners should not content 
themselves with praying for a new heart.” Sermons, 36. They should not settle for this passive response, but should 
actively choose to change their hearts. They should not wait, but should do, and immediately. 36-38. 
75 LST, 276. 
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used is the truth.76 The human messenger (the preacher, etc.) is not necessary, but when 
present works to persuade the sinner to convert through the truths of the gospel. “The 
preacher is a moral agent in the work; he acts; he is not a mere passive instrument; he is 
voluntary in promoting the conversion of sinners.”77 Essentially, the preacher or other 
third party human agent functions in the same way as the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit 
has the advantage of a greater knowledge of the sinner and of the applicability of 
particular truths to the sinner’s situation, but is otherwise doing nothing that a preacher 
or other human agent might do.78 In other words, it would seem in Finney’s view that the 
Holy Spirit’s function in conversion is not unique, and theoretically is not even necessary, 
since the same function can be fulfilled by human agency. Given that the entire role of 
influence in conversion is also technically not necessary, this only further weakens an 
already questionable role for the Holy Spirit in conversion. 
In several other descriptions in Finney’s writings the role of the Spirit seems 
optional or superfluous. For example, he writes, “The influences of the Spirit are wholly a 
matter of grace. If they were indispensable to enable us to perform duty, the bestowment of 
them would not be a gracious act, but a mere matter of common justice.”79 So these 
influences are dispensable, it appears. Elsewhere he suggests that the Spirit of God is only 
needed to persuade a sinner to turn from sin when he is so entrenched in it as to make the 
persuasions of other people inadequate. “The degree of his dependence upon the Spirit, is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 Sometimes Finney lists these in the manner here described, e.g. LOR, 17. He also sometimes includes 
truth as a fourth agent instead of an instrument, e.g. LOR, 195. However, even there the first three are 
moral agents, whereas reading further he describes truth as a “mere unconscious instrument.” LOR, 195. 
77 LOR, 18. See also LST, 274. Also see Finney’s sermon, “Sinners Bound to Change Their Own Hearts” in 
Sermons, 20-22. 
78 “It is true that God converts sinners. But there is a sense, too, in which ministers convert them. And you 
have something to do; something that requires wisdom; something which, if you do it wisely, will insure the 
conversion of sinners in proportion to the wisdom employed.” LOR, 193. 
79 LST, 108. 
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just the degree of his obstinacy.”80 Evidently there is hope for some less obstinate 
individuals to manage apart from the Spirit. Or in yet another example, Finney suggests 
that the gospel, and with it “the gift of the Holy Spirit, to convict, convert, and sanctify 
the soul, is a system of grace throughout. But to maintain this, I must also maintain, that 
God might justly have required obedience of men without making these provisions for 
them. And to maintain the justice of God in requiring obedience, I must admit and 
maintain that obedience was possible to man.”81 Here Finney’s relentless logic drives him 
to the consistent conclusion that if, as he insists, to be a responsible moral agent involves 
the capacity to fulfill the obligation (refusing to acknowledge any distinctions in how this 
capacity might be understood, e.g. natural vs. moral inability), then this unassisted 
capacity must be present. This, ultimately, is at least one very important reason why 
Finney struggles with the role of the Holy Spirit.82 In sum, though Finney says no one is 
saved without the Holy Spirit, it is difficult to conclude anything other than that in 
Finney’s system the role of the Holy Spirit is, at most, a persuader and, at least, virtually 
irrelevant. 
When Finney ventures to say that conversion “never did occur without divine 
agency,” perhaps he would have been more accurate to say that it never has occurred, 
but that it could. A critical perspective would note that it is indeed an odd coincidence 
that this purported human ability to obey God or to repent has not, even in Finney’s view, 
ever actually occurred in human history. Perhaps there is indeed a better explanation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Sermons, 27. 
81 LST, 331. 
82 Finney himself seems aware of this difficulty. “Whenever the necessity and importance of the Spirit’s 
influences are held forth, there can be no doubt that persons are in danger of abusing the doctrine and 
perverting it to their own injury. For instance, when you tell sinners that without the Holy Spirit they never 
will repent, they are very liable to pervert the truth, and understand by it that they cannot repent, and 
therefore are under no obligation to do it until they feel the Spirit. It is often difficult to make them see that 
all the ‘cannot’ consists in [is] their unwillingness, and not in their inability.” LOR, 107. 
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Finney is loathe to mention the notion of inability due to its misuse or misunderstanding in 
his context, but it certainly would appear to be the stronger explanation, and more 
consistent with biblical passages than some of the strained interpretations Finney at times 
provides.83 
As to biblical imagery, even Finney notes that “the sinner is dead in trespasses and 
sins,” but “God calls on him” to “Arise from the dead.” And so, in Finney’s view, “the 
sinner puts forth his activity, and God draws him into life; or rather, God draws, and the 
sinner comes forth to life.”84 But here, in fact, is Finney’s dilemma in this question of roles. 
In the above declaration he puts forth two distinct and conflicting options as if they could 
be easily held together. Is he going to go with option number one (“the sinner puts forth 
his activity, and God draws him into life”) or option number two (“God draws, and the 
sinner comes forth to life”)? Does God initiate the process of conversion, or the human? 
And if Finney takes his own statement seriously, that the sinner is indeed dead in sins – an 
image that certainly fits the biblical expression of the human sinner, how could such a 
dead body initiate any process whatsoever? Finney seems to want it both ways, but this 
appears inherently problematic.85 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 For example, Finney writes, Regeneration is ascribed to man in the gospel, which it could not be, if the 
term were designed to express only the agency of the Holy Spirit.” LST, 270. He then quotes I Cor. 4:15 in 
support. “For though ye have ten thousand instructors in Christ, yet have ye not many fathers; for in Christ 
Jesus I have begotten you through the gospel.” How this clearly establishes his point is a mystery to me. 
84 LST, 271. 
85 Were Finney to respond to this discussion of the role of the Holy Spirit and the human in conversion, he 
would likely stress the historical context that he was addressing. In his Lectures on Systematic Theology he notes, 
“When I entered the ministry, I found the persuasion of an absolute inability on the part of sinners to 
repent and believe the gospel, almost universal.” He says he faced “stern opposition” when preaching for 
sinners to do their duty, as both sinners and those in the church said one must wait on God to repent. 
Likewise one needed to wait on God for revival. “Man had no more agency in producing them than in 
producing showers of rain.” LST, 330. In a passage from Lectures on Revivals he suggests that when the place 
of election and God’s sovereignty has been distorted such that sinners become passive, then human ability 
in conversion must be emphasized. Clearly in the Calvinist context in which he was working he believed 
this to be the case. “It has been customary, in many places, for a long time, to bring the doctrine of election 
into every sermon. Sinners have been commanded to repent, and told that they could not repent, in the 
same sermon.” LOR, 205. In such a context a minister must “go right over against them, and crowd upon 
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It seems that one might finally say that for the Calvinist one cannot turn to God in 
repentance and obedience unless one is regenerated, whereas for Finney one cannot be 
regenerated unless one turns to God. Next we must consider what the nature of the 
change is that occurs at this regeneration or conversion. 
 
The Nature of the Change of Conversion 
 
In examining Finney’s understanding of the nature of the change that occurs at 
conversion, one point is very clear. In Finney’s view conversion never results in any 
change to a person’s basic faculties, natural abilities, physical nature, or any aspect of 
one’s substance. “Physical regeneration, under every modification of it, is a stumbling-
block. Original or constitutional sinfulness, physical regeneration, and all their kindred 
and resulting dogmas, are alike subversive of the gospel, and repulsive to the human 
intelligence.”86 Regeneration is not “a change in the substance of soul or body.”87 To 
admit that this is in any way true would be to acknowledge that in our natural state, we 
lack some portion of ability to respond to God’s call. As we have seen above, Finney 
believes this would remove the moral responsibility of sinners and render them not 
responsible for their sins.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
them their ability to obey God, and to show their obligation and duty, and press them with that until he 
brings them to submit and be saved. They have got behind a perverted view of these doctrines.” LOR, 200. 
If, on the other hand, there is too much emphasis in a congregation on human ability, the minister must 
stress the work of the Spirit. So one might temper one’s criticisms of Finney by arguing that he is 
overstating his case to address his context. He adds, “When talking of election, the preacher is not talking of 
the sinner’s duty. It has no relation to the sinner’s duty. Election belongs to the government of God. It is 
part of the exceeding richness of the grace of God. It shows the love of God, not the duty of the sinner. And 
to bring election and repentance together in this way is diverting the sinner’s mind away from his duty.… A 
great deal of ingenuity has been exercised in endeavoring to reconcile a sinner’s ‘inability’ with his 
obligation to obey God. Election, predestination, free-agency, inability, and duty, have all been thrown 
together in one promiscuous jumble.” LOR, 205. 
86 LST, 285. 
87 LST, 271. 
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Finney reiterates this further in his sermon, “Sinners Bound to Change Their 
Own Hearts,” which is based on Ezekiel 18:31 (“Make you a new heart and a new spirit, 
for why will ye die?”). There he argues that the word spirit is used in the sense of the 
temper or spirit of a person, and not of a spiritual entity.88 The word heart, which has 
many meanings in the Bible, is not used in the passage to mean any change in the 
substance or constitution or faculties of a person. Any constitutional change providing 
some principle of holiness in a person would remove the virtue of one’s holiness, making 
it the result of physical necessity rather than choice.89 Similarly, if the making of a new 
heart involved some physical change, it would be unreasonable. One cannot be held 
responsible morally for something one cannot do, just as one cannot be condemned if 
commanded to fly unless God gave a person wings. No reasonable person condemns 
himself under such circumstances. Since God commands us to change our hearts on pang 
of eternal death, it is intrinsic to such a command that we are able to do so. So the 
question of whether the demand is reasonable hinges on the ability of a person to make 
the change. A physical change is unreasonable, but a moral (voluntary) change is not. All 
humans have the power to choose to obey or not to obey God, to choose him for their 
end or their own selfish interests.90 Finney suggests that all such doctrines “be laid aside as 
relics of a most unreasonable and confused philosophy.”91 
Neither should one claim that this change is merely a mystery. Finney warns that 
couching religion in mystery provides undue comfort to sinners. Tell a sinner “that 
regeneration is all a mystery, something he cannot understand; and leave him all in a fog 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Sermons, 4. 
89 Sermons, 5-6. Finney also discusses biblical notions of the “heart” in LST, 272f. When the heart is used to 
represent the center of moral actions, it “cannot be meant to designate any involuntary state of mind” since 
such a state can have no moral character. 272. The heart is “something over which we have control.” 273. 
90 Sermons, 17-18. 
91 LST, 285. 
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of darkness, and you relieve his anxiety. It is his clear view of the nature and duty of 
repentance, that produces his distress. It is the light that brings agony to his mind, while 
he refuses to obey.… Only cover up this light, and his anxiety will immediately become 
far less acute and thrilling.”92 
If the nature of the change that occurs to an individual in conversion is neither 
physical, constitutional, nor mysterious, what does it consist in exactly? This change of 
nature is a change in heart, an active choice to follow God in obedience to his law, a willful 
submission to God, all of which results in a holy life. It is a total moral reformation and a 
reorientation of one’s will to godly desires. In a passage from Lectures on Systematic Theology 
Finney summarizes his view: “Regeneration is represented in the Bible as constituting a 
radical change of character, as the resurrection from a death in sin, as the beginning of a 
new and spiritual life, as constituting a new creature, as a new creation, not a physical, 
but a moral or spiritual creation, as conversion, or turning to God, as giving God the 
heart, as loving God with all our heart, and our neighbor as ourselves.”93 Let us further 
explore various aspects of his views on this change. 
One important element of this change that Finney mentions often, reminiscent of 
Edwards, is that regeneration always involves a change in heart. Regeneration “expresses 
the act of turning; the changing of the heart, or of the ruling preference of the soul.” It is 
a “turning from sin to holiness, or more strictly, from a state of consecration to self to a 
state of consecration to God” and it is “the repentance that is required of all sinners.”94 
When speaking to anxious sinners, “no direction should be given, that does not include a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 LOR, 340. 
93 LST, 273. 
94 LST, 343, 344. 
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change of heart.… In other words, nothing is proper, which does not imply actually 
becoming a Christian.”95 
For Finney the spiritual heart is analogous to the physical heart, the source of “the 
moral affections and actions of the soul.” It is “the fountain of spiritual life, … that deep seated 
but voluntary preference of the mind, which lies back of all its other voluntary affections and emotions, and 
from which they take their character.”96 In this regard it is not unlike Edwards’ notion of the 
disposition, although Finney is much more careful never to allow such a disposition any 
physical or constitutional reality in a person.97 To speak of a change of heart for Finney is 
not so much to speak of a change in an individual, but rather an individual’s shift to godly 
obedience and affections, a living out of God’s directives. One does not wait until one’s 
heart is changed, after which one does these things. Instead it is in doing these things that 
one changes one’s heart. “God requires sinners to love him. That is to change his heart. 
God requires him to repent. That is to change his heart.… The very word itself, repent, 
signifies a change of mind or heart. To do either of these things, is to change your heart, 
and to make you a new heart, just as God requires.”98 A change of heart, and conversion 
itself, is always tied to obedience for Finney. “All religion consists in obeying God from 
the heart. All religion consists in voluntary action.”99 The resulting change of conversion 
is quite simply obedience, which results in holiness. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 LOR, 363. 
96 Sermons, 8. 
97 Finney actually equates the notion of a holy heart with a holy disposition in his “Sinners Bound” sermon. 
“We know by experience that it is the nature of mind to be controled [sic] in its individual exercises and 
affections, by a deep-seated disposition or preference of a particular course or object.” Sermons, 10. Nevertheless, 
Finney gives the idea of disposition no where near the emphasis that Edwards does, and seems to use it in a 
more limited sense than Edwards did. For Edwards the disposition is at the center of one’s being and 
orientation, and is almost something of an entity. For Finney the disposition is defined by one’s choices 
more than being the basis for those choices, and is more closely akin to the idea of one’s will. 
98 LOR, 373. 
99 LOR, 413. As he says elsewhere, “Our prime object should be, to induce the sinner to obey God.” 337. 
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Finney asks, “What is religion?” His answer is plain and simple; “it is obeying 
God.” Since obedience is in the very nature of conversion, the notion that someone might 
be seeking Christ is meaningless to Finney. To seek God is to obey God. “To say that a 
person can seek to obey God, and yet not obey him, is absurd.… To seek religion, implies 
a willingness to obey God, and a willingness to obey God is religion.”100 Therefore at its 
core the change of conversion is a choice. It “must consist in a change in the attitude of the 
will, or a change in its ultimate choice, intention, or preference; a change from selfishness 
to benevolence.”101 Because, as has been said previously, all humans have the ability to 
obey, what is then vital in conversion is to choose to obey. If we choose to obey, we will 
obey. This is why, for Finney, the notion of seeking is nonsensical. 
It is in our choices that we define our heart and moral character. This has been 
true since Adam. When first created, Adam had no moral character or disposition. He 
only became defined when he acted or made choices. He became holy in disposition in 
choosing to follow God, and hence had a completely holy heart.102 When Adam 
disobeyed, when he chose his own ends over God’s desires, the change “was a real change 
of heart; from a perfectly holy, to a perfectly sinful one. But here was no constitutional 
change, no change in the substance of either body or mind.” His disposition, moral 
character, his heart was changed not by changing his powers of choice, but by his choice 
itself.”103 Finney states that even God is defined by his disposition, by his choices. “His 
holiness does not consist in the substance of his nature, but in his preference of right. His 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Therefore “it is a contradiction to say that an impenitent sinner is seeking religion.” LOR, 335. 
101 LST, 273. It is, he says, “is a radical change of the ultimate intention, and, of course, of the end or object 
of life.” 273. 
102 Sermons, 10-12. 
103 Sermons, 13. 
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holiness must be voluntary.”104 Holiness, then, is for Finney a moral concept rather than 
a form of participation in the divine nature. 
In a telling illustration of his conception of the nature of this change in conversion, 
Finney compares the change of an individual in choosing to follow Christ with changing 
one’s choice of a political candidate. When a person moves from supporting one 
candidate to a different candidate, the person works towards their interest and election. 
“He has new political friends on the one side, and new political enemies on the other. So 
with a sinner; if his heart is changed, you will see that Christians become his friends–
Christ his candidate. He aims at honoring him and promoting his interest in all his 
ways.”105 However, just as no one would think a person’s actual physical or constitutional 
makeup must be modified to change one’s choice of candidates, so too, when one chooses 
Christ in conversion no change is needed beyond the choice. We can cast our votes for 
God and his kingdom, or for ourselves and our kingdoms. In these preferences our hearts 
are defined. 
There are some issues and difficulties that arise in part from Finney’s perspective 
on the nature of the change of conversion, particularly as related to sanctification (which 
Finney insists must be entire – perfectionism), and to perseverance and moral character 
(how or where in a person is moral and/or spiritual development and character 
preserved? Is perseverance even possible?). These will be addressed later in this chapter. 
Thus far we have determined that for Finney, conversion, like revival, is not 
supernatural, but accomplished through natural means, that it is wrought by the work of 
humans and the Holy Spirit, that the Holy Spirit does this work by persuasion, and that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Sermons, 12. 
105 Sermons, 15. 
 	  
151 
the change that takes place in conversion is not accomplished “by physical force, or by a 
change wrought in their nature or constitution.” Instead it occurs when the heart is 
changed, which involves the active choice of the subject in choosing God’s concerns over 
selfish concerns. Another of the ways that Finney describes this change of conversion is 
that of “yielding to the truth.” This truth, “made effectual by the Holy Spirit,” is 
instrumental in the accomplishing of conversion.106 It is to Finney’s notion of the role of 
the intellect and truth or knowledge that we now turn. 
 
The Role of Knowledge and the Intellect in Conversion  
 
Finney makes numerous references to the critical role of knowledge and intellect 
for conversion and Christian life. In the earliest pages of his Lectures on Systematic Theology 
he writes, “You were made to think.… God designed that religion should require thought, 
intense thought, and should thoroughly develop our powers of thought.” Finney wants his 
readers to think “intensely” for themselves in forming their theological positions, and 
insists that such positions can and should be completely logical. He writes, “I regard the 
assertion, that the doctrines of theology cannot preserve a logical consistency throughout, 
as both dangerous and ridiculous.”107 Proper use of the Bible also demands this same 
reasoning capacity. Finney is dedicated to rejecting or modifying any doctrine which 
conflicts with progress in knowledge and holiness.  
This forms part of the basis for Finney’s rejection of some of the views of his 
teachers and other Calvinists. Finney believes that they “were driven to confess that they 
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could not establish the logical consistency of their system;” they had to “shut their eyes 
and believe, when revelation seemed to conflict with the affirmations of reason.”108 Such 
a path Finney refuses to take. Indeed, we shall examine later just how central these 
notions of reasonableness are to Finney’s project. Although faith is not merely intellectual, 
faith “implies an intellectual perception of the things, facts, and truths believed. No one 
can believe that which he does not understand.”109  
If reasoning is crucial to the Christian life and faith, so too is knowledge, the 
material of reason. Knowledge is required for healthy Christian life. To be “sound in the 
faith,” converts are to “be taught fully and plainly, all the leading doctrines of the Bible. 
Doctrinal knowledge is indispensible to growth in grace.”110  Knowledge is also required 
to enter the Christian life. One must let go of any hope in oneself and find in Christ alone 
the soul’s “all-sufficient portion and salvation.” Finney writes that such knowledge is “the 
indispensable condition of appropriating faith.”111 
 
Types of Knowledge 
Unlike Edwards, Finney does not distinguish strongly between different kinds of 
knowledge or knowing, but he does maintain something of the same distinction, although 
less prominently. On occasion when he speaks of knowledge he distinguishes between 
what amounts to mere mental assent and knowing from the heart, deep in one’s being. 
He writes that in the Bible there is described what he terms an “intellectual faith.” This is 
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“a simple conviction of the truth.”112 Such a faith is passive, and is not saving. Even the 
demons have that. Those in the Bible that are portrayed as having faith but then falling 
away probably had this kind of faith. The other kind of faith is a “saving faith,” and 
moves beyond intellectual assent to a type of belief that results in virtue and in actions.113  
In this latter saving faith Christ is “revealed to the inward being.” In assenting 
faith “nothing is done more than to store our heads with notions or opinions and theories,” 
and our hearts become “more and more, at every moment, like an adamant stone.” 
Finney suggests that this deeper faith and knowledge is not accomplished solely by one’s 
intellect. It is “an entirely different thing to know Christ, as He is revealed by the Holy 
Spirit.”114 Through this deeper faith the knowledge of Christ becomes transformative 
through the Holy Spirit.115 
 
Finney’s Faculty Psychology 
There is a faculty psychology at work for Finney in discussing the intellect and 
other capacities of a human being. In his theology lectures he describes “three primary 
faculties of the mind which we call intellect, sensibility, and will.” The intellect is further 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 LST, 530. 
113 An example illustrating Finney’s criticisms of the reduction of Christianity to assenting knowledge can be 
found in Finney’s Memoirs. There Finney describes the process by which people were considered converted 
in a German Reformed church in Evans Mills, NY. The minister would come to a church and “catechize 
their children, and receive such of them as had made the required attainments in knowledge. This was the 
way in which they were made Christians. They were required to commit to memory the catechism, and to 
be able to answer certain doctrinal questions; whereupon they were admitted to full communion in the 
church. After receiving the Communion they took it for granted that they were Christians, and that all was 
safe. This is the way in which that church had been organized and continued.” Memoirs, 74. Finney 
preached that what they needed was holiness, and not just some kind of head knowledge, and there was a 
great revival of the small community. “This revival among these Germans resulted in the conversion of the 
whole church, I believe, and of nearly the whole community of Germans.” 76-77. 
114 LST, 415. 
115 “I have often feared, that many professed Christians knew Christ only after the flesh; that is, they have 
no other knowledge of Christ than what they obtain by reading and hearing about Him, without any 
special revelation of Him to the inward being by the Holy Spirit.” LST, 415. 
 	  
154 
divided into “the three-fold fundamental distinction of the sense, the reason, and the 
understanding.”116 Finney also acknowledges other divisions of the intellect not relevant to 
his discussion, e.g. imagination or memory.117 We will have further occasion to discuss his 
faculty psychology below, but here let us describe briefly his understanding of these 
divisions of the intellect. 
In Finney’s view, the sense perceives sensations and brings them to consciousness. 
The reason intuits self-evident truths, such as mathematical, philosophical, and moral 
axioms. “The classes of truths given by this function of the intellect are self-evident. That 
is, the reason intuits or directly beholds them, as the faculty of sense intuits or directly 
beholds a sensation.” In the same way one perceives a house merely by looking at it, so 
too self-evident truths appear before reason when examined. There is no reasoning 
necessary. Truths from the senses are certain as experienced sensations, but are subject to 
doubt in that one is not always certain that what one perceives matches the external 
object or reality. However, self-evident truths perceived through reason are not subject to 
doubt; “this faculty directly beholds the truths which it affirms.”118 
Finney distinguishes between reason and the understanding.119 The understanding 
organizes and classifies the information gained through the senses using the self-evident 
truths or principles given by reason. Although the truths of reason are never in error, the 
knowledge and opinions formed by the understanding may be in error, and the result is 
considered knowledge “only in a modified and restricted sense.”120 
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There are two broad divisions of truth: those which need proofs and those which 
do not. All truths are of the former type except for those directly intuited by reason. 
Truths of demonstration become certain truths to a mind when properly demonstrated 
and then become undeniable. Truths one has demonstrated to be true to one’s own mind 
still must be demonstrated to be true to the minds of others to be accepted. If 
demonstrated properly others “cannot but see the truth demonstrated.” Because of this 
one cannot merely pronounce theological truths to others, since it is “of little use to 
dogmatize, when we ought to reason, demonstrate, and explain.” One must not merely 
assert religious truths, therefore, but should demonstrate them. “God convinces and 
produces faith, not by the overthrow of, but in accordance with, the fixed laws of 
mind.”121 So we are not merely to leave the resolution of what we assert to others in the 
hands or sovereignty of God, without first demonstrating them.122 All of this puts one’s 
reasoning powers at the forefront of conversion. 
Truths of divine revelation, Finney suggests, require proof. “Some of these truths 
are above reason in the sense that the reason can, a priori, neither affirm nor deny them.” 
Thus Finney argues that what needs to be proved is that a given truth has been “given by 
a divine inspiration.” If that is established, then the truth is to be believed because our 
minds are constituted in such a way as always to be obligated to believe what God has 
uttered.123 
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Role of Knowledge in Conversion  
How does all this relate to the role of knowledge and intellect in conversion? 
According to Finney, truth is the instrument God uses in bringing about conversion.124 
We have already seen above the role of the Holy Spirit and of other humans in persuading 
individuals to follow Christ. “Truth is the outward means” of this persuasion. So for 
Finney, “regeneration and sanctification are to be effected by moral means – by 
argument and not by force.”125 
In one of Finney’s list of inferences at the close of his “Sinners Bound to Change 
Their Own Hearts” sermon, he writes, “The idea that the Spirit converts sinners by the truth, is the 
only view of the subject that honours either the Spirit, or the truth of God.”126 Whether it be the Holy 
Spirit, and or the preacher, one must use the truth to bring the mind of an anxious sinner, 
“by the shortest rout [sic], to the practical conclusion, that there is, in fact, no other way 
in which he can be relieved and saved, but to renounce himself and rest in Christ alone. 
To do this with effect, requires great skill.”127 This repentance implies self-reflection, and 
understanding of the nature of sin and the law, and a full acceptance of the law’s 
“reasonableness.”128  
In a clear indication of the importance of one’s intellect and reasoning to 
conversion, Finney suggests that both the quantity of knowledge available and the degree 
of one’s capacity for reason both influence the probability of conversion. For example, in 
commenting on how best to preach the gospel, Finney notes that the leading minds of 	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many communities historically have not responded well to the gospel because of how the 
gospel is presented. In the past “ministers had not grappled with mind, and reasoned so as 
to make that class of minds see the truth of the gospel, and feel its power.” But when the 
minister shows them “the reasonableness of religion,” then one finds “that class of minds 
are more easily converted than any other. They have so much better capacity yielding to 
the force of reason, that as soon as the gospel gets a fair hold of their minds, it breaks 
them right down, and melts them at the feet of Christ.”129 Finney believes in the capacity 
of every human being to respond to the gospel, if only it can be placed powerfully in front 
of them. If they have strong rational capacities, then they can be persuaded more easily 
by powerful reasoning to respond to the gospel. As he puts it elsewhere, “the more truth 
can be brought to bear on the mind, other things being equal, so much the more probable is it 
that the individual will be converted.”130 Finney then constantly stresses the reasonableness 
of Christian beliefs, and the value of knowledge and intellect in the conversion of sinners. 
 
Intellect not Fallen? 
Finney’s view of the role of the intellect is so high that it is a question as to 
whether he sees it as in any way fallen or broken by sin. Consider how Finney defines sin 
in the following passage in which he discusses Romans 5:12-19. “Paul and other inspired 
writers represent sin as consisting in a carnal or fleshly mind, in the mind of the flesh, or 
in minding the flesh. It is plain that by the term flesh they mean what we understand by 	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the sensibility, as distinguished from intellect, and that they represent sin as consisting in 
obeying, minding, the impulses of the sensibility.”131 Does Finney consider the intellect to 
be free from the effects of sinful depravity? He seems to pit the law of the flesh against the 
law of reason. “The law in his members, that warred against the law of his mind, of which 
Paul speaks, is manifestly the impulse of the sensibility opposed to the law of the reason.” 
It is not the law of reason, but this law of flesh, “the impulse of his sensibility,” that 
“brings him into captivity, that is, influences his will, in spite of all his convictions to the 
contrary.”132 At least here it appears that an unfallen capacity of reason is set against 
one’s fallen flesh. Such a view also fits with Finney’s denial of any form of constitutional 
depravity that would incline one to sin and hence waive one’s moral responsibility for it. 
 
Limits of Knowledge 
Although we see that for Finney the intellect and knowledge have an exalted 
function in his system of theology, knowledge does have its limits as well. One must take 
care, for example, not simply to equate possession of religious knowledge with religion 
itself. Religion does not consist in doctrinal knowledge. “Knowledge is essential to 
religion,” Finney writes, “but it is not religion. The devil has doctrinal knowledge, but he 
has no religion.”133 Nor does a greater volume of knowledge necessarily indicate 
conversion or an increase in grace in one’s life. “Knowledge is indispensable to grace, and 
growth in knowledge is essential to growth in grace, but knowledge is not grace, and 
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growth in knowledge does not constitute growth in grace.”134 Moreover, the impact of 
knowledge on a person’s spiritual state is only felt when that knowledge is internalized by 
the action of the Holy Spirit. This is even true, in Finney’s view, of knowledge directly 
from Scripture. In a statement that seems reminiscent of something between Friederich 
Schleiermacher and Karl Barth, Finney writes, “The Bible is not of itself, strictly and 
properly a revelation to man. It is, properly speaking, rather a history of revelations 
formerly made to certain men. To be a revelation to us,” Finney writes, “its truths must 
be brought by the Holy Spirit within the field of spiritual vision. This is the condition of 
our either knowing or properly believing the truths of revelation.”135  
 
Results of Knowledge  
What is the result of the kind of saving knowledge described above? How does one 
know that one has a saving faith through a deep, inner knowledge of Christ? For Finney, 
to know Christ is to be converted, and to be converted is to obey. As Finney puts it, 
“What is conversion? Obeying the truth.”136 At the end of the day for Finney, it is not 
about what you think; it is about what you do. 
Finney is quite clear about this. He has a pragmatic, utilitarian, instrumental view 
of knowledge. It is important as a basis for action, and not for its own sake. Finney’s 
concern is that people will slip into a passive role, thinking that merely notional ideas of 
the truth in one’s mind indicate one’s converted state. But growing in grace is not the 
same as getting new notions. Christians do not need new notions, but rather dutiful action. 	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“The only design of doctrine is to produce practice,” Finney exclaims. “The church is 
mighty orthodox in notions, but very heretical in practice, but the time must come when 
the church will be just as vigilant in guarding orthodoxy in practice as orthodoxy in 
doctrine, and just as prompt to turn out heretics in practice as heretics that corrupt the 
doctrines of the gospel.”137 We will have more to say on this relation of knowledge and 
practice when discussing below the role of experience in and authentication of conversion. 
Finney insists that knowledge is vital to conversion, but it does not stand alone. 
“Two things are indispensable to evangelical or saving faith. The first is intellectual 
conviction of the truth of a thing,” not meaning “merely the abstract truth of it, but in its 
bearing on you.”138 That this is Finney’s position we have now made clear. The second 
thing indispensable to Finney in true conversion is a result of the first, a change in “a 
corresponding state of the affections.”139 It is impossible for a person to possess in one’s 
heart these kinds of spiritual truths about God and Christ, and not feel differently about 
them. To explore this further, we turn now to the role of emotions in conversion. 
 
The Role of Emotions in Conversion  
 
Finney shares with Edwards a concern for head and heart religion. As has been 
observed above, Finney is concerned with the mind. No less clear is the inadequacy of the 
mind for faith when operating independent of the heart and emotions. “When he comes 
to take up theology in a cold abstract way he finds his spirituality as little promoted as if 
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he was studying Euclid.”140 Held in the abstract, the multiplication of new notions about 
Christianity merely hardens the heart. Indeed revival at its core seems to be the 
movement from head to heart, as one comes to realize the power of the truths that one 
holds through the power of the Holy Spirit.  
In examining the role of emotions in Finney’s view of conversion, or even in 
revivalism more generally, one might expect the revivalist to seek to instill emotional 
responses in his hearers through powerful, emotive speaking, emphasizing the emotions 
over against an intellectual component. Although some may have been critical of Finney 
in his earliest years for using sheer emotionalism with his less literate backwoods 
audiences, in reality Finney moves fairly quickly toward a much more intellectual 
approach that stresses notions of truth and forms of intellectual persuasion over strictly 
emotional appeals. By his middle age he is even more critical of forms of revivalism based 
on emotionalism.141 
Certainly there are signs throughout Finney’s writings indicating that stereotyping 
Finney’s revivalism and theology of conversion as anti-intellectual emotionalism is 
unjustified. Finney sees preaching as “hot passion and cold logic” and seeks always to 
persuade the mind and move the heart.142 He is a lawyer arguing his case, but with the 
intended result not merely to convince hearers of an intellectual point after which they 
might go on their way, but rather that they turn their life in a new direction. It is by 
focusing the mind, in fact, that Finney believes emotions are changed; one does not access 
them directly. As Finney puts it, “People talk about religious feeling, as if they thought 	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they could, by direct effort, call forth emotion. But this is not the way the mind acts.” 
Finney counters, “The emotions of the mind are not directly under our control. We cannot 
by willing, or by direct volition, call forth our emotions.… The emotions are purely 
involuntary states of mind.”  One’s emotions can, in fact, be controlled, just not directly. 
Emotions “can be controlled indirectly. Otherwise there would be no moral character in 
our emotions, if there were not a way to control them.”143 
Finney expresses his ideas on this in a somewhat contradictory way. If emotions 
are “purely involuntary states of mind,” then, in his view, one should not be held morally 
accountable for them. Yet Finney wants to give them a moral tone. What this amounts to 
is that a person is responsible for one’s emotions to the extent that one makes choices as 
to what content is placed in one’s mind, content that brings with it emotional responses. 
But this all starts with the intellect, not the emotions. As Finney writes, “A man can direct 
his attention to any object, about which he ought to feel and wishes to feel, and in that 
way he will call into existence the proper emotions.”144 
Because of this dynamic, one should expect that with deep piety toward God 
come powerful emotions and other manifestations.145 Moral beings, in Finney’s view, are 
wired to be impressed by great moral character, and are therefore to be most impressed 
and awestruck by consideration of God’s holiness and take delight in him. It is more 
colloquially termed ‘love for God.’ The intellect perceives this character of God, which 
leads to strong feelings in the sensibility. But we must consciously be aware of such a love, 
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and act on it, rather than merely noting the warm feelings in our hearts. One must never 
mistake emotional responses for saving faith.146 
The Holy Spirit plays a part in these emotional responses. The Spirit does not 
help us by “superseding the use of our faculties.”147 Instead he helps “by exciting our own 
faculties.” Again here we find that the source of emotions are found in the intellect. The 
Holy Spirit, to aid in instilling godly emotions in us, “enlightens our minds, and makes 
the truth take hold of our souls.” The Spirit “leads us to a deep consideration of the state 
of things; and the results of this, the natural and philosophical result, is, deep feeling.”148 
Even when Finney seems to be writing primarily about emotions, the subject often 
shifts to discussions of or appeals to the intellect. In his instructions for how to promote a 
revival, for example, he writes, “If you mean to break up the fallow ground of your hearts, 
you must begin by looking at your hearts – examine and note the state of your minds, and 
see where you are.”149 To look at the state of one’s heart and emotions typically leads to a 
consideration of the mind or intellect, because it is the avenue by which the feelings are 
affected. To the extent that individuals need to be brought to excitement by revivalists, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 See LST, 148-51. The moral nature of emotions still remains somewhat ambiguous in Finney’s writings. 
Although, as described above, he can write of the moral character of one’s emotions, in other places he 
seems to insist that bringing emotions to mind by contemplation of certain morally excellent content still is 
“altogether an involuntary state of mind” and “has no moral character.” LST, 149. When stressing such 
points, however, it seems Finney’s concern is to prevent an individual from mistaking particular positive 
emotional responses to content such as God’s goodness with some kind of salvific or proper standing before 
God, as if to have such feelings indicates a living faith. Faith involves active choices, actively willing to 
orient one’s life in conjunction with God’s priorities and will. Too many “judge of their religious state, not 
by the end for which they live, that is, by their choice or intention, but by their emotions.” LST, 149. 
147 LOR, 90. 
148 LOR, 91 (emphasis mine). “The Spirit makes the Christian feel the value of souls, and the guilt and 
danger of sinners in their present condition.” He also helps us to “apply the promises of Scripture.” 91. To 
some extent emotions even seem to be an indicator for Finney of the presence of the Spirit. For example, 
“Prayer meetings are often too long. They should always be dismissed while Christians have feeling, and not 
be spun out until all feeling is exhausted, and the spirit is gone.” 135. As we have seen already, a lack of 
feeling indicates a lack of depth in the appropriation of truths beyond an abstract level. Because the Holy 
Spirit plays a role in persuading individuals of the truth of the gospel, stronger feelings could be considered 
an indicator of the Spirit’s presence. 
149 LOR, 40. Or again, “To break up the fallow ground, is to break up your hearts – to prepare your minds to 
bring forth fruit unto God.” 38. 
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this is due to the weak state of their knowledge. Finney anticipates a time after which the 
church has matured and is “enlightened, and the counteracting causes removed, and the 
entire church will be in a state of habitual and steady obedience to God.”150 
One must not forget that Finney also spent years in the classroom at Oberlin 
where he sought to help students to think for themselves and not merely follow his points 
of view. As his career progressed he moved further and further in this direction, such that 
in 1860 in England he was upset by the noise and antics of the Methodists to whom he 
was preaching (it certainly seemed no worse than what he had inspired in his early years 
of revival). “He insisted that penitents needed to be ‘intelligently converted.’”151 In 
essence, emotions are a byproduct of the internalized knowledge of the truths of the 
gospel. 
Problems with emotions may arise in relation to conversion and revivalism. Some 
may wait for certain feelings, especially if they observe them expressed by others, e.g., at a 
revival. “Sinners often lay out a plan of the way they expect to feel, and how they expect 
to be converted, and in fact lay out the work for God, determined that they will go in that 
path or not at all.”152 This, Finney says, is a mistake. There is no one path and no certain 
set of feelings that accompany every person’s true response to the gospel. To insist on 
them only prevents one from responding in action to the gospel call. More often than not 
the feelings one experiences are even unexpected.  
Some think that revivals should be dispensed with because of the problems and 
excesses that are sometimes associated with them. “This cannot, and must not be. True, 
there is danger of abuses. In cases of great religious as well as all other excitements, more or 	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less incidental evils may be expected of course.” Finney argues that “the best things are 
always liable to abuses.”153 Emotional appeals are grounded in intellectual convictions. 
And if, in the course of revivals, evils or abuses arise, they are “of small importance when 
compared with the amount of good produced by revivals.” The belief of some that the 
church should abandon the use of revivals “brings in its train the damnation of the 
world.”154 
Although there may be a danger of too much or misdirected emotion, in Finney’s 
view the greater problem is a lack of emotions. This indicates a lack of true conviction, 
repentance, and conversion. Too many in the church “are only half converted, and their 
religion is rather a change of opinion than a change of the feeling of their hearts. There is 
mechanical religion enough, but very little that looks like deep heart-work.”155 True 
repentance involves “not only a change of views, but a change of feelings.” More 
specifically, one comes to feel as God does about sin, and has an “abhorrence of sin.”156 It 
is not merely refraining from sinful things; those who have truly repented have “turned 
their mind away” from sinful things.157 If one is truly converted one no longer even desires 
to do sinful things. If one still desires to sin, then one is not converted. 
The carnal lack these emotional responses to the truths of the gospel. “The 
thought of God, of Christ, of sin, of holiness, of heaven, and hell, excites little or no 
emotion in the carnal mind.”158 Such a want of emotion (and action) in response to these 
truths indicates that a person “is an infidel, let his professions be what they may. He that 
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feels nothing and does nothing, believes nothing. This is a philosophical fact.”159 Here 
again Finney again links feelings to what one knows or believes to be true.160 
Ultimately, in sum, one must say that Finney places emotions in a very secondary 
role. The lack of emotions can be cause for concern regarding one’s converted state, but 
are never to be considered an actual barrier to conversion, nor a clear indicator either 
way of one’s converted state. Those who lack emotion should still be encouraged to act on 
the gospel, all feelings aside.161 Those who are filled with emotion should do the same, 
because those emotions themselves are no secure indication that one is converted. 
“Religion does not consist in raptures, or ecstacies [sic], or high flights of feeling. There 
may be a great deal of these where there is religion. But it ought to be understood that 
they are all involuntary emotions, and may exist in full power where there is no 
religion.”162 Indeed the more mature a Christian becomes, the less one regards one’s 
emotions – even though much emotion may be present. Such a person “acts less under the 
influence of feeling or emotion. He does things less because he feels so, and more because 
it is right.”163 What is so critical for Finney is not for one to feel, but for one to act on the 
knowledge one has of religion, to order one’s life and priorities in view of God’s desires, and 
to act in a way consistent with them. Choosing to act on behalf of the gospel brings us to 
our next section on the role of the will in conversion. 
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160 “Repentance always consists in a change of views and feelings.” LOR, 366. 
161 Finney is especially insistent that young converts not rely on emotions. “Young converts should be 
carefully taught, when duty is before them to do it. However dull their feelings may be, if duty calls, do it. 
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The Role of the Will in Conversion 
 
Although Finney denies that the emotions are a sure indicator of one’s converted 
or unconverted state, he does, as we have seen, at times insist that emotions will 
accompany saving faith. Finney also denies that “the will, or heart, may be right, while 
the affections or emotions are wrong.”164 Finney argues that any emotions not consistent 
with one’s intentions are not of any moral significance or character. Moral character is to 
be found in one’s intentions, while emotions can be the result of necessity rather than 
choice. One cannot control one’s emotions completely the way one controls one’s choices. 
One should not focus on what one cannot control, since one is ultimately therefore not 
morally responsible for those things.165 
What we can control is our will, which is why Finney insists that “where there is 
true saving faith, there is always corresponding conduct.”166 Human will is free and 
unfettered, and Finney incessantly emphasizes the primacy of the choices one makes as 
the central concern in one’s standing before God. In his study of Finney Glenn Hewitt 
goes so far as to say that “by the time he was writing his mature theological reflections, 
Charles Finney was convinced that regeneration was almost entirely a matter of personal 
deliberate choice.”167 Finney’s own words indeed seem to support this position. 
The very definition of conversion seems to consist in this human choice. Finney 
writes in Lectures on Revivals that “sinners cannot be converted without their own agency, 	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become powerful temptations to seek their gratification, instead of seeking the highest good of being.” LST, 
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for conversion consists in their voluntary turning to God.”168 Later, at the very outset of his 
Lectures on Systematic Theology, Finney describes his intention to press to their logical 
conclusions the truths and consequences of various doctrines, foremost among them “that 
the will is free, and that sin and holiness are voluntary acts of mind.”169 
Finney believes that this is a notion drawn from the Bible, which he believes 
“everywhere, and in every way, assumes the freedom of the will.”170 Finney denies that 
there can be any passivity in conversion. In his view, evangelical faith is not just firm 
conviction or intellectual assent, though that form of it can also be found in the Bible. No 
virtue can be attached to that passive variety of faith. “The Bible distinguishes between 
intellectual and saving faith.” The former is the faith of devils, the latter of saints. Faith is 
also not “a feeling of any kind.”171 These also are passive. As a virtuous action, “it must 
be a phenomenon of the will.… It is the will’s closing in with the truths of the gospel.”172 
This notion is clearly present in the aforementioned analogy wherein conversion is 
likened to changing one’s vote from one candidate to another. The only change present 
in conversion is not one of one’s constitutional makeup, but a choice and the concomitant 
actions that come as a result of that choice. “Regeneration then is a radical change of the 
ultimate intention, and, of course, of the end or object of life.” This change “must consist 
in a change in the attitude of the will, or a change in its ultimate choice, intention, or 
preference; a change from selfishness to benevolence.”173  
Finney’s shift to an emphasis on free will is born out in his own conversion 
experience. As Hardman describes it, on Finney’s conversion on October 10, 1821, 	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“suddenly it became clear; until then he had believed scripture intellectually, but he had 
not realized that faith was a voluntary trust, not an intellectual state. It was to place 
oneself under the mercy of a supremely forgiving heavenly Father.” In choosing to trust 
and follow God, “he found himself in a totally different state, full of joy.”174 The act of 
choosing God is transformative; it reorients a person.  
Finney’s strong emphasis on conversion as a free choice is closely related to his 
view of the nature of moral agency. For moral obligation to exist, both free will (more 
broadly moral agency) and light or knowledge is required.175 Finney himself remarks at 
the beginning of his systematic text that what he has said “on ‘Moral Law’ and on the 
‘Foundation of Moral Obligation’ is the key to the whole subject.”176 For Finney, all 
moral agents in their voluntary actions should obey the moral law through which God 
expresses his moral government. “It is the rule for the government of free and intelligent 
action, as opposed to necessary and unintelligent action. It is the law of liberty, as 
opposed to the law of necessity.”177 The moral law directs the free will, but does not 
control it. Most importantly, there is no moral element involved in any decision that is 
not voluntary. Free will must be present for morality to be in play. Liberty is an essential 
attribute of a moral law. Moral laws tell people what they ought to do, but do not force 
them to do it. All forms of government are either moral or physical, the former providing 
what one ought to do and the latter obeyed by necessity.178 The former is a government 
of motive; the latter is a government of force. Whatever the moral law requires of the 	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moral agent must be possible for the agent. If it is not possible, then the individual is 
under necessity and no longer a moral agent. Choice is intrinsic to moral law. “To talk of 
inability to obey moral law is to talk nonsense.”179  
Therefore, because for Finney there can be no moral implications, no right or 
wrong, in any decisions that are not voluntary, it is absolutely necessary that one be 
completely free and able either to accept or reject God. Otherwise one cannot be held 
responsible for the rejection of God and God’s moral law. Finney claims that everyone is 
conscious of being a moral agent, and of the idea of right and wrong. Thus by these alone 
everyone is aware of being under moral obligation. It is because we all possess this free 
will in relation to our choices that we are all under the demands of the moral law.180 
It is by way of these free choices also that Finney defines the Christian expression 
of right and wrong in one’s life in terms of holiness or sin. All sin is voluntary; otherwise it 
is not sin. To choose sin is to reject God’s law. “Every sin, then,” Finney writes, “consists 
in an act of will.”181 The same is true of holiness, even for God’s holiness. “All holiness, in 
God, angels, or men, must be voluntary, or it is not holiness. To call any thing that is a part 
of the mind or body, holy–to speak of a holy substance, unless it be in a figurative sense, is 
to talk nonsense.”182 Holiness is not praiseworthy unless it is voluntary, and it is not a 
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substance one possesses, but defined by the ongoing choices one makes.183 We define our 
choices as right and wrong through our intentions, however, and not always through the 
actual consequences of our actions, since we only have complete control over our 
intentions. It is by these intentions or motives that we are judged.184 
In conversion, this willing or turning to God involves more than the completion of 
simple, outward acts, even acts of obedience. Religion does not, for Finney, “consist in 
going to meeting or reading the Bible, or praying, or any other of what are commonly 
called religious duties.”185 Those duties are not at the core of religion, but rather “A LIFE 
OF PIETY” to which these activities may or may not contribute.186 To be pleasing to 
God, right actions must be accompanied by right motives and a right heart. “All religion 
consists in obeying God from the heart.”187 It is a willingness to obey God, but moreover 
having the heart of one who is “willing that God should rule in all things.” Finney even 
goes so far as to say that “obedience to God consists in the state of the heart.”188 It is a 
foundational or fundamental choice or orientation of submission to God’s will in all 
things, that controls all other choices.  
Finney terms this state of submission and obedience to the moral law of God 
benevolence. Benevolence is at the core of right willing. It is the state in which God 
always exists. “The moral attributes of God and of all holy beings, are only attributes of 
benevolence. Benevolence is a term that comprehensively expresses them all. God is love. 	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This term expresses comprehensively God’s whole moral character. This love, as we have 
repeatedly seen, is benevolence.”189 Finney defines benevolence as “the obedience of the 
will to the law of reason and of God. It is willing good as an end, for its own sake, and not 
to gratify self.” Selfishness, on the other hand, is “a spirit of self-gratification.”190 Finney 
spends considerable time exploring the nature of benevolence via a consideration of the 
attributes of love, e.g. virtue, humility, impartiality, universality, and opposition to sin. 
Ultimately, Finney writes, “every form of sin may be resolved into selfishness, just as every 
form of virtue may be resolved into benevolence.”191 Ultimately his discussion is familiar, 
stressing again the place of voluntarily willing the good, as defined in accordance with the 
universal application of God’s interests to any given situation, apart from any self-interest, 
and denying that any element of benevolence extends beyond willful choices into the 
constitution or substance of the self, which would eliminate the moral character of 
benevolence.192 
One must take care to distinguish willing from desiring. For Finney the former 
always results in actual choices, whereas the latter is equivalent to something like wishful 
thinking. For example, “people often desire to be Christians, when they are wholly unwilling 
to be so.”193 There are many things that we desire, but which for various reasons we 
choose not to will to do. “WILLING to obey Christ is to be a Christian. When an 
individual actually chooses to obey God, he is a Christian. But all such desires, as do not 
terminate in actual choice, are nothing.”194 People can have all kinds of good desires, but 
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if they do not result in actions they amount to “practical Atheism.” Therefore, Finney 
writes, “No degree of desire is itself virtuous.”195  
 
Relation to God’s Sovereignty and Election 
How does Finney frame his notion of God’s sovereignty with that of complete 
human free will? Finney mostly comes to struggle with notions of God’s sovereignty and 
election only later in his career as a professor of systematic theology. There he insists that 
“foreknowledge and election are not inconsistent with free agency.”196 Finney argues that 
the election of God exists, but is misunderstood by those who reject the doctrine. Finney 
believes that people oppose election because they think it means that the elect are saved 
regardless of their conduct, and also that salvation is not possible for the non-elect. 
Election neither frees the elect from the obligation to obedience, nor denies salvation to 
any who are willing to repent and obey God. To think otherwise, Finney argues, is to 
misunderstand election. “The elect were chosen to eternal life, upon condition that God 
foresaw that in the perfect exercise of their freedom, they could be induced to repent and 
embrace the gospel.”197  
Similarly, the doctrine of reprobation does not represent God’s ultimate end in 
creation, or that he intends endless misery for any. Reprobation does not mean that any 
will be condemned against their will, nor is it the cause of their destruction, nor that no 
means were applied to bring about their salvation, or that any are sent to hell except for 
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their own voluntary wickedness.198 “The only true reason why all of you [sinners] are not 
Christians,” Finney writes, “is that you are unwilling [to accept God’s terms of salvation]. 
You are not made unwilling by any act of God, or because you are reprobate; but if you 
are reprobate, it is because you are unwilling.”199  
Why does God not make the sinner willing to accept him? Because, according to 
Finney, “He sees that it would be unwise in Him to do so.” How does Finney know? He 
calls it “an irresistible inference” due to “two facts.” The first is that God is “infinitely 
benevolent.” The second is that, if God does not actually make all sinners willing, then 
there must be good reason not to since Finney does not “believe that God would neglect 
anything that He saw to be wise and benevolent, in the great matter of man’s 
salvation.”200  
For Finney, then, reprobation is just; everyone is free to choose salvation or not. 
Reprobation is also benevolent, because in the total picture a universe with the reprobate 
is a better universe because of the balance of good that comes to others in such a universe. 
Reprobation is the necessary side effect of allowing humans free choice and moral agency, 
and having a moral government in place that is just.201  
Some insist that Romans 9 and other Bible passages teach that God sovereignly 
creates some for condemnation and some for salvation, “and forms the character of both 
so as to fit them for their respective destinies, with an absolutely irresistible and efficient 
sovereignty.”202 Finney argues that this is, morally speaking, impossible. One must be free 
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to choose or reject God, or one is not a moral being at all. Such a position amounts to 
“fatalism.”203  
Finney distinguishes “decree” from purpose. By purposes Finney means design or 
intention, and these are “ultimate and proximate.” God’s ultimate purpose is to secure his 
ultimate end, but he does this through means or proximate purposes. Decree can mean a 
law or statue, or it can mean foreordination – to render certain. Most theological writers 
use it in the latter sense, but often confound its meaning with that of purpose. Finney 
objects to using the word decree in regard to the acts of moral agents, since God does not 
actively determine them but only foreknows them. The moral agent’s free will ultimately 
determines the outcome.204 Finney prefers using purpose when speaking of God’s 
government, and decree when speaking of God’s law or command.205 
Sounding vaguely like Edwards, Finney describes a form of certainty he calls 
moral certainty. There are certain events “conditionated upon, the free actions of moral 
agents. This class do not occur under the operation of a law of necessity, though they 
occur with certainty.” He clarifies further his notion of this certainty: “It is not a certainty 
of necessity in any sense; it is only a mere certainty, or a voluntary certainty, a free, 
certainty, a certainty that might, by natural possibility in every case, be no certainty at 
all.”206 God knows these events through his foreknowledge, but does not make them 
certain. “They are certain in themselves.”207 It does seem as though such certainty has a 
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necessary correlation with God’s foreknowledge, or that God’s foreknowledge includes 
within it a kind of implicit certainty, even if not caused by God. This is reminiscent of 
Edwards in Freedom of the Will; knowledge implies certainty. Perhaps Edwards would even 
term it necessity, even though Finney would undoubtedly object to that.208 
However one may view this, Finney makes clear finally his view; the 
“foreknowledge and designs of God respecting our conduct or our destiny, do not in the 
least degree interfere with our free agency. We, in every case, act just as freely as if God 
neither knew nor designed anything about our conduct.”209 Any other view, in Finney’s 
mind, empties individuals of their moral agency and moral responsibility. In essence, all 
of God’s sovereignty expressed through both election and reprobation is never in 
contradiction with human free will. Finney argues for a position that would now likely be 
termed “middle knowledge.” God foreknows, but does not foreordain, the choices of 
moral free agents. “Neither the Divine fore-knowledge nor the Divine purpose, in any 
instance, sets aside the free agency of the creature.”210  
 
Finney and Edwards/Reformed Thought 
Finney has, perhaps, no deeper disagreement with, and no notion he reacts as 
strongly and frequently to, as Calvinist notions regarding inability – and related notions 
such as original sin. In the very first line of his preface to Lectures on Systematic Theology he 
declares, “To a great extent, the truths of the blessed gospel have been hidden under a 
false philosophy.”211 Finney stridently opposes Calvinist doctrines that deny free will and, 	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in his view, promote a form of passivity and waiting on God, especially regarding 
conversion. He complains, “People have been told that they must repent, and, in the 
same breath, told that they could not repent.”212 Sinners throw “their duty off upon God, 
or else run into despair, from the supposed impracticability of doing what is requisite for 
their salvation.” They are caught in “theological labyrinths and mazes” that make it ever 
more difficult for a preacher or revivalist to lead them to the gospel.213 To a large degree 
these difficulties are due to Calvinist conceptions of moral depravity. 
Finney argues that there is such a thing as total moral depravity, but that it has 
been misrepresented by Calvinism. Too often it has been explained in a manner that 
confuses physical with moral depravity. Moral depravity does not involve constitutional 
(involuntary) states, but rather only willful choice. “Moral depravity is sin itself and not 
the cause of sin.”214 It is “not a sinful nature but a sinful heart.”215 Moral depravity must 
not be tied to any form of physical or constitutional depravity, since “physical depravity, 
being depravity of substance as opposed to depravity of the actions of free will, can have 
no moral character.”216 There can be no such thing as “involuntary sinfulness.” Sin is, by 
its nature, voluntary, else it is not sin.217 Finney constantly reiterates this point. 
Finney is aware that some passages of Scripture are sometimes understood as 
supporting inability, but he argues that “the strong language often found in scripture 
upon the subject of man’s inability to obey God, is designed only to represent the strength 	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directions which used to be plain are now obscure. People have been taught so long, that there is something 
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of his voluntary selfishness and enmity against God, and never to imply a proper natural 
inability.”218 He considers Romans 7 specifically, arguing that when Paul says he cannot 
do what he wills, by willing he means “legal resolutions” made by “convicted sinners and 
backslidden saints,” and not the experience of true saints. “Paul speaks as if speaking of 
himself, but was doubtless speaking as the representative of a class of persons already 
named [sinners and backsliders].”219 He argues further that we often say we “cannot” 
when we mean we “will not” do something in popular speech. This, Finney suggests, is 
how Paul is using the term in Romans 7. He concludes that it is “a gross and most 
injurious perversion of scripture, as well as a contradiction of human reason, to deny the 
natural ability, or which is the same thing, the natural free agency of man, and to 
maintain a proper natural inability to obey God.”220 
Moral depravity, in Finney’s view “consists in selfishness.” It is “a spirit of self-
seeking, a voluntary and entire consecration to the gratification of self. It is selfish ultimate 
intention; it is the choice of a wrong end of life.”221 Original sin undermines Finney’s 
belief that God never demands that people do something they are incapable of doing. 
Original sin cannot be accepted in any material sense, since it would then absolve an 
individual of any moral responsibility for any resulting sinful behaviors. One is not born 
with original sin. Instead “Sinners make their own wicked hearts. Their preference of sin is their 
own voluntary act.”222 They do this virtually from birth, always seeking to gratify their 
various appetites. The will becomes habituated to satisfying the sensibility at an early age 
before the reason is even developed. This accounts for the reality of habitual sinfulness 	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from a young age, but there is no moral sin until the reason is developed adequately to 
reveal the choice of moral obligation, with the aid of the Holy Spirit. Finney complains 
that those who preach or teach this view “are charged with preaching heresy, because 
they presume to teach that faith is an exercise, and not a principle, and that sin is an act, 
and not a part of the constitution of man.”223 Finney himself was prompted to leave the 
Presbyterian church rather than face heresy charges over such issues. Finney, as well as 
many others at this time, insist that God condemns no one on the basis of original sin, nor 
is anyone forced to sin. 
Finney rejects any Edwardsean style distinction between natural and moral ability, 
and directly engages Edwards as representative of this Calvinist conception. He calls 
Edwards’ notion of natural ability “no ability at all,” but rather “nothing but an empty 
name, a metaphysico-theological fiction.”224 God’s moral government “assumes and 
implies the liberty of the human will, and the natural ability of men to obey God.” 
Furthermore, “the human mind necessarily assumes the freedom of the human will as a 
first truth.”225 It is a universal and practical assumption, even for those who in theory 
might deny it. Freedom of the will is an absolute necessity for any choices of moral 
significance to exist. “The natural ability or liberty of Edwards and his school,” Finney 
insists, “has nothing to do with morality or immorality,” because it only encompasses 
outward actions rather than actual willing.226 Even though Finney distinguishes his 
position from Edwards, he almost sounds like Edwards when he writes, “I admit the 
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ability of man, and hold that he is able, but utterly unwilling to obey God.”227 In practice 
it does not seem so unlike Edwards’ insistence that in our natural state we do as we will, 
but we always will not to obey God. 
Finney even suggests that those who try to enhance God’s glory by stressing 
human inability actually take away from it. “Instead of making his only difficulty to 
consist in an unwillingness, they insist upon his inability, and thus destoy [sic] his guilt, and 
of course the grace displayed in his salvation.”228 Finney seems to press together his 
notion of free will with God’s agency in conversion in ways that are not altogether 
satisfying or clear. It does not “detract from the glory of God that the act of turning is the 
sinner’s own act. The fact is, he never does, and never will turn, unless God induces him 
to do it; so that although the act is the sinner’s own, yet the glory belongs to God, 
inasmuch as he caused him to act.”229 Finney seems to want to preserve something of 
God’s sovereignty and grace, even though his conception of human will seems to rule it 
out. This tension has already been seen in the earlier discussion of the role of the human 
and Holy Spirit in conversion, and remains here as well. 
 
Voluntarism vs. Intellectualism 
It might seem like a foregone conclusion with all his constant talk of ability and 
the will to label Finney a voluntarist. Certainly Finney outwardly sounds like a voluntarist. 
Could there even be a more pronounced example of an individual that showcased the 
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importance of freedom and ability and choice than Finney? However, a closer look at the 
question suggests a more ambiguous response. 
The path to willing goes through persuasion, and the path to persuasion 
invariably goes through the mind. All willing is based on knowledge and reasoning, on 
persuasion. Indeed, as we have already observed, persuasion is the very tool used by the 
Holy Spirit in inducing conversion. For Finney, even God is confined to this in working 
toward the conversion of individuals. As Harry Conn, editor of the 1976 edition of the 
Lectures on Systematic Theology, puts it, “Mr. Finney aimed his preaching at man’s intellect, 
not his emotions, and believed that all virtue resides in the proper exercise of the will. He 
believed that the means that the Father used to draw men to Christ is truth (John 6:44, 
45), which removes the idea of causation in salvation.”230 
Persuasion is the tool used by preachers. Finney himself moves more and more 
into reasoned arguments in his revivalistic work. While clearly present even within any 
emotional excesses of his early revival context, his tendency toward intellectualism 
becomes even more pronounced as his career progresses.231 He is ever concerned to be 
rational, and in fact this rationalistic bent seems often to rule over all other authorities 
including Scripture. It is this strong occupation with reasoning that pushes him into some 
extreme positions (e.g., perfectionism). He is compelled almost always to follow the logic of a 
given view to its end. His desire to “preserve a logical consistency” can be seen 
throughout his theology – even in his very conception of God.  
God himself, by his very nature, is eminently reasonable. God is, in fact, bound by 
reason. God never acts unreasonably or contrary to reason. Even when humans cannot 
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see a reason for God’s actions and commands, “our reason affirms that He has and must 
have good and sufficient reasons for every command.”232 Were this not the case, we 
would not be bound to obey God.  
This predilection toward reason is often apparent, for example, in the ways in 
which Finney talks about God. At times he even refers to the “divine reason” as a kind of 
synonym for God.233 Finney can be very impersonal and philosophical in his speech 
about God, as though God is just part of a larger reasoned argument. Reason indicates 
that God must be such and such kind of being to be God, and a number of other truths 
necessarily follow from these truths. Even though at times Finney quotes Scripture at 
length to support his views (at other times it is notably lacking), it seems in a certain sense 
superfluous to his argument. It would stand without the support of Scripture because it is 
a necessary demand of reason, and God himself is the highest expression of reason. For 
example he writes, “The reason could not recognize any being as God to whom these 
attributes did not belong. But if infinite wisdom and benevolence are moral attributes of 
God, it follows of course that all His designs or purposes are both perfectly wise and 
benevolent.”234 Uncounted arguments in the book run along the logic of this example: 
reason demands a, b, c; therefore x, y, and z follow necessarily. 
Much of this type of speech about God is better understood when one 
understands that moral obligation is not founded on God’s will. Finney believes the 
demand to seek the highest good of all is a moral obligation of all in itself, outside of any 
command of God. Like every other moral being, God himself is under this moral 	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obligation. The moral law’s “known intrinsic value would, of itself, impose obligation on 
moral agents to choose it for its own sake, even had God never required it; or, if such a 
supposition were possible, had He forbidden it. Thus, disinterested benevolence is a 
universal and an invariable duty.”235 If, therefore, God seems at times to be an 
unnecessary accessory to Finney’s moral system, it is because in some ways he is. 
Reason is the highest authority. God cannot modify its demands. Reason is the 
final judge, and Finney has such confidence in this reason that he even deems himself 
capable of using it in judgment of God. Should God “command me to choose, as an 
ultimate end, or for its own intrinsic value, that which my reason affirmed to be of no 
intrinsic value, I could not possibly affirm my obligation to obey Him.”236 Such a 
remarkable elevation of reason and the confidence in humanity to wield it makes clear 
that the foundation of much of Finney’s theology comes not from the God of Abraham, 
who demanded of him the sacrifice of his son, but a deified, nineteenth century model of 
reason.237 At many points it is this confidence in reason that brings Finney to his 
particular beliefs about conversion, human ability, and moral law. 
For Finney, Christianity is eminently reasonable. Every movement toward reason 
is a movement toward holiness, because reason always moves one toward God’s laws, 	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which, like the moral law, are eminently reasonable. Although Finney warns against any 
purely notional form of Christianity that involves only cold intellectual assent without the 
heart, his tendency to stress the power of reasoning and the almost explicit idea that 
reason operates in individuals unscathed by the effects of sin work against those warnings. 
He is a lawyer in the courtroom of reason even more than the courtroom of revelation. 
Yes, he can warn that unbelief “is not ignorance of truth.”238 It is not merely a negation 
of knowledge or of faith, but an active state (like impenitence), a willful act.239 But at the 
same time, he also notes that “God only requires of you to choose and act reasonably, for 
certainly it is in accordance with right reason to prefer the glory of God, and the interest 
of his immense kingdom, to your own private interest.”240  
Thus one might say that the problem is the will, but the deeper problem can be 
seen as irrationality. To follow God is, for Finney, the only rational path of a human 
being. To will otherwise is irrational. If “the great and fundamental sin, which is at the 
foundation of all other sin, is unbelief,” a state, or rather choice, of the will, such a choice 
is inherently irrational.241 Rationality is the substrata of the entire scheme. Unbelief “is 
the heart’s rejection of evidence, and refusal to be influenced by it.”242 Intellectual 
skepticism in the presence of light implies unbelief, closing one’s eyes to the truth. It is a 
sin. Unreasonableness is an attribute of selfishness. “The selfish choice is in direct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 LST, 356. Likewise, he writes in his Sermons, “If right apprehensions of truth presented by the Spirit of God convert a 
sinner, does it not follow that his ignorance is the cause of his sin? I answer, No!” 32. 
239 Every sinner “at first sins against what knowledge he has by overlooking the motives to obedience, and 
yielding himself up to the motives to disobedience, and when once he has adopted the selfish principle, his 
ignorance becomes wilful [sic] and sinful, and unless the Spirit of God induce him, he will not see.” Sermons, 
33. Here the sinner hates God not because he has false notions of God, but because God is the benevolent 
opposite of his own selfish orientation. 
240 Sermons, 19. 
241 LST, 409. 
242 LST, 356. 
 	  
185 
opposition to the demands of the reason,” which is designed to follow the rule of God.243 
Finney defines benevolence as “the obedience of the will to the law of reason and of 
God.”244 Conversely, sinners are not governed by their reason, “but by feeling, desire, 
and impulse.”245 Selfishness “is a dethroning of reason from the seat of government, and 
an enthroning of blind desire in opposition to it.… It is a denial of that divine attribute 
[reason] that allies man to God, makes him capable of virtue, and is a sinking him to the 
level of a brute.”246 Saints, on the other hand, are ruled by reason.247 To be a Christian is 
to follow the dictates of reason wherever they may lead (certainly an intellectualist 
position), whereas to be unregenerate is to follow the will in defiance of the reason. To do 
something unreasonable is to do something immoral. 
Finney seems to arrive at a position that is in tension with his claims of human 
ability, suggesting that when the problem of knowledge is resolved sinners may still 
choose unbelief – a willful act, and can then only be turned by the Holy Spirit. Hence 
Finney denies that the problem of unbelief is a problem of knowledge. Yet then one is left 
with a sinner possessing adequate knowledge, but not the will to follow that knowledge to 
God. Why do sinners not choose God if the problem is not ignorance? Certainly Finney 
has made clear that such a choice involves no inherent constitutional bias toward sin. 
How can such a state be resolved? If one has the ability always to choose for God, and the 
degree of knowledge is not at issue, then what is left for the Holy Spirit to influence in 
conversion? If Finney is saying that although sinners know, they lack the will to obey, he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 LST, 181. 
244 LST, 141. 
245 LST, 294. 
246 LST, 182. Even if the feelings of sinners happen to match with their intelligence, it is the feelings that are 
controlling the will. Finney adds, “The fact is, that there is not, and there never can be, in earth or hell, one 
impenitent sinner who, in any instance, acts otherwise than in direct and palpable opposition to his reason.” 
LST, 182. 
247 “The saint is governed by reason, the law of God, or the moral law.” LST, 294. 
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seems to violate his own principles. If there is no substance or actuality in the constitution 
of a person, however conceived, that prevents the will from choosing God in the light of 
adequate knowledge of God, then what is the cause for the rejection of God? Is choosing 
selfishness over benevolence merely a random act? It seems that in an unconverted state 
we are able to but in fact never actually do choose God, which runs counter to Finney’s 
constant stress on human ability. 
It seems that it is the will to submit to reason that ultimately brings one to God, 
and denial of reason that is cause to reject God. Finney writes that “when reason is 
thoroughly developed by the Holy Spirit, it is more than a match for the sensibility [the 
ability to feel and sense], and turns the heart to God.” The problem arises when “the 
sensibility gets the start of reason, and engages the attention in devising means of self-
gratification, and thus retards, and in a great measure prevents, the development of the 
ideas of the reason which were designed to control the will.” The Holy Spirit forces truth on 
individuals in such a way “as to secure the development of reason,” and thereby “brings 
the will under the influence of truth” and gives “reason the control of the will. This is 
regeneration and sanctification.”248 
As can be seen, then, there remains ambiguity on this question. Finney indeed 
stresses the primacy of the will throughout his writings, and yet also directly and indirectly 
stresses reason, which forms the underlying basis for virtually everything he does in his 
theological work. Reason is thus intrinsic to conversion. It is inherently reasonable to be a 
Christian, and in following reason one should never go astray. 
Finney’s emphasis on the power and importance of reason is characteristic of his 
time, as Brooks Holifield, Mark Noll, and others have clearly shown. More than any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 LST, 268 (emphasis mine). 
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other figure in this dissertation, Finney displays the characteristics and confidences that 
come with Scottish Common Sense Philosophy.249 Throughout his writings Finney shows 
a remarkable confidence in reason, and an elevation of its authority to the highest 
position. 
 
Conversion and the (Dis)Unity of the Self  
 
How are the will, intellect, and emotions interrelated in individuals? Previously 
some of Finney’s views on faculty psychology were mentioned in relation to his views of 
the intellect. Here we return briefly to a further consideration of his views of the unity of 
the self, and the relation of these views to his understanding of the workings of conversion. 
Often it seems more accurate in reading Finney to describe his view of the disunity 
of the self. Finney seems to consider the various faculties not as psychological fictions – 
concepts to explain the interplay of various functional aspects of the human mind, but as 
actual divisions of human existence, even entities that exist independently within a person. 
Early in his theology text he states that “all human investigations proceed upon the 
assumption of the existence and validity of our faculties.”250 He discusses these various 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249 A key principle of Scottish Common Sense Philosophy or Realism, Mark A. Noll writes, was brought to 
America especially through the writings of Francis Hutcheson. This was “the assertion that just as humans 
know intuitively some basic realities of the physical world, so they know by the nature of their own being 
certain foundational principles of morality.” “Common Sense Traditions and American Evangelical 
Thought,” American Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer, 1985), 216-238, 221. He adds that this “reliance on a 
Hutchesonian moral sense was a staple of nineteenth-century Unitarianism and transcendentalism. Yet it 
was also very much a part of the evangelical mainstream as well. The Oberlin revivalists Asa Mahan and 
Charles Finney made constant use of that which was ‘intuitively evident’ in morals and religion according 
to ‘the changeless laws of our being.’” 222. These types of references are to be found throughout Finney’s 
writings, and perhaps more than any other reason, account for the sense that Finney’s writings often seem 
more philosophically than theological or biblically oriented.  
250 LST, 5. In his introductory remarks to this volume, the Rev. Parkhurst suggests likewise, writing that 
“Finney taught that we must assume or suppose or presuppose as a fact that we have faculties; such as the 
three primary faculties of the mind: intellect, sensibility, and will.” LST, xx. 
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faculties in almost a technical sense, and spends considerable energy detailing the various 
faculties and their roles and relations to one another, and to things like love or virtue.251 
The intellect does this, while the sensibility does that. The sensibility feels some attribute 
of love, e.g. patience, but it is not a virtue in this feeling state because it has not been 
intentionally willed.252 However, he rarely, if ever, makes any statements that represent 
these divisions as conceptual fictions that help us to understand ourselves.  
Finney wants to suggest that such an approach is scientific, some kind of 
interaction between components with various causes and effects. In fact, he writes that 
“theology is, to a great extent, the science of mind in its relation to moral law, and that it is 
“so related to psychology that the successful study of the former without a knowledge of 
the latter is impossible.”253 Thus he attempts to parse the activities and relations of these 
components. For example, in assessing the features of selfishness, Finney writes that it 
“consists in the will’s yielding itself to the impulses of the sensibility in opposition to the 
demands of the intelligence.”254 
It is in failing to maintain this very precision regarding psychological science that 
Finney faults Edwards. As Finney puts it, “Edwards throughout confounds desire and 
volition, making them the same thing. Edwards regarded the mind as possessing but two 
primary faculties –the will and the understanding. He confounded all the states of the 
sensibility with acts of will.” Edwards makes the strongest desire “identical with volition or 
choice, and not merely that which determines choice.”255 In Finney’s view Edwards, like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 See, for example, his long discussion of the attributes of love, LST, 139-76. 
252 LST, 164-65. 
253 LST, 12 (emphasis mine). 
254 LST, 182. 
255 LST, 311. 
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many others, “confounded actions of the will with emotions and desires, which results in 
“a theoretical denial of the freedom of the will.”256  
Such parsing, however, seems a questionable task. How does one divide yielding 
to feeling with willful choice? Finney argues that the former is not morally praiseworthy 
while the latter is. Is there not choice involved with yielding to good desires within 
oneself? If one follows good sensibilities in oneself, leading to good actions, are these not 
good and moral acts? How can yielding to the sensibility ever really be a choiceless act? 
Finney discusses the example of a compassionate man who gives to the poor, but who 
Finney judges to be selfish because his actions are caused by an overdeveloped sensibility 
of compassion, since he gratifies himself by giving. Finney writes, “There is no virtue, no 
benevolence in it. It is a mere yielding of the will to the control of feeling, and has nothing 
in it of the nature of virtue.”257 For Finney these divisions are determined by one’s 
intentions, seeking to please oneself versus seeking the good of being in general. “The 
choice of any thing whatever, because it is desired, irrespective of the demands of the 
reason, is selfishness and sin. It matters not what it is.”258 It seems, however, a pretty fine 
line between being pleased in doing good and being selfish. In fact it pushes even further 
in the direction of disunity, since desire and reason are split, and necessarily undermine 
each other. 
Finney is, in this regard, a reflection of his time. This type of faculty psychology 
was dominant in his day, and he seems to embrace it somewhat uncritically.259 Its clean 
divisions undoubtedly appeal to him, even as they seem somewhat contrived to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 LST, 334. 
257 LST, 185. 
258 LST, 186. 
259 Hardman specifically discusses Finney’s timebound notions of faculty psychology, suggesting that it 
entails “totally inadequate categories and explanations for human behavior.” Finney, 388. 
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contemporary reader. Finney differentiates sharply, even artificially, between various 
human components in a desire for fully rational, precise, and airtight arguments for his 
positions. These sharp lines and differentiation typify his thinking in several areas. At the 
close of the chapter we will comment further on this characteristic of Finney’s theology. 
 
The Means of Conversion 
 
Means are necessary for conversion. Finney takes a very common sense approach 
to the use of means in conversion. He is matter of fact in declaring that means are critical 
to conversion and revival, and that God always carries out his work through human 
means. “No sinner ever was or ever will be converted, but by means wisely and 
philosophically adapted to this end.”260 That is why, for example, revivals are works of 
humans as well as of God. That is why, should humans stop applying these means, 
revivals will cease. As we have already seen above, conversion is not a supernatural 
change or transformation of an individual. In the same way, the means to conversion and 
revival are not supernatural, “not a miracle, or dependent on a miracle, in any sense.”261 
They are not arbitrary acts expressing God’s sovereignty that preclude “a rational 
employment of means for promoting a revival of religion.”262 In fact, Finney says, the 
devil is pleased when people think that they cannot promote a revival because they might 
interfere with God’s sovereignty.263 Neglecting the means of grace is a sin of omission.264  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Sermons, 39. 
261 LOR, 13. 
262 LOR, 21. 
263 LOR, 21. 
264 LOR, 41-45. 
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Contrary to such arbitrary acts of God, these means are natural; revival can be 
wrought through “a purely philosophical result of the right use of the constituted 
means.”265 The relationship of these means to the end of conversion is virtually that of 
cause and effect. “There has long been an idea prevalent that promoting religion has 
something very peculiar in it, not to be judged of by the ordinary rules of cause and effect; 
in short, that there is no connection of the means with the result, and no tendency in the 
means to produce the effect.” Finney considers this idea absurd, and suggests that “no 
doctrine is more dangerous than this to the prosperity of the church.”266  
As mentioned previously, Finney compares human efforts for the salvation of souls 
to the farmer and his wheat field. The harvest is from God, but there is no harvest 
without the farmer’s activity. Some think that if a revival is truly the work of God it 
cannot be stopped, but Finney says this is not so. “A revival is the work of God, and so is 
a crop of wheat; and God is as much dependent on the use of means in one case as the 
other.”267 
To call these means necessary and natural, in Finney’s view, is not to place God 
outside of the picture. It is God who has established a world in which certain means bring 
about specific results, in conversion as well as in farming. Specific means are necessary, 
but all means are divinely established. “God has connected means with the end through 
all the departments of his government – in nature and in grace. There is no natural event 
in which his own agency is not concerned.”268 These means, whether in nature or in 
grace, are not random, but are instead those means appropriate to the task as appointed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 LOR, 13. 
266 LOR, 14. Elsewhere he writes, “Few more mischievous sentiments have ever been broached, than that 
there is no philosophical connexion between means and end in the conversion of sinners.” Sermons, 39. 
267 LOR, 278. 
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by God. One does not use random means in sowing wheat for the harvest, but instead 
must use proper techniques of farming. The same is true for revivals and conversion. 
Both involve God’s blessing as God establishes the laws by which both operations are 
successful. Neither are miraculous or magical, however. Instead the implementation of 
proper means or causes are directly connected to results.269 
Finney actually minimizes to a great degree any difference between the operation 
of nature and of grace. Their operation seems virtually indistinguishable. All that happens 
in nature is due to God’s providence, and is accomplished through means. God “neither 
administers providence nor grace with that sort of sovereignty, that dispenses with the use 
of means. There is no more sovereignty in one than in the other.”270 Grace, too, is natural, 
in the sense that means are logically or actually linked to results. What makes it grace is 
not how it works but that it is made available at all to undeserving sinners. The apparatus 
itself just works. Such a scheme works to Finney’s liking – with clean, clear, rational 
connections between means and results, causes and effects. All that we need in life “are 
obtained with great certainty by the use of the simplest means.”271 
If the means to conversion are necessary, natural, and also divinely established, 
just what are these means? Broadly speaking, the means used for conversion involve 
persuasion by the truth. Finney states this categorically: “There never was and never will 
be any one saved by any thing but truth as the means.” Sinners are to be converted “by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 It is worthwhile to quote Finney at greater length on this point. Means “will not produce a revival, we all 
know, without the blessing of God. No more will grain, when it is sowed, produce a crop without the 
blessing of God. It is impossible for us to say that there is not as direct an influence or agency from God, to 
produce a crop of grain, as there is to produce a revival. What are the laws of nature, according to which, it 
is supposed, that grain yields a crop? They are nothing but the constituted manner of the operations of God. 
In the Bible, the word of God is compared to grain, and preaching is compared to sowing seed, and the 
results to the springing up and growth of the crop. And the result is just as philosophical in the one case, as 
in the other, and is as naturally connected with the cause.” LOR, 13-14. 
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argument and not by force,” respecting their own free will and power of choice.272 
Regeneration “is nothing else than the will being duly influenced by truth.”273 
More specifically, Finney considers many kinds of means in these persuasive 
efforts that lead to conversion. Finney emphasizes that conversion and revival results from 
“the right use of the appropriate means.” These means bring about results, but only when 
used properly. For Finney, when working to convert others, it is one of the marks of being 
filled with the Spirit “to use means wisely, in a way adapted to the end, and to avoid 
doing hurt.”274  
One of these means is prayer, which is “an essential link in the chain of causes 
that lead to a revival; as much so as truth is.” Some have so emphasized the use of truth 
in converting others that they have little heeded the need for prayer. Others have made 
the opposite mistake, but “sinners are not converted by direct contact of the Holy Ghost, 
but by the truth, employed as a means.”275 Both are necessary. Prayer is especially 
important because, of all these means to influence humans, prayer is the means to 
influence God.276 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
272 LOR, 175. 
273 LST, 275. 
274 LOR, 13, 120. 
275 LOR, 53. 
276 In LOR Finney spends considerable space discussing prayer. Some of this moves beyond the bounds of 
this dissertation, but it is worth mentioning his argument that there is a form of prayer  that he terms 
prevailing or effectual prayer, or a prayer of faith. This is “that prayer which attains the blessing that it seeks.” 54. 
Finney describes the elements of such a prayer, and insists that it will always be successful if it meets the 
criteria he lists. A prayer of faith always obtains the blessing sought. It is a particular type of prayer distinct 
from other benevolent wishes we bring to God in prayer, which may or may not result in the thing being 
requested. 73-74. “This kind of faith always obtains the object.” 79. Finney goes so far as to argue that it is 
precisely because Christians have failed to use the prayer of faith that family members and others are in hell. 
It is because no believers used the prayer of faith on their behalf for their conversion. 85-87. “There is 
reason to believe millions are in hell because professors have not offered the prayer of faith.” 86. Even 
“pious parents can render the salvation of their children certain. Only let them pray in faith, and be agreed 
as touching the things they shall ask for, and God has promised them the desire of their hearts.” 331. On 
prevailing prayer, see 52-88.  
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Another important means is preaching, which William Cooper considers to be 
Finney’s “chief means of persuasion.”277 But if there is to be preaching, there must be a 
preacher. Thus other humans are a means of conversion, or at least an agent for the 
means. The preacher is not a removed third party, but “a willing, designing, responsible 
agent, as really so as God or the subject is.”278 
 
Finney’s “New Measures” 
Given Finney’s understanding of the nature of conversion and the importance of 
persuasion in bringing individuals to that point of choosing the gospel and voluntarily 
willing themselves to submit to God’s will and laws, the means of accomplishing this take 
on even greater importance. If one can find the most persuasive means, then one will 
have the most success in making converts. During Finney’s lifetime there was much 
controversy over his “new measures,” which could as easily be called new means, used as 
revival methods. In actuality, as others have shown previously, most of these measures 
were not entirely new, nor were they primarily Finney’s invention.279 Nevertheless, he 
became well-known for championing their use and they came to be associated with his 
theology and practices. 
In Finney’s view, one is never limited to a certain, defined set of means to 
conversion. One has flexibility. Finney argues that although there were specific measures 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 William H. Cooper, Jr., The Great Revivalists in American Religion, 1740-1944, (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & 
Company, 2010), 76. 
278 LST, 274. 
279 For example, in LOR, 267, fn.17, McLoughlin describes the probable source of Finney’s “anxious seat” 
as the “mourner’s bench” of Methodist camp meetings. Finney himself argues that the history of these 
innovations is gradual rather than sudden.  “Our present forms of public worship, and every thing, so far as 
measures are concerned, have been arrived at by degrees, and by a succession of New Measures.” LOR, 250. Finney 
appeals to Luther and the other reformers, to Wesley, and to Edwards in support of this long history of 
innovative measures. Finney also argues, for example, against the notion of protracted meetings being new. 
LOR, 262f. 
 	  
195 
given to the Jews in the Old Testament, under what he calls the gospel “anti-type” in the 
New Testament “it was left to the discretion of the church to determine, from time to 
time, what measures shall be adopted, and what forms pursued, in giving the gospel its 
power.”280 The early apostles did not imitate one another or set down measures, and the 
great commission prescribed no forms or directions on measures, only to preach the 
gospel and disciple all the nations. Nevertheless, some measures are necessary to carry out 
the preaching of the gospel. Just as the early church created its own set of new measures 
through which to communicate the gospel, one must always be adapting one’s means 
according to the needs of the time. 
Finney here makes a legitimate point that one must not concretize the means of a 
given period as the only right means, that change in means or measures is normal and 
can be seen going all the way back to the early church. Although many might agree with 
such a point, the difficulty still remains in determining which means are appropriate and 
which are not. A critic might agree that new measures are necessary and yet disagree 
about the impact of specific means such as Finney’s “anxious seat.”281 
For Finney, judging the appropriateness of means is a rather simple task. The 
recommended means are those that work, the means that are most effective in bringing 
sinners to conversion. “If a measure is continually or usually blessed,” he declares, “let the 
man who thinks he is wiser than God, call it in question. TAKE CARE! how you find 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 LOR, 251. 
281 In LOR, Finney describes the “anxious seat” as “the appointment of some particular seat in the place of 
meeting, where the anxious may come and be addressed particularly, and be made subjects of prayer, and 
sometimes conversed with individually.” 267. 
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fault with God.”282 The opponents of the new measures are so taken up with the evils of 
the measures that they have had no success in revivals themselves.  
Finney acknowledges, “that there have been evils, no one will pretend to deny.”283 
But he argues that the blessings greatly outweigh any evils, and that the same or greater 
evils have accompanied all other great revivals in history. He also goes so far as to argue 
that concern with the measures used in revivals is a sign of not being filled with the 
Spirit.284 “It is the right and duty of ministers to adopt new measures for promoting revivals.”285 
Some churches have opposed their minister merely because he used measures seen as new. 
Finney counters that “without new measures it is impossible that the church should 
succeed in gaining the attention of the world to religion.”286  Although “novelties should 
be introduced no faster than they are really called for,” nevertheless “new measures we 
must have.”287 
Finney compares his Protestant opponents of new measures to Roman Catholics, 
who he believes defend every particular form or means as divinely instituted. “This 
zealous adherence to particular forms and modes of doing things, which has led the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282 LOR, 190 (capitalization his). Or again, “The success of any measure designed to promote a revival of 
religion, demonstrates its wisdom.” 189. Finney gives two exceptions to this statement: a. measures 
introduced solely for their novelty or effect, and b. measures that accompany a revival which are not the 
actual reason for its success, and are perhaps even a hindrance. “But when the blessing evidently follows the 
introduction of the measure itself, the proof is unanswerable, that the measure is wise.” LOR, 189. 
283 LOR, 272. 
284 LOR, 121-22. 
285 LOR, 275. “Let a minister enter fully into his work, and pour out his heart to God for a blessing, and 
whenever he sees the want of any measure to bring the truth more powerfully before the minds of the 
people, let him adopt it and not be afraid, and God will not withhold his blessing. If ministers will not go 
forward, and will not preach the gospel with power and earnestness, and will not turn out of their tracks to 
do any thing new for the purpose of saving souls, they will grieve the Holy Spirit away, and God will visit 
them with his curse, and raise up other ministers to do work in the world.” 275. 
286 LOR, 272. 
287 LOR, 273. Finney is especially concerned that those being trained for ministry realize this. “We see the 
importance of having young ministers obtain right views of revivals. In a multitude of cases, I have seen that great 
pains are taken to frighten our young men, who are preparing for the ministry, about the evils of revivals, 
new measures, and the like.” LOR, 274. Finney singles out Princeton Seminary as an example of this. 
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church to resist innovations in measures, savors strongly of fanaticism.”288 Such a view is 
contrary to the Bible, in Finney’s view. “The fact is, that God has established, in no 
church, any particular form, or manner of worship, for promoting the interests of religion. 
The scriptures are entirely silent on these subjects, under the gospel dispensation.”289  
Looking back while writing his Memoirs Finney describes the typical means he used 
when at work in revival. “The means used were simply preaching, prayer and conference 
meetings, much private prayer, much personal conversation, and meetings for the 
promotion of that work. There was no appearance of fanaticism, no bad spirit, no 
divisions, no heresies, no schisms.”290 Finney describes and defends at length various new 
measures in his lecture, “Measures to Promote Revivals,” found in Lectures on Revivals.291 
These various new measures include lay exhortation, female prayer meetings, and most 
controversially, anxious meetings, protracted meetings, and the anxious seat. The point of 
all these measures was, again, the persuasion of the sinner by the truth. For the purposes 
of this study it is not necessary to evaluate all the various measures as much as to 
recognize that means are necessary and flexible, and that God’s approval of various 
means is seen in their successful implementation. 
The means of conversion, in Finney’s view, are not to be used by sinners but 
rather on sinners for their conversion. Means are for the church’s use. “It is a mistake of 
sinners, to think they are using means for their own conversion. The whole drift of a 
revival, and every thing about it, is designed to present the truth to your mind, for your 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
288 LOR, 275. 
289 He adds, “The church is left to exercise her own discretion in relation to all such matters.… The only 
thing insisted upon under the gospel dispensation, in regard to measures, is that there should be decency and 
order.” LOR, 276. 
290 Memoirs, 78. 
291 LOR, 250-76. The editor calls this lecture “Finney’s definitive reply to ten years of criticism by 
conservative Calvinists against his ‘new measure’ revivalism.” 250, fn 1. 
 	  
198 
obedience or resistance.”292 For a sinner to be told to do anything but submit to God is 
“false comfort.” This includes telling a sinner that “he must use the means.”293 He will use 
the means and not submit his heart. “What is the sinner’s use of means, but rebellion 
against God? God uses means. The church uses means, to convert and save sinners, to 
bear down upon them, and bring them to submission. But what has the sinner to do with 
using means?”294 Anything apart from the deliberate choice to follow God is merely 
distraction. The purpose of the means are to put that decision front and center in view of 
the sinner by persuasive demonstration of the truth. 
Finney argues that God’s election secures the success of means. He calls election 
“the only ground of hope in the success of means.” At the same time, election “does not render means 
for the salvation of the elect unnecessary.”295 Here there is a definite tension with some of 
Finney’s previous assertions. It is difficult to see how this is a consistent and coherent 
position given Finney’s position on human choice and on the cause and effect nature of 
the operation of means. If there is indeed such a “philosophical” or necessary connection 
between properly implemented and appropriate means and their effects, how or where 
does God’s election factor into it? Finney holds to a view of election because he finds it in 
Scripture, but it seems a very weak view as “God’s purposes do not render any event, 
dependent upon the acts of a moral agent, necessarily certain, or certain with a certainty 
of necessity.”296 Again confirming the necessity of free human choice in conversion, he 
insists that ”neither the Divine fore-knowledge nor the Divine purpose, in any instance, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 LOR, 19. “What sinners do is to submit to the truth, or to resist it. It is a mistake of sinners, to think they 
are using means for their own conversion.” 19. 
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295 LOR, 457. 
296 LOR, 503. 
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sets aside the free agency of the creature,” nor does election “pose any obstacle to the salvation 
of the non-elect.”297 
Neither the atonement, nor the Holy Spirit can properly be considered means for 
Finney. The atonement gives the sinner no positive righteousness.298 The atonement “was 
not a commercial transaction.” It was not simply “the payment of a debt.” It appears that 
Finney’s understanding of the atonement is not ultimately for sinners at all. “The 
atonement of Christ was intended as a satisfaction of public justice [rather than 
retributive justice].”299 God cannot repeal or change the moral law, but he can show how 
he is justified in pardoning sin. The atonement is not a means to conversion, but a public 
demonstration of God’s rightness in saving sinners. God does not bypass moral law. Its 
requirements are met, but atonement then becomes something necessary for the defense 
of God’s character, not the salvation of human sinners. 
The Holy Spirit, acting alone (i.e. miraculously), also cannot be considered a 
means to conversion for Finney. The Holy Spirit can only work through various means of 
persuasion for conversion. Finney notes that for those who hold to some kind of 
constitutional regeneration the Holy Spirit is the sole agent, with no other means or 
instruments of conversion. For them regeneration is “an act of creative power.” For them 
regeneration “is a miracle,” since for them “there is no tendency whatever in the gospel, 
however presented, and whether presented by God or man, to regenerate the heart.” 
These theologians have claimed “that there is no philosophical connection between the 
preaching of the gospel and the regeneration of sinners,” and that, in fact, the very means 
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of preaching the gospel itself increases the enmity of sinners to the message apart from the 
work of the Holy Spirit.300 In essence they deny all means. Finney responds, “Instead of 
telling him that regeneration is nothing else than his embracing the gospel, [it is] to tell 
him that he must wait, and first have his constitution recreated before he can possibly do 
anything but oppose God! This is to tell him the greatest and most abominable and 
ruinous of falsehoods.”301 This Finney can never accept. The means of conversion place 
the choice of the gospel in the control of the human will. 
 
The Relation of Conversion to Baptism 
 
Even though baptism is considered by most Protestants to be, at the very least, a 
public witness to the conversion of an adult or the reception of a child into the covenant 
community, Finney has surprisingly little to say regarding it. Throughout his Lectures on 
Revivals it is rarely even mentioned. Given the New Testament’s strong connection 
between conversion and baptism, this is fairly surprising. It also probably says as much 
about Finney’s ecclesiology and the location of conversion (considered further below) as it 
does about his particular views of baptism. In one of the few references to it, Finney is 
discussing the anxious seat and the public nature of its challenge to sinners to declare for 
the gospel. He then, in a rather striking way, compares this practice to baptism, writing, 
“The church has always felt it necessary to have something of the kind to answer this very 
purpose. In the days of the apostles baptism answered this purpose. The gospel was 
preached to the people, and then all those who were willing to be on the side of Christ 
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were called on to be baptized. It held the precise place that the anxious seat does now, as a 
public manifestation of their determination to be Christians.”302 It seems that baptism is 
somewhat interchangeable with other practices. One is left wondering what role remains 
for baptism now, why – with the anxious seat – it is even still necessary. On the other 
hand, one could as easily inquire of Finney why the New Testament practice of baptism 
should not continue instead of being displaced by the anxious seat. But at least in my 
readings Finney is silent on these matters. Baptism certainly does not bear any prominent 
place for Finney in conversion and its aftermath, and cannot be said to be in any critical 
way related to it.  
 
The Timeframe of Conversion 
 
Finney strongly emphasizes the immediacy of conversion. It is so central as to 
characterize a primary component of Finney’s model of conversion (immediate ongoing 
human decisionism). There is never reason to delay. Such a view is inherent to Finney’s 
previously described position, since the need to delay would imply some limitation of the 
sinner in responding to the gospel. The call to conversion demands an immediate 
response. The timeframe is always now. 
Finney is critical of those who give false comfort by telling sinners that conversion 
is a progressive work. Such preachers reject sudden conversions, and suggest that people 
“get better by degrees.” Finney rejects this approach entirely. “All this is false as the 
bottomless pit,” he writes.303 “Regeneration, or conversion, is not a progressive work,” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 LOR, 268-69. 
303 LOR, 338. 
 	  
202 
Finney insists. To think of it as progressive is “absurd.” What is regeneration if not “the 
beginning of obedience to God? And is the beginning of a thing progressive? It is the first 
act of genuine obedience to God – the first voluntary action of the mind that is what God 
approves, or that can be regarded as obedience to God. That is conversion.”304  
Finney expects conversion to take place quickly in circumstances where the gospel 
is preached clearly. He always urges his listeners to repent here and now. “If there be 
sinners in this house, and you see your duty clearly, TAKE CARE how you delay. If you 
do not submit, you may expect the Spirit of God will forsake you, and you are LOST.”305 
There are some who acknowledge that God is at work through revivals, for example, but 
think that “perhaps it is quite as well to have sinners converted and brought into the 
church in a more quiet and gradual way.” Such types, Finney adds, “think it so much 
safer and better, to indoctrinate the people, and spread the matter before them in a calm 
way, and to bring them in gradually, and not run the danger of having animal feeling or 
wildfire in their congregations.”306 Such people for Finney do not acknowledge the 
necessity of revivals, and the immediate nature of their work. Or some might advise an 
anxious sinner to set aside their concerns for the present and wait on God. Finney mocks 
this approach, suggesting that such types “have assumed to be so much wiser than God, 
that when God is dealing with a sinner, by his Spirit, and endeavoring to bring him to an 
immediate decision; they think God is crowding too hard, and that it is necessary for them 
to interfere.” They then find reasons for the sinner to delay his or her decision, when in 
fact “the proper course to take with a sinner, when the striving of the Spirit throws him 
into distress, is, to instruct him, to clear up his views, correct his mistakes, and make the 	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way of salvation so plain that he can see it right before him.”307 This approach leads to an 
immediate response.  
Finney argues that to delay that response is virtually never advisable, and may 
result in the sinner never returning to such a point of decision. To any inclined to wait on 
God Finney writes, “God comes with pardon in one hand, and a sword in the other, and 
tells the sinner to repent and receive pardon, or refuse and perish.” The choice is a simple 
and present one. But “now here comes a minister of the gospel, and tells the sinner to 
‘wait God’s time.’ Virtually he says, that God is not ready to have him repent now, and is 
not ready to pardon him now, and thus, in fact, throws off the blame of his impenitence 
upon God.” According to Finney, such ministers need something like “the rebuke of 
Elijah when he met the priests of Baal.”308  
As was seen above, the use of means should never interfere in, but rather 
encourage, the immediacy of the response of a sinner to the gospel call of obedience. 
Means are for use in bringing a sinner to conversion, and not for use by the sinner – 
which can only distract from immediate submission to God. That is what is needed. Such 
an approach also rejects “telling the sinner to pray for a new heart.”309 This is only again 
another diversion from immediate repentance and turning over one’s heart to God. 
Finney’s approach also rejects “telling the sinner to persevere.”310 For Finney this is like 
telling the sinner to continue in his or her sin. Finney here appears somewhat reminiscent 
of Edwards’ discussion of false religious affections. Finney is perceptive of all the ways a 	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310 He continues on this point later, writing, “God calls the sinner to repent, he threatens him, he draws the 
glittering sword, he persuades him, he uses motives, and the sinner is distressed to agony, for he sees himself 
driven to the dreadful alternative of giving up his sins or going to hell. He ought instantly to lay down his 
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sinner may be self-deceived, and refuses to tolerate excuses for delaying one’s immediate 
response to the gospel call when, in fact, one has the capacity to do so.  
Conversion is instantaneous and concurrent with the moment the sinner ceases in 
rebelling against God and submits to him. Such a sinner “ceases, from that moment, to 
be a rebel in his heart, just as soon as he comes to this conclusion. So it is with the sinner 
when he yields the point, and consents in his heart to do, and be, whatever God shall 
require.”311  
All the means discusses above are to work toward this immediate response, and 
never are to be used in any way to delay such a response. So in the use of prayer for 
sinners, one “should pray that they may be converted there. Not pray that they may be 
awakened and convicted, but pray that they may be converted on the spot.”312 Likewise 
in preaching, preachers should use the best means available under any given 
circumstances to convert the sinner “upon the spot.”313 They should try to convince the 
sinners immediately to convert, just as one would in arguing on any other point. 
Finney’s new measures are no different. Their purpose is immediate conversion. 
Anxious meetings, for example, can take two forms. One can talk briefly with each 
anxious sinner present and then make remarks to the group to remove their objections, or 
one can talk at length individually with each one. The goal of both, however, is the same 
– “to lead them immediately to Christ.”314 The anxious seat is likewise a provocation to 
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313 LOR, 40. See also 206-207. 
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immediate response. In effect, it forces an anxious sinner to make a clear declaration one 
way or the other regarding the gospel, and denies the sinner the opportunity for passivity 
in the midst of the gospel call. 
 “FINALLY,” Finney writes, “never tell a sinner any thing, or give him any 
direction, that will lead him to stop short, or that does not include absolute submission to 
God. To let him stop at any point short of this, is infinitely dangerous.”315 Because, as we 
have seen previously, one has the ability always to respond to the gospel call, there can 
never be any justification for delay, and at the very point of submission to God one is 
converted. Finney makes a multitude of similar statements, all insisting that conversion is 
immediate rather than gradual, and should always be sought with sinners without 
toleration of delay.316  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
contention between Finney and his Calvinist critics. Hardman notes that for Finney the doctrine of election 
hinders preaching, because “it stifled seminary graduates in urging their congregations toward immediate 
response.” Finney, 282. 
315 LOR, 359 (capitalization his). 
316 Some further samples of such statements should make this apparent. “No direction should be given to a 
sinner, that will leave him still in the gall of bitterness and the bonds of iniquity. No answer is proper to be given, 
with which, if he complies, he would not go to heaven, if he should die the next moment.” LOR, 363. “Any 
direction given to sinners, that does not require them immediately to obey God, is an indulgence to sin. It is in 
effect, giving them liberty to continue in sin against God. Such directions are not only wicked, but ruinous 
and cruel. If they do not destroy the soul, as no doubt they often do, they defer, at all events, the sinner’s 
enjoyment of God and of Christ.” LOR, 379. “Sinners are expected to repent NOW.” LOR, 206 
(capitalization his). Sinners need to know they have something to do immediately. “Religion is something to 
do, not something to wait for. And they must do it now [repent], or they are in danger of eternal death.” LOR, 
207. For the sinner “another moment’s delay, and it may be too late for ever. The Spirit of God may depart 
from you–the offer of life may be made no more, and this one more slighted offer of mercy may close up 
your account, and seal you over to all the horrors of eternal death.” Sermons, 41-42. 
Finney may have tempered his views on immediatism somewhat later in his career. Hardman discusses this. 
By 1845 Finney was back in print on revivals, but now in a more critical form to counteract abuses and 
shortcomings in revival practices. He had a series of articles in the Oberlin Evangelist in 1845. Among other 
things, Finney asserted, in Hardman’s words, “that many evangelists were apparently interested chiefly in 
immediate results, or numbers, rather than in the permanence and stability of their converts.” Finney, 382. 
He also argued “that recent evangelists relied on their own persuasive power over an audience to get them 
to express a desire for change, rather than relying upon the power of God. This would be a fundamental 
fault, Finney believed, in that at the outset an evangelist would not impress upon an audience that only God 
can bring about any true and complete conversion.” 382. Hardman notes that this is virtually a criticism of 
Finney’s own earlier views. 382-83. 
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The Authentication of Conversion 
 
How can one ascertain the authenticity of these immediate experiences of 
conversion? Are there marks of true conversion? How does one know if one is a 
Christian? The Bible, Finney states, “enjoins it as an imperative duty” to answer this last 
question.317 Like Edwards before him, Finney looks to the fruit of one’s life to determine 
the answer. The Bible insists on “the necessity of a holy life, if we think of ever getting to 
heaven."318 And the measurement of one’s holiness, of the fruit of one’s life, is simply 
obedience. Obedience lies at the core of conversion. Everyone who has truly repented 
and submitted to God will display obedience to God’s law. “Repentance consists in the 
turning of the soul from a state of selfishness to benevolence, from disobedience to God’s 
law, to obedience to it.”319  
Such obedience cannot be reduced simply to external actions. For Finney one’s 
moral nature is always bound up with one’s intentions. Hence the real question for 
Finney is, “What are evidences of a change in the ultimate intention? What is evidence 
that benevolence is the ruling choice, preference, intention of the soul?” This is not 
always immediately obvious, since the experience and outer life of saints and sinners may 
be alike in several areas, in areas where “the attitude of their will” is not immediately 
apparent.320 Finney argues that it is part of the constitutional nature of all moral agents to 
“approve of what is right and disapprove of what is wrong,” and thus “both saints and 
sinners may both approve of and delight in goodness.”321 They may share a desire for 	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their own or others’ happiness, and a dread of misery for either, or for the triumph of 
truth and righteousness. They may both equally admire and approve of the character of 
good individuals. They can both abhor sin, or delight in justice or in truth. They may 
both be fair in business. There remains, however, a key difference between them. 
Although they may both share the same outward actions, “the sinner is constrained by his 
feelings to do what the saint does from principle, or from obedience to the law of his 
intelligence.”322 That is to say, sinners often do good things because it makes them feel 
good, not because they know it to be the right thing to do because of their understanding 
and appreciation of the law. They are then only honoring and obeying themselves and 
their own desires, rather than God.323 
In spite of external ambiguities, Finney says that “as a general thing, it is easy to 
distinguish sinners, or deceived professors from saints by looking steadfastly at their 
temper and deportment in their relations to reform. They are self-indulgent.”324 The true 
saint, on the other hand, “denies himself.” It is the essence of regeneration that a saint is 
oriented to the greatest good of being, and thus does not act out of self-gratification. Even 
if this self-denial is not always apparent on the outside, internally “self-denial consists in 
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the actual and total renunciation of selfishness in the heart.”325 Both a king and a poor 
man can live either for the good of all or for self-gratification.326  
This being said, Finney stresses the countercultural, counter-worldly message of 
Christianity. Christians should show the impenitent "the great difference between them and 
Christians."327 Christians should be “living above the world.” They should not try to 
conform Christianity to the world, but instead conform individuals to the demands of 
Christianity. This contrast is itself a sign of authentic conversion. Finney lists several 
specific biblical truths to which a Christian should testify, including the immortality of the 
soul, the vanity of all earthly goods, the “glorious sufficiency of religion,” “the guilt and 
danger of sinners,” the reality of hell, Christ’s love for sinners, the necessity of a holy life 
for going to heaven, the necessity of self-denial, and of “meekness, heavenly-mindedness, 
humility, and integrity.” In short, there is “the necessity of an entire renovation of 
character and life, for all who would enter heaven.”328 
Christians should appear and act differently from others. Finney often seems less 
interested in what individuals profess; what is important is what people do. True Christians 
distinguish themselves not by profession of right doctrines, but rather “by precept and 
example, on every proper occasion, by their lips, but mainly by their lives.” They certainly 
ought to profess the truths of Christianity; “Christians have no right to be silent with their 
lips; they should rebuke, exhort, and entreat with all long-suffering and doctrine.” 
However, this alone cannot distinguish true Christians from hypocrites. Finney repeats 
the old adage, “Actions speak louder than words.”329 The elect are “known by their 	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character and conduct.”330 Authentication of conversion comes through evidence in one’s 
actions, and one’s motivations. 
Later in Lectures on Revivals Finney details further the signs of faith. The presence of 
faith is indicated by a person’s greater purity and singleness of heart in his or her desire to 
glorify God and save souls. There should be a greater love for God, and for other people. 
A converted person should demonstrate greater self-abasement and humility. Other 
evidences include a greater abhorrence of sin, “less relish for the world,” a greater delight 
in fellowship with other Christians, a more forgiving spirit, growth in charity, less anxiety 
about worldly things, greater willingness to give away one’s property, having no separate 
interest apart from Christ, more willingness to confess one’s faults in front of others, and 
being raised more and more above the world such that one cares less about its opinions of 
oneself.331  
A final, but noteworthy characteristic of the converted is their reforming instinct. 
Perhaps as much describing himself, Finney writes, “Saints are interested in, and 
sympathize with, every effort to reform mankind, and promote the interests of truth and 
righteousness in the earth. The good of being is the end for which the saint really and 
truly lives.” The notion of a ruling benevolence for all cannot be just a theory, but must 
take hold of one’s heart, which leads necessarily to the reformation of society in all ways 
necessary to improve the lot of humanity. Far from being disinterested, spiritually content 
observers, “as saints supremely value the highest good of being, they will, and must, take 
a deep interest in whatever is promotive of that end. Hence, their spirit is necessarily that 
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of the reformer.”332 Finney insists that “true saints love reform. It is their business, their 
profession, their life to promote it.”333 
The person who exhibits these many signs without and motivational 
transformation within can be at peace within, even amidst occasional conflicts of feelings 
and desire. In such a person, “conscious as he is of conformity of heart to the moral law, 
he cannot but affirm to himself, that the Lawgiver is pleased with his present attitude.” 
The Spirit witnesses that the person is God’s child. Such persons know that they are 
pleasing God, and that they have “God’s smile of approbation.”334 This peace of God 
exists in them because they “and God are pursuing precisely the same end, and by the 
same means.”335 
If this peace is the result of true conversion, what of those who doubt? 
“Ordinarily,” Finney writes, “the very idea of a person’s expressing doubts, renders his 
piety truly doubtful.”336 In fact, Finney suggests that the best course of action when 
encountering doubters is to encourage their doubts further.337 Otherwise such individuals 
may be self-deceived as to their status before God. Finney seems even to disdain doubt, 
and is undoubtedly troubled by the ambiguity in the status of a doubter. He also suggests, 
rather pragmatically, that “it is inconsistent with the greatest usefulness, for a Christian to 
be always entertaining doubts. It not only makes him gloomy, but it renders his religion a 
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stumbling block to sinners.”338 Yet because there are those who are uncertain, Finney on 
more than one occasion explores marks of a lack of true faith in the sinner. 
We cannot be certain, but because of the many descriptions of reprobates in the 
Bible “we may form a pretty correct opinion, whether we or those around us are 
reprobates or not.”339 Signs of an unregenerate state include long prosperity in sin, 
“habitual neglect of the means of grace,”340 those who grow old in sin, the absence of 
God’s discipline or chastisement, people who remain unreformed/unchanged even after 
chastening, and “embracing damnable heresies.”341 The unregenerate also lose their 
desire for heartfelt discussions of faith, and lose their inclination for public or private 
duties of devotion. In those inclinations they retain they become hypocritical and take 
“more delight in public meetings than in private duties and secret communing with God.” 
They feel “less delight in revivals of religion,” and become more “captious about 
measures used in promoting revivals.”342 They also do not display the regenerate 
tendency toward reform and the improvement of the world. “The sinner,” Finney writes, 
“is never a reformer in any proper sense of the word.”343 The sinner may seek reform 
outwardly at times, but always does so for selfish reasons. He does not do so for principle 
but for feelings or sensibility.  
All of this reflects the lack of change in one’s inner motivations. Unlike the 
disinterested benevolence that marks the heart and motivations of a regenerate person, all 
unregenerate persons have a heart of selfishness, which leads them always to self-	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gratification in all their choices. And unlike the role of reason and law in the regenerate, 
the sinner, as we have seen above, is not governed by reason, but feeling, which never 
results in morally praiseworthy actions since the intention behind them are selfish. 
Finney argues that this is a great problem especially among those influenced by 
revivals. They are brought by great emotion to act in ways consistent with the Christian 
life – giving money and time to the cause of Christ, and are fully convinced that they have 
experienced conversion, but it is a “deep delusion,” and they are still “governed by their 
feelings” instead of their intelligence controlling their will. When the feelings die down, 
they revert to previous behaviors.344 The sinner is, after all, finally a slave to sin. “The 
seventh of Romans,” Finney says, “is his experience in his best estate.”345  
There are others who have a conversion experience or response to the gospel and 
yet “seem to be stillborn” rather than born again. Finney writes that “we may charitably 
hope they are Christians, but still it is uncertain and doubtful. Their conversion seems 
rather a change of opinion, than a change of heart.” Their conversion has been only one 
of assent, and has not been a transformation of their deepest motivations. That is why the 
manner of revivals is so important. One must recognize that at the right time, “if, when a 
sinner is under conviction, you pour in the truth, put in the probe, break up the old 
foundations, and sweep away his refuges of lies, and use the word of God, like fire and 
like a hammer, you will find that they will come out with clear views, and strong faith, 
and firm principles.” They will be soundly converted, secure in their faith, “not doubting, 
halting, irresolute Christians, but such as follow the Lord wholly.”346  
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Those uncertain of their condition need not remain in such a state. The best 
solution for individuals uncertain of their converted state is simply to repent immediately. 
“Whether you are a Christian or not, don’t stop to settle that, but repent, as if you never 
had repented.”347 Those unwilling to do this give evidence of their sinful state.348 
According to Finney, a revival practice particularly helpful in the authentication 
of conversion is the anxious seat. Although some object to the seat as a cause of deception 
and delusion, Finney argues that it has the opposite effect on sinners. It calls forth those 
who are wavering, who may seem agreeable to the gospel message but are not wholly 
committed to it. Preach to the awakened sinner, and at that moment “he thinks he is 
willing to do any thing, he thinks he is determined to serve the Lord, but bring him to the 
test, call on him to do one thing, to take one step, that shall identify him with the people 
of God, or cross his pride,… and he refuses.” In effect the anxious seat calls a person’s 
bluff; “his delusion is brought out, and he finds himself a lost sinner still; whereas, if you 
had not done it, he might have gone away flattering himself that he was a Christian.” The 
anxious seat “prevents a great many spurious conversions, by showing those who might 
otherwise imagine themselves willing to do any thing for Christ, that in fact they are 
willing to do nothing.”349 
Here again one can also see Finney’s emphasis on the immediacy of the decision. 
While Finney is probably correct in asserting that the anxious seat could prevent certain 
forms of self-delusion, one can certainly imagine it having the opposite effect. One could 
be so moved as to make a public commitment in a highly emotional context, and yet be 
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deluded by and ever recall that particular experience of the moment as evidence that one 
is a Christian in spite of ongoing evidence to the contrary.  
Finney emphasizes in no uncertain terms that some of the greatest difficulties 
regarding the authentication of conversion stem from Calvinist notions of depravity. 
“This notion of physical depravity, and physical regeneration, and physical sanctification 
is the great curse of the church.”350 It is the cause of a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the nature of saving faith, substituting passivity and waiting on God for an active 
obedience to the law of God. Finney considers it “a false philosophy of the mind, 
especially of the will, and of moral depravity.” This problematic view “has covered the 
world with gross darkness on the subject of sin and holiness, of regeneration, and of the 
evidences of regeneration, until the true saints, on the one hand, are kept in a continual 
bondage to their false notions; and on the other, the church swarms with unconverted 
professors, and is cursed with many self-deceived ministers.”351  
Such a view, in Finney’s eyes, prevents regenerate Christians from thinking 
obedience to God’s law is possible, and deceives unregenerate individuals from requiring 
obedience of themselves as an indication and requirement of conversion. The notion of 
physical depravity serves as the great excuser of non-obedience. It teaches that virtue 
consists in something other than obedience to the law. Even though “it is generally 
asserted in their articles of faith, that obedience to moral law is the only proper evidence 
of a change of heart,” many people believe that anyone who claims to keep the moral law 
is a hypocrite or heretic. Those believing this are generally considered orthodox 
Christians, and they “must assume that there is some rule of right, or of duty, besides the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
350 LOR, 467. 
351 LST, 293. 
 	  
215 
moral law; or that virtue, or true religion, does not imply obedience to any law.”352 
Finney vigorously denies this, and argues that there is no other duty or law of right 
besides the moral law, and that only in keeping the moral law does God’s government 
consider a person virtuous or truly religious. Although some suggest that such a state of 
non-obedience can result in the growth of faith, Finney exclaims, “The idea that persons 
grow in grace during seasons of declension, is abominable.”353  
For Finney obedience to God is not only possible, but is also total. One who has 
submitted to God will obey God, and obey God completely. There can be no confusion 
in one’s moral activities and motivations. The Calvinist model has caused many to believe 
this is not possible. “The idea has so long prevailed, that we cannot be perfect here, that many 
professors do not so much as seriously aim at a sinless life. They cannot honestly say, that 
they ever so much as really meant to live without sin.” There is neither the reality, nor 
even the intention, to be sinless, but rather the expectation that since this is not possible, 
sin is ever mixed with righteousness. Such professors “drift along before the tide, in a 
loose, sinful, unhappy and abominable manner, at which, doubtless, the devil laughs, 
because it is, of all others, the surest way to hell."354 
Such a perspective is directly contrary to the very nature of religion. “What is 
religion,” Finney declares, “but a supreme purpose of heart or disposition to obey God? If 
there is not this, there is no religion at all.”355 Basic to the very core of any true Christian 
is (at the least) an intention to obey God in all things. No real Christian can hope to 
approach God with only some kind of partial submission to God’s will. 
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The severity with which Finney argues this point varies. Early on he seems 
content to describe such total obedience in terms of intention only.356 Young converts, for 
example, are to “aim at being perfect. Every young convert should be taught, that if it is not 
his purpose to live without sin, he has not yet began to be religious.”357 Since young 
converts may have many points on which they remain ignorant, they must be allowed to 
grow and be directed into greater righteousness. Other Christians must then “point out 
things that are faulty in the young convert which he does not see” since “he is but a child, and 
knows but little about religion.”358 Implicitly such a position suggests that all intentions, if 
not all actions, be sinless.  
Ultimately, however, Finney concludes explicitly that there can be no mixture 
whatsoever of sinful moral actions with obedience. There is no such thing as partial 
obedience. “The only sense,” Finney qualifies, “in which obedience to moral law can be 
partial is, that obedience may be intermittent. That is, the subject may sometimes obey, 
and at other times disobey.”359 “Present evangelical faith,” Finney reasserts, “implies a 
state of present sinlessness.”360 This must be so, if the whole will is dedicated to Christ. In 
fact, no one can be justified while remaining in sin, “either upon legal or gospel principles, 
unless the law be repealed.”361 The ramifications of this view will be explored further 
below in examining the permanence of conversion, but at present it must be stated clearly 
that Finney has no toleration for any mixture of intentions, nor of moral actions. At any 
given moment an individual is either in a state of total obedience or disobedience. “The 	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theory of the mixed character of moral actions, is an eminently dangerous theory” since 
“it leads its advocates to place the standard of conversion, or regeneration, exceedingly 
low–to make regeneration, repentance, true love to God, faith, etc., consistent with the 
known or conscious commission of present sin.”362 As in a variety of other areas of 
Finney’s thought, there can be no ambiguity here. 
Even in his earlier Lectures on Revivals Finney makes this quite clear in the following 
striking passage. “Obedience to God consists in an obedient state of heart, a preference of 
God’s authority and commandments to every thing else.” Such a preference cannot be 
partial. “If, therefore, an individual appears to obey in some things, and yet perseveringly 
and knowingly disobeys in any one thing, he is deceived. He offends in one point, and this 
proves that he is guilty of all; in other words, that he does not, from the heart, obey at all.”363  
Finney’s standard is perfection, and his logic tends toward the view that any true 
Christian should be perfect.  
 
Authentication, Sanctification, and Perfectionism (Entire Sanctification) 
What is implicit in Finney’s early theology soon becomes explicit and remains a 
key part of his theology for the rest of his life. A perfected life is the ultimate authenticator 
of conversion, and Christians are called to and capable of perfection, of a sinless state.364 
“The truly regenerate soul,” Finney declares, “overcomes sin.”365 Cooper considers this 
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perfectionist teaching “the most controversial novelty flowing from Finney’s theological 
outlook.”366 Whether or not one agrees with this assessment, it is certainly a striking 
feature of his thought that flows logically from his other beliefs and assumptions. 
Finney and others at Oberlin began to stress the doctrine of perfectionism in the 
fall of 1836. Hardman notes that, as was true with Finney, “much of Burned-over District 
perfectionism differed little from traditional Methodist teaching stemming from John 
Wesley, and this can be seen as one contributing source, but unquestionably there were 
other sources, now lost to history.”367 It is worth noting that Finney sees his perfectionist 
theology not in opposition to Calvinism, but following from it.368 Since, in Finney’s view, 
it is always possible through natural ability not to sin, then it must be at least theoretically 
possible to be totally sanctified, since it is within one’s power. Even many moderate 
Calvinists have typically agreed to this. 
Even from the first pages of his Lectures on Systematic Theology Finney wants to press 
to their logical conclusions the truths and consequences of various doctrines, foremost 
among them “that the will is free, and that sin and holiness are voluntary acts of mind.”369 
For Finney every command of God implies the human capacity to fulfill the command. If 
God commands us to love him with all heart, mind, strength, and soul, then it must be 
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possible to do so.370 Furthermore, every command can also be read as a promise. 
Passages like Deuteronomy 10:12371 and 30:6372 show that obedience to the law requires 
entire sanctification, and “if the law requires a state of entire sanctification… then this is a 
promise of entire sanctification,” since in Finney’s view God will never require that which 
we are unable to do. But “faith is an indispensable condition of the fulfillment of this 
promise. It is entirely impossible that we should love God with all the heart, without 
confidence in Him.”373 
In similar fashion, by Finney’s explicitly stated logic, any promise can be read as a 
command since, “if His bountifulness equals His justice, His promises of grace must be 
understood to mean as much as the requirements of His justice;” what God promises to 
do also involves what we are capable of doing without our wills being violated. “It 
appears to be profane trifling, when such language is found in a promise, to make it mean 
less than it does when found in a command.”374 
Finney declares that if what he has said is true, if only full obedience to God’s 
moral law is virtue, then “the church has fallen into a great and ruinous mistake, in 
supposing that a state of present sinlessness is a very rare, if not an impossible, attainment 
in this life.” Such an error “teaches us to hope for heaven, while living in conscious 
sin.”375 Such a state cannot indicate the presence of any saving faith or virtue.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
370 LST, 382. 
371 “And now, Israel, what does the LORD your God require of you, but to fear the LORD your God, to 
walk in all his ways, to love him, to serve the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul” 
(ESV). 
372 “And the LORD your God will circumcise your heart and the heart of your offspring, so that you will 
love the LORD your God with all your heart and with all your soul, that you many live” (ESV). 
373 LST, 384. 
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Finney provides several biblical passages that, “understood and pressed to the 
letter, would not only teach, that all regenerate souls overcome and live without sin, but 
also that sin is impossible to them.” For all such individuals born of God, “to overcome 
sin is the rule,” and to sin, on the other hand, “is only the exception.” The biblical image 
of the regenerate is that they “habitually live without sin, and fall into sin only at intervals, 
so few and far between, that in strong language it may be said in truth they do not sin.”376  
Among those passages Finney uses in support for this doctrine is Eph. 4:15-19, 
which Finney terms “a very strong passage” supporting his perfectionist doctrine. “It 
asserts that abundant means are provided for the sanctification of the church in this life. 
And as the whole includes all its parts, there must be sufficient provision for the 
sanctification of each individual.”377 And since the means provided are meant for this life, 
then so is entire sanctification. He also considers Jer. 31:31-34 “undeniably a promise of 
entire sanctification.”378 Finney says that “the church, as a body, have certainly never 
received this new covenant [in Jer.],” but many individuals throughout its history have 
received it.379  
Finney considers various other passages that he argues support entire 
sanctification without question.380 Finally, Finney considers Paul to be a supreme 
example of the attainability of perfection. Finney considers various writings of Paul to 
make the case that he considered himself entirely sanctified He also considers passages 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
376 LST, 300. Finney continues on this point, “The fact is, if God is true, and the Bible is true, the truly 
regenerate soul has overcome the world, the flesh, and Satan, and sin, and is a conqueror, and more than a 
conqueror. He triumphs over temptation as a general thing, and the triumphs of temptation over him are 
so far between, that it is said of him in the living oracles, that he does not, cannot sin. He is not a sinner, but 
a saint.” 301. 
377 LST, 383. 
378 LST, 385. 
379 LST, 386. 
380 See, for example, LST, 386f. He includes passages such as Ezek. 36:25-27, I Thess. 5:23-24, Col. 3:12, 
and 2 Cor. 7:1. 
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that would tend to contradict the doctrine, notably Romans 7, which, he argues, is used 
as an illustration of the carnal state, and not as a description of Paul’s sanctified state. It 
must stand in contrast to the entire sanctification indicated in Romans 8. He concludes, 
“In relation to the character of Paul, let me say: If Paul was not sinless, he was an 
extravagant boaster, and such language used by any minister in these days would be 
considered as the language of an extravagant boaster.”381 
Denying the doctrine of perfectionism creates apathy about sin in the church, 
Finney asserts, and the effects of this denial can, in fact, be seen in the church in his day. 
He suggests that one must deal with sin as one would deal with the problem of alcohol; 
“total abstinence” is the only path to “high attainments in holiness.”382 In Finney’s mind, 
to teach sanctification and not teach entire sanctification is like preaching only for the 
partial obedience of God. Does one implore Christians to more obedience at the same 
time as teaching that they are not expected to obey fully?  
Finney’s interpretations of biblical passages in support of his views on perfection 
are often less than convincing. Many of the passages urge hearers to obedience, but in 
Finney’s reading all commands or urgings imply a capacity for perfection. He seems 
unable to acknowledge the possibility that even though we are called to full obedience, we 
will fall short and require God’s grace. Such a reality does not remove the expectation of 
obedience; it only covers our failings in attaining it. In Finney’s logic, however, such a 
scenario compromises the teaching of the Bible on the attainability of entire sanctification. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
381 LST, 403. 
382 LST, 395. 
 	  
222 
 
The Permanence of Conversion  
 
Finney’s views on the permanence of conversion, or what – in traditional 
Reformed terms – is termed the perseverance of the saints, are somewhat conflicted. Finney 
says he has “felt greater hesitancy in forming and expressing my views upon this, than 
upon almost any other question in theology. I have read whatever I could find upon both 
sides of this question, and have uniformly found myself dissatisfied with the arguments on 
both sides.” At times in his ministry he has nearly concluded “that the doctrine is not 
true.”383 But he cannot reconcile that position with the Bible. Therefore, as we will find, 
he attempts to hold together the biblical notion of God’s secure election and his key 
beliefs in unfettered human ability and freedom – free from interference by any outside 
force. The success of that which comes out of this mix remains to be seen. 
 
The Possibility of Permanence 
Given Finney’s prior theological commitments it must first be asked, how, even 
theoretically, in Finney’s theological system is any notion of permanence possible? Put 
differently, how is there any place for ongoing sanctification or growth in character and 
virtue, or for total, enduring perfectionist obedience, if there is no change within 
individuals other than the choices they make at any given moment? How is sanctification 
or character preserved in the life of a Christian? Finney speaks of “a preference of the glory 
of God and the interests of his kingdom to one’s own happiness” in the converted 
individual. He speaks of the weakening of old habits, and the strengthening of godly 	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habits, and says that “every act of obedience to God strengthens this preference, and 
renders future obedience more natural.” How or where is this preference strengthened 
and preserved? At times he seems to consider this preference as somehow a feature of the 
individual. Unlike the self-interest expressed by the selfish heart, for example, “a new 
heart consists in a preference of the glory of God and the interests of his kingdom to one’s 
own happiness.” A sinner’s “own selfish orientation” runs opposite to God’s desires. 
Christians must “change our moral character; our moral disposition; in other words,… change 
that abiding preference of our minds, which prefers sin to holiness.”384 Finney says this is a 
change of the end of our actions, not the means by which we might seek such an end. But 
how do such changed preferences abide?   
In similar fashion, one wonders how “the saints persevere,” as Finney writes, “not 
by virtue of a constitutional change,” but by the abiding and indwelling influence of the 
Holy Spirit.”385 Exactly where does the Spirit abide? If such possible inconsistencies imply 
Finney’s uncertainty over an actual or constitutional change of some kind in sanctification, 
Finney’s overt statements indicate otherwise. It is only a change of intention, of ruling 
principle. “By principle,” Finney writes, “I do not mean a seed, or sprout or root, or any 
thing created and put into the soul. It is all nonsense to talk about such kind of holiness, 
or such a principle as that.” It is rather “a controlling determination in the mind to do 
right.”386 It is willing to follow the principle of God’s benevolence over selfishness, this and 
nothing more. 
Finney suggests that Christians, especially new Christians, be taught to expect to 
persevere. One must not tell converts that they must walk by faith, not sight, as an excuse 	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for them not to practice their faith. In Finney’s view, this is to tell them, essentially, that 
“you must learn to get as cold as death, and then hang on to the doctrine of the Saint’s 
Perseverance, as your only ground of hope that you shall be saved.” Immediately one sees 
that perseverance means something different for Finney than a typical Reformed view in 
which it is God who actively preserves the saint in salvific faith by grace. Finney can find 
in such a view only antinomianism. He mocks, “Cease to persevere and then hold on to the 
doctrine of perseverance.… It is not faith, it is presumption, that makes a backslider hold on to 
the doctrine of perseverance as if that would save him, without any sensible exercises of 
godliness in his soul.… Faith without works is dead.”387 Works can never become 
detached from any discussion of perseverance. 
As regards the human then, perseverance is something active rather than passive. 
It is that same active obedience that brings one to perfection. And as was mentioned in 
that discussion of perfectionism above, Finney insists that there can be no such thing as 
partial obedience, “in the sense that the subject ever does, or can, partly obey and partly disobey at the 
same time.” If consecration is real it is total. One can only will one ultimate end at any 
given moment. “Sin is the supreme preference of self-gratification. Holiness is the 
supreme preference of the good of being.”388 These two preferences cannot exist at the 
same time. Furthermore, Christ himself “has expressly taught that nothing is regeneration, 
or virtue, but entire obedience, or the renunciation of all selfishness. ‘Except a man 
forsake all that he hath, he cannot be My disciple’ (Luke 14:33).”389 Finney argues for the 
all or nothing nature of obedience and virtue on multiple occasions. He absolutely denies 
that “selfishness and benevolence can coexist in the same mind.” He also denies that an 	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act or choice can “have a complex character, on account of complexity in the motives 
which induce it.” He argues that there can be no ambiguity in the ultimate end chosen. 
Sin and holiness “cannot by any possibility, coexist.”390 
As in sanctification, regeneration “implies an entire present change of moral 
character, that is, a change from entire sinfulness to entire holiness.”391 Because there can 
be no mixing of these states, for Finney one is always completely sanctified or completely 
sinful at any given moment. Therefore it would seem that there can be no sense of the 
perseverance of the saints. One is gaining or losing one’s salvation constantly, at any 
given moment, unless one reaches a state of perfection, and even that state is not secure. 
At times Finney attempts to avoid this scenario by insisting that the growth in grace that 
occurs in Christians is a growth in knowledge which a Christian constantly incorporates 
into one’s actions as one lives out one’s love for God. The love is total, but the knowledge 
is partial.392 At other times Finney overtly embraces the scenario. If there can never be 
any kind of substantial, constitutional, or material change in a person in conversion – 
nothing but a change in one’s own, inviolate will, then how are converted individuals at 
any given moment not always in the identical place of the unconverted in choosing for 
Christ or themselves? 
Indeed it appears that, for Finney, this is precisely the place of Christians. “The 
Christian… is justified no longer than he obeys, and must be condemned when he 
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disobeys.” “Until he repents,” Finney declares, “he cannot be forgiven. In these respects, 
then, the sinning Christian and the unconverted sinner are upon precisely the same ground.” When a 
Christian sins he is under the condemnation of the law, because the law of God cannot be 
abrogated. The Christian sinner is different from an unconverted sinner in that “a 
Christian is a child of God. A sinning Christian is a disobedient child of God. An 
unconverted sinner is a child of the devil.” As a child of God, Finney writes, a “Christian 
sustains a covenant relation to God; such a covenant relation as to secure to him that 
discipline which tends to reclaim and bring him back, if he wanders away from God.”393 
Essentially a Christian has some advantages that make it easier to turn away from sin, but 
while in sin a Christian – in Finney’s eyes, is not different than an unconverted sinner. 
“Whenever a Christian sins he comes under condemnation, and must repent and do his 
first works, or be lost.”394  
Is there some way, then to bring about conversions that endure? It is certainly not, 
according to Finney, by preaching misleading models of perseverance. Christians must be 
taught the proper meaning of perseverance. This has not been done adequately in 
Finney’s view, since “it is astonishing how people talk about perseverance. As if the 
doctrine of perseverance was ‘Once in grace, always in grace,’ or ‘Once converted, sure 
to go to heaven.’” Instead Finney suggests that the true idea of perseverance is “that if a 
man is truly converted, he will CONTINUE to obey God. And as a consequence, he will 	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Whenever he sins, he must, for the time being, cease to be holy.” 116. Finney asks, “Can a man be born 
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Cor. 10:12. Quoting Finney Hardman writes, “‘Nothing that grace has done, or ever will do for us, can 
render our perseverance in holiness unconditionally certain.” Finney, 345.   
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surely go to heaven. But if a person gets the idea, that because he is converted, therefore he 
will assuredly go to heaven, that man will almost assuredly go to hell.”395 Perseverance, 
this passage makes clear, depends upon a Christian persevering, on continued obedience. 
The ordering here is indeed important; obedience and sanctification are not a 
consequence of conversion, but rather the only validation of and justification for that state. A 
Christian’s fate lies in that immediate, ongoing, human decisionism that we suggest 
characterizes Finney’s model. These human decisions are made in the present, and must 
continue to be made in every present moment of a Christian’s life. Any declaration, 
repentance, or commitment to God is rendered void by the sin of any given moment, and 
one must start again. 
Perseverance depends ultimately on right teaching. In a manner similar to his 
claims regarding revivals, Finney suggests that if one teaches Christian converts properly, 
giving them the necessary biblical principles that result in right conduct, they can and will 
live out those principles. But, “if the education of young converts is defective, either in 
kind or degree, you will see it in their character all their lives. This is the philosophical 
[scientific] result, just what might be expected, and must be always so.”396 As with revivals, 
from the correct procedures come the right effects. However, after wrong instruction 
“they will be left justly in doubt whether they are Christians.”397  
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always clear, even on divisive issues. 
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Wrong instruction leaves the Christian at high risk of backsliding.398 Finney 
suggests that there are two kinds of backsliders. The first kind “profess religion, whether 
they possess it or not.” Perhaps they outwardly professed faith and joined a church, or 
expressed some other form or appearance of religion but likely were never actually 
converted. The second type of backslider describes one “who is truly converted and is a 
Christian, but has left his first love. His zeal has grown cold.”399 Such backsliders are 
“worldly minded,” and do not feel their hearts “drawn out in painful anxiety and prayer in view 
of the state of the church.”400 They must be born again, again. In essence, a backslider has lost 
the fervor of the heart in his or her Christian practices, and especially in his or her secret 
life before God.  
Backsliders are a very unhappy lot, since “they neither enjoy God nor the world.” 
They are the “most despicable of all people,” despised by both Christians and non-
Christians.401 Finney considers them also to be the “most inconsistent,” hardest to please, 
“most loathsome,” “most injurious” to religion, and “most hypocritical.”402 One must guard 
against backsliding from the beginning of conversion. Like an alcoholic having just one 
small drink, backsliding comes on with that first small sin. And like an alcoholic, the 
obviously safe method of avoiding backsliding is “TOTAL ABSTINENCE from sin.”403 
In other words, the method is perfection, a sinless state.  
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There is some ambiguity in Finney’s comments on the backslidden state. The 
converts of revivals are prone to “declension and backsliding.”404 He says that in the 
midst of revivals Christians must regularly be “re-converted.” This moves them out of a 
mechanistic mode of meeting Christian duties and reignites their hearts.405 What the 
status of such backsliders is salvifically is not in these references made clear, although one 
would assume – given his other statements on total obedience, etc. – that such backsliders 
would be in a state of condemnation before God. 
Later, in Lectures on Systematic Theology, Finney considers some of those biblical 
figures that are suggested to be backsliders, notably King Saul, David, and Solomon. 
Finney suggests that Saul was never truly converted, and that David and Solomon 
ultimately did persevere in holiness. He is clearly not inclined to suggest that David, for 
example, had lost his salvation. He suggests as well that neither in contemporary cases of 
converted backsliders, or in other biblical examples, can the notion of perseverance be 
shown clearly to be false.406 He calls perseverance “an unalterable condition of 
justification,” adding that “perseverance in faith and obedience is a condition, not of 
present, but of final or ultimate acceptance and salvation.”407 In such a reference true 
perseverance can only be recognized by looking back, not by looking forward. 
 
Finney’s Arguments for Perseverance 
Were it not for some material toward the end of Lectures on Systematic Theology, one 
would never conclude that Finney supports any notion of permanence in conversion. 
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However, here he turns, somewhat surprisingly, to a defense of the doctrine of the 
perseverance of the saints.408 In an effort to come to grips with the numerous scriptural 
passages pointing toward the security of salvation for the saints, Finney puts forth a 
positive assessment of the meaning of perseverance. In its essential form, the most this 
version of perseverance claims is that God assures that all who take hold of the means of 
salvation and live their lives in obedience are assured of their salvation. If one does x, y 
will follow. In such a scheme one’s salvation is only as secure as one’s performance in 
living a holy and obedient life. 
Finney attempts to describe the manner in which one can say that a Christian’s 
salvation is secure or certain. Making every effort to maintain previous assertions 
regarding the nature and freedom of human moral choices, Finney suggests that the 
certainty of salvation for true saints falls under a form he terms “moral certainty.” These 
are certain events “conditionated upon, the free actions of moral agents. This class do not 
[sic] occur under the operation of a law of necessity, though they occur with certainty.” 
He clarifies further that far from being a necessary certainty,  “it is only a mere certainty, 
or a voluntary certainty, a free, certainty, a certainty that might, by natural possibility in 
every case, be no certainty at all.” God knows these events through his foreknowledge, 
but does not make them certain. “They are certain in themselves.”409 From the human 
perspective, there is also every chance that such events will not take place. There is, as he 
puts it, “the utmost danger, in the only sense in which there can be in fact any danger 
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that any event whatever will turn out differently from what it does, in the sense that it is 
not certain how it will be.”410  
Although such events and certainties are no certainty to humans, “God may 
foresee that so intricate is the labyrinth, and so complicated are the occasions of failure, 
that nothing but the utmost watchfulness and diligent use of means on His part, and on 
our part, can secure the occurrence of the event.”411 In such a way God knows the 
certainty of the final salvation of every elect saint, as the Bible teaches, even though, at 
the same time Christians may fear for their salvation. This certainty of God does not 
render the obedience of individuals more or less probable. The certainty offered by the 
doctrine is such that should cause one to take greater hold of the means, not less, as would 
a farmer assured of a good crop if diligent.412  
Finney writes, “Regeneration is represented as securing perseverance in 
obedience.”413 Whereas earlier we saw Finney express regeneration as dependent upon 
perseverance and in some ways analogous to obedience, here Finney reverses the order, 
and makes perseverance inherent in regeneration.414  
  
Assessment 
If, in mild contrast to Lectures on Revivals, Finney is more circumspect when 
discussing perseverance by the time of his Lectures on Systematic Theology, the same 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 LST, 506. 
411 LST, 506. 
412 LST, 510. 
413 LST, 532. 
414 Finney later writes, “I know that to this it has been replied, that although nothing else can separate us 
from the love of God, yet we may separate ourselves from His love. To this I answer, true; we may, or can 
do so; but the question is, shall we, or will any of the elected and called do so? No, indeed; for this is the 
thing which the apostle intended to affirm, namely, the certainty of the salvation of all true saints.” As 
expressed there Finney in fact seems very close to Reformed doctrine. LST, 539. 
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controlling principles are present in both. The priority of the free and unencumbered 
human will, and the all or nothing character of human intentionality and obedience 
continue to be emphasized in the later book, even if some of Finney’s other rhetoric 
regarding perseverance is toned down. Those principles that run throughout all of 
Finney’s works seem to allow for only the weakest of conceptions of perseverance. Sin, 
any sin, breaks the relationship with God so completely that a sinning Christian is every 
bit as condemned as a non-Christian by God’s law. 
The perseverance of the saints is often termed eternal security. It is a doctrine that 
has been used by Luther and others as a great comfort for Christians, that they might 
look with confidence to God’s firm and gracious grasp on their lives, rather than 
constantly questioning their own capacities and success in gaining God’s approval. In 
Finney’s hands, however, this doctrine does no such thing. In place of security it offers 
only insecurity, and an even greater emphasis on the necessity of one’s constant and 
unfailing choice of holiness in one’s life. In the context of perseverance Finney seems 
never to direct an individual toward God’s grace and saving works; he never suggests one 
look to Christ’s work on the cross, for example. The emphasis is always on human activity 
and choice – continued obedience and holiness. Although from a divine perspective 
Finney’s doctrine offers certainty, from a human perspective it offers none. Any notion of 
perseverance that Finney provides dies the death of a thousand qualifications. 
Consider, for example, what Finney overtly says is not meant by the perseverance 
of the saints. He does not mean “that any sinner will be saved without complying with the 
conditions of salvation; that is, without regeneration, and persevering in obedience to the 
end of life.” The truly regenerate still have the natural possibility that they could fall from 
grace and be lost. He does not mean “that the true saints are in no danger of apostasy 
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and ultimate damnation.” He does not mean that, from a human perspective, some of the 
saints may not fall and be lost. He does not mean that salvation is possible apart from 
“great watchfulness and effort, and perseverance on their part, and great grace on the 
part of God.” He does not mean that the salvation of saints is certain, “in any higher 
sense than all their future free actions are.” Additionally, he says, “There is and must be, 
as much real danger of the saints failing of ultimate salvation, as there is that any event 
whatever will be different from what it turns out to be.”415 It appears that for Finney, the 
perseverance of the saints offers no more assurance than one has about any of one’s other 
free acts in life. That is to say, one cannot differentiate Finney’s notion of perseverance, as 
a certainty of God’s foreknowledge, from an overall notion of God’s knowledge of the 
future and the certainty of all things that comes with it. The most that perseverance 
amounts to in Finney’s view involves the certainty of God’s foreknowledge, a 
foreknowledge that God has of every free or humanly uncertain act.  
Similarly, Finney’s view of perseverance makes God’s role in election and 
perseverance essentially passive. God does not act on saints, or even actively choose them, 
but merely has knowledge of future events. God is a watcher and a knower but not a doer 
or active agent. This general principle of foreknowledge does not ever seem to translate 
into any kind of unique activity of God in holding the saints close to his breast.  
Finney’s view of perseverance is consistent with our previous discussion of the 
nature of the change of conversion. The change of conversion is simply the change in 
one’s will and actions to follow God. To choose sin is to unconvert. Ultimately the idea of 
perseverance amounts to very little. The sinning Christian is in certain respects identical 
with the unconverted sinner, and in that moment destined as surely for hell as the sinner. 	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Perseverance becomes simply a descriptive phrase for certain humans rather than a predictive 
phrase or a prescriptive action (of God). 
In sum, it is to Finney’s credit that he attempts to incorporate the biblical teaching 
on perseverance into his theological system, but given his other theological commitments 
it cannot be maintained in any meaningful fashion. Finney tries to hold to some form of 
election and perseverance together with his views on nature of conversion and the priority 
of an unfettered human will, but he cannot. There is, in reality, no possible security or 
permanence in his conception of conversion, apart from that which depends on the 
continued performance of the human being in willing and doing good and maintaining 
holiness. There is no resting in God’s grace for the Christian. Although God may be 
passive, the Christian never can be. 
 
A Morphology of Conversion and the Ordo Salutis  
 
Having viewed Finney’s understanding of conversion through a variety of lens, we 
are now in a position to say something regarding his understanding of the order of 
salvation. Unlike Edwards, Finney spends little time considering directly any formal 
theological notion of the ordo salutis, nor does he address older Puritan notions of 
preparationism. However one can find clues, both explicit and implicit, for his views on 
these subjects. We turn first to an exploration of Finney’s thoughts on any progression or 
morphology of conversion or need for preparation. 
As has been demonstrated above, if Finney stresses anything regarding conversion, 
it is its immediacy. There is never good reason to delay for tomorrow one’s response to 
the gospel call today. Thus Finney has little patience with those who might encourage 
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sinners to hesitate in any way while following some progression of steps to conversion. As 
is often the case, he seems to have in mind certain Calvinist trends and ideas, such as 
those that would indicate that some kind of waiting on God is necessary.416 
One should not pray for repentance, but simply repent immediately. Likewise, 
praying for the conviction or the Holy Spirit merely delays what one should do now. Nor 
should one “tell the sinner he has not repented enough. The truth is, he has not repented at all. 
God always comforts the sinner as soon as he repents.”417  
One must also not encourage sinners to think “that they must suffer a considerable 
time under conviction, as a kind of punishment, before they are ready properly to come to 
Christ.”418 Long periods of conviction in the sinner are, in Finney’s view, the result of 
poor instruction. Finney believes that a sinner under conviction, when clearly and 
forcefully presented with the gospel, will accept or reject it rather quickly. “If he does not 
soon submit, his case his hopeless. Where the truth is brought to bear upon his mind, and 
he directly resists the very truth that must convert him, there is nothing more to be done. 
The Spirit will soon leave him.”419  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
416 Hambrick-Stowe writes, “Almost everyone was familiar with Jonathan Edwards’s edition of The Life of 
David Brainerd, first published in 1749 and still in print and enormously popular during Finney’s lifetime.” 
Charles Finney, 16. They considered Brainerd’s conversion story to be archetypal. Hambrick-Stowe notes 
that Finney read Edwards’ Life of David Brainerd, Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival of Religion, and 
Religious Affections (17). He suggests that Finney’s experience followed this long-established pattern going 
back to the Great Awakening (16). He argues that Finney was very tied to this Puritan conversion language 
and tradition, and that the Puritan language was engrained in the very culture of Finney’s day and sounded 
very natural (18). Finney’s conversion experience was typical, he knew, and “conforming also to the basic 
lines of the archetypal Puritan pattern, itself rooted in Scripture, Finney’s conversion in essence restated the 
tradition for his generation. He felt that what God had done in his heart was what God also wanted to do 
for others.” 19. While it is true that Finney’s own conversion reflects some of this classic Puritan pattern, 
Finney does not seem ever to use his own conversion as a model for his thinking, or recommend anything 
like the Puritan steps to others. As can be seen in this section, he seems – on the contrary – to be quite 
opposed to the notion. 
417 LOR, 349. 
418 LOR, 372. 
419 LOR, 378. He adds earlier, “People pray that sinners may have more conviction. Or, they pray that sinners 
may go home solemn and tender, and take the subject into consideration, instead of praying that they may 
repent now.… Instead of bringing them right up to the point of immediate submission, on the spot, it gives 
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In short, Puritan preparationism plays no part in Finney’s views. Preparationism 
amounts to an unnecessary delay by a human subject who possesses already the capacity 
to respond to the gospel. It is an error for sinners to think first that “they must make 
themselves better, or prepare themselves” for conversion, or to look to any “legal course 
to get relief.”420 Conversion is like sanctification, which is not attained through “a long 
introduction of preparatory exercises.”421 The problem is “voluntary selfishness,” and the 
solution is voluntary as well – choose to turn and obey God. 
Turning to his view of the ordo salutis, Finney himself shows no special attention to 
a formal order of salvation in his own writings, but still there is much one can say about 
his perspective, even if it cannot all be stated definitively. Any ordering scheme put forth 
to represent Finney must be qualified in several ways. Because of Finney’s all or nothing 
approach to conversion and sanctification, almost any notion of order appears strained as 
the entire order is reduced or simplified to the voluntary act of any given moment. And 
because he believes the born again person can be unborn, any ordering must also be 
understood as reversible. Adding further confusion to any suggested scheme is the 
distinction Finney sometimes introduces between present and permanent sanctification and 
justification, which is considered further below.  
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them time to breathe, it lets off all the pressure of conviction, and he breathes freely again and feels relieved, 
and sits down at his ease.” 356. Elsewhere he writes, “An idea has prevailed in the church, that sinners must 
have a season of protracted conviction, and that those conversions that were sudden were of a suspicious 
character.” Finney disagrees with this. “We nowhere in the Bible read of cases of lengthened conviction.” 
Sermons, 38. 
420 LOR, 371. 
421 LST, 410. 
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Faith 
 
Present Sanctification 
 
Present Justification 
 
Permanent Sanctification (Perfectionism) 
 
Permanent Justification 
 
Election is bracketed in this suggested order. Finney might claim that election is 
rightly first on such a list, and his statements toward the end of Lectures on Systematic 
Theology support his contention.422 However, such a claim is, at best, dubious, given the 
conclusions arrived at in our previous section on the permanence of conversion. There is 
a passivity to God’s work related to salvation; foreknowledge does not equal active 
election, and other central tenets of Finney’s system are incompatible with the necessity of 
any active electing by God. In fact it becomes very difficult to require any special activity 
of God in this order, aside from his general revelatory activity that is available to all 
humanity – and thus an activity that is not unique to any salvific activity or order. 
As is clear by now, for Finney the will plays a primary role in conversion. Thus 
when one considers the ordo salutis, it is the choice of a person that is critical to conversion. 
Repentance then, as a human act temporally and logically rises in this order above 
sanctification, above justification, even above regeneration.423 Repentance is the key 
moment of salvation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422 For example, he writes, “God by His own agency secures the conversion, sanctification, and salvation of 
all that ever were or will be saved.” LST, 451. Finney declares the biblical doctrine of election to be “that all 
of Adam’s race, who are or ever will be saved, were from eternity chosen by God to eternal salvation, 
through the sanctification of their hearts by faith in Christ. In other words, they are chosen to salvation by 
means of sanctification. Their salvation is the end–their sanctification is a means.” LST, 449. 
423 Finney is very clear about repentance preceding justification. He writes, “Repentance is also a condition 
of our justification… It must be certain that the government of God cannot pardon sin without repentance. 
This is as truly a doctrine of natural as of revealed religion. It is self-evident that, until the sinner breaks off 
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It is not quite as simple as this, however. There is a sense in which a part of this 
order of salvation is being constantly repeated in the life of a Christian, since for Finney 
every time a Christian chooses sin that person is – at that present moment – fully a sinner 
and even, it appears, outside of God’s grace. So repentance must constantly reoccur until 
a Christian reaches a state of entire sanctification or Christian perfection. At this point a 
Christian has become so sanctified as to never intentionally choose sin over obedience. 
Because of this, Finney at times distinguishes between present and permanent 
sanctification and justification. In contrast to present sanctification, permanent 
sanctification is “a permanent state of obedience to God.” The distinction in justification 
is analogous. Present obedience to God is a condition of present justification, and the 
more permanent form (perfectionism) is a condition of permanent justification. A 
permanent state of sanctification “is doubtless a condition of permanent justification,” 
and it is this form of sanctification that the Bible speaks of as following after (present) 
justification, but this permanent state is “not a condition of present justification.”424  
It should also be noted that although regeneration in this scheme is placed after 
repentance, they are virtually synonymous. For Finney regeneration is repentance (and 
conversion is regeneration). Because Finney is so insistent that there can be no change in 
one’s substance or constitution in regeneration, regeneration becomes then nothing more 
or less than the turning of one’s will to God and obedience. It is this act of turning that is 
regeneration. And this act of turning is what one calls repentance. Regeneration is not a 
state as much as a series of choices, an orientation of the will. This orientation, however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
from sins by repentance or turning to God, he cannot be justified in any sense. This is everywhere assumed, 
implied, and taught in the Bible.” LST, 366. 
424 LST, 368. 
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is not grounded in some deeper disposition. Finney objects to the language of those like 
Edwards here. It is always found in the act of willing obedience at the present moment. 
What is perhaps the most striking and most certain feature in Finney’s ordering of 
the salvific process is the placement of sanctification before justification. Here Finney 
diverges most strongly from the Reformed and Puritan traditions. “It certainly cannot be 
true,” Finney writes, “that God accepts and justifies the sinner in his sins. The Bible 
everywhere represents justified persons as sanctified, and always expressly, or impliedly, 
conditionates justification upon sanctification, in the sense of present obedience to 
God.”425 Finney then seems to make a distinction similar to Edwards, suggesting that 
sanctification is not the ground of, but instead the condition of justification.426 But it is 
difficult to avoid the conclusion that for Finney sanctification not only accompanies 
justification but is, in certain logical and temporal aspects, the ground of it. Such a 
conclusion is difficult to avoid upon reading statements such as the following from Finney: 
“Present, full, and entire consecration of heart and life to God and His service, is an 
unalterable condition of present pardon of past sin, and of present acceptance of God.” 
“The penitent soul,” Finney says, “remains justified no longer than this full-hearted 
consecration continues. If he falls from his first love into the spirit of self-pleasing, he falls 
again into bondage to sin and to the law” and must repent and return to Christ.427 Finney 
notes that “some theologians have made justification a condition of sanctification, instead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
425 LST, 368. 
426 “Present sanctification, in the sense of present full consecration to God, is another condition, not ground, 
of justification.” LST, 368. 
427 LST, 369. 
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of making sanctification a condition of justification.” Finney calls this  “an erroneous view 
of the subject.”428  
There is even a sense in which one could argue that sanctification be put above 
even repentance in the above order. To be sanctified is to be set apart voluntarily in 
service of God. It “is present obedience to the moral law.” It “is implied in repentance, 
faith, regeneration, as we have abundantly seen.”429 All these other aspects imply 
sanctification because they imply submission and obedience to God and his laws, and this 
obedience is complete at any given moment. Therefore sanctification is implicit in all of 
those steps.430 Repentance without sanctification cannot be repentance but only a self-
deception. For God to provide forgiveness of sin through repentance alone, a power that 
every sinner is capable of, “would be a virtual repeal of the divine law” since humans 
would “trample on the divine authority” and know that they might sin and still be 
forgiven through their repentance.431 
In some respects it would be more akin to Finney’s thinking simply to collapse this 
whole order into two steps, the first a compendium of repentance, faith, regeneration, and 
sanctification which could be summed up as willful obedience, and the second being 
justification. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428 LST, 368. He says further, “No faith receives Christ as a justification, that does not receive Him as a 
sanctification, to reign within the heart.” Therefore “perseverance in obedience to the end of life [i.e., 
sanctification] is also a condition of justification.” 367. 
429 LST, 368. 
430 At the same time, however, Finney says that sanctification is brought about through faith, which seems 
to place faith ahead of sanctification. Finney writes, “It should never be forgotten that the faith that is the 
condition of justification, is the faith that works by love. It is the faith through and by which Christ sanctifies 
the soul.” LST, 366. Yet on the next page he says that faith, “from its very nature… implies repentance and 
every virtue [i.e., sanctification],” which seems to put sanctification ahead of faith. 367. 
431 LST, 213. 
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The Location of Conversion  
 
Having now considered numerous aspects of Finney’s understanding of 
conversion, we turn lastly to where conversions are best attained. Finney’s inclinations on 
the location of conversion are not entirely uniform. Even though in Lectures On Revivals he 
is very critical of much ministerial training, and of Calvinist/Presbyterian ministers in 
particular, Finney does direct much of his advice for the preaching of the gospel at the 
church and ministers. In doing so he also writes considerably about the effectiveness of lay 
people in sharing the gospel; all of the church and not only the minister should be 
involved in efforts at conversion and revival. In what follows we will examine the ways in 
which Finney promotes various locations or contexts for conversion, and some of the 
related attitudes he demonstrates related to location. 
Even in Lectures on Revivals, his most revival- versus church-centric book, Finney 
suggests an important role for the church in conversion. “So far as we know,” he writes, 
“neither God nor man can convert the world without the co-operation of the church.… 
God cannot convert the world by physical omnipotence, but he is dependent on the 
moral influence of the church.”432 In the work of conversion, the church is as important 
for God’s work in it as for humanity’s. In a sense this merely reflects what we have seen 
previously, the diminished activity of God in conversion and the agency of humans in 
bringing it about. 
Still, Finney is skeptical of converts who are unwilling to place themselves within a 
church context. “Sometimes persons professing to be converts will make an excuse for not 
joining the church, that they can enjoy religion just as well without it. This is always 	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suspicious. I should look out for such characters. It is almost certain they have no 
religion.”433 Christians are not meant to be lone wolves, but to live their faith in 
community. Finney calls on new converts to associate themselves with a church as soon as 
possible. “Young converts should, ordinarily, offer themselves for admission to some church of 
Christ immediately.… They should not wait.”434 This does not mean that in all cases the 
churches should accept them for membership immediately. But in general, and especially 
in the country, people should be received immediately.435 
Moreover, Finney suggests that some criticisms of the church and clergy related to 
conversion are unjustified. A minister’s lack of success is not always due primarily to the 
minister. “If they are blameworthy, let them be blamed. And no doubt they are always 
more or less to blame when the word produces no effect. But it is far from being true that 
they are always the principal persons to blame.” Although this is something of a mixed 
note, it does indicate the importance of the ministerial office. The problem is often not 
the preacher, but the hearers. “Churches should remember that they are exceedingly 
guilty, to employ a minister, and then not aid him in his work.”436 Too many church 
members are passive and expecting the clergy to do all the work of conversion without 
their participation. They are to be actively involved in this critical aspect in the life of the 
church. 
Even in the midst of Finney’s apparent emphasis on the role of the church in 
conversion, however, one can find signs of a weakened conception of it. Finney suggests 
often that the church has failed in some central tasks, most notably evangelism expressed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
433 He adds, “Ordinarily, if a person does not desire to be associated with the people of God, he is rotten at 
the bottom.” LOR, 395. 
434 LOR, 389. This was also an implicit criticism of Calvinist churches as well. McLoughlin notes that most 
Calvinist churches at that time made a revival convert wait six to twelve months before joining. 
435 LOR, 389-92. 
436 LOR, 243. 
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through revival efforts. “We see the awful guilt of this church,” Finney writes, “who come 
here and listen to lectures about revivals and then go away and have no revival, and also the 
guilt of members of other churches who hear these lectures and go home and refuse to do 
their duty.”437 If the church has failed, perhaps revival efforts must move outside of it. 
Finney also minimizes the role of doctrinal content of the church in conversion. 
He suggests that “in examining young converts for admission to the church, their 
consciences should not be ensnared by examining them too extensively or minutely on 
doctrinal points.” Even though the role of the church is, in part, to teach them doctrines, “if 
they are to be kept out of the church till they understand the whole system of doctrines, 
this end is defeated.”438 Instead, in examining young converts for church membership one 
should focus not on their head knowledge, “how good scholars they are in divinity,” but 
“is to find out whether they have a change of heart, to learn whether they have experienced 
the great truths of religion by their power in their own souls.”439 
If Finney considers the church important to conversion, he also in various ways 
pushes the location of conversion away from the church, and is critical of both the 
institutional church and its ministers. We turn now to a consideration of some of the ways 
in which this takes place. If Finney discusses the church often, the conception of the 
church for which he strives is minimalist, emphasizing the laity, looking to the power of 
the Spirit rather than any denominational forms, deemphasizing doctrine, and critiquing 
the clergy in a variety of ways. 
Finney makes no shortage of remarks that can be deemed anti-clerical, or at least 
minimize the clergy/laity distinction, and that encourage a very low conception of the 	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ministry and church. It has already been mentioned that Finney called on church 
members to assist their ministers in the work of conversion. One should avoid in theory or 
practice any idea that revival is the work of the minister alone. Finney makes this point on 
several occasions, and works to raise the role of the laity and reduce any contrast of their 
work with that of the clergy.440 He chastises his lay listeners, “Do not complain of your 
minister because there is no revival, if you are not doing your duty. That alone is a sufficient 
reason why there should be no revival.”441  
Far from being passive, “Church members ought to study and inquire what they can 
do, and then do it.”442 At times Finney employs war imagery in describing the work of laity. 
“Young converts,” he says, “should be trained to labour, just as carefully as young recruits in 
an army are trained for war.”443 Or again, he remarks, “Christians should be trained like 
a band of soldiers.” The role of the minister in this army is “to train them for usefulness, 
to teach them and direct them, and lead them on, in such a way as to produce the 
greatest amount of moral influence.”444  
This means that any number of lay practices, such as lay prayers, should not be 
opposed. “Ministers and many others have very extensively objected against a layman’s 
praying in public, and especially in the presence of a minister. That would let down the 
authority of the clergy, and was not to be tolerated.” Finney considers this ridiculous. 
Finney also defends others lay practices against opposition, including the practice of lay 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
440 Hardman comments on this: “Until this time in America, the great prestige of the clergy had made it its 
responsibility, and not that of the laity, to be evangelists and win the lost.… With the great influence that 
his Lectures on Revivals were to have for the next century, Charles Finney was bringing about a dramatic 
reversal of the old understanding, and insisting that every Christian was directly and inescapably charged 
with the responsibility of evangelism.” Finney, 280. 
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exhortation. Finney even (inaccurately) appeals to Edwards on this practice, stating that 
“so much opposition was made to this practice nearly a hundred years ago, that President 
Edwards actually had to take up the subject, and write a labored defence [sic] of the 
rights and duties of laymen.”445  
Church members not only are called to many of the same activities as ministers, 
especially regarding conversion, but are called to live by the same standards of holiness. 
“It has long enough been supposed that ministers must be more pious than other men.” 
This is a mistake, according to Finney. “Other men… are just as absolutely bound to 
consider their whole time as God’s and have no more right to love the world, or 
accumulate wealth, or lay it up for their children, or spend it upon their lusts, than 
ministers have.”446 The same call to holiness applies to all Christians, and young converts 
especially should be taught to be as holy as their ministers. 
In this regard church members have often failed, perhaps because they are only 
formal members of a denominational church, instead of true members of the universal 
church of Christ. Finney bemoans the state of the church. “If the church were to live only 
one week as if they believed the Bible, sinners would melt down before them.”447 Church 
members, regardless of maintaining formal ties to the church, have not committed fully to 
Christ. “The church is now filled up with hypocrites,” Finney pronounces, “because they 
were never made to give up the world. They never were made to see that unless they 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
445 LOR, 258. On this the editor remarks in a footnote, “As Albert Dod pointed out in his review of Finney’s 
lectures, Finney was mistaken in stating that Edwards ever wrote a defense of the right of laymen to exhort, 
though he may have spoken of their right to offer prayer in the presence of a minister. Edwards abhorred 
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made an entire consecration of all to Christ, all their time, all their talents, all their 
influence, they would never get to heaven.”448  
Finney often places the Spirit in opposition to the churches and their ministers. It 
seems to him that often the laity are more in touch with the Spirit of God than the clergy. 
“The piety of the ministry, though real, is so superficial, in many instances, that the 
spiritual part of the church feel that ministers cannot, do not, sympathise [sic] with them.” 
Those filled with the Spirit “will often be grieved with the state of the ministry.” Finney 
considers this “one of the most prominent, and deeply to be deplored evils of the present 
day.”449  
Moreover, many of the very forms and expressions of denominational life run 
counter to the Holy Spirit and squelch it. In fact, in reference to prayer, Finney believes 
that “the very idea of using a form, rejects, of course, the leadings of the Spirit. Nothing is 
more calculated to destroy the spirit of prayer, and entirely to darken and confuse the 
mind, as to what constitutes prayer, than to use forms.”450  
Finney’s own revival activities also illustrate the relative disregard he has for 
church structures and denominational borders. Finney operates as an itinerant preacher 
for the bulk of his early career. On many occasions in his revival work, as well as in his 
work while pastoring in New York City, he readily works across denominations. Even 
though he is himself ordained as a minister, he felt no restraint in preaching the gospel 
before ordination, and involves himself in denominational issues only as necessary to 
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pursue his revival work and use of new measures.451 He rarely mentions denominational 
creeds, and when he does it is often for the purpose of criticizing some doctrine within 
them. And when his denominational ties to Presbyterianism are threatened by possible 
heresy charges, he readily breaks with the Presbyterians for the Congregationalists. 
McLoughlin writes that Finney “disliked man-made creeds; he saw no need for 
institutionalized denominational systems; he believed in the priesthood of all believers. 
His mission, as he saw it, was to create a universal Church based upon the fundamentals 
of the gospel.”452  
Especially early on in his public career as a revivalist, Finney raises concerns 
among more establishment-minded preachers like Lyman Beecher. According to 
Hardman, “In Beecher’s view, Finney did not call his converts to propriety and 
preservation of the old, but rather to enthusiasm and unpredictability, and he posed the 
menace of detaching religion from the institutional framework, for he believed the 
churches to be lukewarm and impotent.”453 In another sign of their diminished standing, 
Finney notes that ministers even in the past few decades used to have particular ways they 
were to dress, which now have incrementally largely fallen by the wayside (no more wigs, 
cocked hat, short or small clothes, gowns). “Reason has triumphed” and the demands of 
particular dress for ministers are falling by the wayside.454 	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to be excused but simply did not bother to attend, and the presbyteries allowed his cavalier disdain only in 
deference to his prominence and heavy work load, whereas a lesser man might have been stringently 
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Some suggest that the shift toward the power of the laity and away from the clergy 
has less to do with theology and more to do with Finney’s methods and theology finding 
synergy with rising political and social trends of his day.455 Whatever its sources, however, 
it places conversion into a much less settled and diminished traditional church context for 
conversion and Christian growth. 
The area in which Finney is perhaps most critical of his ministerial colleagues is 
that of their training or education. The types of traditional (read Calvinist) training they 
have received have left them ill-suited for ministry. Such critiques are found especially 
throughout the pages of Lectures on Revivals. Ministers are ineffective. “There is evidently a 
great defect in the present mode of educating ministers. This is a SOLEMN FACT, to 
which the attention of the whole church should be distinctly called; that the great mass of 
young ministers who are educated accomplish very little.” Ministerial education is 
actually an impediment to ministry, Finney charges. “It is common for those ministers 
who have been to the seminaries, and are now useful, to affirm that their course of studies 
there did them little or no good, and that they had to unlearn what they had there learned, 
before they could effect much.”456 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that ministers now dressed like everyone else, both in and out of the pulpit, is part of the anti-clericalism 
which he shared with the Jacksonians.” 253-54, fn. 4. 
455 Hardman comments, “This shift away from the primacy of the clergy – utterly foreign to Mather, 
Edwards, Timothy Dwight, or Beecher – was of course very much in harmony with the Jacksonian 
democracy of his day.” Finney, 281. He suggests that some of the reason for his early success was closely tied 
with “his determination to democratize American Protestantism, and the relationship between this force 
embodied in his career and the democratizing influence of President Andrew Jackson’s political thought 
[elected in 1828]..… Just as Jackson railed against privilege, monopoly, and property qualification for 
voting, Finney railed against the social conservatism of the Presbygational church structure.” 151. William 
Cooper concurs. He writes, “The influx of political changes from what we now call Jacksonian democracy 
mixed with the influence of a popular theology of the people finds its clearest religious expression in the 
New Measures. The New Measures, organized around lay participation, depending upon a clear-cut 
biblical literalism, expressly anti-Calvinistic, unsacramental, pragmatic and non-sectarian, was really the 
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A minister, Finney argues, must be able to draw out all classes of sinners in the 
congregation, and must destroy lies held by sinners without providing new lies in which 
sinners take refuge. Finney assails bookish ministers who rail against various heresies 
through book knowledge without understanding how the people of the day are actually 
thinking about such things, sometimes resulting in people becoming more enamored with 
the heresies than with the objections presented regarding them.457 Ministers “must be 
acquainted with the real views of men in order to meet them, and do away their errors 
and mistakes.”458 But Finney’s colleagues are out of touch with the laity. Due to their 
training young ministers “are not familiar with the mode in which common people think.” 
Instead they are “shut up in their schools” and fail to learn how to relate to the average 
layperson.459 In fact, Finney says that some business people, more familiar with everyday 
humanity, are much more effective and well-equipped for ministry than the learned.  
It is somewhat paradoxical that Finney both emphasizes the intellectualist 
component in faith, and yet also can display somewhat anti-intellectual tendencies. In 
respect to ministerial training, this shows itself in the great respect shown to the more 
‘common’ wisdom of the laity, and Finney’s aloofness to more rigorous scholarly training 
that may leave one in an ivory tower and unable to relate to normal people. In contrast to 
those so trained, Finney notes that a minister may be very wise and not very learned. . He 
comments, “A learned minister and a wise minister are different things.… Do not 
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understand me to disparage learning. The more learning the better, if he is also wise in 
the great matter he is employed about.”460  
How is one then to assess the value of ministerial education? Finney insists that 
the value of one’s learning must be measured by one’s capacity to win souls. “Those are 
the best educated ministers, who win the most souls.… Learning is important, and always 
useful. But after all, a minister may know how to win souls to Christ, without great 
learning, and he has the best education for a minister, who can win the most souls to 
Christ.”461  This measures not only the value of a minister’s learning, but also a minister’s 
overall wisdom, all learning aside. “The amount of a minister’s success in winning souls 
(other things being equal) invariably decides the amount of wisdom he has exercised in the 
discharge of his office.” In other words, all other things being equal, the wisdom of a 
minister is indicated “by the number of cases in which he is successful in converting 
sinners.”462 It is just like a doctor’s skill being indicated by his cure rate. For Finney this is 
an objective and hard measurement that may be used. “Are we at work, wisely, to win 
souls?,” He asks. “Or are we trying to make ourselves believe that success is no criterion 
of wisdom? It is a criterion. It is a safe criterion for every minister to try himself by.”463 It 
is a pragmatic measurement.   
Again, however, one finds Finney equalizing the clergy and laity. Finney can use 
this same standard in judging the reality of the faith of lay Christians, since they also have 
the same call on them to convert others. Laypeople in the church who know how to win 	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461 LOR, 186. He adds, “I would say nothing to undervalue, or lead you to undervalue a thorough 
education for ministers. But I do not call that a thorough education, which they get in our colleges and 
seminaries. It does not fit them for their work. I appeal to all experience, whether our young men in 
seminaries are thoroughly educated for the purpose of winning souls. Do they do it? Every body knows they 
do not.” 191. 
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souls should be considered wise, and those who do not, regardless of other knowledge or 
learning, should not be considered wise as Christians.464 In both cases any learning 
outside of that which contributes to soul-winning is devalued.  
If Finney equalizes clergy and laity, his practices and attitudes also show little 
concern for denominational borders or their distinguishing theological features. He 
desires to preach a gospel in many respects free from the hindrances of theological 
nuance and stripped down and equipped for preaching in any context. As Hardman 
comments, “Part of his methodology was a broad, undenominational approach to 
presenting the gospel, which might be accepted as much by Methodists, Baptists, and 
Episcopalians as by Presbyterians.”465 This kind of lowest common denominator 
preaching and theology in many respects anticipates a variety of features that develop 
more forcefully later within evangelicalism, including parachurch ministries, a kind of 
evangelical ecumenism, and nondenominational churches. Hardman notes that “from 
1828 on, Charles Finney was always willing to cooperate with as many churches and 
clergymen as would join in united work in a city.”466 
Finney’s affinity with Jacksonian ideology has previously been mentioned. 
Finney’s perspective in this regard trends toward individualism and away from a 
corporate mentality.467 The call of the gospel is a call to individuals to repent. Although 
Finney does also maintain a concurrent concern for reform of the society, which he 	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populace, in the largest auditorium of the city. The same was true of the Rochester revival of 1830-1831, 
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comments regarding Finney’s Rochester revival of 1830-31 that “for the extent of interchurch cooperation, 
and the magnitude of support, it was the first citywide evangelistic effort that may be properly compared 
with the urban campaigns of the last third of the nineteenth century.” 210. 
467 McLoughlin notes, “It can be said that Finney and Jackson, each in his own way, were striving for much 
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believes is inherent to true Christianity, everything starts with the individual. Give a 
person a Bible, preferably alongside the preaching of the Word, and let that person 
repent and turn to God. Nothing else need be involved, because the power to turn to God 
lies within each and every person. “Sinners cannot be converted without their own 
agency, for conversion consists in their voluntary turning to God. No more can sinners be 
converted without the appropriate moral influences to turn them; that is, without truth 
and the reality of things brought full before their minds either by direct revelation or by 
men.”468 Humans can play a part in the conversion of others, but it still works largely on 
an individual level, and others are not vital to the sinner’s conversion. 
Even when Finney talks about the New Covenant he can shift it away from a form 
of corporate agreement or influence and toward its impact on individuals. Finney says 
that “the church, as a body, have certainly never received this new covenant,” but many 
individuals through its history have received it.469 Finney here does not see the covenant 
operating on the community as a whole, but on individuals. Someday it will apply to 
every Christian in the church, but it has not yet. Thus this is not a covenant that can be 
applied generally to the church as fulfilled in Christ, but only to some specifically. This 
seems a very strange interpretive grid for such a covenant promise, but does nevertheless 
accentuate his individualistic outlook and low ecclesiology.  
Hardman perhaps captures the essence of much of this discussion of location in a 
passage from his biography. He suggests that due to Finney’s background and 
experiences (and enhanced by his rejection by three seminaries), these  
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went far to solidify his pietistic insistence that he could learn all he 
(or any true man of God) needed from a solitary study of the Bible, 
and that all human institutions and organizations, including church 
and clergy, inhibited his work for God. Pietism as well as anti-
intellectualism are at work here. One thing is certain; Finney 
during his Oberlin years may have overcome his aversion to 
institutional loyalty, but all his life he remained nondenominational, 
and the seeds of this were surely planted at this time.470  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
A number of issues have already been raised in this chapter regarding Finney’s 
views on conversion. In concluding let me make a few other critical observations on some 
of Finney’s broader theological and personal tendencies that drive him toward his view of 
conversion as immediate ongoing human decisionism. 
First one should recognize that Finney has a pragmatic approach to conversion. 
He has little patience in parsing all that might be entailed in conversion theologically. His 
concern is practical; convert the sinner, and do it now. This aspect of Finney’s thinking 
pushes him to stress what I have termed the decisionism that is characteristic of his model of 
conversion. Finney charges that “all preaching should be practical.”471 Doctrine likewise 
should be judged in practical terms. He argues, “Any thing brought forward as doctrine, 
which cannot be made use of as practical, is not preaching the gospel. There is none of 
that sort of preaching in the Bible. That is all practical.” Preaching doctrines abstractly is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
470 Finney, 51. 
471 “All preaching,” he says, “should be doctrinal, and all preaching should be practical. The very design of 
doctrine is to regulate practice. Any preaching that has not this tendency is not the gospel.” LOR, 198. 
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“absurd.” Instead, he says, “God always brings in doctrine to regulate practice. To bring 
forward doctrinal views for any other object is not only nonsense, but it is wicked.”472  
There seems to be an implicit anti-intellectualism in such a view. For Finney, one 
must never lose oneself pondering deep issues when they cannot be related directly to 
everyday life. Yet there are many topics that require such forms of thinking, but which 
will be devalued by such a view. I would suppose that this is the reason why any number 
of theological concerns receive little or no treatment by Finney. They are not worth one’s 
time. 
It is also, I suppose, Finney’s practical and serious manner that causes him to 
condemn humor and jesting. Humor serves no purpose except to draw a person away 
from the task at hand. Among the various causes of backsliding Finney lists levity, 
considering it so self-apparent that it has no place in the Christian life that he can 
condemn it in one sentence before moving to his next point.473 Elsewhere he suggests that 
serious Christians should “be shocked to see a minister show levity,” or to show any of 
that same levity in their own lives.474 Why use humor when one can speak directly 
anyway? This leads to another dominant characteristic of Finney’s thinking; he has no 
toleration for ambiguity. 
Finney’s intolerance of ambiguity is one of the most striking features of his 
thinking. Most always for Finney things are black or white, all or nothing; there is no in 
between state. This characteristic of Finney is hard to overstate, and has been observed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472 He adds, “The very idea of making this distinction [between practical and doctrinal] is a device of the 
devil.” LOR, 198 (emphasis mine). 
473 Finney writes that levity “is so obviously a cause of backsliding, that I need not dwell upon it.” LOR, 440. 
474 LOR, 418. As we saw earlier, lay Christians should apply the same standards to themselves as to their 
ministers. Finney later warns new converts against levity. “I need not enlarge on this any farther than to say, 
that it is the besetting sin of many persons, and unless they place a tenfold watch at the door of their lips, 
they will never grow in grace.” 457. 
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throughout this chapter. There can be, for example, no ambiguity in any moral act. 
There can be no mixture of motives, intentions, or preferences. There can be no mixture 
of sinfulness and holiness in a person, no mixture of obedience and disobedience, no 
ambiguity on the state of one’s heart, and no mixture in one’s preference for selfishness or 
benevolence. There can be no ambiguity in the moral tenor of any human act or 
condition. One never does anything with mixed motives. All moral actions are either 
completely holy or completely sinful, since all stem ultimately from two polar opposite 
preferences or states of the heart, selfishness and benevolence. No hyperbole seems 
adequate to Finney to express their opposite natures. They are so utterly divided and 
distinct as to be “as contrary as heaven and hell, and can no more coexist in the same 
mind, than a thing can be and not be at the same time.”475 They are “just as much and as 
necessarily at war with each other, as God and Satan.” Finney says further, “They are the 
two, and the only two, great antagonistic principles in the universe of mind.”476 At any 
given moment a person fully embraces one or the other. 
In a variety of ways this all links directly with Finney’s thoughts on conversion 
(and sanctification). This characteristic ties in forcefully with Finney’s notion of the 
immediacy of conversion, since any notion of a process of conversion implies blurred lines 
and undefined states entirely unacceptable to him. A person is completely converted at 
any given moment, or not at all. A person is following God, or is not. A person is perfectly 
obedient in all things, or is otherwise completely sinful. Christians do not sin.477 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
475 LST, 162. 
476 LST, 188.  
477 “Present evangelical faith,” Finney states, “implies a state of present sinlessness.” LST, 355. This must be 
so, if the whole will is dedicated to Christ. 
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presence of any degree of sin indicates not less faith, but no faith.478 There can be no such 
thing as partial obedience.479 Finney takes issue with those who teach that God accepts the 
partial obedience of Christians because of Christ’s work.480 How can God justify one who 
only obeys the moral law partially? Finney argues, “The theory of the mixed character of 
moral actions, is an eminently dangerous theory.… It leads its advocates to place the 
standard of conversion, or regeneration, exceedingly low–to make regeneration, 
repentance, true love to God, faith, etc., consistent with the known or conscious 
commission of present sin.”481 It gives those within the church reason to accept the 
presence of sin, instead of attaining to sinless perfection. 
If true Christians are sinless, non-Christians are completely sinful. They possess no 
virtue whatsoever. “The moral depravity of the unregenerate moral agents of our race is total.” That is 
to say, “the moral depravity of the unregenerate is without any mixture of moral 
goodness or virtue, that while they remain unregenerate, they never in any instance, nor 
in any degree, exercise true love to God and to man,” even if they may perform outward 
actions that appear as such.482 A person is one or the other completely – holy or sinful, 
obedient or disobedient, Christian or non-Christian, justified or not justified.  
How does this stark divide between sin and holiness in Finney translate to the lives 
of people, of saints, who are invariably a mixture of the two? Ironically, these 
unambiguous declarations of sinfulness and holiness result in even greater ambiguity, and 
almost a schizophrenic outlook for those Christians who, at times, encounter sin in their 
own lives. There can be no rest, no security, in one’s experience of the Christian faith in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478 Finney writes, “Sin and holiness, then, both consist in supreme, ultimate, and opposite choices, or 
intentions, and cannot by any possibility, coexist.” LST, 109. 
479 As he puts it, one cannot “partly obey and partly disobey at the same time.” LST, 104. 
480 He writes, “This appears to me, to be as radical an error as can well be taught.” LST, 123. 
481 LST, 120. 
482 LST, 248. 
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such a scheme. Finney’s view seems neither realistic as a view of the Christian life, nor 
biblical, and is certainly out of character with fundamental Protestant beliefs stemming 
from the Reformation, and even from Paul himself. One can only imagine what Luther 
would say to Finney. That would make for some interesting table talk! 
Perhaps some of Finney’s rigid thinking stems from his previous training as a 
lawyer. In some respects Finney remains ever the lawyer at heart throughout his second 
career as a churchman, ever an advocate for conversion. He never seems to have left his 
legal methods behind. His desire to persuade in “colloquial, lawyer-like” language is 
rooted in his early training, as is his emphasis on rational persuasion and the moral 
agency of his hearers.483  
In his first published sermon, “Sinners Bound to Change Their Own Hearts,” 
Finney uses overt courtroom imagery to describe the role of God and sinner in 
approaching conversion. God exerts the same moral power as a courtroom advocate to 
argue a case to the jury. The jury is made up of sinners, who are free to accept or reject 
the arguments of the lawyer, to render a verdict. Finney openly espouses ministers to 
adopt this perspective, and “should labour with sinners, as a lawyer does with a jury, and 
upon the same principles of mental philosophy."484 Such a context is ideal, in Finney’s 
eyes, for conversion. The jury box becomes the anxious bench. The preacher should 
make the gospel case powerfully, convincingly, and directly, and the sinner is then pressed 
to consider the evidence and make a decision without delay, “while the truth is held up in all 
its blaze before the mind.”485  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
483 LOR, 218. 
484 Sermons, 32. 
485 Sermons, 38. Finney unfavorably contrasts many ministers to lawyers, who have learned successfully how 
to speak thoughtfully and powerfully in an extemporaneous style. Too many ministers, on the other hand, 
are so confined to thinking by writing that they are limited and ineffective in many contexts. Finney argues 
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Hardman makes the case that not only Finney’s methods, but also the content of his 
theology, were influenced by his law training. He suggests that “the influences of a legal 
training, and his own demand for individual responsibility, made Finney impatient with 
the doctrine of original sin and inability.”486 He notes that in Finney’s legal studies he 
read Blackstone’s legal textbook, in which the notion of free will was critical to any 
punishable offense, and freedom and responsibility were indelibly linked. Blackstone also 
influenced Finney’s view of the law. Hardman writes, “This contribution of Blackstone to 
Charles Finney’s presuppositions and categories is basic for an understanding of him in 
later years as a preacher and theologian. Foundational to Finney’s approach both to 
evangelism and to theology is the unquestioned assumption that, forensically and 
religiously, human beings are responsible to higher law.”487 One does not have to read 
much Finney to find nearly omnipresent the idea of responsibility to the law. 
Finney is said to have made one of his most famous remarks on the day following 
his conversion. The lawyer Finney responded to his client, “‘Deacon Barney, I have a 
retainer from the Lord Jesus Christ to plead his cause, and I cannot plead yours.’”488 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
that more extemporaneous preachers are needed, versus manuscript preachers – who cannot maintain the 
kind of force, contact, and flexibility with their audience as the former group. Although some object that 
this style of preaching ends up lacking depth and is repetitious, Finney suggests it only seems repetitious 
because hearers remember the content better, whereas read sermons are quickly forgotten and seem new 
when repeated. “We can never have the full meaning of the gospel, till we throw away our notes,” he suggests. 
LOR, 218. Furthermore, too many theology professors, including his old teachers, do not read and interpret 
the Bible in ways “such as would be admitted in a court of justice.” LST, 1. And thus their views on several 
basic doctrines (regeneration, faith, repentance, love, inability, etc.) seem contrary to Scripture and reason. 
486 Finney, xiii. 
487 Finney, 38. In his Memoirs Finney tells of his first buying a Bible as a lawyer to study how its principles 
were related to laws. In another sign of his lawyer mind at work, he was critical of George Gale's lack of 
precision when using terms like regeneration, sanctification, etc. Memoirs, 10-12. 
488 Memoirs, 27. 
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Finney continued pleading the case for his new client, and represented the case for Christ 
to his jury of sinners for much of the rest of his life.489  
Those jurors convinced and converted by these arguments find that the Christian 
life is actually one of constant conversions. Conversion, for Finney, amounts to an ongoing 
series of temporary decisions to obey God’s law. Everyone is always in a state either of sin 
and judgment before God’s law, or of virtue and obedience to the moral law. There is no 
in between state. Conversion is only as permanent as one’s obedience to the moral law. In 
this sense a Christian and a sinner are in the same position, in that neither escape the 
condemnation of the law except through obedience, and both are punishable if in a state 
of sin. Every time a Christian sins he returns to the same state before God as an 
unconverted sinner. Only repentance and a return to obedience puts the Christian right 
before God. Conversion essentially is repentance, and is repeated throughout one’s life. 
If conversion is repentance, it is also sanctification (and vice versa). The two 
collapse into each other. At any given moment a true Christian is holy, not becoming holy. 
Because of Finney’s particular understanding of conversion and sanctification, as much as 
he talks about the latter, he is at the same time talking about the former. This reduces 
sanctification to conversion, and in some respects validates Nevin’s criticisms that for 
Finney and his ilk, conversion is everything and sanctification nothing. Finney offers no 
real development in the Christian life, beyond perhaps growth in knowledge that results in 
greater obedience. Finney does not talk about the development of Christian virtues, for 
example. To be fair, Finney does guard against all forms of antinomianism. He does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489 Hardman relates an interesting account of Finney’s speaking at his great Rochester revival of 1830-31. A 
journalist, Henry Brewster Stanton, wrote an account of hearing Finney at the time: “‘It did not sound like 
preaching, but like a lawyer arguing a case before a court and jury.… The discourse was a chain of logic, 
brightened by the felicity of illustration and enforced by urgent appeals from a voice of great compass and 
melody. Mr. Finney was then in the fulness [sic] of his powers.… His style was particularly attractive for 
lawyers. He illustrated his points frequently and happily by reference to legal principle.” Finney, 201-2.  
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tolerate a type of conversion that gives only freedom from the law. But he also does not 
offer any rich notion of sanctification. Even his thoughts on entire sanctification or 
perfection generally have a rather legalistic feel, rather than a sense of the kind of 
character and love that is the sign of a mature Christian. He does on occasion speak of 
love, but those occasions often tend to go in the more impersonal or philosophical 
direction of benevolence. 
Although Finney spends considerable time on the importance of right intentions, 
overall Finney is much stronger in describing external characteristics of Christian life than 
internal. Obey the law; carry one’s love into society through reform efforts: Finney is 
always focused on doing something more than being something. This is a self-conscious 
effort on Finney’s part. “The church has entirely mistaken the manner in which she is to 
be sanctified,” Finney contends. “The experiment has been carried on long enough, of 
trying to sanctify the church, without finding any thing for them to do. But holiness 
consists in obeying God.” Here we find what seems to be a notion of growth in 
sanctification. Sanctification is linked to obedience, but “sanctification, as a process, 
means obeying him more and more perfectly.” Perhaps Finney can talk about 
development! But what does this sanctifying process look like? “The way to promote it in 
the church, is to give every one something to do.” Not only is this development externalized, 
but it also, even in action, lacks depth. The main activity for all Christians is “saving 
sinners.” Everyone should be trained to do this. One who is converted finds growth by 
converting others.490 In this way Finney anticipates certain segments of evangelicalism 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
490 LOR, 429 (emphasis mine). Finney is clear that the measure by which to judge the growth of 
sanctification is, as has been mentioned previously, the ability to convert others. “Jesus Christ has made his 
people co-workers with him in saving sinners, for this very reason, because sanctification consists in doing 
those things which are required to promote this work.” 429. Finney does, at times, sound some contrary 
notes to this picture. For example he writes, “It is just as indispensable in promoting a revival, to preach to 
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today, emphasizing the saving of souls to such an extent that the content of the Christian 
life is emptied of substance.  
Finney’s practicality, his black and white tendency of thinking, his legal 
background, and certain emphases of his theology all conspire to leave a hollowness in his 
description of the interior Christian life. In these ways Nevin’s criticism of Finney in 
particular and revivalism in general are not without justification.491 
Finney’s views on conversion lend credence to the oft repeated accusation that 
Finney’s theology is Pelagian. One of the fundamental principles on which Finney bases 
his theology is that the natural human ability exists to choose to obey God or to sin, that 
there is freedom of the will, and that without these features there can be no morality or 
condemnation for sin.492 Everything turns on Finney’s understanding of moral law and 
anthropology. Given these principles, Finney is opposed absolutely to any perspective 
suggesting divine modification of the human constitution for conversion, since that would 
deny a preexisting human ability vital for his notion of moral responsibility. As much as 
Finney labors to conceptualize the work of God and of grace in such a framework, it is 
inevitable that the charge of Pelagianism should arise. It is virtually inherent in Finney’s 
core anthropology. Humans have the capacity, unassisted, to obey God, to convert and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the church, and make them grow in grace, as it is to preach to sinners and make them submit to God. 
Many seem to think that if they can only get people converted, the whole ground is gained, and that they 
will grow in grace of course without any special aid. But… young converts will no more grow in grace, 
without being properly preached to, than sinners will turn to God without being preached to.” LST, 469. 
Yet all the tendencies of his theological system work against such a notion of growth, and it is not well-
developed in most of his writings. It is worth noting that this very quote does not come until the second to 
last page of LST, and is in the context of the need for preaching the truth to both sinners and Christians, 
since of both are required obedience – the former initially and the latter continuing – to be a Christian. 
491 For a good discussion of Nevin’s perspective and his criticisms of Finney, see chapter 1 in Christopher J. 
Ganski, “Spirit and Flesh: On the Significance of the Reformed Doctrine of the Lord’s Supper for 
Pneumatology,” Ph.D. diss. (Marquette University, 2011). See especially 48-63. 
492 Hence Finney strongly opposes the Calvinist doctrine of original sin. He writes, “If men are without 
excuse for sin, as the whole law and gospel assume and teach, it cannot possibly be that their nature is sinful, 
for a sinful nature would be the best of all excuses for sin.” LST, 263. 
 	  
262 
sanctify themselves, to make for themselves a new heart. Any command of God, even any 
promise, implies the human capacity to fulfill it. One is not a Christian because of anything 
God has wrought in a person. At its core conversion is wrought by a human decision. 
In Finney’s scheme of immediate ongoing human decisionism the cross slips in 
disturbing fashion to the background. Christ’s death is more for the moral defense of God, 
a justification for his choosing to forgive sinners, than it is any justification for sinners 
themselves.493 And what grace God extends in repentance to the sinner is always only for 
past sins, never present ones. Both the initiation and the maintenance of one’s salvation is 
the work of the human. 
In his Lectures on Revivals Finney is most animated in opposing two tendencies, 
ministers poorly prepared for actual ministry and preaching of the gospel, and theological 
perspectives that overemphasize God’s sovereignty and election – resulting in a kind of 
quietism or passive response to gospel preaching. In his view both of these tendencies are 
best embodied, not coincidentally, in Old School Presbyterianism and Calvinism. Finney 
is constantly complaining of the unsuitability of the formal training received by most 
ministers. He suggests that their education serves more as an obstacle than a help to the 
spread of the gospel. Ministers too often seek to impress their hearers with their educated 
views and scholarship, rather than reach them in ways they can understand with the 
gospel message. They too often use illustrations from ancient history rather than common, 
everyday ones, and they use terms that are little understood by most of their 
congregations. Their learning actually obfuscates rather than clarifies the gospel. Finney 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
493 Finney writes, “The atonement of Christ was intended as a satisfaction of public justice [rather than 
retributive justice].” LST, 219. God cannot repeal or change the moral law, but he can show how he is 
justified in pardoning sin. 219. The atonement, in Finney’s view, is not a payment for sin, but a revelation 
of God’s character and a strengthening of his moral government. For more on Finney’s view of justification 
see, for example, LST, 360-77. 
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goes so far as to suggest that a minister is “wicked” if he or she fails to communicate the 
gospel in colloquial forms and terms.494 For too many ministers, the difficulty is not “for 
the want of mind, but from the wrong training.”495 We turn next to the views of that 
venerable institution of which Finney was so critical, Princeton Seminary. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
494 LOR, 208. 
495 LOR, 216. 
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Chapter Three – Archibald Alexander and Princeton Seminary 
 
 
The Princeton Theology was a significant theological force in the nineteenth 
century. Representative of a particular blend of Old School Calvinism, New School 
Presbyterianism, and Scottish Common Sense Realism, its representatives at Princeton 
Seminary addressed all manner of theological and cultural issues and were widely read 
and respected in America by both their friends and their foes. For the purposes of this 
study a consideration of their views on conversion is fruitful, as they represent the center 
of an Old School Calvinism of great influence in nineteenth century American theology, 
and that is, at least among some evangelicals, almost as influential today as it was when it 
was first expressed. They also represent a unique blend of concerns that result in a 
particular view of conversion not shared by others in this study. Although closest in form 
to that of Jonathan Edwards, they depart from his views in significant ways.1 
What we will find upon closer examination of the views of Princeton is an 
approach to conversion that bears much theological similarity to Edwards, although from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 There are a variety of significant secondary sources on Princeton and its leading figures and theology. A 
few of the most notable include The Princeton Theology 1812-1921, ed. Mark A. Noll (1983; rpt. Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker Academic, 2001); Noll, America’s God (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); William K. 
Selden, Princeton Theological Seminary: A Narrative History, 1812-1992 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1992); David B. Calhoun, Princeton Seminary, Vol. 1: Faith and Learning 1812-1868 (Carlisle, PA: Banner of 
Truth Trust, 1994); Calhoun, Princeton Seminary, Vol. 2: The Majestic Testimony 1869-1929 (Carlisle, PA: 
Banner of Truth Trust, 1996); James H. Moorhead, Princeton Seminary in American Religion and Culture (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012); E. Brooks Holifield, Theology in America (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2003); Andrew W. Hoffecker, Piety and the Princeton Theologians (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 
1981); and Reformed Theology in America, ed. David F. Wells (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1997). 
There is no lack of primary sources, as the leading figures of the seminary, especially Charles Hodge, wrote 
extensively. Further materials on Charles Hodge are described in the following chapter. This chapter will 
lean most heavily on Archibald Alexander’s 1844 book, Thoughts on Religious Experience (1844; rpt. New York: 
Arno Press, 1972).  
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a somewhat different mindset. They share Edwards’ view of conversion as a supernatural 
work of God. They also, contrary to some characterizations of Princeton, share a distinct 
emphasis on the place of piety and experience in conversion. Unlike Edwards, however, 
they tend to place a greater stress on the importance and role of knowledge in conversion 
– knowledge that is both spiritual and cognitive. Thus I have termed the Princetonian 
model of conversion transformative spiritual knowledge. The Princetonians in many respects 
are in direct opposition to Finney’s approach, and yet still share – to at least some degree 
– certain characteristics with Finney, especially regarding the location of conversion. 
Before examining this position in greater detail, some additional background is in 
order. In the nineteenth century Princeton Seminary was, as David Calhoun puts it, “one 
of the centers – in its earlier years, perhaps the center – of American evangelicalism.”2 
Thus in a study of the changing models of conversion in American evangelicalism 
Princeton simply cannot be ignored. Of the three major Princeton theologians of the 
century – Archibald Alexander (1772-1851), Charles Hodge (1797-1878), and Benjamin 
B. Warfield (1851-1921) – Hodge was the most influential.3 We will examine Hodge in 
detail in the following chapter. Aside from Hodge, the two figures most central to the 
Princeton Theology were Alexander and Warfield. The former was first Hodge’s 
professor and later his colleague. The latter, after a short gap in years, succeeded Hodge 
as the preeminent Princeton theologian and extended Princeton’s views into the early 
twentieth century. This chapter will introduce the reader to the views of Princeton 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Calhoun, Princeton vol. 1, xxii. Mark Noll likewise considers Princeton Seminary the most influential of the 
nineteenth century in America. See Princeton Theology, 18-20. 
3 Andrew Hoffecker comments, “Charles Hodge is the central figure in any discussion of the Princeton 
theology.” Piety, 44. 
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Seminary and the “Princeton Theology” on conversion, especially through the thought of 
its first professor, Archibald Alexander.  
There remains, however, the question of the “Princeton Theology.”4 Is it proper 
to speak of this institution’s theology in a unified manner? Would it not be more accurate 
to speak of Hodge’s theology, or Alexander’s, or Warfield’s? Furthermore, how much 
development even within the careers of each of these figures was there such that their 
views varied at various points of their careers? 
The extent to which Alexander and Hodge are unified, at least as regards the 
topic of conversion, should become clear in this and the following chapter. As a historian, 
however, I realize fully that there were, of course, various developments within and across 
these three figures as the nineteenth century proceeded. They were each faced with 
different and changing social, political, cultural, and religious contexts. Thus each of 
them had particular emphases in their theologies addressing these concerns.  
Alexander came out of the Revolutionary era and the birth of the nation, with all 
of its uncertainties and changes. In his younger days there would be many alive that could 
still attest to various religious experiences of the First Great Awakening. Later he lived in 
the midst of the country’s Second Great Awakening, and as a Presbyterian leader and 
Princeton professor evaluated various expressions of those revivals.5 As the first professor 
at Princeton Seminary Alexander carried much responsibility in establishing the views 
and culture of the new school.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Hodge himself denied that such a thing as the “Princeton Theology” existed, believing that what they 
taught was simply that which had been taught for centuries. His theological conservatism prompted his 
famous remark that “a new idea never originated in the Seminary.” A. Hodge, LCH, 521. See also Biblical 
Repertory and Princeton Review Index Volume, vol. 1, 11 (1870-71) (further citations as BRPR). 
5 Alexander himself considered his conversion to have taken place in the earliest days of the Second Great 
Awakening, in 1788. See Calhoun, Princeton vol. 1, 45-47. 
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Hodge’s situation was somewhat different. First, he grew up essentially in the 
bosom of the Presbyterian seminary. As a twelve-year-old he attended the installation of 
Alexander at Princeton. He later attended the college and the seminary, was the protégé 
and spiritual son of Alexander, and at an early age became a member of the seminary’s 
faculty, with almost no other professional or pastoral experience previous to this. Almost 
his entire life revolved around the seminary, and in his long decades there he saw 
changing religious, cultural, and societal tides. During his tenure European theology, 
especially out of Germany, had a growing influence on the American theological context. 
Biblical and historical criticism were gaining momentum. The sciences continued to grow 
in knowledge, breadth, and influence. Powerful forces were also at work in society and 
culture. Hodge lived through the great slavery debates and divisions, and through the 
ultimate division of the country in the Civil War. He also experienced and played a part 
in great upheavals and splits within the nineteenth century Presbyterian church bodies. 
By the time of Warfield’s career, new concerns were rising up, particularly in the 
areas of science and of biblical criticism. Whereas Alexander and Hodge had found it 
relatively easy to argue for the congruency of science and Christianity, and for the 
authority of Scripture, by Warfield’s time these were no longer givens. Thus one finds in 
Warfield a much greater emphasis on apologetics. 
If their contexts brought from them occasional writings on somewhat varied 
subjects, the theological foundation out of which those writings came remained 
remarkably similar. As David Calhoun, author of a two-volume history of the seminary, 
puts it, “from 1812 to 1929, Princeton Theological Seminary represented a coherent, 
continual effort to teach and practice what the Princetonians believed was historic 
Reformed Christianity.” In his assessment, they were successful. They “stood squarely in 
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the great stream of historic Christianity and orthodox Calvinism.”6 Granting their 
different emphases, there remains a remarkable degree of continuity among these three 
figures throughout and across their careers. It would be difficult indeed to attempt to 
distinguish between an ‘early’ and a ‘late’ Alexander or Hodge. Alexander, near the end 
of his life, commented that his “views of theological truth are what they have always 
been.”7 Hodge’s theological base remained anchored in a confessional Reformed model 
that he had learned under Alexander.8 Although it was not until several years into his 
Princeton career that Hodge actually took a position in systematic theology (he was 
initially Professor of Oriental and Biblical Literature), this shift in teaching responsibilities 
was not the result of, nor did it result in, any significant changes to his theological position. 
As Hodge himself wrote, “it does not become us to have so little confidence in what God 
has said, as to allow ourselves to be driven about by every wind of doctrine.”9 
The continuity between these three figures also can be seen clearly. Having been 
taught by Alexander, Hodge adopted his mentor’s thought wholeheartedly. For most of 
his career, until his own Systematic Theology was published, he saw fit, like his teacher, to 
use Francis Turretin’s dogmatics as a primary theological text with his students.10 When 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Princeton vol. 1, xxiv, xxv. 
7 Religious Experience, xiii. 
8 In his introduction to Alexander’s Thoughts on Religious Experience, W. J. Grier wrote that “Dr. Miller 
[second professor at Princeton Seminary], Dr. [Charles] Hodge and he [Archibald Alexander] lived and 
worked together for many years ‘in absolute singleness of mind, in simplicity and godly sincerity, in utter 
unselfishness and devotion to the common cause, in honour preferring one another. Truth and candour 
was the atmosphere they breathed; loyalty, brave and sweet, was the spirit of their lives.’ To their students 
through all the years the concord and affection of these servants of Christ was a beautiful sight. This 
concord sprang from devotion to the same great system of truth.” Religious Experience, xiv. He is quoting from 
A. Hodge, LCH, 378. 
9 CHMC, folder 20:11, “Let your conversation becometh the Gospel,” September, 1826. 
10 Mark Noll observes, “When Alexander stepped aside from Princeton’s chair of theology in 1840 out of 
deference to Hodge, little change occurred in the actual teaching of that subject. Hodge continued to quiz 
the students on their reading, to assign theological questions for their homework, and to use as textbook the 
seventeenth-century dogmatics (in Latin) of the Swiss Reformed theologian Francis Turretin.” Charles 
Hodge, Charles Hodge: The Way of Life, ed. Mark A. Noll (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 22. 
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Warfield arrived, he saw no need to produce a new text, adopting Hodge’s Systematic 
Theology instead. He described Hodge as “my ideal of a teacher.”11 Reading the histories 
of Princeton Seminary and other biographical information on the three professors, one 
does not find Hodge or Warfield making any major correctives to their respective 
predecessors.12 At the centennial celebration of the seminary it was said that Princeton’s 
professors “‘all spoke the same thing and there were no divisions among them.’”13 
Hoffecker observes that “an overwhelming continuity exists in the succession from 
Alexander through Hodge to Warfield.”14 In the nineteenth century this continuity was 
reflected across the seminary’s entire faculty.15 Although Warfield’s views on conversion 
will not be considered in this dissertation, his continuance of the theological traditions of 
Alexander and Hodge is worthy of recognition. He carried their theological notions into 
the twentieth century and to new generations of theological students. 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Benjamin B. Warfield, Selected Shorter Writings of Benjamin B. Warfield vol. 1, ed. John E. Meeter (Nutley, NJ: 
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1970), 439. 
12 In his history of Princeton Seminary Selden notes, “The deaths of Charles Hodge in 1878 and of his son 
Archibald Alexander Hodge in 1886 in no way diminished the commitment of Princeton Theological 
Seminary to the Reformed faith as espoused by the Old School adherents. If for no other reason the 
continued presence of William Henry Green and the appointment to the faculty of Benjamin Breckenridge 
Warfield in 1887 assured theological constancy.” Princeton Narrative History, 68. 
13 Francis L. Patton, “Princeton Seminary and the Faith,” in The Centennial Celebration of the Theological 
Seminary of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America at Princeton, New Jersey (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
Theological Seminary, 1912). 342. 
14 Hoffecker, Piety, 95. Between the three theologically Hoffecker says “a remarkable consensus was 
manifest.” vi. Mark Noll concurs, writing that the Princeton Theology “retained a remarkable consistency 
over the course of its remarkable life.” Princeton Theology, 40. 
15 Of the 13 professors appointed after William Henry Green in 1851, “all but three were alumni of the 
Seminary seven had been students of Charles Hodge and two were his sons. Calvinistic doctrines as 
espoused at Princeton Seminary were inbred in their souls.” Selden, Princeton, 57. Calhoun notes that “of 
Princeton’s thirty-one professors until 1929, twenty-three were graduates of the seminary.” Princeton vol. 1, 
xxv. 
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Princeton and Revivalism  
 
In nineteenth century America, it is virtually impossible to discuss conversion in 
any comprehensive fashion without also addressing the impact of revivalism. Revivalism’s 
close relationship to conversion extends back to Edwards and the First Great Awakening, 
but in the century that followed Edwards revivalism was such an ongoing part of the 
landscape and contributed to such a marked degree to changing views of conversion that 
it requires some attention in this study.16 This is all the more true as Edwards and later 
Finney played such a large role in the revivals of their day. Though one might assume (as 
a few too many scholars have) that the environment at the bastion of Old School 
Calvinism was markedly opposed to all forms of revivalism, this was not the case. 
Princeton’s relation to revivalism was much more complex. Certainly there was 
considerable animosity to the views of Charles Finney, and the basis of this animosity will 
be considered further in this and the following chapter. However, it would be a mistake to 
assume that Princeton’s aversion to Finney’s revivalism was representative of its overall 
attitude toward revivalism. Nor was this animosity transferred to all revivalists. Notable 
among the exceptions in the nineteenth century was Dwight L. Moody, who was even 
invited to speak at the Princeton campus in 1876.17 Revivalist Asahel Nettleton (1783-
1844) was also well-regarded by Princeton. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 It has been suggested that the Second Great Awakening was really more of a series of awakenings 
occurring on and off throughout much of the nineteenth century in America. In his fine historical study of 
the first half of that century, What Hath God Wrought, Daniel Walker Howe writes, “In terms of duration, 
numbers of people involved ,or any other measure, the Second Great Awakening dwarfed the First. 
Because of its diversity, perhaps it should be called a multitude of contemporaneous ‘awakenings.’” (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 186. 
17 “In February [1876] evangelist D. L. Moody and his associate, Ira Sankey, came to Princeton at the 
invitation of [Princeton College president James] McCosh, Charles Hodge, and the students.” Calhoun, 
Princeton vol. 2, 24. Calhoun writes that Princeton “gladly supported D. L. Moody.” 24. 
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It is not so surprising that Princeton would have some openness to revivalism 
when one considers that Princeton had its roots in the old ‘Log Cabin School’ of the 
eighteenth century – many of whose students had been profoundly shaped by the 
revivalist George Whitfield and the First Great Awakening. Many of the seminary’s early 
students were brought to faith or strongly influenced by revivals. The college experienced 
numerous periods of revival in its early decades, and this revivalistic impulse carried over 
to the seminary when it was established.18  
Perhaps the most significant figure in the early history of Princeton outside of its 
first three professors was Ashbel Green (1762-1848). Green was president of Princeton 
College for a decade and later head of the seminary’s board. His 1831 sermon to 
Princeton Seminary students illustrates his and Princeton’s attitudes toward revivalism. In 
this sermon, aside from guarding against anti-intellectualism, preaching on the Bible, and 
the importance of a missionary spirit, Green embraced revivals of religion. “‘We hope 
and trust,’ he said, ‘there is no student in this seminary, who is not a cordial friend to such 
a display of divine grace, as is commonly called a revival of religion.’ He urged the students 
to spend at least part of their coming vacation ‘in some place or congregation–easily to be 
found, blessed be God, at the present time–where a revival of religion exists.’”19 Green’s 
positive assessment of revivalism was representative of Princeton’s attitude as a whole 
regarding revivalism. In his history of the seminary Calhoun notes that Green’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Calhoun observes, “The majority of the students in Princeton's early years–including a number of 
converts from the notable awakening which occurred in 1815 at Princeton College–were products of 
revivals.” Princeton vol. 1, 219. 
19 Calhoun, Princeton vol. 1, 187. His quotations are from Ashbel Green’s sermon to Princeton Seminary 
students on 16 May, 1831. “An Address to the Students of the Theological Seminary, at Princeton,” Biblical 
Repertory and Theological Review, 3 (1831), 350-60 (further citations as BRTR). 
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“wholehearted support of revivals” was one theme among others that “the students heard 
continually in classes and chapel, in formal presentations and informal conversations.”20  
The Princetonians, according to Calhoun, attempted to avoid the extremes of 
opposition to any form of revivals on the one hand, and embracing forms of revivalism 
that brought with them theological innovation on the other. Princeton not only attempted 
moderation in its approach to revivals, but also even participated in them. There were 
revivals on the college and seminary campus. Professors and students also went out and 
preached amidst occurrences of revival, generally without any “new measures.”21 Later 
the seminary both supported and benefitted from the “Businessman’s Revival” in 1857 
and the years following, reaching its peak enrollment in the nineteenth century in 1858.22 
Revivals at the College continued sporadically over most of the century.23 
This moderated support for revivals was exemplified in the seminary’s first 
professor, Archibald Alexander, who was himself a strong but careful supporter of 
revival.24 Alexander defended the authenticity of religious revivals and the conversions 
they brought about, even if he was also circumspect regarding their abuses. He believed 
that revivals resulted in conversions of a supernatural nature, but that they were often also 
accompanied by any number of false conversions – those swept up by the common 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Princeton vol. 1, 188. 
21 See Calhoun, Princeton vol. 1, 230-34. “New measures” refer to innovative revivalistic practices of Finney 
and many other revivalists designed to bring about conversions through emotional appeals or other 
psychological pressures, e.g. the “anxious bench” at the front of the revival where those who were wavering 
on the brink of converting were brought in the sight of the assembly and often pressured directly by the 
evangelist to convert. 
22 See Calhoun, Princeton vol. 1, 369-71. 
23 Warfield, who attended Princeton College from 1868-71, wrote, “‘It was said in our time that no class in 
Princeton College ever passed through its four years without experiencing a religious revival. Our class 
formed no exception.’” As quoted in Calhoun, Princeton vol. 2, 22. 
24 “There was no one in the Presbyterian church who had studied more closely the whole subject of revivals 
than Archibald Alexander. His lifelong positive attitude toward revivals was partly due to his early 
experiences in Virginia. His warnings concerning the dangers of emotional excesses, unbiblical methods, 
and doctrinal deviations were not the observations of a detached critic.” Calhoun, Princeton vol. 1, 230. 
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emotions and force of the group, but lacking true conviction of sin and repentance and 
renewal. He at one point even suggested that perhaps what was termed a ‘revival’ would 
not be considered as such if only those with lasting conversions responded to the period of 
revival.25 But he was unwilling to bind the work of the Spirit in bringing about true 
change and conversions in the midst of revivals. “The opinion entertained by some good 
people that all religion obtained in a revival is suspect, has no just foundation. At such 
times, when the Spirit of God is really poured out, the views and exercises of converts are 
commonly more clear and satisfactory than at other times, and the process of conversion 
more speedy.”26  
It is not insignificant for this study that Princeton’s attitudes toward revivalism 
varied significantly. This variation illustrates the differences across various expressions of 
revivalism in views on conversion and its significance for the theology and ministry of the 
church. For example, Princeton fought against Finney’s “new measures” because it saw in 
them a movement from conversion as a supernatural work of God to a human work. It 
was, in their view, a return to a form of Pelagianism. More on these issues will arise in the 
course of this study.  
 
Archibald Alexander  
 
We begin this story not with Charles Hodge, but with his teacher Archibald 
Alexander, who was to have a formative influence on Hodge’s theology, and even on all 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 After all revivals, there is a sad declension in the favourable appearances; because that which has no root 
must soon wither. In looking back after a revival season, I have thought, how would matters have been if 
none had come forward, but such as persevere and bring forth fruit? Perhaps things would have gone on so 
quietly that the good work would not have been called a revival.” Alexander, Religious Experience, 54. 
26 Alexander, Religious Experience, 54. 
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of the Princeton men of the nineteenth century. Alexander addresses many of the 
concerns and questions of this dissertation in a book he published in 1844 titled Thoughts 
on Religious Experience.27 In fact, it probably includes the most expansive consideration of 
conversion of anything I found within this Princeton era. Before delving into Hodge’s 
own views, a briefer description of Alexander’s views on conversion will be helpful to 
understand the background of Hodge’s own views and the continuity of the ‘Princeton 
theology’ over this period. 
 
Conversion as Supernatural  
 
What are the characteristics of conversion as understood by Alexander? First of all, 
at its root source conversion is the result of a supernatural act. It is not something that 
humans can bring about by following certain practices or methods, by self-denial, even by 
pleading with God in prayer. It is not an event that one can will to happen, nor one that 
can be obtained through knowledge alone. In short, it is beyond the capacity of humans 
to bring it about. It is, instead, “a spiritual operation; or as the effect produced is 
confessedly above the powers of unassisted nature, let us call it supernatural, which is the 
precise technical term used by the most accurate theologians.”28 
Alexander despairs over those enthusiasts and revivalists who seek to bring about 
results that can be observed through various human means and efforts, without resting on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 For the purposes of this study my concern is to capture the views of the Princeton Theology. Thus 
although Alexander had a long career already as a pastor and teacher before coming to Princeton Seminary 
as its first professor, I will not explore that period of his life. I have no reason, however, to think that his 
earlier views were in any substantive way different from those we find in the latter half of his career spent at 
Princeton. As, was already noted above, Alexander himself commented near the end of his life how his 
views had not changed (see 268, fn. 7).  
28 Alexander, Religious Experience, 62. 
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the Holy Spirit for the true work of lasting conversion. “That, through ignorance, vanity 
and enthusiastic ardour, many preachers in our day have attempted to produce such 
excitements, cannot be denied, and by the true friends of vital piety is greatly lamented.” 
He continues, “Perhaps nothing has so much prejudiced the minds of sensible men 
against experimental religion as the extravagance and violence of those factitious 
excitements which have been promoted in various places by measures artfully contrived 
to work upon the passions and imagination of weak and ignorant people.”29 This, for 
Alexander, is the very definition of enthusiasm. Alexander regards practices to be those of 
an enthusiast when, instead of garnering religious affections through meditation on 
biblical truths, they instead seek to manufacture religious affections through the use of 
particular human efforts and means. Enthusiasm “always substitutes human fancies or 
impulses for the truths of God, which it uniformly undervalues.”30 Reliance on human 
abilities and practices rather than on God’s action is always the mark of enthusiasm for 
Alexander. 
How does a person know that a supernatural force is at work in them in 
conversion? One cannot have conscious awareness of the source of one’s new thoughts 
and orientation, but one can be assured through the Word of God that the movement 
from iniquity to delight in the service of God is of divine origin. Alexander also argues 
that this verifies the authenticity of the gospel against skeptics, because the resulting 
change in the person cannot be explained through natural means alone. “Those who 
would ascribe all experimental religion to mere natural feelings, artificially excited, must 
believe that there are no such transformations of character as have been mentioned, and 
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that all who profess such a change are false pretenders.”31 Alexander considers such a 
view “manifestly untenable,” since, from his perspective, there can be no question as to 
the fact that people have been transformed by the preaching of the gospel. 
If Alexander demands that one view conversion as a supernatural event, he also 
admits that the supernatural aspect can be overemphasized or distorted. He 
acknowledges that many readers of his book may find it lacking in its account of 
conversion since it does not discuss “dreams and visions, or voices and lights, of a 
supernatural kind.” Likewise there are some who “glory in their ignorance and lack of 
education” and claim God’s special inspiration in their lives. Alexander considers this 
another form of enthusiasm, for it adds human requirements to a biblical understanding 
of conversion. He does not deny that there are many ways in which the Holy Spirit can 
be at work in conversion, including dreams, and is unwilling to limit the activity of the 
Spirit so long as the changes wrought by such activity are “proved to be genuine by the 
future life of the person.”32 To require unusual or extraordinary circumstances as 
evidence of one’s conversion, however, would be a mistake. 
  
The Role of the Human and the Holy Spirit in Conversion  
 
Alexander is often concerned not to limit God’s freedom in how he brings about 
change in those he elects, and he takes care not to overdefine or explain the process of 
conversion in a way that confines God’s activities or denies the essential mystery involved. 
God’s ways are not our ways, and we must acknowledge a lack of capacity to understand 
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them. Therefore “the mode of the Spirit's operation in regeneration is altogether 
inscrutable: and an attempt to explain it is worse than folly.” Later in his book Alexander 
uses biographical narratives of various individuals, including conversion narratives, to 
illustrate and discuss features of religious experience. After providing an account of an 
Episcopal clergyman who, previously outside the faith entirely, discovered the reality of 
faith, he comments on the unusual circumstances surrounding how this person came to 
faith. “These are all remarkable circumstances, and to some, may seem to savour of 
enthusiasm. But we cannot prescribe limits to the Holy Spirit in His ways of leading 
benighted souls into the path of life.”33 Alexander is thus guarded about declaring what is 
and is not of the Spirit, in spite of his aversion to certain forms of ‘enthusiasm.’ The 
changes wrought in conversion push beyond the limits of human understanding. 
Although a person has a role in responding to and growing in grace 
(sanctification), there is no human role at the point of regeneration, the foundation of 
conversion. The desire to add some further human dimension to the process is ever the 
temptation for human beings. Alexander is alert to what he sees as the rise of Pelagian 
ideas in certain theological streams of his day. Perhaps with Finney in mind, he writes, 
“Among all the preposterous notions which a new and crude theology has poured forth so 
profusely in our day, there is none more absurd, than that a dead sinner can beget new 
life in himself.”34 Dead in sin, we can have no part in the new birth. Those who argue 
that we can will our own conversion are, in his view, deeply mistaken.  
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Regeneration is the result of grace alone. “The doctrine of free grace, without any 
mixture of human merit, is the only true object of faith.” Christians must “derive their life 
entirely from Christ.”  But this is a very difficult spiritual habit and a difficult pastoral task. 
“To exercise unshaken confidence in the doctrine of gratuitous pardon is one of the most 
difficult things in the world; and to preach this doctrine fully without verging towards 
antinomianism is no easy task, and is therefore seldom done.”35 
 
The Nature of the Change of Conversion 
 
If conversion is the result of a supernatural act of the Holy Spirit, and if it occurs 
by grace alone – apart from any human impetus, what is the nature of the change that 
occurs in conversion? In Alexander’s view, the change occurs at a fundamental level of 
the person. Conversion, in this model, is transformative. As he puts it, “an entire revolution 
has taken place in his principles of action as well as in his sentiments respecting divine 
things.” The unregenerate person lacks the capacity for spiritual perception. “I hold that 
no unregenerate man is, while in that state, any more capable of spiritual perception than 
a blind man is of a perception of colours.” In the change of conversion “a principle of 
holiness is implanted, spiritual life is communicated, the mind is enlightened, the will 
renewed, and the affections purified and elevated to heavenly objects.” This change is 
wrought without violating our human nature. “God operates on the human mind in a 
way perfectly consistent with its nature, as a spirit, and a creature of understanding and 
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will.” He restores the soul’s “lost power of spiritual perception and susceptibility of holy 
feeling, without doing any violence to its free and spiritual nature.”36 
The transformation of conversion occurs at the core of our being, “by the power 
of God creating ‘a new heart,’ to use the language of Scripture.”37 A person can have a 
great deal of ‘head knowledge’ about God, and perhaps even be an adept theologian of 
sorts, but still lack that inner transformation that allows the knowledge of the gospel to 
penetrate and affect his or her entire being.38 “The truth is necessary, but until the mind 
is brought into a state in which it can perceive it in its beauty and glory, it is heard and 
read and contemplated without any transforming effect–without drawing the affections to 
God, or subduing the power of selfish and sensual desires. The fault existing in the 
percipient being, there must be such an exertion of divine power as will remove it, and 
this is regeneration.” The unregenerate person has a disposition oriented away from 
divine things and unable to feel their force. Alexander argues that if there are those who 
“cannot conceive of permanent, latent dispositions in the soul, both good and evil, I can 
do no more than express my strong dissent from their opinion, and appeal to the 
common sense of mankind.”39 Here Alexander lands at a position similar to Edwards, 
although his appeal to common sense is certainly more at home in the nineteenth century. 
As the reader may recall, Edwards argued that it was precisely at this inner disposition 
that the change of regeneration took place, changing a person from a being oriented 
toward evil to one oriented toward the divine and receptive to God’s goodness and beauty. 
Alexander uses very similar language here, although he tends less toward Edwardsean 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 Alexander, Religious Experience, 55, 62, 59, 59, 62. 
37 Alexander, Religious Experience, 61. 
38 “An unregenerate man may be able to deliver able lectures on all the points of theology, and yet not have 
one glimpse of the beauty and glory of the truth with which he is conversant.” Alexander, Religious Experience, 
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39 Alexander, Religious Experience, 61, 62. 
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notions of taste and sight, and more toward references to knowledge and truth, to which 
we now turn. 
 
The Role of Knowledge and the Intellect in Conversion 
 
Knowledge plays a critical role in Alexander’s view of conversion, such that it is 
included in the descriptive phrase for Princeton’s model. If conversion is not brought 
about by knowledge alone, still knowledge is required for conversion. For Alexander, to 
be converted is to have a saving faith. Such a faith involves, at a fundamental level, the 
acquisition of knowledge and a firm belief in that knowledge. As he put it, faith “is a firm 
persuasion or belief of the truth, apprehended under the illumination of the Holy Spirit,” 
or even more simply “a belief of the truth.”40 To have faith requires content to be believed, 
an object of faith. Thus knowledge is an essential component in conversion.  
Alexander refers to knowledge often, and one might infer from this that Alexander 
works from a predominantly intellectualist position, and has even reduced faith to mere 
assent to propositions. Alexander is well aware of this potential misunderstanding, and 
explains at length how his view differs from faith as assent. He denies that the knowledge 
of which he speaks involves only “a naked assent of the understanding.”41 What is crucial 
is that the unregenerate person lacks a capacity for spiritual knowledge, and thus there is 
no way for a view of that knowledge to be efficacious. Mere assent to the gospel, without a 
deeper perception and embrace of it, does not represent true conversion. A strictly 
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intellectual knowledge of divine things is powerless to bring about transformation.42 Even 
though the misconceptions of a regenerate person may be corrected by teaching better 
doctrine, or by a more complete presentation of the gospel, Alexander insists that the 
problem is not in the measure of truth received. “The blindness is in the mind, which can 
only be removed by an influence on the soul itself.”43 Until that inner transformation is 
wrought by God in regeneration, no amount of information – regardless of how accurate 
– will have a transforming effect. 
While Alexander does not refer overtly to the older Puritan conceptions of a two-
fold manner of knowing in any writings I encountered, his approach resembles theirs and 
perhaps is even in the background of his thought.44 Thus, as we also saw earlier in 
Jonathan Edwards, Alexander distinguishes merely intellectual knowledge from what 
could, again like Edwards, be termed an affective knowledge – or, as Alexander 
sometimes calls it, a spiritual knowledge. Again and again Alexander refers to saving 
knowledge as something that moves beyond mere factual or doctrinal knowledge to a 
knowledge that is perceived and felt in its fullness. It is an affective, integrated, life-
changing knowledge. 
Therefore what makes knowledge saving versus merely knowledge regarded as 
true is the content of that knowledge, and the capacity to perceive it in its totality. 
Following the inner change of regeneration wrought by God, knowledge of divine things 
that had formerly perhaps been merely ‘head’ knowledge can now be perceived in its true 
force. Alexander sees this illumination as “the first effect of regeneration.”45 One is not 	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only able to recognize the truth intellectually, but also to feel its force and power, and 
respond mindfully, willfully, and emotively. In turn, faith is the first response of a 
regenerated person.46 “A saving faith is produced by the manifestation of the truth in its 
true nature to the mind, which now apprehends it… in its spiritual qualities, its beauty, 
and glory, and sweetness; whereas a historical or speculative faith may rest on the 
prejudices of education, or the deductions of reason; but in its exercise there is no 
conception of the true qualities of divine things.” This capacity to know more fully in a 
deeper, more spiritual sense is given only by God through the Holy Spirit. The 
unregenerate person is not transformed by divine knowledge because he or she does not 
really know it in this deeper sense. “If men are unaffected with the truth known, it must 
be because they do not know it aright: neither can they perceive it in its true nature until 
they are regenerated. Did any man ever see an object to be lovely and not feel an 
emotion corresponding with that quality?” In these very same truths, perceived by the 
regenerate person, new meanings, insights, and affections are found. “Every man on 
whom this divine operation has passed experiences new views of divine truth. The soul sees in 
these things that which it never saw before. It discerns in the truth of God a beauty and 
excellence of which it had no conception until now.”47 One cannot know spiritual truths 
in this deeper sense and not be affected. Hence transformative spiritual knowledge is at the very 
core of Alexander’s Princetonian model of conversion. 
How much knowledge is required for conversion? Alexander declines to answer 
this question, arguing that it cannot be known. “What degree of knowledge is absolutely 
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necessary to the existence of piety cannot be accurately determined by man, but we know 
that genuine faith may consist with much ignorance and error.”48 But what he does say is 
that the more accurate the knowledge, and the greater the quantity of it available to the 
regenerated person, the greater the transformation and growth. At least some knowledge 
of spiritual truths is required, and the regenerated person perceives the fullness and power 
of what spiritual truths are available as illumined by his or her newfound capacity.49 
However, that which is in error or not known at all cannot play a part in this new 
perception, and hence cannot contribute to this transformation of conversion, or its 
continuation in sanctification.50 “As spiritual knowledge is the foundation of all genuine 
exercises of religion, so growth in religion is intimately connected with divine knowledge. 
Men may possess unsanctified knowledge and be nothing the better for it; but they cannot 
grow in grace without increasing in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ.”51 Alexander 
argues that children should be provided with religious education, and that it is also of 
value to those adults who have not yet experienced regeneration. A greater and more 
accurate knowledge, even if not transformative in and of itself, will not hurt the 
unregenerate individual and will provide more content to be illumined should that 
individual be regenerated by the work of the Holy Spirit.52 It also protects regenerate 
persons from enthusiasm by judging their experiences against the truths of Scripture.53 	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religious education of children is useless or even injurious; and their opinion is also condemned who 
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The Role of Emotions in Conversion 
 
Emotions play a role in conversion. They represent part of the response to a true 
spiritual knowledge of divine things. If one gains knowledge in this deeper sense of God 
and Christ, he or she cannot help but be swayed or affected, and an emotional response is 
part of an authentic response to the gospel. As such it is to be expected, and if completely 
absent would raise questions as to the authenticity of the conversion experience. Just as a 
clear vision of the beauty and love of one lover to the other, or a stirring work of art, 
cannot help but produce emotional responses, a clear view of God and his love and grace 
as expressed in Christ’s person and work cannot help but produce emotional responses.54 
So too those with a spiritual view of Christ, a true knowledge that moves beyond merely 
intellectual knowledge, cannot help but find in him the beauty and glory of God, and 
adore him. 
On the other hand, one must be careful not to demand a particular emotional 
response. There are a multitude of factors that affect how individuals respond to grace. 
No template can be produced. Alexander is critical of those who would specify the 
‘appropriate’ emotions that should result from conversion. 
Realizing that humans are social beings and that religion is a social phenomenon 
as well, Alexander also addresses the social aspect of emotions. We are influenced 
emotionally by each other, and all the more so when gathered together as a large group 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
maintain that it matters little what men believe provided their lives are upright. All good conduct must 
proceed from good principles, but good principles cannot exist without a knowledge of the truth.… 
Between truth and holiness there is an indissoluble connection.” Alexander, Religious Experience, 28. 
53 “In judging of religious experience it is all-important to keep steadily in view the system of divine truth 
contained in the Holy Scriptures; otherwise, our experience, as is too often the case, will degenerate into 
enthusiasm.” Alexander, Religious Experience, xviii. 
54 As was observed above in discussing the role of knowledge. “Did any man ever see an object to be lovely 
and not feel an emotion corresponding with that quality?” Alexander, Religious Experience, 63. 
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for worship or revival. Although it can be abused, Alexander welcomes a place for the 
influence of emotions across a shared body in worship. “Without it how dull and 
uninteresting would social worship be.” We share emotions in worship, and this is part of 
what makes a gathering of Christians one body, having “but one heart and one soul… as 
their voices mingle in the sacred song of praise to the Redeemer.” Likewise, in a revival, 
common emotions also spread. Alexander writes that “it is no evidence of a spurious work 
that the sympathies [shared emotions] of the people are much awakened, or that many 
are led to seriousness by seeing others affected. God often blesses this instinctive feeling in 
this very way.”55  
Like knowledge, however, emotions can deceive as evidence of conversion. They 
can lead people astray. They can do so on an individual basis, as when one sees in oneself 
certain raised emotions that are mistaken for a conversion experience. Perhaps more 
commonly, emotions can lead people astray this same way in shared social settings. In 
such settings individuals can be swept away in the common tide of emotion and be 
deceived regarding their own spiritual state or experience of conversion. Simply raising 
emotions without a deeper grasp of truth is, like mere intellectual knowledge, problematic.   
At one point Alexander shares with the reader his experience while observing a 
revival meeting some time earlier. He noticed that while many were attentive, some paid 
little or no attention to the preacher and talked among themselves throughout the 
preacher’s sermon about crops, planting seasons, and the like. He relates how later as the 
sermon neared its climax many in the audience were quite affected and demonstrative in 
their emotions, with a variety of cries and moans, raised hands, and other agitations. This 
emotional response spread through the group like the tide. “But,” he writes, “what 	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astonished me most of all was that the old tobacco-planters whom I have mentioned and 
who, I am persuaded, had not heard one word of the sermon, were violently agitated. 
Every muscle of their brawny faces appeared to be in tremulous motion, and the big tears 
chased one another down their wrinkled cheeks.”56 They were just some of the many in 
the audience that had paid little attention to the content of the sermon but been swept 
into various powerful emotions. Raised emotional responses without the accompanying 
sight of spiritual truths is a danger in revivals.  
Even though there are legitimate group emotions present in any revival setting 
that accompany a true response to the gospel, there are bound to be many who are not 
responding to that content but merely swept up in the common emotions of the group. 
These people are then in danger of self-deception, thinking themselves converted and 
resting easy when no regeneration has taken place. This is cause for Alexander to object 
to the practices of certain revivalists that are more concerned to produce certain 
responses than they are to preach the gospel with clarity and provide the content on 
which meaningful conversions are built, regardless of the response. In what seems a clear 
reference to Finney’s new measures, he asks whether it is “judicious, by impassioned 
discourses addressed to the sympathies of our nature, to raise this class of feelings to a 
flame? Or [sic] to devise measures by which the passions of the young and ignorant may be 
excited to excess? That measures may be put into operation which have a mighty 
influence on a whole assembly is readily admitted; but are excitements thus produced 
really useful?”57 Alexander’s answer is clearly no. In a letter regarding his thoughts on 
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conversion Alexander is even more direct in his thoughts on the question of inducing 
strong emotional responses. “All means and measures which product a high degree of 
excitement, or a great commotion of the passions, should be avoided; because religion 
does not consist in these violent emotions, nor is it promoted by them; and when they 
subside, a wretched state of deadness is sure to succeed.”58 Authentic revival is then not 
only not aided, but also actually damaged by such enthusiastic measures and disorder. 
For Alexander emotional responses to the gospel are both appropriate and 
desirable. But they must rise up in response to the spiritual knowledge or vision of the 
person of Christ and content of the gospel, and not be sought independent of that firm 
ground. The sense of knowing described by Alexander moves beyond head knowledge, 
and influences all aspects of the regenerate person, including the emotions.59 Yet to the 
extent that emotions interfere with a response to true spiritual knowledge, they are 
harmful. And in his view almost without fail extreme emotions do precisely this.60 
 
The Role of the Will in Conversion 
 
We have discussed the place of knowledge, and indirectly of intellect, and we have 
discussed the place of emotions. Another category commonly used in describing aspects of 
a person is the will. Unlike Edwards, Alexander does not explore extensively the place of 
the will (at least not in this work). However, again like Edwards, Alexander grates under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
extraordinary means of awakening the feelings.” From his letter in the appendix of William B. Sprague, 
Lectures on Revivals of Religion, 2nd ed. (New York: Daniel Appleton & Co., 1833), 230 
58 From his letter in the appendix of Sprague, Lectures on Revivals, 234. 
59 In the new spiritual perception of the converted soul, “there is a new perception of truth; whether you 
ascribe it to the head or the heart, I care not.” Alexander, Religious Experience, 64. 
60 “When people are much excited, their caution and sober judgment are diminished.” From his letter in 
the appendix of Sprague, Lectures on Revivals, 234. 
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the supposed divisions that make up a person, and argues for a more unified view of the 
person. There is a certain artificiality in attempting to address the role various 
components of a person in conversion. Alexander rejects the kind of faculty psychology in 
use by some in his day that divide the operation and even the substance of human being 
into various divisions – will, intellect, emotions or similar terms – each of which carry out 
particular functions. In his view the intellect, will, and emotions are all part of a unified 
human being and cannot be divided. 
This is evident in his criticism of the notion of some that the will is fallen but the 
intellect unscathed by the fall, or that the will alone is responsible in matters of morality. 
“That doctrine is not true which confines depravity or holiness to the will, and which 
considers the understanding as a natural and the will as a moral faculty.” He argues that 
the understanding and the will are both natural and moral faculties. Alexander does not 
believe, as some accuse the Princeton school of believing, that the rational or reasoning 
capacities of a human being can avoid the disordering of the fall. As he puts it in a pithy 
manner, “the soul is not depraved or holy by departments.”61 He is critical of those who 
make “too wide a severance between the understanding and the will; between the intellect 
and the affections.”62 Human beings are fallen in the unity of their being, and are also 
converted in that same unity. The faith that follows from regeneration “comprehends the 
objects ascribed both to the understanding and the will.”63 
As was described earlier, Alexander sees conversion as a supernatural act wrought 
by the Holy Spirit. As such, the will plays no role at the initial point of regeneration. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Alexander, Religious Experience, 63. 
62 Alexander, Religious Experience, 62. He later adds, “The wide distinction between the understanding and 
will, which has very much confounded our mental philosophy, has come down to us from the schoolmen.” 
65. 
63 Alexander, Religious Experience, 65. He does not admit the distinction of some that the understanding is a 
faculty for truth claims, and the will for the question of goodness. 
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will can have no part in the act of regeneration without the obliteration of grace This is 
not to say that people do not appear to choose to follow Christ. But that choice is already 
a sign of God’s grace to them, without which they never would have chosen. Likewise 
some appear to choose to leave the faith. Alexander would argue that they were then 
never really converted. Conversion is at its root wholly an act of God. If the will is 
involved in any capacity grace is undermined. But the will, together with all aspects of the 
person, is renewed in conversion, and the renewed will seeks to know and serve God as its 
highest pleasure. 
For Alexander the lack of any place for the will in conversion can be illustrated by 
some of his comments while discussing the place of dreams and visions in conversion. 
Although we saw previously that he opposes those who would require some kind of 
extraordinary dreams or visions as evidence for conversion, he does not deny the 
possibility that God might work through dreams and the like. He even considers the 
testimonies of some who have claimed to have been converted while asleep, which would 
certainly remove any place for a conscious will in choosing conversion. He does not 
disallow that such conversions may occur, noting that while they may be “suspicious,” still 
“if they are proved to be genuine by the future life of the person, we should admit the 
possibility of God's giving a new heart, just as He does to the infant.”64 Alexander cites 
the example of the infant as another clear example of conversion apart from conscious 
will or intellect paralleling the first. 
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The Means of Conversion  
 
The gospel message is the only right means of conversion. Any preaching or 
evangelistic activity that does not stress this primary means, providing the opportunity to 
gain a true knowledge of the gospel in its deeper sense, is bound to run astray. We have 
already seen some of Alexander’s critical comments on those using methods along the 
lines of Finney’s new measures. The biblical message of Christ’s sacrifice on the cross on 
our behalf is the foundation of conversion, and its means involves the transmission of that 
spiritual knowledge. Alexander writes that “commonly before a person comes to the 
knowledge of a truth, the need of information is sensibly felt; and the appropriate means 
of communicating it are provided.”65 These means may be the preaching or teaching of 
the Word, Scripture reading, or other means that involve the acquisition of this 
knowledge.  
Alexander notes that this acquisition often occurs before conversion. “It is a great 
practical error,” he writes, “to suppose that nothing connected essentially with the sinner's 
conversion is experienced or done until the moment of his conversion.”66 Rather, the 
sinner may have to correct errant opinions, learn Christian truths, learn the Bible and 
God’s path of salvation. Alexander is critical of any means that do not involve this 
transfer of the knowledge on which one’s redemption and confidence before God are 
based.67 He also argues that in a revival “it makes the greatest difference in the world, 
whether the people have been carefully taught by catechizing, and where they are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Alexander, Religious Experience, 116. 
66 Alexander, Religious Experience, 116. 
67 Such knowledge is merely notional or conceptual before one’s conversion; in the regenerative work of the 
Holy Spirit this notional knowledge is transformed into spiritual knowledge. 
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ignorant of the truths of the Bible.”68 Those in the former category are primed for true 
revival, but those in the latter category are susceptible to spurious revival efforts based on 
emotions and wildness instead of clear spiritual truths. This is because in a genuine 
revival the effects on the people mirror the depths of the truths preached. Alexander uses 
the illustration of the impression made on wax by a seal. The wax is conformed perfectly 
to the image of the seal. So too is the truth impressed on the hearer, and the less distinct 
or accurate those truths, the more blurred their impression.69  
In fact, Alexander stresses the same means for conversion and sanctification. 
Knowledge is essential to coming to faith, and knowledge is essential to growth in faith. 
Growth in the Christian life is a progressive experience in which believers are, according 
to Scripture, to “mortify sin and crucify the flesh, and to increase and abound in all the 
exercises of piety and good works.”70 The means by which this occurs, Alexander clearly 
states, is knowledge. “The origin and nature of this growth… is knowledge, even the 
knowledge of our Lord and Saviour, Jesus Christ. Just so far as any soul increases in 
spiritual knowledge, in the same degree it grows in grace.”71 As noted previously, this 
knowledge is not merely rote head knowledge, as if memorizing a catechism yields instant 
results. Rather it is the taking to heart of this knowledge, by the agency of the Holy Spirit. 
He suggests that a person “learn to contemplate the truth in its true nature, simply, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Alexander, from his letter in the appendix of Sprague, Lectures on Revivals, 232. 
69 Alexander, from his letter in the appendix of Sprague, Lectures on Revivals, 232. 
70 Alexander, Religious Experience, 157. 
71 Alexander, Religious Experience, 158. In another clear statement of this point he writes, “As spiritual 
knowledge is the foundation of all genuine exercises of religion, so growth in religion is intimately connected 
with divine knowledge. Men may possess unsanctified knowledge and be nothing the better for it; but they 
cannot grow in grace without increasing in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ.” 168. 
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devoutly, and long at a time, that you may receive on your soul the impression which it is 
calculated to make.”72 
Alexander does not demand any particular context for the delivery of this message. 
It can happen anywhere. It may happen in a church context, but just as well may occur, 
for example, in a revival meeting, or in individual reading and reflection of Scripture. 
This is, I would suppose, due largely to Alexander’s inclination not to limit unduly the 
activity of the Spirit. Nevertheless, this weak link between conversion and the church 
contributes to a weak ecclesiology. 
 
The Relation of Conversion to Baptism 
 
Alexander’s minimal ecclesiology can be seen in the relation, or lack thereof, 
between conversion and baptism. Rarely does Alexander speak of baptism together with 
conversion. He seems content to leave out any mention of baptism when addressing issues 
related to conversion. The exception to this is when he examines the question of whether 
baptism and regeneration can coincide. He suggests that children could be regenerated at 
baptism (theoretically, if God chose to act at that moment), but that this is not typical. 
“Although the grace of God may be communicated to a human soul at any period of its 
existence in this world, yet the fact manifestly is, that very few are renewed before the 
exercise of reason commences; and not many in early childhood.”73 This comment is 
consistent with his stress on the reception of spiritual knowledge as the foundation of the 
conversion experience. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 He continues, “Avoid curious and abstruse speculations respecting things unrevealed, and do not indulge 
a spirit of controversy.” Alexander, Religious Experience, 161. 
73 Alexander, Religious Experience, 13-14. 
 	  
293 
The Timeframe of Conversion 
 
For Alexander there is no set timeframe for conversion. He is careful to 
acknowledge the variety of forms in which people are converted, and this variety includes 
variation in the timeframe of conversion. He insists on neither the necessity of a sudden 
conversion experience nor a gradual one. He believes that both can and do occur. “Light 
breaks in upon the soul, either by a gradual dawning, or by a sudden flash; Christ is 
revealed through the gospel, and a firm and often a joyful confidence of salvation through 
Him is produced.”74  
Alexander also points out that often a conversion that appears to some as a 
sudden event is actually the result of a much longer process. Too often, he believes, 
people fail to comprehend all that was at work in a person before an outward conversion 
event. “They seem to think that nothing has any relation to the conversion of the sinner 
but that which immediately preceded this event; and the Christian is ready to say, I was 
awakened under such a sermon, and never had rest until I found it in Christ; making 
nothing of all previous instructions and impressions.”75 Because of this, people are often 
prone to lift up as successful only those preachers who produce these immediate results, 
rather than acknowledging the steady work of others whose preaching and teaching of 
gospel truths cultivated the ground out of which those seemingly ‘immediate’ conversions 
sprung.76 Alexander suggests instead that we should recognize that “sometimes persons 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 From his letter in the appendix of Sprague, Lectures on Revivals, 232. 
75 Alexander, Religious Experience, 2. 
76 “So, when a revival occurs under the awakening discourses of some evangelist, people are ready to think 
that he only is the successful preacher whose labours God owns and blesses; whereas he does but bring 
forward to maturity, feelings and convictions which have been long secretly forming and growing within the 
soul, but so imperceptibly that the person himself was little sensible of any change.” Alexander, Religious 
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are brought along very gradually in their acquisition of the knowledge of the truth. One 
discovery is made at one time, and another truth is revealed at another time; and between 
these steps there may be a long interval.”77 
Even though he recognizes the possibilities of both immediate and gradual 
conversion experiences, Alexander suggests that the latter are to be preferred as a better 
indicator of true and lasting change of heart. Even though both those appearing to be 
gradual and those that seem to occur suddenly may be valid conversions, “in general, 
those impressions which come gradually, without any unusual means, are more 
permanent than those which are produced by circumstances of a striking and alarming 
nature.” By the steady work of the preaching and teaching of the word people are readied 
for conversion, rather than through some rash experience filled with emotional excesses, 
the dangers of which have already been discussed. Still, Alexander insists that “even here 
there is no general rule. The nature of the permanent effects is the only sure criterion. ‘By 
their fruits ye shall know them.’”78 The validity of a conversion experience is to be judged 
not by the timeframe in which it occurs, but by the lasting changes which that experience 
produces. As it was for Edwards, for Alexander the converted can only be recognized by 
the permanent changes that result in their lives – even though the manner and 
circumstances of those conversions will vary greatly.79 
Even though what appears to be a gradual process of conversion is often to be 
preferred, regeneration specifically, as distinguished from the more general process often 
described with the term conversion, is in fact never gradual. Although from a human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Alexander, Religious Experience, 116. 
78 Alexander, Religious Experience, 15. 
79 And even here, making such determinations based on the assessment of changes in the lives of individuals 
is for Alexander risky business, as we shall see below. 
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perspective conversion often appears to be gradual, in reality there is always a particular 
moment or instant at which regeneration occurs, a particular time at which a change is 
wrought in an individual by God. Thus Alexander can speak of changes in a person that 
occur “at the moment of their conversion.” Or he can compare the Wesleyan view of 
sanctification to regeneration in that it is “instantaneous.”80 Alexander argues that there is 
typically gradual preparation for conversion through common grace, and gradual 
sanctification after, but there is never gradual regeneration. 
The difficulty from the human perspective with focusing on this moment, however, 
is that it is not readily identifiable. So while regeneration is immediate, the broader 
process of conversion often appears as gradual. Alexander is suspicious of those who 
would insist in reducing that wider process to a moment in time, or who would declare 
with confidence the timing of this moment in themselves or others, or who would require 
such declaration as an evidence of one’s conversion. Even when such a moment may 
seem clear, that moment we choose to call the moment of conversion may only be a later 
development of an earlier hidden regeneration. It is therefore hard to determine the 
moment of conversion in this more narrow sense of regeneration. The new birth of 
conversion, Alexander suggests, can be compared to physical birth, in that, like physical 
birth, the new birth is only the outward sign of a process that was started much earlier in 
conception, a moment that cannot be precisely determined.81 Or it is like a seed that first 
sprouts underground, and only later breaks the surface. “We believe that, as no mortal 
can tell the precise moment when the soul is vivified, and as the principle of spiritual life 
in its commencement is often very feeble, so it is an undoubted truth, that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Alexander, Religious Experience, 157, 130. 
81 Alexander, Religious Experience, 72. 
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development of the new life in the soul may be, and often is, very slow; and not 
infrequently that which is called conversion is nothing else but a more sensible and 
vigorous exercise of a principle which has long existed.”82 
Much of the later portion of Alexander’s book on religious experience is filled with 
various narrative examples, some of which he uses to demonstrate this point. In one 
chapter he provides a narrative of the experience of someone known only by the initials 
R.C. to illustrate especially “the gradual manner in which some persons are brought to 
the knowledge of the truth; and the extreme difficulty of ascertaining, in many cases, 
where common grace ends and special grace commences.”83 He writes that as he looks at 
this man’s experience he is “utterly at a loss to say when the work of grace commenced.” 
Even if he suggested a particular time, “perhaps scarcely any two persons, taken at 
random, would agree in this point; for while some would scarcely admit that there was 
any exercising of saving faith until the last manifestation here described, others would be 
for carrying it back to the very beginning of the exercised soul's serious attention to 
religion.”84 Another narrative example later in the chapter, in which Alexander gives a 
very long quoted narrative of Sir Richard Hill’s long path to conversion, reinforces this 
point. It continues to the end of the chapter, and describes the fits and starts by which 
Hill finally comes to an assurance of conversion and confidence in his faith in Christ.85 I 
can only surmise that Alexander’s insertion of this extended quotation of about nine 
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82 Alexander, Religious Experience, 4. The initiation of the conversion process is hidden, “just as the seed 
under ground may have life, and may be struggling to come forth to open day.… No one supposes, 
however, that the moment of its appearing above ground is the commencement of its life; but this mistake is 
often made in the analogous case of the regeneration of the soul.” 4. 
83 Alexander, Religious Experience, 107. This narrative and his consideration of it is found on 107-116. 
84 Alexander, Religious Experience, 116. 
85 Alexander, Religious Experience, 117-25. 
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the complexities of the path to salvation and the difficulties that arise in mapping the 
process of conversion or its precise moment. Ultimately Alexander does consider 
regeneration to occur at a specific moment in time, but he also believes that from our 
limited human perspective such a moment is not easily identifiable with certainty in most 
cases. Therefore conversion is much more likely to appear as a process than as a moment. 
 
The Authentication of Conversion 
 
For Alexander there are great difficulties intrinsic to making judgments on the 
validity of others’ conversions based on their religious experiences or actions. Finally it is 
only through the fruits of their lives over time that one might have the best indication of 
real conversion, but no one can, from the human perspective, declare with certainty those 
who are converted and those who are not. The operation of the Holy Spirit on the hearts 
of individuals is a mystery. “Who can trace the work of the Spirit in this wonderful 
renovation?… Surely, then, there must be mystery in the second birth!”86 
Alexander’s views on gradual conversion serve to illuminate his suspicions 
regarding the place of experience in conversion. A central reason for arguing against an 
emphasis on instantaneous conversion is what Alexander perceives as the unreliability of 
self-perception or self-testimony to account for one’s inner state and changes. “All 
investigations of the exercises of the human mind are attended with difficulty, and never 
more so, than when we attempt to ascertain the religious or spiritual state of our 
hearts.”87 In a process that is largely hidden from human perception, we typically cannot 
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even discern the moment of our own conversion, much less judge the validity of the 
conversion experiences of others. This is true all the more in a revival context, where 
valid works of conversion of individuals by the Spirit are mixed with those individuals 
merely affected temporarily by their environment.88 
Thus due to a variety of factors, some of which have already been mentioned (e.g., 
the effect of strong group emotions on the emotions of an individual), a supposed 
knowledge of the specific time of one’s conversion is no sure indicator of the reality of that 
conversion. Alexander gives examples of those who, after ardently professing a specific 
time of conversion, later fall away from the faith. In his view this “falling away” really 
indicates that the person was never converted in the first place. An overemphasis on 
experience can also, at times, cause those who are in fact not actually converted to have a 
false confidence.  
On the flip side, Alexander discusses other examples of pious, clearly converted 
persons who cannot name the time of their conversion with any precision. These include, 
for example, Thomas Halyburton, and Philip and Matthew Henry.89 He also discusses 
John Wesley, and suggests that he was a penitent Christian both before and after his 
experience at Aldersgate.90 For some the change of the new birth seems readily apparent, 
while for others it remains more hidden. One cannot predict its effect on people. 
“Whether those ‘chosen in Christ’ are not, in their natural state, subject to impressions 
which others never experience, must remain undetermined, since we know so little of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 “While so many are affected, but few may be truly converted; and no human wisdom is adequate to 
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operations of the Holy Spirit.… The wind which agitates the whole forest, may tear up but few trees by the 
roots.” From his letter in the appendix of Sprague, Lectures on Revivals, 230.  
89 See Alexander, Religious Experience, 99f. 
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real state of the hearts of most men.”91 The conversions of great sinners may not be 
dramatic, and those of upright and moral persons striking, feeling the weight of their sin 
in greater fashion.92  
Though some suggest that obtaining a sense of comfort is indicative of 
regeneration, Alexander argues that this too is not reliable. “Comfort is no sure evidence 
of a genuine birth; some who become strong men in the Lord are born in sorrow. They 
weep before they are able to smile.”93 The variety of factors that impact the ways in 
which we respond to the Spirit’s work of regeneration make that response too 
unpredictable to classify. 
To seek out a ‘conversion experience,’ or to preach or use means that make such 
experiences central to one’s view of conversion, is then to place confidence in what are 
often highly questionable events. This is not to say that God might not be at work in those 
events, but they take the focus away from a confidence founded in the gospel of grace and 
replace it with a confidence in a particular form of experience, an experience that, as 
evidenced by the lives of many pious Christians, is not common to all Christians. 
Alexander’s aversion to the use of experience as a measure of conversion becomes 
even more apparent when he argues against the practice of giving account of conversion 
“of the exercises of their minds” before admittance to communion (here he means church 
membership). He notes how these conversion accounts generally bear a striking 
resemblance to one another. Due to public pressure as well as an awareness of typical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 Alexander, Religious Experience, 3. 
92 See his comments in, Religious Experience, 23-28. He provides a variety of anecdotal accounts to illustrate 
his point here, such as the experiences of the slave trader John Newton, and pastor/theologian Jonathan 
Edwards. 
93 Alexander, Religious Experience, 72. 
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conversion accounts, in such situations people often merely say what is expected.94 “Few 
persons have humility and discretion enough to be trusted to declare in a public 
congregation what the dealings of God with their souls have been.”95 Religious language 
can easily be learned and copied by a hypocrite.96 He observes that the practice can also 
often lead to a spiritual pride in the amount of one’s supposed humility in their account.97 
Most importantly, he writes that “the practice seems also to be founded on a false principle, 
namely, that real Christians are able to tell with certainty whether others have religion, if they hear their 
experience.”98 But this, he notes, is precisely what many sects of enthusiasts believe. 
“Enthusiasts have always laid claim to this discernment of the spirits, and this enthusiasm 
is widely spread through some large sects; and when they meet with any professing piety, 
they are always solicitous to hear an account of their conviction, conversion, etc.”99 
Alexander continues to criticize the use of experience as a guide to another’s 
spiritual condition for all of these reasons. Any assurance that we do take from experience 
should be grounded not in what we might see as a moment of conversion or other 
particular conversion experience, but in our trust and confidence in Christ’s work for us 
in the gospel of grace. The gift of assurance, then, is rooted fundamentally in a true 
spiritual knowledge (as discussed above) of Christ for us.100 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 “In those social meetings in which every person is questioned as to the state of his soul, the very sameness 
of most of the answers ought to render the practice suspect.” Religious Experience, 29. 
95 Alexander, Religious Experience, 29. 
96 “Temporary believers may use the same language, and exhibit to others precisely the same appearance as 
true converts.” From his letter in the appendix of Sprague, Lectures on Revivals, 230. 
97 Alexander, Religious Experience, 34. 
98 Alexander, Religious Experience, 29 (emphasis mine). 
99 Alexander, Religious Experience, 29. 
100 It is not a gift, however, given to all. The diversity of genuine Christian experiences of conversion also 
applies to the presence of assurance or lack thereof. “Among some classes of religious people, all doubting 
about the goodness and safety of our state is scouted as inconsistent with faith. It is assumed as indubitably 
true, that every Christian must be assured of his being in a state of grace, and they have no charity for those 
who are distressed with almost perpetual doubts and fears. This they consider to be the essence of unbelief; 
for faith, according to them, is a full persuasion that our sins are forgiven. No painful process of self-
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If experience is not a sufficient justification for knowing one is converted, neither 
is it irrelevant. The best way to judge experience is over a long period of time. One who 
has been regenerated will over time display signs of that conversion as a process of 
sanctification moves forward. Even though there may be struggles with the ‘old man’ and 
sin in one’s life, the converted individual will typically progress in piety and good works. 
Such a process, while not completely trustworthy as an indicator, is still a confirmation 
and an encouragement to those pondering their state before God.101  
 
The Permanence of Conversion  
 
The above discussion anticipates our final point regarding Alexander’s 
understanding of conversion. In Alexander’s view, true conversion is always a permanent 
change. The inner transformation by a supernatural regeneration brought by the Holy 
Spirit is not reversible. “Under the preaching of the gospel we find a permanent change 
of moral character taking place: so great a change that, even in the view of the world who 
observe it, the subject appears to be ‘a new man’.” However hidden it may at times 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
examination is therefore requisite, for every believer has possession already of all that could be learned from 
such examination. Among others, doubting, it is to be feared, is too much encouraged; and serious 
Christians are perplexed with needless scruples originating in the multiplication of the marks of conversion, 
which sometimes are difficult of application, and, in other cases, are not scriptural, but arbitrary, set up by 
the preacher who values himself upon his skill in detecting the close hypocrite, whereas he wounds the weak 
believer, in ten cases, where he awakens the hypocrite in one.” Alexander, Religious Experience, 30. 
101 Against Wesley and others who would argue for the attainment or gift of complete sanctification, 
Alexander sees sanctification as a gradual process. “It is understood that the followers of John Wesley hold, 
in conformity with his recorded opinion, that sanctification is not a gradual and progressive work, which 
remains imperfect in the best in this life, but that, like regeneration, it is instantaneous, and that the result is 
a complete deliverance from indwelling sin; so that from that moment believers are perfectly holy, and sin 
no more–unless they fall from this high state of grace–in thought, word, or deed. Here then there can be no 
similarity between the religious experience of an Arminian, who has attained sanctification, and a Calvinist, 
who is seeking to grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ. The one is conscious of no 
sin, inward or outward, of nature or of act, and must have perpetual joy–a heaven on earth; while the other 
is groaning under a deep sense of inherent depravity which works powerfully against his will, and 
continually interrupts and retards his progress.” Alexander, Religious Experience, 130. 
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appear, or however much a regenerated soul may ‘backslide,’ they are still ever under 
God’s mercy. “There are few truths of which I have a more unwavering conviction, than 
that the sheep of Christ, for whom He laid down His life, shall never perish. I do believe, 
however, that grace may for a season sink so low in the heart into which it has entered, 
and be so overborne and buried up, that none but God can perceive its existence.”102  
Against the view of Methodists, who argue that one might be converted but then 
fall from grace, for Alexander the only alternative view of the ‘backslider’ is to see that 
individual as never truly converted in the first place. This we have alluded to earlier in 
discussing the limited value of a supposed knowledge of the time of one’s conversion. Self-
testimony is not a reliable indicator of a truly regenerated heart, and those that appear to 
fall out of grace were never in his view under grace. Alexander describes different forms 
of backsliding, and seems to distinguish between cases of Christians backsliding, and of 
those who have been exposed or influenced strongly in some way by Christianity, but 
were never truly converted and have fallen away from it, never to return. There is no 
falling away from a truly regenerated heart. As he puts it, “We never hear of a sinner 
being born a third time.”103 
 
A Morphology of Conversion and the Ordo Salutis 
 
The typical steps to conversion, according to Alexander, include conviction, 
external reformation and adoption of religion, despair, and God’s gracious regeneration. 
But these steps are not to be held or demanded rigidly. He argues, for example, that a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Alexander, Religious Experience, 55, 7. 
103 Alexander, Religious Experience, 175. 
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sense of conviction, while very common, may not always precede conversion, nor is it 
proven to be required from Scripture.104 All these steps are common, but as we have seen 
elsewhere, Alexander refuses to insist on a strict path for the operation of the Spirit in 
areas that are not clearly prescribed by Scripture. He notes that “there are some truly 
pious persons who are distressed and perplexed, because they never experienced that kind 
of conviction which they hear others speak of, and the necessity of which is insisted on by 
some preachers.”105 Insistence on certain steps not prescribed by the Bible can be 
damaging. 
R. C., the previously mentioned subject of one of Alexander’s chapters, describes 
in the most personal and detailed terms his struggle to be converted. R. C. attempted to 
arrive at a state of conviction which might then lead to regeneration, but found himself 
unable to arrive at a proper sense of conviction of sin. But in talking with a preacher, he 
learned that there was no certain amount of conviction needed for conversion; one must 
only throw oneself at the mercy of Christ and rest in him alone. When at the culmination 
of this process of conversion, “with a deep and feeling conviction of my utter helplessness” 
he prayed, “‘God be merciful to me a sinner,’” R. C. described what followed. “God was 
pleased to give me such a manifestation of His love in the plan of redemption through 
Christ, as filled me with wonder, love, and joy. Christ did indeed appear to me as 
altogether lovely, and I was enabled to view Him as my Saviour, and to see that His 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 “It would be very difficult to prove from Scripture, or from the nature of the case, that such a 
preparatory work [conviction] was necessary” for conversion. Alexander, Religious Experience, 16. He later 
adds, “I do not consider legal conviction as necessary to precede regeneration, but suppose there are cases 
in which the first serious impressions may be the effect of regeneration.” 20. 
105 Alexander, Religious Experience, 17. 
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sufferings were endured for me.”106 He was given an assurance of God’s favor, though he 
still at times later continued to struggle with sin. 
Alexander does not discuss an ordo salutis in the manner of some earlier Reformed 
scholastics, but he does indicate clearly that regeneration precedes faith. Even though 
“the discovery of the purity of the law, and this deep feeling of the evil of sin, commonly 
precede any clear view of Christ and the plan of salvation,” Alexander writes, “this has 
given rise to the prevalent opinion that repentance goes before faith in the natural order 
of pious exercises. But, according to our idea of faith… it must necessarily precede and be 
the cause of every other gracious exercise.”107 According to Alexander, one’s faith is 
always a response to a previous act of God.  
 
Prominence of Conversion in Theological Viewpoint 
 
Conversion holds a prominent place in Alexander’s theology. Although Jonathan 
Edwards will always be intimately connected with revivalism due to his place in the First 
Great Awakening, in my reading of Alexander, I would argue that he is even more the 
revivalist theologically than Edwards. Conversion is a centerpiece of his theology. As he 
puts it, “THERE is no more important event which occurs in our world than the new 
birth of an immortal soul.”108 It is what opens him to so much of the revivalist spirit of his 
day. There is no greater concern than the salvation of souls for Alexander, and this 
expresses itself in the strong, individualistic, evangelistic and revivalistic concerns of his 
writing and activity. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Alexander, Religious Experience, 115 (quoting R. C.’s narrative). 
107 Alexander, Religious Experience, 73. 
108 Alexander, Religious Experience, 21. 
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Over the course of this chapter we have seen that Alexander has a robust concern 
for conversion, and for the closely related phenomenon of revivalism. We have observed 
the importance of knowledge of the gospel and biblical truths as a means to that 
conversion, a knowledge that is not merely notional but involves the deeper, richer, and 
often emotive response of a unified human being of intellect, emotions, and will to a 
vision of the truth as provided through the supernatural work of the Spirit. Alexander’s 
view of the indeterminate timeframe of conversion and its permanence has been 
described. We have observed several similarities between Alexander’s views and those of 
his evangelical predecessor, Jonathan Edwards – most especially in the supernatural and 
gracious nature of conversion, and in the dispositional change at its root. They also share 
a common interest in revivals and the examination of those experiences that flow out of 
revival activity and their potential in authenticating conversions. We have also observed 
some differences between the two, most noteworthy among them Alexander’s lesser 
emphasis on discussions of the will and greater emphasis on and greater role for 
knowledge. Along with this has also come the difficulty of defining clearly the nature of 
this knowledge and the extent or quantity of knowledge necessary for conversion. This is 
likely the most problematic area of Alexander’s views on conversion. Also problematic 
has been the rather weak ecclesiology that flows out of his views on conversion. 
It remains to be seen in what forms Alexander’s views on conversion are to be 
carried on or modified at Princeton by his student, colleague, ‘spiritual son,’ and 
successor, Charles Hodge. It is to these concerns that we turn in the following chapter.
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Chapter Four – Charles Hodge 
 
 
Although in the evaluation of the views of Princeton Seminary the focus is on 
Charles Hodge (1797-1878), some considerable space has been taken to consider the 
views of Archibald Alexander. This has been done first to show, as we shall see, the 
remarkable consistency across these two generations of Princeton professors. It also is 
necessary, I would argue, for any thorough understanding of Hodge’s views and 
development. It would be hard to overestimate Alexander’s impact on Hodge. In his 
recent biography of Hodge, Andrew Hoffecker writes that while Hodge was a student at 
the seminary Alexander “took special interest in the young Hodge, who responded 
willingly with filial devotion.” He suggests that Alexander was “the most dominant 
influence” on Hodge at this formative time, and that “he served as teacher and surrogate 
father” to Hodge.1 David Calhoun, historian of Princeton Seminary writes that “when he 
was a child, Charles Hodge had lost his own father; and Archibald Alexander became, in 
a special sense, his father.”2 It was Alexander who was crucial to Hodge returning to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Andrew W. Hoffecker, Charles Hodge: The Pride of Princeton (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 2011), 50, 
47. Likewise John W. Stewart considers Alexander to be “the third and surely the most formidable 
influence on the adolescent Hodge. Hodge always addressed him as ‘Doctor’ and was overtly 
uncomfortable when he differed with his mentor, which was not very often.” “Mediating the Center: 
Charles Hodge on American Science, Language, Literature, and Politics,” Studies in Reformed Theology and 
History, Vol. 3, No 1 (Winter 1995), 1-114, 19. 
2 David B. Calhoun, Princeton Seminary Vol. 1: Faith and Learning 1812-1868 (Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth 
Trust, 1994), 105. In correspondence between Hodge and Alexander included in the biography of Hodge 
by his son, Hodge himself refers to Alexander as “my revered Father.” Alexander A. Hodge, The Life of 
Charles Hodge (1880; rpt. New York: Arno Press, 1969), 275 (further citations as LCH). In addition to 
material mentioned in the previous chapter, the most significant secondary sources on Charles Hodge 
include his son Alexander’s biography and two other recent biographies: Andrew Hoffecker’s Charles Hodge, 
and Paul C. Gutjahr, Charles Hodge: Guardian of American Orthodoxy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 
and another book of essays, Charles Hodge Revisited: A Critical Appraisal of His Life and Work, ed. John W. 
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Princeton as a professor. It was Alexander under whom Hodge served as a junior 
colleague for the first decades of his long career. Hodge named his firstborn son after 
Alexander. When Alexander was close to death he sent for Hodge to visit him. Calling 
Hodge “his dear son,” he wished to bid him farewell, telling him, “I consider it one of my 
greatest blessings that I have been able to bring you forward.” Upon returning to his 
home Hodge made a note to himself that he might remember this “solemn interview with 
my spiritual father, to whom I am more indebted in every respect than to any man or to 
all other men.”3 Upon Alexander’s death, “to show the depth of his attachment to 
Alexander, Hodge purposely walked in the same group as his sons during the funeral 
procession. In their four decades together, no single man had exercised a more profound 
influence on Hodge's life and thinking.”4 Alexander was a formative force in Hodge’s 
theological views, and an abiding influence throughout Hodge’s life. Even in his address 
at the “Semi-Centennial” celebration of Hodge’s fifty years at Princeton Seminary toward 
the end of his life in 1872 Hodge did not fail to refer to him. Calhoun quotes A. A. 
Hodge’s comment that “Hodge always affirmed that he was ‘moulded [sic] more by the 
character and instructions of Dr. Archibald Alexander, than by all other external 
influences combined.’”5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Stewart and James H. Moorhead (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002). Primary sources for Hodge are 
massive, and include published books and mountains of journal articles, and enormous repositories of his 
papers and letters, the most significant of which are the Charles Hodge Manuscript Collection in the 
Princeton Theological Seminary Archives (further citations as CHMC), and the Charles Hodge Papers in 
the Princeton University Archives (further citations as CHP). The published books most referred to in this 
dissertation are Hodge’s Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (1871-72; rpt. London: James Clarke & Co., 1960), 
(further citations as ST followed by volume number: page); Conference Papers (New York: Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1879), (further citations as CP). 
3 CHP, folder 6-27. Miscellaneous Manuscript Material. Note dated 10/12/1851. 
4 Gutjahr, Hodge, 260. He also writes that Alexander’s “philosophical predilections and theological stances 
proved to be the single most important interpreter for Hodge of both the Bible and the Westminster 
Confession.” 202. 
5 Calhoun, Princeton vol 1, 105, quoting LCH, 47. A. A. Hodge comments later that “Dr. Hodge never 
departed from the theology of his beloved teacher [Alexander].” 273. 
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If Alexander’s influence is undeniable, nevertheless it is Hodge who has had the 
greatest impact on the nineteenth century and beyond. Paul Gutjahr, his biographer, 
notes that in the years after replacing Alexander as professor of theology Hodge’s “voice 
came to represent the standard of conservative confessional orthodoxy among American 
Presbyterians.”6 Hodge’s long career came to define the seminary itself, and his influence 
continued in central ways for decades after his death.7 Of the thirteen professors 
appointed after William Henry Green in 1851, “all but three were alumni of the 
Seminary seven had been students of Charles Hodge and two were his sons. Calvinistic 
doctrines as espoused at Princeton Seminary were inbred in their souls.”8 Hodge was also 
very influential in the broader Presbyterian church, taking an active role in its oversight, 
officially representing his Presbytery at the General Assembly on a regular basis from 
1842 on, and serving as the moderator of the General Assembly in 1846.  
One could even argue that no single Protestant theologian was as influential in 
nineteenth century America as was Hodge. As the leading voice of what was arguably the 
leading Protestant theological institution of the century, and as a professor of thousands of 
students over a fifty-plus year career of classroom teaching, Hodge had an enormous 
influence on generations of budding theological students, pastors, and teachers.9 “No 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Gutjahr, Hodge, 206. 
7 William K. Selden writes that Hodge “became the individual with whom the Princeton theology became 
most singularly identified well into the early part of the twentieth century.” Princeton Theological Seminary: A 
Narrative History, 1812-1992 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 47. 
8 Selden, Princeton Narrative History, 57. 
9 Mark Noll considers Princeton Seminary the most influential of the nineteenth century in America. See 
The Princeton Theology 1812-1921, ed. Mark A. Noll (1983; rpt. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2001), 
18-20. He comments elsewhere: “By the time of his jubilee at Princeton Theological Seminary in 1872, 
Hodge had personally instructed more theological students than had attended any other seminary in the 
country.” Charles Hodge, Charles Hodge: The Way of Life, ed. Mark A. Noll (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), 1. 
David W. Bebbington records that “between 1822 and 1878, Charles Hodge trained more than two 
thousand students.” The Dominance of Evangelicalism (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2005), 137. 
Calhoun puts the number at 2,700. David B. Calhoun, Princeton Seminary, Vol. 2: The Majestic Testimony 1869-
1929 (Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth Trust, 1996), 37. Others, including Gutjahr, put the number at 
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single American professor trained more graduate students in any field than did Hodge 
during the nineteenth century.”10 His influence was extended even further by his career 
in print, since he was a very active scholar, producing not only his three-volume magnum 
opus of systematic theology but also a variety of other books and countless, extensive 
articles as editor and writer for the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review.11 Hodge was also 
read extensively by others, and had considerable influence well beyond the bounds or 
Presbyterianism. His journal publications engaged all manner of theological issues, as well 
as significant cultural and social issues of his time. In his volume on Princeton Seminary’s 
history, William Selden observes, “No single individual was identified more intimately 
with the Calvinistic theology of the nineteenth century than Charles Hodge. Nor was 
anyone in the Presbyterian Church in that era held with such affection, respect, even 
awe.”12 More recently, Gutjahr asserts that “in the life of Charles Hodge one finds a 
stunning panoramic view of nineteenth-century Protestantism,” and that he “towered in 
the theological circles of his day.”13 Significant as he was over his lifetime, he is also 
important for his ties to a Reformed tradition that extended further into the past before 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
upwards of three thousand students. “Training more pastors,” Hoffecker notes, “than all other seminaries 
in his era combined, Hodge extended Presbyterianism’s influence by fleshing out one of the most 
compelling, coherent worldviews of all his denominational peers.” Charles Hodge, 28. 
10 Gutjahr, Hodge, 213. 
11 In its earliest editions it was called the Biblical Repertory, and then briefly the Biblical Repertory and Theological 
Review. Mark Noll comments that these journals “had become the second oldest quarterly review of any 
kind in the United States and had outlived all of the religious journals in existence when the Biblical Repertory 
and Princeton Review was first published in 1825.” Hodge, Way of Life, 1. He later adds that “no one, not even 
his closest friends, believed that Hodge emerged the victor in all of these controversies. But by the same 
token, no religious leader during Hodge’s active years with the Princeton Review could merely ignore the 
polemics that poured forth quarter by quarter in the pages of that formidable journal.” 30. 
12 Princeton Narrative History, 71. Elsewhere he writes, Hodge “taught theology to more students than any 
other professor at Princeton Seminary, and his writings were more widely read than almost any other 
Protestant theologian of the nineteenth century.” 47. David Calhoun states, “Charles Hodge was widely 
recognized as the leading spokesman for confessional Calvinism in America and as a figure of international 
reputation.” Princeton vol. 1, 353. 
13 Hodge, 4. 
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him and has also continued in various forms into the twenty-first century.14 Thus, his 
views are in certain respects representative of a living tradition that has continued to 
engage and influence evangelicalism today. In all these ways, Charles Hodge’s 
importance for this study is undeniable. 
Remarkably, until 2011, only one biography of this significant figure existed, 
prepared by his son two years after his death. Such an oversight among the academy 
reflects their own biases and interests, because whatever one may think of Hodge, no fair 
assessment of American religious history can disregard his place in it. After one hundred 
thirty years with no biographies, two appeared in 2011 to fill the void.15 Still, Hodge 
remains understudied, and this section of the dissertation aims to rectify this lack of 
scholarship in at least one area, providing a better understanding of his thought as it 
relates to conversion. 
One of the difficulties in studying a figure such as Hodge is dealing with the sheer 
volume of writings he produced. Not only did Hodge write several books and a three 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 E. Brooks Holifield writes that “Hodge stood, as he repeatedly said, for ‘Old Calvinism.’ He had in mind 
chiefly the Calvinism of the late sixteenth- and seventeenth-century confessions, but on occasion he linked 
Princeton’s Calvinism with the Old Calvinist party in eighteenth-century New England – Moses 
Hemmenway, James Dana, Jedediah Mills, and others.” “Hodge, the Seminary, and the American 
Theological Context,” in Hodge Revisited, 110. Winthrop S. Hudson and John Corrigan note that “Hodge 
was deeply influenced by Swiss orthodoxy, and a strong confessionalism became the hallmark of this 
theology.… His theological system was based solidly on the Westminster Standards and other Reformed 
confessions which he sought faithfully to expound and defend.” Religion in America, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992), 161. Noll writes that none of Hodge’s theological students “doubted 
Hodge’s persistent loyalty to the Reformed theological tradition as defined by classic statements of the 
sixteenth and seventeen [sic] centuries. For Alexander and Hodge, John Calvin, the great lights of English 
Puritanism, the Westminster Confession of Faith, and the influential Calvinistic dogmaticians of 
seventeenth-century Europe were all reliable guides for understanding the Bible.” Way of Life, 22. For more 
on the “Princeton Theology” of the nineteenth century that Hodge represented, see Noll, Princeton Theology, 
and Calhoun, Princeton, 2 vols. 
15 The first, Paul Gutjahr’s Charles Hodge: Guardian of American Orthodoxy, was seven years in the making, and 
provides much detail of his life, if somewhat underwhelming in dealing with theological issues. The second, 
by Andrew Hoffecker, Charles Hodge: The Pride of Princeton, is in some ways the culmination of Hoffecker’s 
work earlier in his career in his groundbreaking corrective on views of Princeton, Piety and the Princeton 
Theologians (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1981), and is in some ways more successful in providing an 
inside view to Hodge’s theology, though somewhat less complete than Gutjahr’s regarding biographical 
details. 
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volume systematic theology for which he is perhaps best known, but as the editor and 
major contributor to the seminary’s scholarly journal he produced masses of articles and 
oversaw the selection and publication of all others that appeared.16 He also gave regular 
sermons or Conference Talks on Sunday afternoons to the seminary students, a great many 
of which are preserved in one form or another. In addition there is an enormous volume 
of unpublished material also available at the large archives of the seminary and of 
Princeton University. In the preparation of this chapter I have consulted a wide range of 
his writings and the archives, but have not read all his works and archive materials 
comprehensively. I am very confident, however, that the great many materials I have 
consulted provide an accurate and rich assessment of his views of conversion. In spite of 
the great mass of materials, Hodge was generally so consistent that one does not find 
significant changes or development that might be the case with others given such a long 
and productive career, although one does find Hodge dealing with changing historical 
circumstances that sometimes produce fresh avenues from which to view his perspectives. 
Also, I have weighted my description of his views more heavily from his journal articles 
and Conference Talks over his Systematic Theology. The latter was produced near the end of 
his career, and due to its more systematic nature tends to produce a somewhat drier, 
more rationalistic (at times) account of his views. It also has been overused by many of 
those who have taken the time to write on Hodge in the past. During his lifetime his 
occasional writings in the form of journal articles had greater influence, and his sermons 
provided a more well-rounded picture of his overall understanding of the Christian faith, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 At times it is difficult to determine accurately whether Hodge was actually the author of a Princeton Review 
article or only its editor. My working assumption in dealing with Princeton Review articles is that, as its editor, 
there is at the least an implicit endorsement of the content of virtually all of its articles by Hodge and thus 
all articles contribute to an understanding of his perspective. Thus at times I may use articles that cannot 
explicitly be identified as authored by Hodge to represent his views. 
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retaining an emotive aspect not always present in the systematic writings.17 As these 
materials, and additional archival materials, have been less explored, I also felt that their 
emphasis provided a greater contribution to the scholarly field. 
Hodge was not concerned with innovation in theology, but rather with 
conservation of the “faith once delivered,” which he thought was best represented by the 
historic Reformed faith.18 Nevertheless, even conservation provokes forms of innovation 
amidst changing social and theological contexts, and this is true of his view of conversion. 
Hodge’s view of conversion is complex and multi-faceted. Throughout his writings and 
sermons he discusses various aspects of conversion, and it is also deeply embedded in his 
broader theological structure. The Westminster Confession forms a central part of the 
theological landscape for Hodge (allegiance to it was required of all Princeton Seminary 
professors),19 but it would be a mistake to reduce his views to some slightly Americanized 
version of the confession.20 Due to his background, other theological influences, and a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Mark Noll comments, “As influential as the individual volumes penned by the Princetonians were – the 
systematic and popular theologies of the Hodges being most important – the impact of their learned 
quarterlies was even greater.” Princeton Theology, 22. And Hoffecker writes that “according to some reports it 
was the weekly conferences [Conference Talks] held in the seminary oratory on matters of practical religion 
that provided the greatest impact that these men had on their students.” Piety, vii. 
18 In his address to the Seminary on the special celebration of his fiftieth year of teaching he praised 
Princeton’s first two professors, Alexander and Miller, saying “they were not given to new methods or new 
theories. They were content with the faith once delivered to the saints. I am not afraid to say that a new 
idea never originated in this seminary.” CHMC, folder 28:2, 1872. Stewart observes that Hodge certainly 
“was no innovator in theology, if by that we mean that he transformed or redirected the foundational 
commitments of Protestant theology.” “Mediating the Center,” 111. 
19 All seminary professors were required to affirm the Westminster Confession and teach nothing that 
explicitly or implicitly contradicted it. See Hoffecker, Charles Hodge, 51. 
20 On this point Stewart writes, Hodge “did believe that the Reformed tradition possessed a doctrinal center 
and, in his case, that core was roughly equivalent with the Westminster Confessions. But he simultaneously 
believed that such nuclei of beliefs were inevitably contextualized, in his case, by the ‘exceptional’ and 
particularist issues of American culture.” “Mediating the Center,” 3. He asserts forcefully that “it is patently 
misleading to suggest, as many historians and theologians have, that Hodge's thought was a mere 
repristination of seventeenth-century Reformed orthodoxy.” He adds, “American cultural movements and 
crises required Hodge to mediate an American Reformed theology with convictions contoured differently 
than German, English, Scot, or Swiss theologians.” 112. On the other hand, Gutjahr’s evaluation leans in 
the other direction. “It is nearly impossible to overstate the importance of the Westminster Confession on Hodge's thought. 
Throughout his later theological development, no single intellectual commitment ever rivaled his allegiance 
to the truths set forth in the confession. Although he would inflect traditional Calvinism in minor ways as he 
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changing American context quite different from that out of which the Westminster 
Confession arose, Hodge’s theology – and his view of conversion in particular – takes on 
a variety of shades. The central thesis of Hoffecker’s biography is that “Charles Hodge 
manifested the attributes associated with Calvinistic confessionalism (strong adherence to 
creedal religion, liturgical forms, and corporate worship) as well as the characteristics of 
evangelical pietism (the necessity of vital religion marked by conversion, moral activism, 
and individual pious practices).”21 At least as applied to his views on conversion, I would 
argue that Hoffecker’s thesis largely holds true. As we shall see, Hodge’s views do 
combine certain pietistic concerns and tendencies with a deep-rooted Calvinistic and 
Presbyterian outlook in ways that produce a view of conversion unique in some respects 
among the central figures of this study. 
More specifically, what we will discover in the pages that follow is that, as for 
Alexander, so also for Hodge, conversion plays a critical and prominent role in Hodge’s 
theology and outlook. Conversion marks the divide between life and death, between 
believer and unbeliever, between Christian and non-Christian. It is, at its foundation, 
utterly a work of God alone, in which one participates only as a result of and subsequent 
to God’s gracious activity. Although it involves no metaphysical change, it is a 
revolutionary and transformative event in which one’s disposition becomes oriented 
toward God. Although the initial change of regeneration happens in an instance, such a 
moment is typically largely hidden from human view and conversion is hence best 
understood more as a process. The primary context of this process may or may not be the 
church, but the reception of salvific knowledge is central to both its initiation and growth. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
applied it to his American setting and combined it with the epistemology of Scottish Common Sense 
Realism, this confession provided the line to all Hodge's thinking.” Hodge, 26 (emphasis mine). 
21 Hoffecker, Charles Hodge, 32. 
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Therefore Hodge, like Alexander, reflects the model of conversion here termed 
transformative spiritual knowledge. Such knowledge does not imply the primacy of the intellect 
alone, however. One’s whole being participates in and is changed intellectually, 
emotionally, and willfully in the process of conversion. All authentic conversions are 
permanent and lasting; one is not born again a third or fourth time. Outward 
appearances, however, may be to the contrary. Hence, the authenticity of conversion is 
best judged by changed behavior over time, and not in trusting in a specific moment, 
feeling, profession, or experience. Revivalism can both help and hinder the process of 
conversion. It can reflect a special work of the Holy Spirit, which should be acknowledged 
and encouraged. However, it is not the central means to conversion, and can also subvert 
true conversion by the use of inappropriate means and manipulative practices and the 
encouragement of trust in particular moments and feelings, instead of a daily and 
longstanding commitment to and trust in God’s grace and ongoing activity in one’s life. 
It is a difficult and somewhat artificial task to isolate conversion from one’s 
broader theological framework. Views on soteriology and atonement, pneumatology, 
anthropology, sin, and any number of other theological topics impact one’s 
understanding of conversion and vice versa. Hodge himself wrote, “the relations of truths 
are part of their nature,” and to remove those relations always involves “something either 
inadequate or defective.”22 Given the space limitations, I will not be able consistently to 
relate conversion to all those other doctrines it touches, but I will make reference to other 
doctrinal categories at times when necessary for clarity. Also, I employ the term 
conversion broadly to encompass the entire process or event by which one comes to a 
saving faith, including regeneration. Hodge, with most Reformed thinkers of his day, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 CHMC, folder 11:5, “The Study of Theology,” 1847. 
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generally reserved the use of the term “regeneration” to God’s act of renewal in the 
human heart – the raising to life of that which was spiritually dead.23 Although at times 
Hodge used the term in a more general fashion, Hodge’s use of the term “conversion” 
usually referred to the human response to God’s activity. As he put it, “conversion is the 
result and evidence of regeneration. It is the action of the person’s own mind and will, in 
consequence of this prior and fundamental work of the Spirit.”24 There is a sense in 
which his use of the term “regeneration” was also more general, in the sense that for him 
particular conversion responses were certain to follow authentic regeneration in some 
form in a changed heart.  
Hodge also believed that conversion was a necessary prerequisite to the proper 
doing of Christian theology, because its truths are spiritually discerned. He believed that 
we are so darkened by sin that we must have the Spirit of God in us to understand it 
properly. “The study of theology is not a mere intellectual process; it is a religious 
exercise.… Theological truth is living truth.”25 Even though his evidentialist leanings 
seemed strong at times, all was ultimately done in the frame of faith seeking 
understanding. 
Earlier Princeton’s attitudes generally toward revivalism were discussed. Before 
examining in more detail Hodge’s view of conversion, we turn to his views on this subject. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Hodge defined it clearly in a journal article from 1870. “Regeneration is the sovereign work of the Holy 
Spirit, creating anew its subjects in Christ Jesus. It is the planting of ‘the seed of God’ in the soul; the 
imparting of a divine, spiritual life to one who is ‘dead in trespasses and sins.’… It is the formation of that 
vital and indissoluble union, between the sinner and the Lord Jesus Christ, in which, as the branch and the 
vine are one, as the body and the head are one, as the husband and the wife are one, so, by the operation of 
the Holy Spirit, the renewed sinner and Christ become one.” “The Early Regeneration of Sabbath-School 
Children,” BRPR 42, 1 (Jan 1870), 23. 
24 He continues, “It is the sinner himself turning from sin and the world to holiness and God, manifested by 
a variety of acts and exercises. And there is all the difference between this and regeneration, that there is 
between the work of the infinite God, and the resulting work of a finite man.” “Sabbath-School Children,” 
23. 
25 CHMC, folder 11:5, “The Study of Theology,” 1847. 
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They are noteworthy because of the close relation of revivalism to views of conversion, 
because Hodge himself was touched by revival both personally and through his mentor, 
Alexander, and because this is one of the rare areas in Hodge’s thinking that 
demonstrates some change over time, and some discontinuity with his mentor, Alexander. 
Hodge addressed the subject of revival relatively often, both directly – with 
sermons, articles, and portions of books – and indirectly – in his evaluations of various key 
figures, contemporary and historical, who played major parts in revivals. Living when he 
did, with the memories of the First Great Awakening still influential, and in the midst of a 
rash of revivals – later to be known as the Second Great Awakening – that continued to 
pop up throughout much of the century, it was virtually impossible to ignore the 
phenomenon.  
Hodge’s view could perhaps best be summarized by saying that he is very open to 
the idea of revivals, but less so to the realities involved with them. In 1858, writing in a 
conference talk, he defines revival as “a sudden change from general inattention to a 
general attention to religion, to those seasons in which the zeal of Christians is manifestly 
increased, and in which large numbers of persons are converted to God.” As one would 
expect, mass conversions are a key characteristic of revivals. In that same talk Hodge 
writes, “Granting the facts of supernatural divine influence, there is no objection to the 
theory of revivals.” But he later adds, “The question of reality may be viewed in another 
light.” How does one know a revival is authentic? Hodge says that one cannot assume 
that every revival excitement is a work of God. Many are purely human works, brought 
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about by the eloquence of the speaker and/or the elevated emotions of the hearers. 
“Much no doubt which passes for revival is more or less of that character.”26  
The importance of revivals lies in their capacity to bring about numerous true 
conversions, and/or to raise the level of piety in the church. Sometimes revivals can only 
be recognized historically, when looking back on the effects of certain periods like 
Pentecost, the Reformation, or Whitefield and Edwards. “Estimated by these standards, 
their importance is incalculable.”27 
Those, however, who make revivals the sole or even primary method, for the 
promotion of religion raise revivals to a mistaken level of importance, as do those who 
insist on revivals as the best way. Hodge suggests that “a regular normal increase is better 
than violent alternations.”28 
Additional reflections on revival by Hodge will be noted as they arise in relation to 
the descriptions of Hodge’s views of conversion that follow. Let us now proceed to 
examine in greater detail various aspects of Hodge’s views on conversion. 
 
Conversion as Supernatural 
 
For Hodge, conversion is a necessity for anyone who would gain God’s favor. The 
problem is sin. The need for conversion only is sensible when the problem it addresses is 
appreciated. Hodge certainly understands this, and stresses human sinfulness, fallenness, 
and depravity. “The history of man is the history of sinners.”29 The natural man is in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 CP, CCXXV, “Revivals of Religion” (2/28/1858), 339. 
27 CP, CCXXV, “Revivals of Religion” (2/28/1858), 339. 
28 CP, CCXXV, “Revivals of Religion” (2/28/1858), 340. 
29 CHMC, Sermons, folder 21:28, “By Grace are Ye Saved,” 2/19/1860. 
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“state of alienation from God.”30 We cannot escape this condition of our own accord. We 
must be made right. Conversion is the means by which this occurs. 
Hodge emphasizes consistently and prominently that the initiation of conversion is 
a supernatural act. It is a central theme in a conference talk from 1854 where he writes, 
“regeneration is the work of the mighty power of God. It is thereby declared to be 
supernatural. It is the effect of the immediate and direct agency of God.” It is completely 
beyond our own capacity to bring it about. “No man regenerates himself. No man 
cooperates in his own regeneration.” This is not only known through experience, but is 
the clear teaching of Scripture, where “regeneration is always referred to God as its 
author. It is always declared to be a divine and not a human work.” As Ephesians 1 and 2 
show, the sinner’s place is analogous to Christ’s after death on the cross. Christ died. His 
body was put in a tomb. Therefore he was completely powerless. Likewise the sinner is 
dead in sin and lying in the darkness of the tomb in relation to God’s holiness, completely 
powerless. Christ was brought from death to a new and greater, glorified life. How great 
is the difference, Hodge considers, between the dead body taken from the cross and the 
glorified and living Christ now seated at the right hand of the Father. No less great a 
change occurs in the conversion of a sinner, who moves from condemnation to 
reconciliation, from sin to holiness, from separation from God to union. Both changes, 
Christ’s resurrection and the sinner’s conversion, are accomplished by the mighty power 
of God alone. Hodge stresses emphatically the importance of this point. Regeneration “is 
a work entirely beyond the range of natural causes. This is a most significant fact. It 
touches the very core of the gospel. It determines the very nature of religion, and controls 
our views of Christian doctrine and experience. There is no truth therefore connected 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 CHMC, Sermons, folder 21:25, “Regeneration,” 4/12/1856. 
 	  
319 
with the method of salvation of greater practical importance than the one under 
consideration.” This doctrine “is the vital principle of all evangelical religion and of all 
just appreciation of the salvation of the gospel.” Its importance “cannot be overrated.” 
The doctrine “teaches us the true nature of religion. It reveals it as something 
supernatural and divine. It is the life of God communicated to the soul, produced and 
sustained by the immediate and continued exercise of the power of God.” This doctrine 
“determines our views on all those great disputed points concerning sin and grace which 
have for ages agitated the church. If we hold fast our conviction that regeneration is the 
work of almighty power we can never waver in our faith concerning the helplessness of 
man, in efficacious grace, in divine sovreignty [sic].”31 This doctrine produces humility, 
and puts the ground of our confidence in God completely, rather than ourselves. 
This talk exemplifies what Hodge expresses consistently throughout his writings 
and sermons, from early in his career to its end. “Regeneration is not a work of nature, 
but a supernatural work of the Holy Spirit.”32 “Christianity, subjectively considered, is 
not nature elevated and refined, it is something new and above nature.” It is 
“supernatural in its origin.”33 Regeneration “belongs to the class of supernatural 
events.”34 Hodge describes regeneration as a powerful, supernatural act of God in his 
Systematic Theology.35 The supernatural nature of regeneration will become even more 
apparent as we turn to a consideration of the role of the human and the Holy Spirit in 
conversion. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 CHMC, Sermons, folder 21:22, “That Ye May Know,” 10/15/1854. 
32 CHMC, folder 23:37, “Salvation by Grace,” 10/2/1853. 
33 Charles Hodge, “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” BRPR, 19, 4 (Oct 1847), 502-39, 517. 
34 CP, XCI, “Evidences of Regeneration” (9/22/1860), 138. 
35 For example, “Regeneration is an act of God.” ST III, 31. 
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The Role of the Human and the Holy Spirit in Conversion 
 
Closely related to Hodge’s view of conversion as supernatural is his understanding 
of the role of the human and the role of the Holy Spirit. When considering the part that 
each play in conversion one must distinguish between a narrowly defined notion of 
regeneration and the broader category of conversion as the total process of coming to 
saving faith. As should already be apparent from the previous discussion, Hodge makes 
very clear that the initial, supernatural act of regeneration that produces saving faith, 
repentance, and conversion in the sinner is one in which the human plays no part. “It is 
God who regenerates. The soul is regenerated. In this sense the soul is passive in 
regeneration.” This is “a change wrought in us, and not an act performed by us.”36 Again 
he writes, “it is supernatural in its origin, due to no power or device of man, to no 
resource of nature, but to the mighty power of God, which wrought in Christ when it 
raised him from the dead; by which power of the Holy Ghost we are raised from spiritual 
death and so united to Christ as to become partakers of his life.”37 As it was for Alexander, 
for Hodge as well, those who are dead in sin do not raise themselves, but must be raised 
by the power of God through the Holy Spirit. 
The work of the Holy Spirit in conversion does not end with the act of 
regeneration, however. Once regenerated, the Spirit continues to dwell in the believer. 
After regeneration, “this life, thus divine or supernatural in its origin, is maintained and 
promoted, not by any mere rational process of moral culture, but by the constant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 ST III, 31. Elsewhere in ST Hodge provides additional clarity on this. “Regeneration does not consist in 
any act or acts of the soul. The word here, of course, is to be understood not as including conversion, much 
less the whole work of sanctification, but in its restricted sense for the commencement of spiritual life.” ST 
III, 7. 
37 “Bushnell on Nurture,” 517. 
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indwelling of the Spirit of Christ, so that it is not we that live, but Christ liveth in us.”38 In 
one of his first sermons, Hodge describes this indwelling activity of the Holy Spirit as 
“enlightening the understanding, purifying the affections, and guiding the life.”39 At the 
other end of his career in his Systematic Theology, Hodge suggests that the Spirit opens the 
individual up to the proper understanding of the truths of Scripture, and that this inward 
guidance “has an authority second only to that of the Word of God,” suggesting that it 
has been neglected far too often.40 Unlike the initial act of regeneration, here the human 
plays an active role alongside the Spirit, both in the initial (visible, conversion) response to 
regeneration, and the lifelong sanctifying process the Spirit undertakes in the convert. As 
Hodge puts it, “in regeneration the Spirit does everything. In sanctification, he excites 
and aids and gives efficacy to the means.”41 
In his Systematic Theology Hodge compares regeneration to the raising of Lazarus 
from the dead. The initial act is supernatural and omnipotent and Lazarus is passive. 
There can be no human cooperation with such a process. After being raised, however, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 “Bushnell on Nurture,” 517. 
39 CHMC, folder 20:2, “Spirit Reap Life,” 12/9/1821. 
40 ST II, 523. “We are clearly taught in Scripture that the truth is not only objectively presented in the 
Word, but that it is the gracious office of the Spirit, as a teacher and guide, to lead the people of God 
properly to understand the truths thus outwardly revealed, and to cause them to produce their proper effect 
on the reason, the feelings, the conscience, and the life. What the Holy Spirit thus leads the people of God 
to believe must be true. No man however is authorized to appeal to his own inward experience as a test of 
truth for others.… But this does not destroy the value of religious experience as a guide to the knowledge of 
the truth.… One great source of error in theology has always been the neglect of this inward guide.” ST II, 
523. 
41 CP, LXXV, “Salvation by Grace” (3/20/1853), 116. Hodge can also stress the contrasting and singular 
role of the human response to the Spirit’s act of regeneration, such as he does in this article from 1870. 
“Conversion is the result and evidence of regeneration. It is the action of the person’s own mind and will, in 
consequence of this prior and fundamental work of the Spirit. It is the sinner himself turning from sin and 
the world to holiness and God, manifested by a variety of acts and exercises. And there is all the difference 
between this and regeneration, that there is between the work of the infinite God, and the resulting work of 
a finite man.” “Sabbath-School Children,” 23. As his other numerous writings related to this make clear, he 
does not intend by this to deny the continued activity of the Spirit in the believer. Rather in this article he is 
making a strong distinction between regeneration as God’s initiating act of renewal, and conversion as an 
individual’s immediate and specific human response to that act. He continues in the same article to describe 
how only God’s Holy Spirit can make the truth efficacious for salvation in the hearts of its hearers. “The 
most serious and tremendous truth we can speak is powerless for salvation, apart from this Divine co-
operation.” 24. 
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Lazarus is an active agent. So too, once regenerated, the human becomes an active agent 
in his or her conversion.42 This is always a response to a previous regenerative work of 
God through the Holy Spirit. Hodge also suggests that the scriptural language of “new 
birth” is just another way of describing this same notion of regeneration. “At birth the 
child enters upon a new state of existence. Birth is not its own act. It is born.” One cannot 
choose to be born, and in birth one comes to an entirely new awareness of that which is 
around oneself. This scriptural description of new birth “is not consistent with any of the 
false theories of regeneration, which regard regeneration as the sinner's own act; as a 
mere change of purpose; or as a gradual process of moral culture.”43 
This was a key issue for Hodge, one in which the gospel itself was at stake. It was 
also not a new issue, since it reflected a fundamental division in church history. As his 
recent biographer notes, Hodge believed that “from the earliest history of the Christian 
church, ‘there have been two great systems of doctrine in perpetual conflict. The one 
begins with God, the other with man.’”44 It was also a divide reflected in Hodge’s 
contemporaries.  
Princeton could tolerate New Divinity views, but believed that the New Haven 
theology of Nathaniel Taylor violated Reformed beliefs in fundamental ways, especially 
in the different understanding of the work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration. Calhoun 
describes this. “The Princetonians distinguished the ‘somewhat modified Calvinism’ of 
the New Divinity from the more radical recasting of Edwards's thought in the New 
Haven School. Dr. Alexander and his colleagues saw themselves as traditional Calvinists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 ST III, 31-32. 
43 ST III, 35. 
44 Gutjahr, Hodge, 271. Gutjahr is quoting Hodge from “Prof. Park’s Remarks on the Princeton Review,” 
BRPR, 23:2 (Apr 1851), 308. 
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but also as true followers of Jonathan Edwards..… They believed that the New Divinity 
innovations were unnecessary and the New Haven views downright heretical.”45 
Nathaniel Taylor and the New Haven theology undercut regeneration as the sole 
responsibility of the Holy Spirit. For Hodge such a suggestion was not only wrong, but 
non-sensical. It cut at the root of the gospel of grace, and required not only alterations of 
traditional doctrine regarding regeneration, but also doctrines like total depravity, the 
sovereignty of God, and salvation by grace alone.  
This also explains much of Hodge’s serious opposition to Charles Finney’s 
approach to conversion. Finney placed the agency for regeneration squarely on human 
choice and intellect. Regeneration was brought about through persuasion and explication 
of particular spiritual truths. It was within the power of each person to accept or reject 
such efforts. Even if the Holy Spirit was involved in the reception of these truths, the final 
decision to accept or reject them lay within human power. Thus, in Hodge’s view, Finney 
made “truth or motive the only efficient cause in regeneration and sanctification,” and 
reduced the role and power of the Holy Spirit to a quite resistible influence. Regeneration 
ultimately was considered a human power, a decision. Thus for Hodge “the views of 
ability entertained at Oberlin are Pelagian and not Edwardean.”46 As such they were to 
him intolerable and heretical. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Calhoun, Princeton vol. 1, 215. In the early years of the seminary, even though the professors were all Old 
Calvinists, the students were split – a majority were Old Calvinists while a minority held to views of the 
New England theology. Hodge and others at Princeton argued tolerance, believing that New Divinity was 
compatible with Reformed confessional standards even if they disagreed with their views. 216-17. “In the 
Princeton view, however, the New Haven teaching did subvert the foundations of the Reformed faith. The 
important difference between Samuel Hopkins and Nathaniel Taylor, they believed, was that for Hopkins 
regeneration was solely the work of the Holy Spirit, but Taylor told the sinner that he had the ability to act 
to escape his damnable condition. Charles Hodge and the Princetonians saw in Taylor's views a radically 
different expression of Christianity from traditional Calvinism.” 217. 
46 “Finney's Sermons on Sanctification, and Mahan on Christian Perfection,” BRPR 13, 2 (Apr 1841), 234. 
“Not only is truth the sole instrument in regeneration and sanctification, in Mr. Finney’s opinion, but men 
have the ability to resist it when wielded with the utmost energy of the Holy Ghost.” 234. 
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The Nature of the Change of Conversion  
 
If conversion is initiated by a supernatural act of regeneration by the Holy Spirit, 
what is the nature of the change that takes place upon conversion in an individual? It is 
not reducible to “outward reformation.” It cannot simply be equated with external 
changes of behavior. The change of conversion is not simply “a change of opinion, an 
intellectual conversion, nor any kind of merely external reformation, because both of 
these may occur and leave the essential principles of the character the same.” It is 
becoming a new creature, and this is more than a change of outward actions, or beliefs or 
opinions, or changing churches, or a change of outward profession – from being an 
idolater to being a Christian. Though the term might be intended at times in Scripture to 
include a changed profession, it is “never to the exclusion of a spiritual change of 
character and state of which this change in profession was supposed to be evidence.”47 It 
is transformative, “an inward, radical change of character.”48 Thus this change has both 
inward and outward aspects, which are inseparable. It reflects “a change not of outward 
conduct merely, nor of mere acts of the mind, but of the character, i. e., of the inward 
principles which control the inward and outward life.”49  
This dual nature of conversion is reflected in a number of other ways as well. It 
involves both a change in one’s objective standing before God, and in one’s subjective 
inner state. It reflects a new forensic standing before God – the removal of guilt and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 CHMC, folder 20:4, “Become as little children…” Matt. 18:3, 4/17/1822 sermon. 
48 CP, XCIV, “If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature” (1/19/1862), 142. 
49 CP, LXXXI, “Except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom 
of heaven” (11/19/1865), 125. This conference talk, given late in Hodge’s career, is yet another example of 
the constancy of Hodge’s positions over his life. It is based on the same passage, Matt. 18:3, as the earlier 
quoted sermon from very early in Hodge’s career in 1822. Both are very similar in their stress of the dual 
nature of true conversion as inward and outward, and the roots of those changes centered in a changed 
heart or disposition. 
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imputation of Christ’s righteousness, but also the subjective experience of forgiveness and 
grace in a renewed heart. It is not merely a “change of external state or relation”50 that 
brings one into the bounds of the visible church, but a union with the living body of 
Christ. “Union with Christ therefore determines not only our relations, but our subjective 
state, not only our relation to the law and justice of God, and our external circumstances, 
but our inward character and life.”51 Authentic conversion involves then both a union 
with the visible church through outward profession, and union with the invisible church 
through inner participation in the life of Christ.52 
Although Hodge does not claim to be able to explain all metaphysical aspects that 
may be related to the changes that occur in conversion, he does make some specific 
arguments about those changes.53 He argues that conversion does not involve a change in 
the substance of a soul, and that the work of the Holy Spirit in the regenerative act does 
not violate or override normal human processes or nature. The Holy Spirit’s supernatural 
influence “always acts in a way congruous to the nature of the soul, doing it no violence, 
neither destroying nor creating faculties, but imparting and maintaining life by contact or 
communion with the source of all life.” It uses what Hodge terms “appropriate means,” 
that is, “means adapted to the end they are intended to accomplish. It operates in 
connexion with the countless influences by which human character is formed, especially 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 CP, XCI, “Evidences of Regeneration” (9/22/1860), 137. 
51 CP, XCIV, “If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature” (1/19/1862), 143. He continues, “This of 
itself proves that being in Christ cannot be anything merely formal or outward.” 
52 Those who make up the kingdom of heaven are those “who not merely in profession but sincerely 
recognize Jesus Christ as their king and cordially obey him, that is the company of those who are truly pious, 
who are everywhere in Scripture represented as a distinct society.” CHMC, folder 20:4, “Become as little 
children…” Matt. 18:3, 4/17/1822 sermon. 
53 The “metaphysical nature” of regeneration “is left a mystery.” He adds, “It is not the province of either 
philosophy or theology to solve that mystery. It is, however, the duty of the theologian to examine the 
various theories concerning the nature of this saving change, and to reject all such as are inconsistent with 
the Word of God.” ST III, 6. 
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with the truth.”54 Hodge seeks to retain the integrity of human operation and functioning 
in all its respects even in the midst of the Spirit’s supernatural work. 
This issue of change of substance in regeneration is of importance to Hodge 
because some (including Finney) are arguing that the Calvinist position requires a change 
of substance, and that if a change of substance is necessary, this would excuse the sinner 
from responsibility since it would indicate a physical defect for which the sinner could not 
be held accountable. Hodge counters that this is a misunderstanding of the Calvinist 
position, and in a key article on this topic draws on past figures from John Owen to 
Turretin, documents from the Synod of Dort, and Edwards, all in support of his 
position.55 
If there is no substantive or metaphysical change in the soul as a result of 
regeneration, just what is the nature of what Hodge considers a “radical change” in the 
regenerated individual? For Hodge the essence of the change of conversion is a changed 
disposition. Most fundamentally it is a change from a disposition to sin to a disposition to 
holy living. This is at the root of all the other external and internal changes of the 
regenerated individual. As he puts it, the nature of conversion “is evidently a change not 
of outward conduct merely, nor of mere acts of the mind, but of the character, i.e., of the 
inward principles which control the inward and outward life.”56 What he means by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 “Bushnell on Nurture,” 517. Elsewhere he writes that regeneration “takes place without any violence 
being done to the soul or any of its laws.” “Regeneration, and the Manner of its Occurrence,” BRTR 2, 2 
(Apr 1830), 261. 
55 See “Regeneration,” 250-297. Elsewhere Hodge also makes the same point denying that regeneration 
results in metaphysical or substantive change. See, for example, CHMC, folder 2:12, Lecture Notes, 
“Regeneration,” from 11/8/1848. See also ST III, where he states flatly, “Regeneration does not consist in 
any change in the substance of the soul.” 6. He later adds, “Regeneration does not consist in a change in 
any one of the faculties of the soul, whether the sensibility, or the will, or the intellect.” 15. As was seen in 
the previous chapter on Edwards, there is some ambiguity in how Edwards is to be understood in support of 
this point. 
56 CP, LXXXI, “Except ye be converted and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom 
of heaven” (11/19/1865), 125. 
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disposition or principle is not “any act or purpose or state of conscious feeling. It is 
something which is the source of acts, purposes and feelings, and which determines their 
character.”57 It is worth hearing from Hodge a fuller description on this important point. 
 
Besides those acts and states which reveal themselves in the 
consciousness, there are abiding states, dispositions, principles, or 
habits, as they are indifferently called, which constitute character 
and give it stability, and are the proximate, determining cause why 
our voluntary exercises and conscious states are what they are. 
This is what the Bible calls the heart, which has the same relation 
to all our acts that the nature of a tree, as good or bad, has to the 
character of its fruit. A good tree is known to be good if its fruit be 
good. But the goodness of the fruit does not constitute or determine 
the goodness of the tree, but the reverse. In like manner, it is not 
good acts which make the man good; the goodness of the man 
determines the character of his acts.58 
 
To speak of a changed disposition is to speak of a changed heart, and it is here in this 
biblical notion that the crucial change of conversion occurs. 
The real question for Hodge is not whether one chooses God in conversion, but 
whether one needs a change prior to this choice to make it, a change in disposition that 
allows one to perceive God’s holiness and goodness and hence desire to choose him.59 
Those who see the nature of the change of conversion in an act miss this essential point 
that for Hodge provides the basis for any holy choice. There is a great divide between the 
hearts of the unregenerate and those of the regenerate, something “supernatural wrought 
in the soul in regeneration.” What it is, “in the former case, is a disposition to sin; and, in 
the latter, a disposition to holy living.”60 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 CP, XCIX, “Mortify the deeds of the body”  (11/17, year not given), 150. 
58 ST III, 32-33. 
59 See Hodge, “Regeneration,” 295. 
60 Charles Hodge, “Witherspoon’s Theology,” BRPR 35, 4 (Oct 1863), 601. 
 	  
328 
The fundamental reordering of the heart that takes place in conversion then 
reorders one’s priorities, one’s affections, and one’s desires as it also provides new insight 
into spiritual truths. This always involves new knowledge, and it is to the role of 
knowledge and the intellect in conversion that we now turn. 
 
The Role of Knowledge and the Intellect in Conversion 
 
In categorizing materials for the preparation of this chapter, it was this category 
on the role of knowledge and the intellect in conversion that had the most materials. 
Hodge constantly speaks of the importance of knowledge, and thus it is vital that we come 
to a clear understanding of how knowledge and the intellect functioned for Hodge in 
conversion. 
This is all the more true as the “Princeton Theology” of which Hodge is so much 
a part has often been severely criticized for being overly intellectualist, concentrating on 
objective over subjective aspects of faith, and confusing and melding their theological 
positions with the sometimes incompatible views of Scottish Common Sense philosophical 
thinking so prevalent in their day. This perspective has been almost a given in much 
scholarship in the past decades regarding Princeton. However this interpretation has 
more recently not been without its critics. Before moving into a more specific discussion 
of the role of knowledge and intellect in conversion, it is valuable to consider the role of 
knowledge and intellect more generally for Hodge and Princeton, addressing some of the 
issues that have been cause for some controversy and criticism. 
 
 
 	  
329 
Princeton’s Supposed Rationalism and Philosophical Dependencies 
Princeton’s view of the role of knowledge has been a matter of some dispute and 
criticism. Certain views regarding rationality were common across most of the spectrum 
of theological and intellectual thought in Hodge’s day. There is disagreement about the 
extent to which Princeton uncritically accepted these views and melded them into its own 
theological outlook. The common scholarly wisdom of the past few decades has suggested 
that Princeton broadly and Hodge specifically adopted the Scottish Common Sense 
philosophy and other intellectual trends of their day to such a degree that their Reformed 
commitments were compromised and their emphasis on intellect and objectivity was 
unduly enhanced. 
Examples of this interpretive framework abound, from decades past to recent 
work. One of the most important and seminal examples of this reading came from 
Sydney Ahlstrom in a 1955 article in Church History, “The Scottish Philosophy and 
American Theology.” In it Princeton was a prime example of and promoter of the union 
of Scottish Common Sense philosophy and theology. He suggested that “for Hodge 
doctrine became less a living language of piety than a complex burden to be borne,”61 
and that his adopted philosophical commitments ultimately divided him in significant 
ways from his Reformed tradition.62 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Ahlstrom, “The Scottish Philosophy and American Theology,” Church History 24 no. 3 (Sep 1955), 268. 
62 “Despite his reiterations of dogmatic formulae, the optimism of the Scottish Renaissance interposes itself 
and separates his theology from that of John Knox and John Calvin.” “The Scottish Philosophy,” 266. 
Regardless of his attacks on theologians straying from his orthodox standard, “the irony remains: Hodge 
himself is caught up in the anthropocentrism of Scottish Philosophy.” 266. He adds, “The adoption of the 
benign and optimistic anthropology of the Scottish Moderates by American Calvinists veiled the very 
insights into human nature which were a chief strength of Calvin's theology. This revision, in turn, affected 
the whole complex of doctrine and infused the totality with a new spirit.” 269. He concludes that “the 
profound commitment of orthodox theology to the apologetical keeping of the Scottish Philosophy made 
traditional doctrines so lifeless and static that a new theological turn was virtually inevitable.” 269. 
 	  
330 
John Stewart describes a Princeton paradigm of science that incorporated 
epistemology from Scottish Common Sense philosophy, an assumption of continuity 
between science and religion, and “a growing notion that theology itself was understood 
and pursued as a science.”63 Tim McConnel questions whether the Old Princeton 
apologetics are common sense or Reformed. His verdict is the former.64 
In his biography Gutjahr argues that Hodge “proved inconsistent in his alliances 
to Calvinist and Scottish Realist thought, depending on one line of reasoning to prove a 
certain point at a certain time and changing his allegiances later when that suited his 
purpose.” He concludes that Hodge’s “own theology became a complex and conflicted 
mix of Calvinist notions of total depravity leavened with the conviction [gleaned from 
Scottish Common Sense philosophy] that every human held within themselves a moral 
sense capable of detecting virtue.”65 
Mark Noll, who has done extensive reading of the Princetonians and Hodge, gives 
a qualified affirmation to this view, observing that “while their theology was rooted in 
Scripture and the Trinitarian orthodoxy of the early church, it also participated fully in 
modern philosophical movements – often without fully considering if the religious and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Stewart, “Mediating the Center,” 22. In his preface Stewart does note the “continuing and wide-spread 
misunderstanding” of Hodge, “compounded by the surprisingly sparse scholarship about this prominent 
nineteenth-century theologian and influential ecclesial leader.” vi. He suggests that Hodge’s Systematic 
Theology is overemphasized and BRPR too often ignored. Nevertheless he does argue for the deep impact of 
the Scottish philosophy on Hodge. “When Old School Presbyterians like Hodge employed the words ‘facts’ 
or ‘natural facts’ with reference to scientific inquiry, we should, I contend, interpret their use of those terms 
in light of these Reidian common sense epistemological assumptions.” 24. 
64 Although McConnel uses a contemporary of B. B. Warfield, William Brenton Greene, Jr. as his 
representative figure for Old Princetonian methods, since he occupied a chair of apologetics at the seminary 
that did not exist in earlier years, he suggests that in placing reason and philosophical commitments on a 
level prior to Scripture, Greene “continued a theme common in Hodge and Warfield, but inconsistent with 
Calvin’s notions of the ‘self-authenticating’ nature of Scripture, as well as the preeminent role of the witness 
of the Holy Spirit in the acceptance of Scripture.” Tim McConnel, “The Old Princeton Apologetics: 
Common Sense or Reformed?,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 46, no 4 (Dec 2003), 671. He 
asserts that Old Princeton “accepted Scottish Common Sense Realism as the philosophical basis on which 
to develop epistemology and apologetics.” 649. 
65 Hodge, 204, 41. 
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secular sources were compatible.” He concludes that the Princetonians “were among the 
American intellectuals who most consistently used the language and the categories of this 
[Scottish Common Sense] philosophy even when, as later observers would contend, its 
tenets seemed to contradict Princeton commitments to Scripture and Reformed tradition.” 
However, he does qualify his interpretation, arguing that one cannot simply dismiss the 
Princeton theologians as Common Sense theologians. Their theology “contains many 
elements that fit poorly into a scheme dominated by the mechanical categories of 
Common Sense. Among these elements is the Princeton stress on religious experience.”66 
The impact of Scottish Common Sense philosophy was widespread across much 
of the nineteenth century, and Princeton had played a significant role in bringing it to the 
fore. Witherspoon, who came from Scotland to serve as Princeton College’s (then the 
College of New Jersey) president in 1768, came to be deeply influenced by it, and its main 
ideas were promulgated in the curriculum at the college from the time of his presidency 
for several decades. Through Archibald Alexander it came to Princeton Seminary at its 
inception. Prominent among the outlook of this philosophy was the notion that all human 
minds universally had the capacity to perceive truths around them through their senses, 
given certain inherent structures of the mind such as cause and effect. Moral truths also 
were thought to be perceptible. These ideas were a response to the philosophical 
skepticism of Hume and others that questioned the capacity of humans to be confident 
that their perceptions of reality reflected actual knowledge of that reality. These common 
sense philosophical ideas were combined with a Baconian inductive method of scientific 
thinking that sought to collect facts and make sense of them. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Noll, Princeton Theology, 25, 30, 33. 
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There can be no question that this period’s philosophical preferences had an 
influence on Hodge. He had been educated at the college and then the seminary, both of 
which instilled common sense views into their students.67 But the influence of these ideas 
was not confined to the institutions at Princeton. These ideas were the prevalent ideas of 
the times in both theological and intellectual thinking across the spectrum.68 Some even 
wonder if Princeton itself was not so much promulgating these theories as merely moving 
along with the contemporary currents of intellectual thought.69 But whether from 
Princeton, or from the broader culture, this was the intellectual soup in which Hodge 
found himself. The question is not so much whether it influenced him, but how much it 
did, and whether it did so in violation of other express commitments of his Calvinist, 
Reformed theological heritage. 
Hodge did himself no favors on this point in many of his comments in the 
introduction to his Systematic Theology. He wrote, “The true method of theology is, 
therefore, the inductive, which assumes that the Bible contains all the facts or truths 
which form the contents of theology, just as the facts of nature are the contents of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Gutjahr argues that “the thorough acceptance of Scottish Realism's moral reasoning at Princeton College 
had a profound effect on Hodge's own theological thinking. Although rigorously tied to the Calvinist beliefs 
of the Westminster Confession, Hodge came to offer Americans a unique strain of Reformed theological 
thinking largely based on a notion of a universal moral sentiment.” Hodge, 40. 
68 It should be noted that although Ahlstrom sees Princeton as a pivotal disseminator of the Scottish 
Common Sense philosophy in America, he also finds it across the entire swath of the theological landscape 
of the early to mid-nineteenth century, from conservative to liberal and even Unitarianism, at Harvard, 
Yale, and Andover. “The Scottish Philosophy,” 262-67. He concludes, “The Scottish Philosophy, in short, 
was a winning combination; and to American theologians, even if they felt the need for philosophic support 
only subconsciously, it was the answer to a prayer. It was, moreover, free enough from subtlety to be 
communicable in sermons and tracts. It came to exist in America, therefore, as a vast subterranean 
influence, a sort of water-table nourishing dogmatics in an age of increasing doubt.” 268. 
69 Noll writes, “a historical examination of the Princetonians also makes it possible to see more clearly 
where they spoke distinctly and where their voices merely mingled with those of their contemporaries. Such 
an investigation reveals at the outset that many of the supposed distinctives of the Princeton Theology were 
simply the common intellectual affirmations of the day.” Princeton Theology, 34. Noll considers Princeton’s 
Scottish Common Sense assertions one example of this, as was their notion of doing theology scientifically. 
He concludes that “at least for much of the nineteenth century, the Princetonians’ Scottish Realism shows 
us more how they sailed along with the American intellectual mainstream rather than against it.” 35. 
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natural sciences.”70 Sections of this introduction to his magnum opus seem to justify this 
‘standard’ interpretation of Hodge, stressing ‘facts’ and the science of theology to an 
extent that the reader is left with the impression that Hodge was overly rationalistic, 
perhaps naïve as to human intellectual capacities and limitations, and reductionistic. It is 
worth quoting Hodge himself at length here: 
 
If natural science be concerned with the facts and laws of nature, 
theology is concerned with the facts and the principles of the Bible. 
If the object of the one be to arrange and systematize the facts of 
the external world, and to ascertain the laws by which they are 
determined; the object of the other is to systematize the facts of the 
Bible, and ascertain the principles or general truths which those 
facts involve. And as the order in which the facts of nature are 
arranged cannot be determined arbitrarily, but by the nature of the 
facts themselves, so it is with the facts of the Bible… So the facts of 
science arrange themselves. They are not arranged by the 
naturalist. His business is simply to ascertain what the arrangement 
given in the nature of the facts is. If he mistake, his system is false, 
and to a greater or less degree valueless. The same is obviously true 
with regard to the facts or truths of the Bible… It is important that 
the theologian should know his place. He is not master of the 
situation. He can no more construct a system of theology to suit his 
fancy, than the astronomer can adjust the mechanism of the 
heavens according to his good pleasure.71 
 
It is unfortunate that Hodge chose to write his introduction with such a particular 
slant toward facts, when the body of his work and thought reflects a much richer and 
broader view of truth, with a greater balance of subjective and objective elements. But the 
fact is (pun intended), he did choose to write it this way. Given these kinds of assertions by 
Hodge, there is some validity to a reading of him as a rationalist, or at least an 
intellectualist focused almost solely on the objective, propositional, intellectual aspects of 
Christian faith, lacking appreciation for its more subjective elements, and lacking more 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 ST I, 17. 
71 ST I, 18-19. 
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critical awareness of the ways in which knowledge and objectivity functioned and their 
limits. Noll suggests in one essay that the introduction to Hodge’s Systematic Theology did 
incalculable damage to his historical reputation.72 I believe this assessment is correct. One 
continues to see that damage today in how he has been read and interpreted. If all one 
had was his systematics introduction one might come to some fairly strong conclusions 
about his views on knowledge and intellect. But the Systematic Theology does not tell the 
whole story, and those who have suggested or written about Hodge as though it 
represents a complete picture of his thought present a distorted picture. 
Hodge himself, at least consciously, rejected outright philosophical systems in 
approaching scriptural truths. It was in putting philosophy above Christianity that the 
false teachers of Colossians erred. They “designed to substitute philosophy for 
Christianity, not by denying the latter, but by explaining it,” but Paul declared 
philosophy a failure.73 Hodge criticized Edward Amasa Park for a view of redemption 
that was “characteristically rational. It seeks to explain everything so as to be intelligible 
to the speculative understanding.” The apostle Paul, on the other hand, taught “not a 
system of common sense, but of profound and awful mystery.”74 But the question is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Noll gives this assessment of the introduction in Hodge’s Systematic Theology, and statements such as the 
Bible being a “storehouse of facts,” and other similar comments. “It is doubtful whether a major American 
thinker ever published anything that so seriously damaged his intellectual reputation as these pages on 
method in the Systematic Theology.” “Charles Hodge as an Expositor of the Spiritual Life,” in Hodge Revisited, 
196. Noll adds, “The curiosity that most of Hodge's earlier theological exposition - as well as much of what 
followed in the Systematic Theology - proceeded in blithe disregard of these methodological counsels cannot 
erase the effect of his words. Although they define a theological method that Hodge himself rarely followed, 
he was the one who chose to open the summary work of his career in this way.” 196. 
73 CP, CXXVII, “Ye are complete in him” (10/27/1872), 190. 
74 Hodge, “Professor Park’s Remarks,” 317, 318. Hodge expands on this point. “The Apostle pronounces 
the judgment of God to be unsearchable and his ways past finding out, as they are specially exhibited in the 
doctrines of redemption, and in the dispensations of God toward our race. The origin of sin, the fall of man, 
the relation of Adam to his posterity, the transmission of his corrupt nature to all descended from him by 
ordinary generation, the consistency of man’s freedom with God’s sovereignty, the process of regeneration, 
the relation of the believer to Christ, and other doctrines of the like kind, do not admit of ‘philosophical 
explanation.’ They cannot be dissected and mapped off so as that the points of contact and mode of union 
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whether he was consistent in practice with what he argued in theory. It is hard to mesh a 
view of theology as a “profound and awful mystery” with the suggestion that the 
theologian’s “relation to the Scriptures is analogous to that of the man of science to 
nature.”75 
Some have suggested that a view of a dry, detached, scholastic Princeton can no 
longer be assumed, and represents a misreading of the Princetonians. In his 1981 book, 
Piety and the Princeton Theologians, Andrew Hoffecker was one of the first to suggest that 
scholarship was overemphasizing objective and intellectual elements of the Princeton 
theology. He sought to “provide a corrective,” arguing that “the Princeton theology 
exhibits both a strong objective doctrinal emphasis and an equally strong subjective 
strand of piety.”76 Even though it allowed that the Princeton theology failed to be 
consistent in practice to what it expressed theoretically, this study still demonstrated the 
importance of the piety informing the theology and lives of the Princeton men. He 
concluded that “not only is this subjective element present, but the omission of it renders 
the interpretations of their thought as a whole radically incomplete.”77 David Calhoun’s 
two-volume history of Princeton Seminary lent support to Hoffecker’s interpretation.78 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
with all other known truths can be clearly understood; nor can God’s dealings with our race be all 
explained on the common-sense principles of moral government.” 317-18. 
75 Hodge, “Bushnell on Vicarious Sacrifice,” BRPR 38, 2 (April 1866), 161-94, 185. See also ST I, 17. 
76 Hoffecker, Piety, 156. 
77 Hoffecker, Piety, 159-60. His 2011 biography, while broader in scope, in some respects builds on his 
earlier book, clearly demonstrating that Hodge and was far from a dry scholastic, and combined lively piety 
and confessionalism, neither of which can be ignored. “From his earliest days until he died in 1878, Hodge 
manifested a piety and belief that reflected a unique combination of Presbyterian New Side piety and 
confessional belief.” Hoffecker, Charles Hodge, 18. 
78 The Princetonians “stood squarely in the great stream of historic Christianity and orthodox Calvinism. 
They faithfully, sometimes powerfully, and often winsomely, preached, taught, wrote, argued, and lived the 
truth as they saw it.” Calhoun, Princeton vol. 1, xxv. 
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More recently, Paul Helseth has issued a direct frontal assault on rationalistic 
readings of Hodge and Princeton in his book, “Right Reason” and the Princeton Mind.79 
Helseth calls “the prevailing historiographical consensus into question by establishing that 
Old Princeton's religious epistemology focused much more on the heart than it did on the 
head.”80 While admitting that Scottish philosophy had some impact on the Princetonians, 
he argues that the theology of Old Princeton as represented by its major figures was not 
unduly influenced by the Enlightenment and Scottish Common Sense Realism, but 
instead “stood in the epistemological mainstream of the Reformed tradition.”81 Their 
supposed intellectualism moved beyond narrowly defined categories of rational thought. 
Instead, “subjective and experiential factors play a critical role in Old Princeton’s 
religious epistemology because Old Princeton's ‘intellectualism’ is moral, not merely 
rational. It has to do, in other words, with the ‘whole soul’ – mind, will, and emotions – 
rather than the rational faculty alone.”82 
Although Helseth argues that “at their best the Princeton theologians approached 
the task of theology not as arrogant rationalists would have done, but as biblically faithful 
Christians have always done,” the phrase, “at their best” is a significant qualifier to 
Helseth’s argument, and in general Helseth overstates his case. The Princetonians, and 
Hodge in particular, are not as consistent in this area as one would like. Still, although he 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Paul Kjoss Helseth, “Right Reason” and the Princeton Mind (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2010). 
Previous to this book Helseth had also written a variety of articles and a dissertation on related topics. 
80 Right Reason, xxvii. 
81 Right Reason, xxvii. 
82 Right Reason, 16. “We may conclude, therefore, that if some conservatives ought to be chastised for 
rationalistic tendencies that threaten the integrity of evangelicalism's contemporary witness, they ought to 
be chastised for tendencies that were acquired from some place other than Old Princeton, for at their best 
the Princeton theologians approached the task of theology not as arrogant rationalists would have done, but 
as biblically faithful Christians have always done. Indeed, they sought to discern the difference between 
truth and error not by appealing to the magisterial conclusions of the rational faculty alone, but by hearing 
the message of the text with ‘right reason,’ which for them was a biblically informed kind of theological 
aesthetic that presupposes the work of the Spirit on the whole soul of the believing theologian.” 221. 
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does not give as much heed to the influence of Scottish philosophy as I believe is justified, 
and taking the body of their texts and sermons as a whole, Helseth is mostly right that 
characterizations of Hodge and the other Princetonians as rationalistic, philosophically 
grounded, and detached are misguided.83 This should become more apparent as we turn 
to a closer consideration of the role of intellect and knowledge in conversion specifically. 
 
Intellect, Knowledge, and Conversion  
Regardless of how one comes out in any debate over intellectualism or Scottish 
Common Sense Realism, there can be no denying that knowledge plays a key role in 
Hodge’s view of conversion. He writes that in Scripture “we are said to be saved through 
knowledge.”84 Elsewhere he writes that in Scripture religion “is a form of knowledge,” a 
“spiritual discernment of divine things.”85 If the change in conversion to a holy 
disposition is to occur, there must be some knowledge for what is holy, some awareness of 
the object of our holy desires. With a description that sounds remarkably like Jonathan 
Edwards, Hodge gives this account in 1830 of the regenerated state. “How can we love 
that which we do not see. The affections must have an object, and that object must be 
apprehended in its true nature, in order to be truly loved.”86 No human presentation of 
spiritual objects or truths, however, is adequate to reveal the full force of those truths to 
the human heart.87 Until that object is revealed by the work of the Holy Spirit, one 
cannot have a holy disposition. “It is obvious, therefore, that regeneration, to be of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 For a fuller assessment of Helseth’s book, see Mark B. Chapman, “‘Right Reason’ and the Princeton 
Mind,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 54, 4 (Dec 2011), 870-74. 
84 “Regeneration,” 284. 
85 “Professor Park’s Remarks,” 342. 
86 “Regeneration,” 284-85. 
87 Only God’s Holy Spirit can make the truth efficacious for salvation in the hearts of its hearers. As Hodge 
puts it, “the most serious and tremendous truth we can speak is powerless for salvation, apart from this 
Divine co-operation.” “Sabbath-School Children,” 24. 
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moral character at all, must consist in such a change as brings the soul into a state to see 
and love the beauty of holiness. It matters not what the change be called; a ‘spiritual 
sense,’ or ‘a taste,’ or ‘disposition,’ it is as necessary as that an object should be seen in 
order to be loved.”88  
Right knowledge matters, because knowledge is essential to faith and Christian life. 
For Hodge there are always two dimensions to faith: assent and trust. Both are required. 
Intrinsic to the notion of assent is that faith has content. To be a Christian one must 
believe certain assertions and not other assertions. It is these specific doctrinal assertions 
that defines what it is to be a Christian.89 Specifically, the knowledge necessary for 
conversion involves knowledge of Christ. Hodge notes that in Paul’s conversion, “the 
truth revealed was the Divinity of Christ,” and that “Paul makes conversion consist in this 
knowledge of Christ.”90 In another sermon he writes, “in numerous passages of the New 
Testament the knowledge of Jesus Christ is declared to be essential to the existence of true 
religion.” He adds that “those who have this knowledge have true religion, and those who 
have not this knowledge have not true religion.”91 Following Christ means to 
acknowledge that he is the truth, and all that this entails. For Hodge this means 
acknowledging that in Christ “is all truth, religious, moral, and scientific.”92 It means 
believing as true God’s revealed plan of redemption.  
If faith involves content, faith cannot be reduced to content. Assent is not 
sufficient. Faith also involves trust. Intrinsic to the notion of trust is a willingness to act in 
the confidence of the object of faith. But both of these aspects require some knowledge as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 “Regeneration,” 285. Hodge indeed appeals to Edwards in support of this position throughout this article. 
89 Those who reject Christianity as a system of doctrine, are unbelievers. They are not Christians.” ST 1, 
177. 
90 CP, XCIII, “Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?” (1/18/1852), 141. 
91 CHMC, folder 21:23, "Excellency of the knowledge of Christ," April 8, 1855. 
92 Hodge, CP, CXXIII, “Ye believe in God, believe also in me” (n.d.), 185. 
 	  
339 
a starting point. As Christ is the object of faith, this starting point necessarily involves 
some knowledge of Christ.93  
One must be careful in how one understands what it means to Hodge to “know” a 
truth. One must not assume that to “know” is confined to a certain kind of rational or 
intellectual knowing, as this is not usually what Hodge has in mind when discussing 
salvific truths. “In the Scriptures, knowledge is not mere intellectual apprehension. It 
includes that but more.”94 As we saw from the description of the debate over Princeton’s 
intellectualism, there is a deeper and fuller form of knowing than just knowing with one’s 
mind, not at all unlike the twofold Puritan form of knowing previously discussed when 
examining the views of Edwards. Knowledge of Christ, according to Hodge, is both 
“speculative and experimental. Both forms of knowledge must be united.”95 The 
knowledge that God reveals in the Son, Hodge writes, “is not external acquaintance.” 
Even those who crucified Christ had that. It is not “familiarity with the facts of history. 
Nor is it a speculative knowledge of all the truth revealed concerning Christ.” One can be 
spiritually dead and still have even extensive speculative knowledge of theological truths. 
Rather, it is “spiritual knowledge, such knowledge as implies just appreciation, and is 
attended with appropriate affections.”96 It moves beyond mere intellectual 
comprehension of propositions, and “includes also the proper apprehension not only of 
the object, but of its qualities; and if those qualities be either esthetic or moral, it includes 
the due apprehension of them and the state of feeling which answers to them.” Such 
knowledge will then always produce some form of response in the knower, reflecting a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 “Knowledge is essential to religion, because religion consists in the love, belief, and obedience of the 
truth.” Hodge, “The Church – Its Perpetuity,” BRPR 28 (Oct 1856), 692-93. 
94 CP, CXLIII, “The Excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus our Lord” (10/11/1843), 214. 
95 CP, CIX, “Growth in Grace” (10/29/1854), 166. 
96 CP, CXLIX, “It pleased God to reveal his Son in me” (4/19/1857), 223. 
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transformed heart or disposition. Thus the true knowledge of Christ is not just intellectual 
knowledge of who he is, but the affective response – “the corresponding feeling of 
adoration, delight, desire and complacency.”97 He stresses this point with his students: 
“Permit me again to remind you that the study of theology is not a mere intellectual 
process; it is a religious exercise. Remember that nothing is so offensive as a body to 
which life belongs but from which it has departed. Theological truth is living truth.”98 
And such a living, spiritual truth moves beyond some mere cognitive acknowledgement 
into the whole fabric of an individual’s being, coloring affections, motivating actions, and 
reorienting priorities. It is this form of truth that is essential to true conversion.99 
Just how important is knowledge to conversion? How much knowledge is 
necessary? And what are the possibilities for conversion for those who lack intellectual 
capacities – whether infants, or those with limited intellectual abilities? Hodge at times 
uses some very strong language to express the importance of knowledge and intellect for 
Christianity in general and conversion in particular. His paradigm is often like that used 
in his discussion of the efficacy of the Lord’s Supper in a conference talk titled, “The 
Lord’s Supper as a Means of Grace, No. 1” from 1859. Here he suggests that only those 
Christians with faith “in what the Scriptures teach concerning this ordinance” can take 
true spiritual nourishment from the Lord’s Supper. Their faith must be grounded in a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Hodge, CP, CXLIII, “The Excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus our Lord” (10/11/1843), 214. 
98 CHMC, folder 11:5 (Lecture notes), “The Study of Theology,” 1847. 
99 In an 1855 sermon Hodge writes, “By true religion is meant that state of mind which is produced by right 
apprehensions, or the spiritual discernment of God and of our relations to him. It includes, therefore, 
reverence, love, and zeal for the divine glory, humility, penitence, faith, and new obedience. It is inward 
holiness, embracing current knowledge, right feeling, and proper action in relation to the Supreme Being.” 
CHMC, folder 21:23, “Excellency of the knowledge of Christ,” 4/8/1855. This was at least the second time 
that Hodge wrote a sermon on this passage. He used the same passage in a sermon from 10/11/1843. This 
would point again toward the importance of the place of knowledge for Hodge, and specifically the 
knowledge of Christ. 
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proper knowledge and understanding of the nature and purpose of the Supper.100 
Knowledge is related to efficacy. It is not just intellectual knowledge, however, but a belief 
or faith in that knowledge.101 It seems a paradigm that Hodge uses for true conversion as 
well. Even though Hodge is referring to knowledge in the twofold way described above, 
still it remains the case that a certain amount of speculative or cognitive knowledge is vital 
to any saving faith, as well as an intellectual capacity to consider that knowledge. Other 
statements of his support such a view. “Without reason there is no apprehension of 
truth.”102 Knowledge and rationality may not be the end, but they are the beginning of 
the true heart knowledge of Christ that constitutes Christianity. 
Although Hodge does understand this knowledge in a much richer way than some 
rationalistic objectivity, with moral and affective aspects indissolubly linked, he also 
prioritizes the relation of an intellectual or cognitive knowledge to other affective and 
experiential elements. The problem with some, such as Horace Bushnell, according to 
Hodge, is that they invert the priority of this relation, suggesting that feeling or experience 
supplies the content of knowledge to which one assents.103 We will examine this further 
later in the chapter. 
If knowledge seems to be absolutely necessary to conversion, the degree and 
clarity of knowledge required by Hodge is more difficult to answer. Hodge insists that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Hodge, CP, CCXX, “The Lord’s Supper as a Means of Grace, No. 1” (9/11/1859), 332. 
101 See also Hodge, CP, CCXX, “The Lord’s Supper as a Means of Grace, No. 1” (9/11/1859), 337. 
102 CP, CXCIX, “Meditation” (1/3/1859), 300. 
103 Gutjahr describes Hodge on Bushnell in this area in the following way: “Bushnell's reasoning throughout 
God in Christ tended toward a vision of organic wholeness that extended all the way to the unity of all 
believers, a godly community bound together by central truths arrived at through the heart, not the head. 
In this way, God in Christ was but a natural extension of Discourses on Christian Nurture, but focused this time on 
the entire family of believers rather than the biological family found in the domestic household.” Hodge, 248. 
He adds, “For Hodge, Bushnell's God in Christ was ‘a failure’ on almost every level, a hopeless montage of 
contradictions and absurdities. He believed that even a casual perusal of the book soon showed that 
Bushnell's heart-centered approach to theology made him thoroughly incapable of being able to argue a 
cogent position. For Hodge, the study of theology involved approaching the Bible's teachings in a rational, 
systematic way. Bushnell proved himself utterly incapable of the rigors of such logical thinking.” 248. 
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errant knowledge is damaging. Just as one ignores the laws of nature at one’s peril, so too 
if one ignores the laws of life. One cannot make or create one’s own moral or spiritual 
laws and doctrines any more than one can natural laws like gravity. “In the spiritual 
world the doctrines of the Bible have the authority that the laws of nature have in the 
external world.” One who ignores the laws of nature in one’s physical life risks death. So 
too, one risks spiritual death in ignoring – intentionally or unintentionally – the spiritual 
doctrines of Scripture. “Ignorance is no more an excuse or a protection in the one case 
than in the other. If a man does not know that arsenic is a poison, it none the less destroys 
his life if he eats it. If we [sic] do not know that sin deserves the wrath and curse of God, 
or that murder or blasphemy is sin, he never the less suffers the penalty.”104  
However, Hodge is at times disinclined to specify what amount or clarity of 
knowledge is necessary for conversion. On the one hand, Hodge declares that “an 
unintelligible proposition, one which conveys no meaning, cannot be an object of faith, 
for faith is intelligent assent to the truth of some proposition,” and “where there is no 
reason there can be no faith.”105 But on the other hand, he suggests that if one sets a 
standard of full understanding, one has little in regard to spiritual truths that would 
qualify. “It is not essential to the existence and exercise of this faith,” he writes, “that we 
should clearly comprehend every truth and fact revealed. The sacred records, like all the 
other works of God, contain truths too high to be comprehended by human reason, and 
mysteries too deep to be fathomed by human penetration.”106 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 CHMC, folder 25:20, “The Truth,” 9/29/1861. He adds, “The laws of the moral and spiritual 
government of God are just as immutable as the laws of nature.” “Error,” he writes, “never can be 
harmless.” 
105 CHMC, folder 11:14 (Lecture notes), “True Office of Reason,” n.d. 
106 CHP, folder 5:16, Manuscripts of Sermons and Lectures, “Nature and Evidences of Faith.” 
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Hodge refuses to declare the extent to which doctrines must be known and 
properly understood. Though knowledge and belief in key doctrines saves, and rejection 
of certain doctrines results in being lost, “it does not follow that they must all be clearly 
known and intelligently received in order to salvation… The scriptures do not warrant us 
in fixing the minimum of divine truth by which the Spirit may save the soul.”107 Evidently 
the Spirit is free to use the slightest of insights into doctrinal truths in a salvific fashion, 
thus allowing for the possibility of salvation even for those severely limited in their 
intellectual capacities or knowledge of doctrinal truths. Hodge seems to struggle both to 
maintain the notion that some knowledge is necessary, and to allow for salvation for those 
of limited intellectual capacity. This is most obvious when he examines the possibilities for 
the salvation of children and infants. In an article on “The Early Regeneration of 
Sabbath-School Children,” he writes that “the degree and kind of the understanding of 
truth, requisite to the Holy Spirit’s work on a child are beyond our ken. A single seed of 
truth lodged in his soul in infancy, may be made the occasion and instrument of 
regeneration. And we do not know but that the effectual work of the Spirit may antedate, 
in some children, the intellectual apprehension of any truth.” He even suggests that some 
“may be sanctified from the womb, or from baptism, and qualified by the presence and 
power of the Spirit for a very early apprehension of the truths of the word of God.”108 He 
does, however, distinguish in this article more strongly between regeneration, a 
preliminary work of God that is quite possible even with infants, and conversion, a 
human response to God’s activity in which human intellectual and other capacities play a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 “Is the Church of Rome a Part of the Visible Church?,” BRPR 18, 2 (April 1846), 340. 
108 Hodge, “Sabbath-School Children,” 27. 
 	  
344 
larger role.109 Some ask whether children can be converted, or whether such a conversion 
is lasting. They wonder if children might lack an intellectual and willful capacity for the 
process, or a time of conviction prior to conversion. But the situation is quite different 
when considering regeneration. Here “the mind dare not limit the power of the Eternal 
Spirit.”110 Finally only God’s Holy Spirit can make the truth efficacious for salvation in 
the hearts of its hearers. 
If the intellect plays a key role in conversion, it still remains a human capacity that 
stands under the authority of Scripture. Essentially, Hodge argues that although a level of 
rationality or understanding of gospel content is necessary, one can never make human 
reason or rationality the standard by which spiritual truths are to be judged. Hodge 
rejects any notions that truths are to be judged by our capacity to understand them.111 
Although he argues that the idea of anything “absurd” being true is nonsensical, he also 
argues that there are mysteries in spiritual truths that cannot be penetrated by human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 “The idea of ‘conversion’ when most prominent in the mind of the teacher, takes him to the child, to his 
intellect, his heart, his will. The idea of ‘regeneration’ when most prominent, takes the teacher to the Holy 
Spirit, to his sovereign agency, to his almighty power, to his infinite love. The first makes the teacher a 
worker together with the child; the second, makes him a ‘worker together with God.’ And, as we have seen, 
the Divine influence is primary, and must be exerted in order to the right mental and moral action of the 
child.” Hodge, “Sabbath-School Children,” 27. 
110 Hodge, “Sabbath-School Children,” 27. 
111 Hodge makes this point often. Against the Rationalists Hodge teaches “1. That reason is not the source 
of religious knowledge. 2. That she is not the judge of the truths of those doctrines so as to be authorized to 
reject what she cannot comprehend or prove to be true. And 3. That the foundation of faith is authority, 
the testimony of God, and not rational evidence. or demonstration.” CHMC, folder 11:14 (Lecture notes) 
“True Office of Reason” n.d. Likewise, Hodge writes, “to us the scriptures are the word of God, which we 
do not judge, but by which we are judged, whence we derive all our religious knowledge. They are at once 
the source and the rule of our faith.” “Religious State of Germany,” BRPR 18, 4 (Oct 1846), 532. Other 
examples abound. “The intuitive principles of the mind are very few and limited, and therefore gives us 
only a small amount of truth. God’s word is the great storehouse of truth. To that and to all it contains we 
are to submit. It contains nothing inconsistent with the laws of our nature, or it would not be his word, and 
therefore to everything it contains we are to submit our understanding.” CP, LXXXVII, “Submission to 
God” (12/11/1853), 132. Even his ST makes the same point. “The effort is not to make the assertations of 
the Bible harmonize with the speculative reason, but to subject our feeble reason to the mind of God as 
revealed in his Word, and by his Spirit in our inner life.” ST 1, 16. 
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reason.112 If one makes human reason too prominent, then one falls into the trap of 
philosophical systems that are foreign to the Bible, or abstract and speculative 
propositions that destroy the power and truth of scriptural doctrines.113 This is the result 
of overreliance on the intellect. In a journal article Hodge takes issue with a proponent of 
an alternate theory of atonement because it removes the mystery from the atonement and 
makes it intelligible, it lacks scriptural support, and it “is a theory woven warp and woof 
out of the understanding.” This is to say that it is not rational but rationalistic, “a piece of 
pure Rationalistic speculation, formed on certain principles of moral philosophy which 
have nothing to do with the Bible.”114 It is founded independent of Scripture, arbitrary, 
and opposed to what Scripture actually teaches. There is a danger in reducing spiritual 
truths to comprehensible propositions, as this may damage their content. 
Hodge even suggests that some individuals “know” or believe something to be 
true intellectually, but live according to a contrary truth. They adopt theoretically with 
their mind, for example, certain “abstract propositions” of theology counter to Scripture 
as true, while actually living by a more biblical view.115 It seems that for Hodge one can 
have mistaken forms of speculative rational knowledge, and yet still have a deeper, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 “Men indeed often deceive themselves on this point, and pronounce that to be absurd or impossible 
which is true and actual. But this does not alter the case: nothing that is really true can be absurd; nothing 
that is absurd can be true.” CHMC, folder 11:14 (Lecture notes), “True Office of Reason,” n.d. He adds, 
“what cannot be true, cannot by any evidence be proved to be true.” This idea only applies to the 
impossible, not the strange, etc. 
113 The false teachers in the Colossians account “designed to substitute philosophy for Christianity, not by 
denying the latter, but by explaining it. They distinguished between faith and knowledge. Faith was for the 
people, knowledge for the educated few.” CP, CXXVII, “Ye are complete in him,” Col. 2:10 (10/27/1872), 
190. The objects of faith were historical events and doctrines; the objects of knowledge were the speculative 
truths behind the historical/doctrinal accounts. According to Hodge, Paul declared philosophy a failure. 
114 “Beman on the Atonement,” BRPR 17, 1 (Jan 1845), 96, 99. 
115 In an article discussing an opposing view of the atonement that Hodge considers overly rationalistic and 
biblically unsound, he suggests that there is not “truth enough in this theory to sustain the life of religion in 
any man’s heart.” However, it is “very possible for a man, to adopt theoretically such an abstract statement 
of a scriptural doctrine, as really denies its nature and destroys its power, and yet that same man may 
receive the truth for his own salvation as it is revealed in the Bible.” “Beman on the Atonement,” 115. 
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subconscious, heart knowledge that is salvific.116 This is an interesting example that seems 
to run counter to certain interpretations of Princeton’s intellectualism, to the extent that it 
would seem almost to allow for a certain kind of anonymous Christian belief. It also 
seems to run counter to some other statements of Hodge that insist that spiritual, heart 
knowledge requires intellectual knowledge. For example, he writes that “the intellectual 
may exist without the spiritual; but the spiritual cannot exist without the intellectual. A 
man may see a thing without seeing its beauty, but he cannot see its beauty without seeing 
the thing itself.”117 What Hodge is most likely suggesting in discussing mistaken 
speculative knowledge is that one’s deeper knowledge – what one believes to be true in 
one’s heart – is finally expressed in one’s life and piety, regardless of any conflicting 
professions of the speculative intellect alone.118 Whatever merit such a notion has, what is 
very clear is that true, salvific knowledge of God, revealed in Christ, is not merely 
intellectual affirmation or rational acceptance alone. True knowledge involves the heart 
and affections. Thus we now turn to a more specific consideration of the place of feelings 
and ‘heart’ religion in conversion. 
 
Emotions and the Subjective  
 
Although Hodge and the Princetonians are at times labeled intellectualists who 
disregard the value of the feelings, anyone who spends any time reading Hodge in depth 
will quickly discover that emotions and subjective factors, though not without their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116 On this same idea expressed elsewhere, see Hodge, “Professor Park and the Princeton Review,” BRPR 
23, 4 (Oct 1851), 692. 
117 CP, CXC, “The Word of God as a Means of Grace” (11/30/1856), 287. 
118 Further discussion of these ideas is found below in the following section on emotions and subjective 
factors in conversion. 
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dangers, play a large role in his theology generally and conversion specifically. As was 
apparent in our previous discussion of knowledge, true knowledge cannot be mere 
speculative knowledge, but always involves the heart, and always is accompanied by an 
affective response. “In the Scriptures, knowledge is not mere intellectual apprehension. It 
includes that but more. It includes also the proper apprehension not only of the object, 
but of its qualities.” True knowledge involves feeling. If an object has moral or aesthetic 
qualities, then knowing that object “includes the due apprehension of them and the state 
of feeling which answers to them.”119 One cannot know beauty truly and not be affected 
by it emotionally. One cannot know God truly without a response that involves one’s 
whole being, including one’s emotions. True religion always brings with it an emotional 
impact. Conversion, as a transformative event, necessarily involves a change in one’s 
emotional or affective orientation to God, to Christ, to spiritual truths. When Paul 
encountered the true knowledge of God in Christ, he became a new man. “Such also must 
in all cases be the nature of genuine conversion,” Hodge writes. One of the essential components 
of such a transformation is “right affections” or “right feelings.”120 One’s confession of 
Christ as Lord “must be both intelligent [intellect] and sincere [and heart] to consider it 
any evidence of a renewed state.”121 Even an accurate and comprehensive intellectual 
knowledge of Christianity is no evidence of one’s converted state apart from the heart 
commitment and feelings that properly accompany such wondrous knowledge.122 One 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 CP, CXLIII, “The Excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus our Lord” (10/11/1843), 214. 
120 “Such also must in all cases be the nature of genuine conversion. 1. Because the Scriptures expressly assert the fact, 
that the knowledge of God is essential to true religion. Religion consists in the knowledge of God, and in 
right affections and acts. Religion includes, therefore, three things. (a.) Spiritual cognition. (b.) Right feelings. 
(c.) Corresponding acts.” CP, CXLIX, “It pleased God to reveal his Son in me” (4/19/1857), 223. 
121 CHMC, Sermons, folder 21:7, “But by the Holy Spirit,” 1/30/1848. 
122 “The apostle teaches that a man may have the highest intellectual abilities, the largest stores of 
knowledge, and the greatest amount of power, and yet be a reprobate. Therefore the knowledge of the 
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does not establish or protect one’s faith primarily with greater learning. Rather, Hodge 
exhorts that “the great thing is to remember that safety is only to be found in a lively and 
growing state of piety in the heart.”123 One needs to enter more deeply, with one’s whole 
being, into one’s relationship to the truth through a lively piety. 
If it is clear that emotions play a significant role in Hodge’s view of conversion, it 
also needs to be made clear that focusing on the emotions as a means to conversion is in 
stark contrast to Hodge’s approach. For Hodge the emotions represent a necessary 
accompaniment of the process of conversion. No one can experience the change of 
conversion without changed emotions, but changed emotions are not what bring about 
conversion. Conversion is brought about by one’s encounter with new knowledge of God 
through Christ. It is “in the order of nature and of experience” that “discernment 
precedes the change of the affections, just as the perception of beauty precedes the 
answering aesthetic emotion.” What for Hodge is true generally is also true specifically in 
conversion. “The glory of God, as it shines in the face of Jesus Christ, must be revealed, 
before the corresponding affections of admiration, love and confidence rise in the heart.” 
It is the Holy Spirit that brings about this illumination of the truths of Christ in the heart. 
The reception of this knowledge is key to conversion. “The knowledge consequent on this 
illumination is declared to be eternal life.” Such knowledge involves more than mere 
rational acknowledgment. “This knowledge is the intuition not merely of the truth, but 
also of the excellence of spiritual objects.”124 For Hodge, logically the knowledge precedes 
the emotional response, but in reality both are required and “inseparably connected.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
truth; the ability to present and enforce it, will avail us nothing, without inward piety.” CP, CIV, “Now 
abideth Faith, Hope, Charity; but the greatest of these is Charity” (1/26/1862), 157. 
123 CP, LXXXIII, “Strive to enter in at the strait gate (5/14/1856), 128. 
124 Hodge, “Professor Park’s Sermon,” BRPR 22, 4 (Oct 1850), 671, 671-72, 672, 672. 
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The feeling produced as a result of the apprehension of an object or truth “is so intimately 
united with the cognition, as to be an attribute of it – having no separate existence, and 
being inconceivable without it.”125 Although inseparable, the cognition is “the governing 
element.” No authentic religious feeling can exist without cognition of spiritual truth.126 
Thus the legitimacy of religious experience for Hodge is rooted in this spiritual 
cognition of truth. If one’s feelings are rooted in errant cognitions, the feelings themselves 
will not be authentic. As Hodge puts it, “religious experience is, and must be the 
conformity of our inward exercises with our view of truth; and hence if those views are 
inadequate or erroneous, our religious experience must be in like degree defective or 
spurious.”127 Religious experience “is genuine when it is determined by the truth of God, 
and it is false so far as it is determined by error.”128 Errant knowledge leads to misguided 
or inauthentic experience.129 
Although Hodge is accused by some of overstressing the place of the intellect, one 
can still find other points at which his stress on ‘heart’ religion is quite remarkable and 
prominent. Even though he typically gives preeminence to a rational comprehension of 
Christian doctrine as a starting point for the Christian life, at other times he seems to turn 
this on its head. He seems to allow, as was mentioned at the end of the section above on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Hodge, “Professor Park’s Remarks,” 343. Hodge expresses the same idea on other occasions as well. For 
example, “Faith is spiritual knowledge, or includes spiritual discernment. The effect of spiritual discernment 
is holy affections.” CP, XCVII, “Sanctified by faith that is in me” (4/7/1867), 148. 
126 “In this complex state the cognition is the first and the governing element, to which the other owes its 
existence; and therefore, in the second place, the Scriptures not only teach that knowledge is an essential 
constituent of religion, but also that the objective presentation of truth to the mind is absolutely necessary to 
any genuine religious feeling or affection.” Hodge, “Professor Park’s Remarks,” 343. In another article 
Hodge writes, “It is true that there is an inward state, answering to the objects of faith; and it is also true 
that this subjective state is necessary to complete the idea of a Christian… but the inward is due to the 
objective, and cannot exist without it.” “Inspiration,” BRPR 29, 4 (Oct 1857), 693. 
127 “The Theological Opinions of President Davies,” BRPR 14, 1 (Jan 1842), 142. 
128 CHP folder 4:2, Conference Talks, “Coming Unto Christ,” 4/6/1862. 
129 Hodge writes elsewhere that it is “an important truth, that no serious religious error can exist, without a 
corresponding perversion or destruction of religious feelings.” “Lecture to Theological Students,” Biblical 
Repertory 5, 1 (Jan 1829), 90. 
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knowledge, that one may have certain mistaken speculative understandings of religion 
unrelated to or in conflict with one’s inward and pious religious life. He goes so far to 
suggest in more than one passage that the theological content of the devotional expression 
of the inner heart experience is to be preferred over one’s intellectual views. Although this 
appears to elevate feelings over intellect, properly understood it is consistent with Hodge’s 
other statements. One can have speculative beliefs that are not “known” in the deepest 
spiritual sense, but instead are shallow, merely cognitive or rational propositions in a way 
detached from reality. As such they do not produce the related affections. However, such 
a person may have other beliefs more deeply held by the intellect, even though perhaps 
less articulated. To the extent that these beliefs are indeed rooted in religious truths, they 
invariably produce affections reflected in one’s pious or devotional life. The evidences of 
those truths expressed in one’s emotions then become a better indicator of one’s true 
beliefs and a more reliable guide to faith than the outward but shallow assertions or 
“nominal” opinions of a rationalistic and errant theology that fail to reflect “the intimate 
persuasion of his soul.”130  
Some suggest that this emphasis on feelings is largely part of Hodge’s earlier 
writings, and that as his career progressed he moved more toward a stress on intellect and 
the objective. Whatever the merits of such an argument, and there are some, one can find 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 “It is freely admitted, that a man’s opinions may be correct, and yet his moral character corrupt. But in 
this case, these opinions are merely nominal, they form no part of the intimate persuasion of his soul, and hence, are 
no expression of his character.” Hodge, “Lecture to Theological Students,” 90 (emphasis mine). One may 
have to even guard against the speculative intellect. Hodge suggests as much directly in lecture notes on 
“Freedom of the Will, or Nature of Free Agency,” where he writes that in order to choose wisely, “it is of 
the highest importance that our souls should be in a healthful moral and religious state, that our moral and 
religious feelings, which after all are our surest guides, after the Bible, should not be subordinated and 
tyrannized over by the speculative understanding.” CHMC, folder 1:36 (Lecture Notes), n.d. One’s feelings 
and experience actually can be a safeguard against a speculative intellect that can lead one away from truth. 
Hodge, taken as a whole, clearly means by this not that feelings are more basic to the foundation of faith 
then the kind of deeper knowing that we have previously discussed, but only that a speculative knowledge 
can be, in a sense, detached from a person’s core beliefs and knowledge of Christ and therefore unreliable. 
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a very deliberate stress on the place of religious feelings and experience from very early in 
his career until his crowning achievement of the three volume Systematic Theology at its end. 
In his “Introductory Lecture” to seminary students from 1829 one finds a pronounced 
emphasis on religious feelings and experience. Here Hodge argues that doctrinal beliefs 
are tied in critical ways to one’s inner heart, religious experiences and character. “There 
is no sentiment more frequently advanced, than that a man’s opinions have little to do 
with his moral character, and yet there is none more fundamentally erroneous. The fact is, 
that opinions on moral and religious subjects depend mainly on the state of the moral and 
religious feelings.”131 Here one’s doctrinal expressions grow out of one’s character and 
inner being. “A man’s religious opinions are the result and expression of his religious 
feelings.” Thus “heterodoxy be the consequence rather than the cause of the loss of piety,” 
and he urges his hearers to guard their hearts against sin. “Holiness is essential to correct 
knowledge of divine things, and the great security from error. And as you see, that when 
men lose the life of religion, they can believe the most monstrous doctrines, and glory in 
them.”132 
Although one does find at the other end of Hodge’s career considerable discussion 
of the “facts” coming out of Scripture and more objective, external aspects of Christian 
faith and doctrine, he certainly does not leave these earlier ideas behind. As with most 
aspects of Hodge’s thinking, he portrays in his Systematic Theology the same marked 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 “Lecture to Theological Students,” 89. He continues, “Mere argument can no more produce the 
intimate persuasion of moral truth, than it can of beauty. As it depends on our refinement of taste, what 
things to us are beautiful, so it depends upon our religious feelings, what doctrines for us are true. A man’s 
real opinions, are the expressions of his character. They are the forms in which his inward feelings embody 
themselves, and become visible.” 89. 
132 “Lecture to Theological Students,” 94-95, 95, 95. Hodge suggests that one not only check one’s theology 
against one’s own religious experience, but also against the experience of other mature Christians. He 
suggests that theological doctrines may be vetted by “the aged children of God” for their truthfulness. 
“Propose to them your novel doctrines, should they shock their feelings, depend upon it, they are false and 
dangerous. The approbation of an experienced Christian of any purely religious opinion, is worth more, 
than that of any merely learned theologian upon earth.” 96-97. 
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consistency reflected throughout his career. He writes forcefully, “The question is not first 
and mainly, What is true to the understanding, but what is true to the renewed heart?” 
He continues, “The effort is not to make the assertations of the Bible harmonize with the 
speculative reason, but to subject our feeble reason to the mind of God as revealed in his 
Word, and by his Spirit in our inner life.”133 
Taken as a whole, Hodge seeks to keep a balance between intellectual and 
affective aspects of Christian life. He rejects both nominal theological speculation not 
rooted in the heart, and disconnected emotional experiences not grounded in some form 
of substantive spiritual truth. Both expressions of intellect and of emotions ultimately 
stand under the authority of Scripture, by which both must be judged.134 Essentially the 
Christian experience produced by doctrinal theology becomes a test of that theology’s 
legitimacy.135 
What Hodge will not accept is a view of religion in which one somehow “knows” 
spiritual truths through one’s feelings apart from any intellectual understanding or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 ST 1, 16. 
134 Hoffecker writes that for Hodge, “the Scriptures are the ultimate court of appeal. They not only 
prescribe the doctrines of the Christian faith but also explicitly outline the experience which attends belief. 
Because believers are still fallible, this may prohibit a correct intellectual interpretation of the Scriptures. In 
such cases, it may be necessary to turn to the hymns, liturgies, and devotional writings Christians have 
written throughout the course of church history as reflections of their Christian experiences. These writings 
not only exhibit a remarkable unanimity but are in the most profound sense thoroughly biblical in their 
perspective.” Piety, 62. 
135 The role of Scripture and the relationship of intellectual and affective concerns is expressed in this 
passage from Systematic Theology. “The true method in theology requires that the facts of religious experience 
should be accepted as facts, and when duly authenticated by Scripture, be allowed to interpret the doctrinal 
statements of the Word of God. So legitimate and powerful is this inward teaching of the Spirit that it is no 
uncommon thing to find men having two theologies – one of the intellect, and another of the heart. The 
one may find expression in creeds and systems of divinity, the other in their prayers and hymns. It would be 
safe for a man to resolve to admit into his theology nothing which is not sustained by the devotional writings 
of true Christians of every denomination.” ST 1, 17-18. The balancing interplay between intellectual and 
experiential elements is here clearly seen. Also in ST he writes, “Although the inward teaching of the Spirit, 
or religious experience, is no substitute for an external revelation, and is no part of the rule of faith, it is, 
nevertheless, an invaluable guide in determining what the rule of faith teaches.” ST 1, 16. All of these 
passages come in the same section as the much maligned passages on Scripture as a “storehouse of facts,” 
etc. Later in ST, Hodge confirms again that one’s holiness is also inseparably connected to the objective 
content of the faith. “The Bible everywhere assumes that without truth there can be no holiness; that all 
conscious exercises of spiritual life are in view of truth objectively revealed in the Scriptures.” ST 1, 177. 
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content. For Hodge such a view is represented in the views of Friedrich Schleiermacher 
and those who follow in his shadow. Hodge believes that Schleiermacher and his disciples 
place subjective feeling at the base of theology. He thinks this wrong because “it proceeds 
upon a wrong view of religion in general and of Christianity in particular. It assumes that 
religion is a feeling, a life. It denies that it is a form of knowledge, or involves the 
reception of any particular system of doctrine.”136 He sees this as a growing divide in the 
theological circles of his day. “The question which lies at the foundation of much of the 
modern discussions on the nature of theology concerns the relation between feeling and 
knowledge. According to one view, feelings determine our knowledge; according to the 
other knowledge determines feelings.” Hodge explains how he understands the former 
approach. “Those who adopt the former theory deny that religion is a form of knowledge, 
or that revelation insists in communicating knowledge to the mind.… Religion consists in 
feeling. The ultimate feeling is a sense of dependence. This exists in all men.” Through 
this feeling one gains “an intuition of its object.”137 The role of the understanding in such 
a scheme is to organize and interpret these “vague, general, unrelated” truths that have 
been intuitively apprehended through the feelings. In such a view there is no objective 
religious knowledge, but only the awakening and interpretation of religious consciousness. 
When addressing such alternative approaches to Christian faith and content 
Hodge tends to be most direct in clarifying how he understands the relationship between 
subjective and objective aspects of Christianity. “The idea that Christianity is a form of 
feeling, a life, and not a system of doctrines, is contrary to the faith of all Christians. 
Christianity always has had a creed. A man who believes certain doctrines is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136 ST 1, 176. 
137 CHMC, folder 11:14, “True Office of Reason,” n.d. 
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Christian… It is true that there is an inward state, answering to the objects of faith; and it 
is also true that this subjective state is necessary to complete the idea of a Christian… but 
the inward is due to the objective, and cannot exist without it.”138 Distinctive Christian 
doctrine is essential to Christian life. “No mistake can be greater than to divorce religion 
from truth, and make Christianity a spirit or life distinct from the doctrines which the 
Scriptures present as the objects of faith.”139 
If Hodge is critical of those who overemphasize religious feelings as the foundation 
of Christianity, he is likewise critical of those who move too far in the other direction, 
overemphasizing a rationalistic, intellectually driven view of faith that is divorced from 
the feelings and affections. This should already be apparent from our previous discussions, 
but it should be mentioned that Hodge is particularly critical of Charles Finney on just 
this point. It is rather ironic that Finney, who used all variety of “new measures” and was 
accused by others of using emotionally driven techniques to bring hearers to a conversion 
experience, should be accused by Hodge, who so many see as overly intellectualist, of 
failing to give proper regard to religious emotion and experience. If Hodge is right, then 
the charge of rationalism or intellectualism so often thrown at Princeton might better be 
applied to Finney. Hodge’s assessment of Finney in this regard is clear in his review of 
Finney’s Lectures on Systematic Theology, which Hodge reviewed in BRPR in 1847. One of 
Hodge’s fundamental objections to the book is to Finney’s mode of argument, in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 “Inspiration,” 693. Hodge makes the same point in his lengthy interactions with Edward Amasa Parks a 
few years earlier. “It is not a matter of indifference what men believe, or in what form right feeling expresses 
itself. There can be no right feeling but what is due to the apprehension of the truth.” “Professor Park’s 
Remarks,” 343. 
139 ST 1, 179. Hoffecker suggests that Hodge’s strong critique of experience at times and his at times 
excessive stress on the objective is a reaction to trends in theology that he desired to counter, including the 
influence of Schleiermacher. “Hodge countered Schleiermacher’s reinterpretation through omission [of 
objective theology] by emphasizing to a greater degree the necessity of the objective element in Christian 
faith. Hodge contended that while it would be incorrect to separate the objective and subjective elements in 
Christianity, it would be error compounded either to exclude the objective completely or to put the 
subjective elements in the prominent position.” Piety, 63. 
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Hodge asserts that Finney “gives himself up to the exclusive guidance of the 
understanding… It is not the informed and informing soul of man, which he studies, and 
whence he deduces his principles and conclusions. He will listen to nothing but the 
understanding.”140 Hodge suggests that Finney does not use reason in some older, 
transcendental sense, but rather the discursive or speculative understanding is front and 
center. Hodge argues that it is not the role of the speculative understanding “to speak 
with authority on questions of religion and morals” because “the understanding, which 
has neither heart nor conscience, can speak on these subjects only as informed, and 
guided by the moral and religious susceptibilities” which “belong to a far higher sphere 
than the speculative understanding.”141 Thus Hodge summarizes his critique of Finney in 
this regard as follows: “We consider it as the radical fatal error of the ‘method’ of this 
book, that it is a mere work of the understanding; the heart, the susceptibilities, the 
conscience, are allowed no authority in deciding moral questions; which is as 
preposterous as it would be to write a mathematical treatise on poetry.”142  
In Hodge’s view then, conversion consists of both the objective and subjective, of 
intellectual and affective aspects. Neither the understanding nor the affections alone are 
instruments of conversion. Any understanding of conversion, or of evangelistic 
approaches, that fail to account for both of them will be considered defective by Hodge. 
In a sermon from 1831 Hodge describes how faith in Christ leads one to a feeling and 
view of his preciousness. “To have him precious we must endeavor to obtain spiritual and 
scriptural conceptions of his nature. We must feelingly believe that He and his Father are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 “Finney’s Lectures on Theology,” BRPR 19, 2 (Apr 1847), 245. 
141 “Finney’s Lectures,” 247-48. 
142 “Finney’s Lectures,” 248. He continues, “the whole history of the church teems with illustrations of the 
fact, that when men write on morals without being guided by the moral emotions; or on religion, 
uncontrolled by right religious feeling, they are capable of any extravagance of error.” 248. For Hodge 
Finney is just one more example of this. 
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one.”143 It is this interesting phrase, to “feelingly believe,” that perhaps serves as a 
summary statement of the place of emotions and intellect in one who would be converted. 
Commonly when describing the components of human existence, in addition to 
the intellectual and emotional, there is a third component – that of the will. What is the 
relation of the will to conversion and these other aspects of human existence? It is to this 
question that we now turn. 
 
The Role of the Will in Conversion  
 
Hodge’s view of the will in conversion is typically Calvinist. That is to say that he 
affirms the typical five points of Calvinism as oft summarized coming out of the Synod of 
Dort as they relate to the operation of the will in conversion. Although these points 
represent an inadequate summary of the whole of Calvinism, they do relate to questions 
of the will and conversion, and their substance can also be found in the Westminster 
Confession that Hodge holds dear. 
As we shall see, due to total depravity, Hodge sees the will as a capacity in humans 
broken by sin and therefore unable on its own to carry out the requirements of holiness 
that God demands. He also sees God’s activity in regeneration as prior to any act of the 
will in conversion and thereby an irresistible act of grace. We are only willing participants 
in conversion to the extent that God first provides us the capacity to be such. The natural 
state of man, standing in opposition to God’s desires, “cannot by any effort of our own be 
changed.” Thus for Hodge, as was also clear in the discussion of the supernatural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 CHMC folder 20:14, “To you that believe, He is precious” (1/2/1831). Italicized emphasis is mine. The 
underlined words are underlined in the handwritten original. 
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character of conversion above, “it is therefore something beyond the power of the will. 
We cannot regenerate ourselves.”144  
Hodge believes that there is a fundamental schism within the theology of the 
church historically. “There have been,” he writes, “two great systems of doctrine in 
perpetual conflict. The one begins with God, the other with man.”145 Much of this battle 
is fought over alternative views of the place of the will, and it is a battle in which many are 
engaged in Hodge’s nineteenth century context.146 
One area in which the battle lines have been drawn deals with just what 
constitutes the bounds of morality. Some confine the basis of morality solely to one’s acts. 
They deny that one’s desires or disposition can, apart from one’s acts, have any moral 
relevance. Only that which follows out of the free and voluntary exercises of a person may 
be the basis of any moral sense or responsibility. In this view morality demands free 
choice, and it is only as one’s will is completely free to choose or reject God’s demands on 
one’s life that one might be held accountable as a sinner before him. Nowhere is this 
choice more stark than in the fundamental acceptance or rejection of God’s offer of 
salvation, in conversion.  
Those who represent this view insist that only those acts which we are free to 
carry out carry any moral sense or obligation. There can be no obligation, it is argued, for 
that which we cannot do. Moreover any idea of a sinful disposition behind one’s choices 
is denied as incompatible with a true notion of free moral choice. Charles Finney is, for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 CHMC, folder 21:25, Sermons, “Regeneration,” 4/12/1856. “Repenting, or turning to God, is a state 
of mind which a man cannot bring himself into by one mere volition. He cannot repent simply by resolving 
or saying within himself, I will repent.” Charles Hodge [?],“The Means of Repentance,” BRTR 2, 1 (Jan 
1830), 114. 
145 “Prof. Park’s Remarks,” 308. 
146 Some aspects of this debate can be found in Allen Guelzo’s book, Edwards on the Will: A Century of American 
Theological Debate (Middleton, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1989). 
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Hodge, a prime example of this viewpoint. Hodge, in a review of Finney’s Lectures on 
Systematic Theology, critiques Finney’s approach. He argues that Finney’s position may “be 
traced to two fundamental principles, viz: that obligation is limited by ability; and that 
satisfaction, happiness, blessedness, is the only ultimate good, the only thing intrinsically 
valuable.” Hodge goes on to quote Finney at length in describing these assumptions. He 
notes that for Finney, “it is a ‘first truth’ or axiom that freedom of the will is essential to 
moral agency, moral obligation and moral character.” Finney uses the term ‘will’ in a 
strict and limited sense as “the power of self-determination.” Hodge argues that Finney 
equates liberty with ability and in doing so moves beyond first truths and argues 
fallaciously by granting as an assumption what is one of the very points in dispute. “An 
inability which has its origin in sin, which consists in what is sinful, and relates to moral 
action, is perfectly consistent with continued obligation,” Hodge argues, on the basis of 
“the instinctive judgment of men,” “the testimony of conscience,” and “the plain doctrine 
of the Bible.”147 Hodge suggests that Finney’s doctrines here lead to the idea that at any 
given moment a person is either wholly a sinner or wholly a saint – totally depraved or 
perfectly holy. For Finney, in each choice we make we are completely sinful or completely 
holy; one cannot by his principles introduce any other basis for moral judgments.148 
Hodge concludes that Finney’s doctrine “rests on a false apprehension of the nature of sin 
and holiness, and of the grounds and extent of our obligations.” We are taught by the 
requirements of our conscience and of Scripture to conform to God’s image, that any 
non-conformity is sin, and that “the law of God exhibits what rational beings ought to be, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 Hodge, “Finney’s Lectures,” 250, 252, 253, 253. 
148 “If the right end is chosen, the agent discharges his whole duty; he fulfills the single command of law and 
reason. If he chooses the wrong end, he commits all the sin, of which he is capable.” “Finney’s Lectures,” 
273. 
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not what they can be, not what they have plenary power at any moment to make 
themselves, but what they would be and would at all times have power to be, were it not 
for their sinfulness.”149  
In Hodge’s understanding, liberty and inability are indeed compatible. The 
question is, can we be both helpless and blameworthy? While some of Hodge’s opponents 
answer this question with a no, Hodge answers with a yes. Far from excusing the sinner, 
“the two sentiments of complete helplessness, and of entire blame-worthiness, are 
perfectly consistent, and are ever united in Christian experience. The believer feels them 
every day.” Even though the believer knows he ought love God with heart, mind, and 
soul, “he feels that no mere efforts of his own, no use of means, no presentation of motives, 
no summoning of his powers, will ever enable him to raise his carnal heart to heaven. 
Does this free him from a sense of guilt? No.”150 Rather the believer acknowledges his or 
her sinfulness and pleads for God’s mercy and renewal. 
Although the debate is an ancient one, what is new in Hodge’s view is that some 
of those answering the question with a no are supposedly Calvinists. Finney himself was 
originally a Presbyterian minister, and there are a growing number of attempts from 
within Calvinism to defend such ideas. For example, Hodge sees the idea that all morality 
must be grounded in free and voluntary exercises as a leading feature of the New Divinity, 
and he attacks their use of leading figures in Reformed history – Augustine, Calvin, 
Edwards, Bellamy, and others – in defending this perspective. In an article from 1832, 
“The New Divinity Tried,” Hodge argues that preaching conversion using these ideas is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Hodge, “Lectures on Systematic Theology,” 275. 
150 “Regeneration,” BRTR 2, 2 (Apr 1830), 285. 
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“fatal to religion and the souls of men.”151 This view of conversion, he argues, virtually 
eliminates the role of the Holy Spirit, and “Christ and his cross are practically made of 
none effect.” From the perspective of Hodge and his fellow Old School Presbyterians, 
“this is another Gospel. It is practically another system, and a legal system of religion.”152 
In the article Hodge proceeds to demonstrate in a lengthy manner that Edwards, Dwight, 
Augustine, Calvin, and others, did not hold to the idea that morality is grounded in 
voluntary exercises, but instead held that holiness and depravity come from a basic 
principle or disposition of a given individual.153 Elsewhere one also finds Hodge 
defending this same notion that morality and virtue are grounded not merely in acts but 
in this prior disposition. In an article on regeneration from 1830 he writes that “the 
common feelings and judgment of men, therefore, do carry moral distinctions back of acts 
of choice, and must do so unless we deny that virtue ever can commence.” Hodge sounds 
just like Edwards in Freedom of the Will (although the references so far he has made to 
Edwards do not include Freedom of the Will, but mostly Original Sin) when he writes that a 
sinner has freedom of the will in the sense that “he has unimpaired the liberty of acting 
according to his own inclinations” and that nothing outside of himself determines his 
choices.154 As a sinner’s disposition is depraved, the sinner desires to sin and is free to 
carry out those desires. 
Those who want to define regeneration as beginning with an act of loving God 
must deny that regeneration involves a change in disposition previous to one’s acting. For 
Hodge, “choice is but the determination of the desire.” If one locates morality in the acts 
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152 “New Divinity Tried,” 301. 
153 “New Divinity Tried,” 279-85. 
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alone, and not in one’s desires and disposition that precede them, then one denies what is 
commonly understood to account for our moral character. What determines one’s choice 
is either indifference, which has no moral character, or some previous inclination, which 
Hodge (with Edwards) argues is the basis for how one understands individuals to be moral 
or not. The real question is not whether one chooses God in conversion, but whether one 
needs a change prior to this choice to make it, a change in disposition that allows one to 
perceive God’s holiness and goodness and hence desire to choose him. As Hodge puts it, 
must there be “a holy ‘relish,’ taste, or principle produced in the soul prior, in the order of 
nature, to any holy act of the soul itself?”155 For Hodge a corrupt person with a broken 
will cannot produce a holy act apart from God’s prior activity of regeneration.156 
For Hodge the very providence of God is at stake in these issues. Hodge suggests 
that a view that does not give God the power to convert people apart from their voluntary 
assent is a God who cannot really guide the universe, and a God in whom one cannot 
depend.157 The irresistible grace of God undergirds the Calvinist understanding of 
providence. The notion of total depravity (and of original sin) is at stake in his argument 
against a human capacity to choose God unassisted and his dispositional understanding of 
sin. 
Hodge is deeply concerned with American trends regarding the will and related 
issues. Writing at mid-century, he comments that “the philosophy, which teaches that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155 “Regeneration,” 291, 296. 
156 In a more technical or precise Reformed sense, for Hodge, the soul is passive in regeneration but active 
in conversion. It is passive in receiving an impression of God’s holiness (only possible by a previous work of 
the Spirit), and active in choosing God as a result. “All that we say is, that it is perfectly intelligible and 
perfectly according to established usage, to speak of the mind as passive, when considered as the subject of 
an impression. If the Holy Spirit does make such an impression on the mind, or exert such an influence as 
induces it immediately to turn to God, then it is correct to say that it is passive in regeneration, though 
active in conversion.” “Regeneration,” 296. 
157 See “New Divinity Tried,” 300. 
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happiness is the great end of creation; that all sin and virtue consists in voluntary acts; 
that moral character is not transmissible but must be determined by the agent himself; 
that every man has power to determine and to change at will his own character, or to 
make himself a new heart; has, as every one knows, extensively prevailed in this country.” 
The effect of this shift in the theological and philosophical landscape “has been to lower 
all the scriptural doctrines concerning sin, holiness, regeneration, and the divine life.” It 
has also promoted an unhealthy individualism in which each person stands alone able to 
will freely their heart and destiny, outside of any impact of union with Adam or with 
Christ. “Everything is made to depend on ourselves.”158 
The issues at stake here are serious enough for Hodge to find an unexpected ally 
in his doctrinal battles, Horace Bushnell. Hodge delivers a surprisingly (though not 
completely) positive review of Bushnell’s book, Discourses on Christian Nurture, in a review 
from 1847. He finds that “the pillars of this false and superficial system” of individualist, 
free, and total self-determination “are overturned in Dr. Bushnell’s book.”159 Bushnell has 
set out to describe a more organic view of Christian conversion in contrast to the popular 
revivalist movements focused on a decisive and emotional event that marks conversion. 
For Bushnell, conversion and character building are processes over time that begin in a 
Christian family before a child has a will of its own. His view that children are to be 
raised in the faith, that Christian formation is a result of human relationships and not 
simply or even primarily human choice, and his denial that adults can simply set their 
disposition acquired in a non-Christian background aside and choose to be regenerated, 
illustrates a process of regeneration that is essentially passive rather than a human act. His 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” 522. 
159 “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” 522. 
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view finds a welcome ear in Hodge.160 Hodge describes Bushnell’s book as having “the 
avowal of most important truths, truths which sound Presbyterians have ever held dear.” 
Of these truths that Bushnell affirms, Hodge lists: “Happiness is not the chief good; virtue 
does not consist entirely in acts, but is a state of being; men are not isolated individuals, 
each forming his own character by the energy of his will; moral character is transmissible, 
may be derived passively on the one hand by birth from Adam, and on the other, by 
regeneration; when sin enters the soul it is a bondage, from which it cannot deliver itself, 
redemption must come from God.”161 All of these “comprehensive truths” support 
Hodge’s understanding of conversion and the place of the will in it.162 
There are many times, and not only in regeneration, when Scripture and 
conscience require of us that which we cannot will. But “inability does not destroy, or 
even weaken our obligation.” Although in these situations we are in a helpless state in 
which “we cannot change our hearts or in our own strength turn to God, we can 
acknowledge our weakness and seek help from God, as did the blind and the deaf.”163 
Those who seek conversion are to come to Christ helpless, seeking his healing. “Coming 
to Christ is essential to salvation.… It is the thing, and the precise, definite thing which 
the awakened sinner should be exhorted to do. He is not to be directed to submit, nor to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 Although Hodge is very critical of Bushnell’s notion that this is all an organic, natural, (i.e. not a 
supernatural) process of regeneration. 
161 “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” 524. 
162 Hodge adds that Bushnell is surprised to find himself agreeing with them and wants to distance himself 
from such Presbyterian viewpoints. Hodge does not know whether Bushnell will venture further into the 
light, or “go back into thicker darkness,” though Hodge fears the latter. “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” 
524. 
163 CP, LXXXVI, “My Son, give me thy heart” (10/5/1862), 132. 
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make choice of God, nor to change his purpose.” To come to Christ is to draw near to 
him and “apply to him for salvation,” with the expectation of healing and pardon.164 
The Christian life still involves the will and human intentions. It just does not 
involve them in a salvific manner. Hodge writes more than once on Philippians 2:12 and 
the meaning of working out one’s salvation. Working out one’s salvation “does not imply 
that we can merit it,” nor “that we can effect it.” However, we still have an agency in this 
salvific process. “The work is obedience. 1. To the gospel. 2. To the prescribed means of 
grace. 3. To all the commands of God.”165 God helps us in this process. In this relation of 
divine and human work, “the human is subordinate and instrumental; the divine, 
controlling and efficient.”166 
Sometimes Hodge, evidently fearful of antinomianism, can word his exhortations 
to work out one’s salvation in ways that in isolation might even be taken for works 
righteousness. In one sermon on Philippians 2:12, he writes that “salvation is to be attained 
only by working.” So “it is not a matter of course that men are saved because Christ has 
purchased redemption for them.”167 Elsewhere he writes, “If a man called to run a race 
saunters along and puts forth no effort, he will not win the prize. And just as surely, if we 
take religion thus easy and make no strenuous exertion, we shall fail of eternal life.”168 Or 
again, “we must take an active part” in this struggle between flesh and Spirit. “We must 
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164 CP, LXXXIV, “Coming to Christ” (12/7/1856), 128, 129. A sense of want or conviction of sin, that no 
one but Christ can save us, and that Christ is willing to save us, is needed before one can come to Christ. 
128-29. Making more clear the relation of this coming to God’s activity, Hodge adds, “The Scriptures teach, 
1. That all are invited to come. 2. That all the elect do come. 3. That coming is essential. 4. That it is the 
very thing to be done. 5. That none who come shall be cast out. 6. That the reason why men do not come is 
their unwillingness. 7. That divine assistance is necessary.” 129. 
165 CP, LXXXIX, “Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling” (9/18/1853), 135. 
166 CP, LXXXIX, “Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling” (9/18/1853), 136. 
167 CP, LXXXVIII, “Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling” (4/6/1856), 133. 
168 CP, XCV, “The Christian Race” (3/29/1857), 144. 
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inactive; we cannot change from one side to the other.… Unless we are successful in 
actually slaying, putting to death the evil principle, we shall perish eternally.”169 Later in 
the same Philippians sermon above, however, he qualifies and clarifies his statement. 
“Working must be directed to a right end; not to making atonement for our sins; not to 
meriting salvation by our good works. These are the two great errors of all false religions.” 
Instead, “the end of our working is to obtain an interest in Christ and to bring our hearts 
and lives into conformity with the will of God. This is a great work, and one absolutely 
necessary. If a man thinks it enough to believe in Christ and then live as he pleases, he 
turns the grace of God into licentiousness, and lays up wrath against the day of wrath.”170 
We do not have a context for what specifically prompts Hodge to address particular 
concerns in his various conference talks, but it is not a great stretch to think that Hodge is 
concerned with popular revivalist methods that overemphasize a momentary conversion 
event (that may or may not be authentic), ignoring a process of Christian growth and 
sanctification that evidences true conversion.171 Whatever his motivation for stressing an 
active role in salvation, it is clear from his body of writings that by this is not intended any 
notion that one’s works or willful acts can of themselves bring one to new life in Christ. 
One should remember that for Hodge reliance on God’s activity is not unique to 
discussions of the will. In every aspect of one’s being a person is to depend on God. “We 
have no strength in ourselves.… The man who depends on himself, his understanding, his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169 CP, XCIX, “Mortify the deeds of the body” (n.d.), 151. 
170 CP, LXXXVIII, “Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling” (4/6/1856), 134. 
171 Hodge’s further clarification of this “working” described above provides some hints of his reasons. “Our 
working is not only to be directed to the right end, but it must work, not in accordance with natural religion, 
or asceticism, or enthusiasm, but in accordance with the gospel. If God has devised and revealed a plan for 
saving men, it is only be conforming to that plan we can be saved. Therefore our working must recognize, a. 
The work of Christ, as Prophet, Priest and King. b. The work of the Holy Ghost. c. The efficacy of all the 
means of grace, none of which are to be neglected.” CP, LXXXVIII, “Work out your own salvation with 
fear and trembling” (4/6/1856), 134 (emphasis mine). 
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will, his efficiency, will fail, whether it be in arriving at truth, in living a holy life, or in 
doing good to others.”172 There is a certain artificiality in the above discussions of intellect, 
emotions, and will, because for Hodge, as for his mentor Alexander, persons are to be 
understood in a unified sense, rather then as a collection of independent faculties. Some 
brief elaboration of this notion in Hodge is therefore necessary in drawing the above 
sections to a close. 
 
The Unity of the Self  
 
Even though Hodge speaks of the will, of the understanding or intellect, of 
affections and emotions, in distinct terms, it is important to understand that he does not 
by this intend that one should think of them as separable components of the human 
person. Like Alexander, Hodge rejects a simple faculty psychology and stresses that these 
various functions of a person are all indivisible aspects of a human being. Thus although 
it is necessary at times to speak of these various functions as distinct, one must also 
remember that they are all interrelated.  
Hodge makes this point clear on numerous occasions in his conference talks, his 
journal articles, and his Systematic Theology. In a conference talk from 1843 he writes, “the 
analysis of our faculties into our cognitive powers, into our susceptibilities and will, 
thought, feeling and volition, may be important to the understanding and classification of 
the phenomena of our nature; but these faculties are neither independent nor distinct.” 
Though at times one may speak as though they are distinct, ultimately even in function 
they are indivisible. “The exercise of the one includes the exercise of the other. There is 	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always an exercise of will in thought, and an exercise of feeling in cognition.”173 This view 
is also found in his 1850 article, “The Theology of the Intellect and that of the Feelings,” 
(“Professor Park’s Sermon”) where Hodge writes that Scripture “never recognizes that 
broad distinction between the intellect and the feelings which is so often made by 
metaphysicians. It regards the soul as a perceiving and feeling individual subsistence, 
whose cognitions and affections are not exercises of distinct faculties, but complex states 
of one and the same subject.”174 In his Systematic Theology near the end of his career he 
writes that the Bible assumes “the unity of our inward life. The Scriptures do not 
contemplate the intellect, the will, and the affections, as independent, separable elements 
of a composite whole. These faculties are only different forms of activity in one and the 
same subsistence.”175 Thus one can see clearly that even though Hodge at times may refer 
to the understanding or the feelings or the will as though they are separate, this is an 
explanatory device only and not a statement of some metaphysical or substantial division 
of an individual’s makeup. 
What Hodge believes is true generally about the unity of human functions he also 
believes accurate as it relates specifically to conversion. “The intellect and heart are not 
two distinct faculties to be separately affected or separately renewed. There is a divine 
operation of which the whole soul is the subject.”176 If the soul is always described as a 
unity in Scripture, then all aspects of that soul are renewed at conversion. The soul does 
not have good parts and bad parts. “Regeneration secures right knowledge as well as right 
feeling; and right feeling is not the effect of right knowledge, nor is right knowledge the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 CP, CXLIII, “The Excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus our Lord” (10/11/1843), 214. 
174 “Professor Park’s Sermon,” 671. (The three articles interacting with Professor Park are known by more 
than one name.) 
175 ST III, 16. Later he writes that there are no distinct substances in the operation of our interior life; “this 
is inconsistent with the unity of our interior life which the Scriptures constantly assume.” ST III, 18. 
176 “Professor Park’s Sermon,” 672. 
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effect of right feeling. The two are the inseparable effects of a work which affects the 
whole soul.”177 As was seen earlier in the discussion of knowledge, salvific faith in Christ is 
not merely propositional assent. “The faith which is required for salvation, is an act of the 
whole soul, of the understanding, of the heart, and of the will.”178 
Hodge’s thoughts on this subject, as on so many others, often come to light in his 
interactions with opponents of one form or another. It is clearly seen in his exchange in 
multiple articles with Edwards Amasa Park. Park argues for two forms of theology, one 
based on intellect and another on feeling, and suggests that they may not always agree. 
Figurative scriptural language, for example, may appear false to the intellect and true to 
the feelings. Hodge argues vigorously against this idea. When figurative language is 
understood properly “it never expresses what is false to the intellect.” One cannot set 
feelings and intellect in opposition in this fashion. If the text “presented any conception 
inconsistent with the truth it would grate on the feelings, as much as it would offend the 
intellect.”179 Hodge argues that Park’s theory “seems to us to be founded on a wrong 
psychology.”180 He improperly divides the soul of the human into distinct faculties of 
feeling and intellect instead of addressing a united person. One cannot dice up a person 
as Park’s theory presumes to do.181 Park’s theology “assumes not that the soul can 
perceive one way at one time and another way at another time, which all admit, but that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 He adds, “The doctrine that regeneration is a change affecting only one of the faculties of the soul has its 
foundation entirely outside of the Scriptures. It is simply an inference from a particular psychological theory, 
and has no authority in theology.” ST III, 36. 
178 ST III, 91. 
179 “Professor Park’s Sermon,” 652. “The feelings demand truth in their object; and no utterance is natural 
or effective as the language of emotion, which does not satisfy the understanding.” 652. 
180 “Professor Park’s Sermon,” 660. 
181 “From the very nature of affection in a rational being, the intellectual apprehension of its object, is 
essential to its existence. You cannot eliminate the intellectual element, and leave the feeling. The latter is 
but an attribute of the former, as much as form or colour is an attribute of bodies. It is impossible therefore that 
what is true to the feelings should be false to the intellect.” “Professor Park’s Sermon,” 661 (emphasis mine). “The 
point which we wish now to urge is that the theory of Professor Park assumes a greater difference in the 
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the feelings perceive in one way and the intellect in another; the one seeing a thing as true 
while the other sees it to be false.” The resulting contradictions become nonsensical. “You 
might as well say that we feel a thing to be good while we see it to be sinful.”182 Hodge 
counters that “feelings demand truth, i.e., truth which satisfies the intellect, in the 
approbation and expression of their object.” Even if expressed figuratively, for an 
emotion to express a truth “it must have the sanction of the understanding. The least 
suspicion of falsehood destroys the feeling.” As a concrete example Hodge observes that 
“the soul cannot feel towards Christ as God if it regards him as merely a man.”183 For 
Hodge, “there must be the most perfect harmony between the feelings and the intellect; 
they cannot see with different eyes, or utter discordant language.”184 
It is precisely such false divisions of faculties and the emphasis on particular 
divisions that lead some of Hodge’s other opponents astray. This is especially true, in 
Hodge’s view, of Charles Finney. In reviewing Finney’s Lectures on Systematic Theology in 
1847, Hodge castigates Finney for his sole reliance on a rational human faculty divorced 
from the rest of one’s person. “Nothing but error can result from this absolute divorce of 
one faculty of the soul from the others; and especially from setting the intelligence in a 
state of perfect isolation, and then making it, in that state, the law-giver of man.”185 In 
creating a theology from the result of speculative logic applied to what Hodge considers 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 “Professor Park’s Sermon,” 663. The word “feeling” here is not being used in a physical, sensory kind of 
way, but in the emotional sense of the word. 
183 “Professor Park’s Sermon,” 665. As another example, “It contradicts the laws of our nature as well as all 
experience, to say that the feelings apprehend Christ as suffering the penalty of the law in our stead, while 
the intellect pronounces such apprehension to be false.… Professor Park’s whole theory is founded upon the 
assumption such contradictions actually exist.” 663. 
184 He continues, “What is true to the one, must be true to the other; what is good in the estimation of the 
one, must be good also to the other.” “Professor Park’s Sermon,” 672. “All religious language false to the 
intellect is profane to the feelings and a mockery of God.” 665. 
185 Hodge, “Finney’s Lectures,” 249. 
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false initial assumptions, Finney has created a house of cards.186 Finney’s theology text 
serves “as an illustration of the abject slavery to which the understanding, when divorced 
from the Bible, and from the other constituents of our nature, reduces those who submit 
themselves to its authority.” The understanding, according to Hodge, “cannot be 
divorced from the other faculties, and act alone, and give the law to them, as a separate 
power.”187 As unified beings at our core, “conscience is intelligent, feeling is intelligent, 
the soul is an intelligent and feeling agent, and not like a threefold cord, whose strands 
can be untwisted and taken apart. It is one indivisible substance, whose activity is 
manifested under various forms, but not through faculties as distinct from each other as 
the organ of sight is from that of hearing.”188 With what Hodge considers to be such a 
fundamentally flawed methodology, Finney’s book is both misguided and destructive. 
If Finney overemphasizes rationality, Hodge finds Schleiermacher and his 
disciples on the other end of the spectrum, stressing the place of an independent faculty of 
feeling in guiding theology rather than any objective revelation of God. Hodge again 
stresses that the feelings and intellect should not be seen as independent entities, nor 
should the content of the intellect be determined by feelings. “This is becoming a very 
current opinion, and has been adopted in all its length from Schleiermacher by Morell. 
Knowledge, or truth objectively revealed is, according to this theory, of very subordinate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 “Apart then from the radical error of making theology a science to be deduced from certain primary 
principles, or first truths, we object to Mr. Finney’s work that it assumes as axioms contested points of 
doctrine; and that it makes the mere understanding, as divorced from the other faculties, the law-giver and 
judge on all questions of moral and religious truth. The result is that he has produced a work, which though 
it exhibits singular ability for analysis and deduction, is false as to its principles and at variance with 
scripture, experience and the common consciousness of men.” “Finney’s Lectures,” 249. 
187 “Finney’s Lectures,” 276, 248. Elsewhere Hodge writes, “Reason is neither the source nor the standard 
of divine truth.” CP, LXXV, “Salvation by Grace” (3/20/1853), 116. 
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importance.”189 For Hodge, using these false divisions of human existence leads to 
rationalism on the one hand and mysticism on the other. Finney leans entirely on the 
intellect of a wrongly divided self, Schleiermacher entirely on the feeling, and Park 
attempts to work both sides independently.190 Hodge desires to acknowledge both the 
place of mystery and of objective content in describing Christianity, a unified view of 
objective and subjective factors – of intellect, of feeling, of affections, of will, of all the 
complexity that makes for a whole human being. Whether Hodge is always successful in 
practice of this integrated approach is another question, but in theory this is where he 
stands. 
 
The Means of Conversion 
 
Although Hodge clearly sees conversion as rooted in a supernatural act, he still 
recognizes that there are means which God provides as avenues to conversion. In God’s 
dealing with humankind generally, he uses means in such a way as not to violate an 
individual’s natural capacities and processes. As Hodge puts it, “As God does not violate 
natural laws, so neither does he violate the laws of our rational and moral constitution, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 “Professor Park’s Sermon,” 670. 
190 In spite of Park’s emphasis at times on feeling, his emphasis on an independent intellect can, according 
to Hodge, lead him to rationalism. Thus, for example, Hodge argues that Parks’ view of redemption is 
“characteristically rational. It seeks to explain every thing so as to be intelligible to the speculative 
understanding. The former is confessedly mysterious. The Apostle pronounces the judgment of God to be 
unsearchable and his ways past finding out, as they are specially exhibited in the doctrines of redemption, 
and in the dispensations of God toward our race. The origin of sin, the fall of man, the relation of Adam to 
his posterity, the transmission of his corrupt nature to all descended from him by ordinary generation, the 
consistency of man’s freedom with God’s sovereignty, the process of regeneration, the relation of the 
believer to Christ, and other doctrines of the like kind, do not admit of ‘philosophical explanation.’ They 
cannot be dissected and mapped off so as that the points of contact and mode of union with all other known 
truths can be clearly understood; nor can God’s dealings with our race be all explained on the common-
sense principles of moral government. The system which Paul taught was not a system of common sense, 
but of profound and awful mystery.” “Professor Park’s Remarks,” 317-18. 
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nor does he disregard them.” God uses natural causes to create rain and provide a 
harvest; he does not simply call them into existence each time. So too, God does not 
“govern his people by blind impulses,” but rather “he uses appropriate means” in 
working within them to guide their will and actions.191 
Hodge asserts that in conversion, as in God’s dealings with humanity more 
generally, God does not simply overpower or somehow magically change an individual, 
but uses means. “This divine, supernatural influence to which all true religion is to be 
referred, always acts in a way congruous to the nature of the soul, doing it no violence, 
neither destroying nor creating faculties, but imparting and maintaining life by contact or 
communion with the source of all life.” This divine influence is given through “the use of 
appropriate means, of means adapted to the end they are intended to accomplish. It 
operates in connexion with the countless influences by which human character is formed, 
especially with the truth.”192 Hodge makes clear that the means of grace “are not means 
in the Romish sense, i. e., rites which have the power to confer grace.” Nevertheless, the 
means of grace “are appointed by God for the purpose of conveying grace, and which he 
has promised to attend by his divine influence. This supposes that God works by 
means.”193 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 CP, CXX, “As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God” (10/18/1874), 181. 
192 Hodge, “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” 517. Elsewhere Hodge writes that God works in the material 
world by means in “sustaining and guiding those laws [of matter] to intelligent ends.” CP, CXC, “The 
Word of God as a Means of Grace” (11/30/1856), 286. He works by means “in the intellectual world, in 
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life.” 286. 
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What does Hodge understand to be the means of conversion? On several 
occasions Hodge describes these means as those of the word, sacraments, and prayer.194 
Even when Hodge considers the dramatic conversion of Paul on the road to Damascus, 
he finds that it involved means. Though Paul’s conversion was without preparation or 
human instrumentality, the means of this change was “the revelation of Christ,” the living 
Word.195 
Hodge argues that while it is wrong to depreciate the importance of means, it is 
also wrong to attribute “an inherent efficacy to these means.”196 The means of grace are 
not magical. They are not efficacious in and of themselves. They are no guarantor of the 
reception of grace. “They are not uniformly successful.”197 “Their efficacy,” Hodge tells 
us, “is due to the attending power of the Spirit.”198 Thus even though prayer is “one of 
the appointed means of supernatural, divine communications to the soul from God,” God 
comes to us in prayer at his option, and we should seek out God in prayer the proper way, 
“through Christ and the Spirit.”199 No means are effective without God’s presence.200 
In discussing the conversion of children Hodge seems to make some special 
allowances. God has a special love for children.201 Hodge considers at length Bushnell’s 
book on Christian nurture specifically in part due to this concern for how children are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 For example, “The means of grace are the means appointed and employed in applying to men the 
benefits of redemption. These are the word, the sacraments and prayer; or more properly, the word and 
sacraments.” CP, CLXXXIX, “The Means of Grace” (3/6/1853), 285. The means of grace are “the word, 
sacraments and prayer. There are no others.” CP, CXC, “The Word of God as a Means of Grace” 
(11/30/1856), 287. “The means of regeneration are the word and sacraments.” CP, XC, “Regeneration” 
(3/12/1854), 136. 
195 CP, XCIII, “Lord, What Wilt Thou Have Me to Do?” (1/18/1852), 136. See also CP, LXXVII, “The 
Conversion of Paul” (10/28/1866), 119. 
196 CP, CLXXXIX, “The Means of Grace” (3/6/1853), 285. 
197 CP, XC, “Regeneration” (3/12/1854), 136. 
198 CP, CLXXXIX, “The Means of Grace” (3/6/1853), 285. 
199 CHMC, folder 24:75, “Prayer as a Means of Grace” (9/18/1859). 
200 CP, CXC, “The Word of God as a Means of Grace” (11/30/1856), 287. 
201 “Sabbath-School Children,” 29. 
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best brought to conversion. In the article Hodge defends a form of covenantal theology in 
which promises to believers include their children.202 One of the great truths Hodge finds 
in Bushnell’s book is that “parental nurture, or Christian training, is the great means for 
the salvation of the children of the church.” In writing this, Hodge recognizes “the native 
depravity of children, the absolute necessity of their regeneration by the Holy Spirit, 
[and] the inefficiency of all means of grace without the blessing of God.” But he also 
believes that both Scripture and experience demonstrate “that early, assiduous and 
faithful religious culture of the young, especially by believing parents, is the great means 
of their salvation.”203 Unlike adults, Hodge argues that, at least for children of the 
covenant (baptized), they are best brought up as members of the visible family of God and 
taught God’s love for them. He terms this “the appointed, the natural, the normal and 
ordinary means by which the children of believers are made truly the children of God.” 
As such “consequently this is the means which should be principally relied upon, and 
employed, and that the saving conversion of our children should in this way be looked for 
and expected.”204 Infant baptism plays a key role in the initiation into this covenantal 
family, and it is to a consideration of the place of baptism in conversion that we now turn. 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 In his review of Bushnell’s book Hodge writes, “There is an intimate and divinely established connexion 
between the faith of parents and the salvation of their children; such a connexion as authorizes them to 
plead God’s promises, and to expect with confidence, that through his blessing on their faithful efforts, their 
children will grow up the children of God. This is the truth and the great truth, which Dr Bushnell asserts. 
This doctrine it is his principal object to establish. It is this that gives his book, its chief value.” “Bushnell on 
Christian Nurture,” 509. 
203 Hodge, “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” 509. 
204 Hodge, “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” 510. In the same article Hodge writes that “it is a great 
blessing to be born within the covenant, to be the children of believers–to them belong the adoption and 
the promises, they are the channel in which the Spirit flows, and from among them the vast majority of the 
heirs of salvation are taken.” 506-07. 
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The Relation of Conversion to Baptism  
 
Although for Hodge baptism is a sign and seal of a child’s entrance into the 
covenantal community, there is no direct relationship between baptism and conversion. 
Brooks Holifield notes that Hodge strongly opposes the notion of baptismal regeneration, 
one of the few areas in which he is critical of Lutheran doctrine.205 Hodge in general 
opposes high church sacramentalism, and comments on this on several occasions. This 
sacramentalism forms part of the basis of his opposition to Nevin and the Mercersburg 
Theology.206 Hodge strongly rejects an ex opere operato operation of the sacraments, 
arguing that such views contradict true Protestant doctrine since they attribute to the 
sacraments “an efficacy independent of faith in the recipient.”207  
Hodge suggests that there is a more “plausible” view of baptismal regeneration in 
which there is not “any mysterious power given to the water, or possessed by the 
administrator; but that God has so bound himself by covenant with his church and people, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 See E. Brooks Holifield’s essay, “Hodge, the Seminary, and the American Theological Context,” in 
Hodge Revisited, 122. 
206 Gutjahr writes that "in Hodge's mind, the Mercersburg Theology combined the worst elements of 
Transcendentalism and Roman Catholicism. It taught a notion of a unifying historical consciousness that 
bore a haunting resemblance to Emerson's Over Soul, and it deified the sacraments, giving them inherent 
power that denigrated the role of reason and preaching.” Hodge, 242.  
207 Hodge, “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” 538. Nevertheless Hodge is willing to acknowledge and even 
defend Roman Catholic baptism as valid against severe criticism from his fellow Presbyterians and beyond. 
As Gutjahr describes it, “many Presbyterians began to wonder about Hodge's own theological loyalties 
when, in 1845, he refused to join the General Assembly in denouncing the efficacy of Roman Catholic 
baptism. Questions concerning Hodge's Catholic sympathies arose just when anti-Catholic sentiment was 
reaching an all-time high in the United States. His thoughtful and carefully circumscribed defense of 
Catholicism's sacrament of baptism subjected him to some of the most pointed and aggressive criticism of 
his career.” Hodge, 235. He notes, I believe accurately, what this indicates for Hodge’s theological method. 
“Hodge's defense of Catholic baptism stands as a vivid example of just how important historical precedent 
was to his theological reasoning. Although inevitably influenced by the culture in which he lived and moved, 
Hodge never acknowledged that anything other than biblical teaching and established church traditions flavored his doctrinal 
reasoning. When it came to the issue of Catholic baptism, he argued almost solely from historical precedent. 
Hodge was willing to oppose his brethren on this issue not because he loved Catholicism, but because he 
aligned himself with every orthodox Christian dating back to the patristic fathers in affirming that Catholic 
baptism was a valid sacramental form.” 237 (emphasis mine). 
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that whenever and wherever this ordinance is properly administered, he changes the 
heart of the subject by his Holy Spirit.” Hodge considers this view a “far more rational 
form of belief” than the Roman Catholic view. “But here is the difficulty. The Scriptures 
do not teach it.”208 Additionally, there are so many who are baptized who later 
demonstrate no signs of regeneration in their lives.209 Such a view tends “to beget a 
superstitious confidence in a mere ceremony, … and to make both parents and children 
less careful as to training, and less sensible of their dependence on Divine grace.”210 
For Hodge “baptism does not regenerate–is not always accompanied or followed 
by regeneration.”211 Elsewhere he puts it more graphically. “Regeneration is not effected 
by baptism. The effusion of water on a corpse might as well be expected to restore it to 
life, as any outward rite to give grace to the soul.”212 However baptism does serve as a 
sign of the covenant, and of the entrance of the recipient into the family of the visible 
church. Although baptism in and of itself does not effect regeneration, Hodge described 
four results of infant baptism. First, it connects the child to the visible church and its care 
and nurture. Second, it connects the church visibly to the child. Third, “it brings the 
parents into public covenant with God, with his church, and with the lambs of his flock.” 
Fourth, it brings God “into covenant with his people and his church.”213 
Hodge does not elaborate on the place of adult baptism nearly so much as he does 
that of infant baptism. When he does one finds a similar but modified view of baptism 
that, just as for infant baptism, is not regenerative. However, unlike its function for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Hodge, “A Practical View of Infant Baptism,” BRPR 33, 4 (Oct 1861), 687. 
209 “In the vast majority of cases, subsequent life shows most plainly that regeneration did not take place at 
baptism.” Hodge, “Infant Baptism,” 687. 
210 Hodge, “Infant Baptism,” 687. 
211 Hodge, “Infant Baptism,” 688. 
212 CHMC, folder 21:22, sermons, “That Ye May Know” (10/15/1854). 
213 Hodge, “Infant Baptism,” 689. 
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children, baptism is not used for adults as an entrance into a process that may lead to 
conversion, but rather as a confirmation of an adult’s reception of faith.214 Hodge is much 
more interested, however, in the nurturing of baptized children as a means to faith. Such 
a process is almost invariably a gradual one. This leads to the consideration of the 
timeframe of conversion to which we now turn. 
 
The Timeframe of Conversion  
 
In examining the timeframe of conversion one finds Hodge moving against the 
rising evangelical current of the nineteenth century. The widespread revivalism of this 
time often emphasizes a moment of conversion. Hodge counters with an emphasis on 
gradualist conversion that cuts against some revivalist trends.  
For Hodge, conversion, when considered more narrowly as regeneration, is 
always an instantaneous event. Hodge makes this clear on several occasions. 
Regeneration, he writes in his systematics text, is “the instantaneous change from spiritual 
death to spiritual life.”215 Elsewhere he writes that “regeneration is an instantaneous and 
finished product.”216 
Hodge also allows that conversion as a broader term reflecting coming to saving 
faith can also be sudden. When moving “from a state of unbelief to one of saving faith, … 
the change may, and often does, take place in a moment.”217 Faith “may be originated in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 It was part of “the stipulations of that covenant, that his people, so far as adults are concerned, should 
not receive the saving benefits of that covenant until they were united to Him by a voluntary act of faith.” 
ST III, 104. 
215 ST III, 5. 
216 “Sabbath-School Children,” 29. 
217 ST III, 70. 
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a moment.”218 Hodge is critical of those “whose theory of religion does not admit of 
instantaneous or rapid conversions.”219 The apostle Paul is an example of such an 
event.220 Although Hodge allows that such rapid conversions are possible, he does not 
insist that all conversion experiences should be of such a timeframe. He only insists that 
conversion in some form is a necessity for any Christian. Conversion is a process that, “in 
some form or other, with more or less distinctiveness, more or less gradually takes place in 
every true believer.”221 
If there is a wide range of timeframes possible for conversion, Hodge makes clear 
that the norm, and the most desirable timeframe, should be gradual rather than an 
instantaneous point in time. He is forthright about this on more than one occasion. In an 
1861 article he writes that “adult conversions among her own children are not so much 
what the church ought to look for, as sanctification from early life. This corresponds both 
with the nature of the covenant and with the nature of spiritual life, which is a gradual 
development.”222 Hodge’s previously described emphasis on the nurturing of children as 
a means to conversion illustrates his belief that this is the most desirable process of 
conversion. Thus, even though in Hodge’s view Bushnell goes too far in disallowing the 
possibility of instantaneous conversion, a central motivation for Hodge’s praise of 
Bushnell’s book on Christian nurture is Bushnell’s emphasis on gradual conversion 
through Christian nurture.223 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 CHMC, folder 25:1, “What Shall I Do to be Saved?” (9/30/1860). 
219 CP, CCXXV, “Revivals of Religion” (2/28/1858), 339. 
220 Hodge writes that Paul’s conversion consisted essentially in “a sudden and entire change in his views of 
Jesus Christ.” CP, LXXVII, “The Conversion of Paul” (10/28/1866), 119. 
221 CHMC, folder 21:7, “But by the Holy Spirit” (1/30/1848). 
222 “Infant Baptism,” 694. 
223 It is “one of the great merits of Dr. Bushnell’s book, in our estimation, that it directs attention to this very 
point, and brings prominently forward the defects of our religious views and habits, and points out the 
appropriate remedy, viz: [f]amily [sic] religion and Christian nurture.” “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” 
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In his review of Bushnell’s book Hodge describes how such parental nurture 
should look over the child’s development and later deliberate assent to a covenantal faith 
at maturity. In such a nurturing process there can be no question of a specific moment of 
conversion. It is indeterminate and hidden. He writes, “it is obvious that in such cases it 
must be difficult both for the person himself and for those around him, to fix on the 
precise period when he passed from death unto life.” Those children who are raised up in 
such a process of nurture and later assent to this faith essentially have no real knowledge 
of a “before” conversion time in their lives. They have been raised as children of God and 
have continued in it. As Hodge sees it, this should be “the appointed, the natural, the 
normal and ordinary means by which the children of believers are made truly the 
children of God.”224 It is sudden conversion, rather than such a nurturing process, which 
is the aberration. 
Yet this is just the opposite of how many revivalists see the situation. Hodge 
contends that “many of the popular views of religion are one-sided and defective.” They 
may overemphasize the supernatural aspect of conversion and hence ignore those gradual 
means God has provided to promote the faith. Those of this ilk may assume that only a 
dramatic or sudden conversion can be effective, and this affects how they raise their 
children. “We see evidence of this mistake all around us, in every part of the country and 
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521. On the other hand, Hodge rejects Bushnell’s insistence on a naturalistic process of conversion and 
rejection of the possibility of instant conversion. He notes that Bushnell directly contradicts Edwards’ notion 
of miracle in regeneration. According to Hodge, Bushnell denies that God works upon humans in any 
manner outside the laws of nature. “He therefore disclaims all belief in instantaneous conversion.… The 
whole tenor of his book is in favour of the idea that all true religion is gradual, habitual, acquired as habits 
are formed. Every thing must be like a natural process, nothing out of the regular sequence of cause and 
effect.” 533. It is Bushnell’s “great mistake” that he does not rest his arguments for Christian nurture “upon 
the covenant and promise of God, but resolved the whole matter into organic laws, explaining away both 
depravity and grace, and presented the ‘whole subject in a naturalistic attitude.’” 535. 
224 “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” 510. 
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the proclamation of the gospel from the pulpit, as almost the only means of conversion; 
and in the disposition to look upon revivals as the only hope of the church.”225 
Hodge does not want to undervalue either gospel preaching or revival. As to the 
latter, “we avow our full belief that the Spirit of God does at times accompany the means 
of grace with extraordinary power, so that many unrenewed men are brought to the 
saving knowledge of the truth, and a high degree of spiritual life is induced among the 
people of God.”226 He praises the “great revivals” of the past led by the likes of Edwards 
and Whitefield and their legacy to the church of Hodge’s day.227 However, he believes 
that in his day too many overemphasize revivals “as the only means of promoting religion. 
So that if these fail, every thing fails. Others again, if they do not regard them as the only 
means for that end, still look upon them as the greatest and the best.”228 This promotes a 
view of the church growing in fits rather than in a more normal steady growth akin to a 
person’s physical development.229 One cannot really know at the time that conversions 
occurring at revivals are authentic and lasting, or even if such apparently dramatic 
conversions actually reflect the true moment of those truly converted. Hodge suggests that 
many who seem to come to conversion in sudden fashion at a revival in reality have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
225 “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” 518. 
226 “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” 519. 
227 “We believe moreover that we are largely indebted for the religious life which we now enjoy, to the great 
revivals which attended the preaching of Edwards, Whitfield, and the Tennents.” “Bushnell on Christian 
Nurture,” 519. 
228 “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” 519. 
229 Hodge promotes this idea here and at other times as well. Referring to Hodge’s book, The Way of Life, 
Gutjahr notes that “using his last chapter to once again decry the passing religious fervency found in 
revivalism, Hodge wrote that genuine sanctified piety was not found where believers ‘pass from convulsions 
to fainting, and from fainting to convulsions,’ but instead, true religion was ‘steady, active and progressive.’” 
205. Gutjahr is quoting from The Way of Life, 294. 
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in the process of conversion for a long time. It is only that they have become more aware 
of this reality that they are able to respond to the revival at all.230 
It must be observed at this point that Hodge’s views here reflect and perhaps 
somewhat grow out of his own experience. As Hoffecker puts it, “Hodge viewed his 
conversion not as a spontaneous, stand-alone beginning of his Christian faith but as the 
culmination of nurture that had begun with his tutelage as a child.” Hodge was nurtured 
in the faith from his earliest youth by his mother, as well as a number of pastors and other 
individuals. During his college years at Princeton he himself experienced a “conversion” 
amidst a campus revival. Hoffecker suggests that for Hodge this “was more of a capstone 
event, culminating all that had preceded and a platform for all that would follow, rather 
than an initiation into a life radically different from his upbringing.”231 Just as Edwards 
had to come to terms with his experience of conversion not conforming to the specific 
Puritan stages by which conversion was thought to occur, so too did Hodge consider how 
to explain the flow of his own life theologically, believing it to be illustrative of the 
dominant biblical model and Reformed practice.  
In his recent biography Paul Gutjahr writes that “while hosts of revival and camp 
meeting preachers focused on the moment of conversion, Hodge and his Princeton 
brethren held fast to an emphasis on piety. Conversion–to be true conversion–had to bear 
certain types of fruit, and this type of harvest could only be judged over a period of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 “As a matter of fact, we are persuaded that many of those who make a profession of religion at a 
particular time, have been born again, and growing under Divine influences long before. The life is only 
more clearly manifested to themselves and others about the time of their professed conversion.” “Infant 
Baptism,” 694. 
231 Charles Hodge, 44. Hodge’s mother and family seemed to view it in similar fashion, the result of a long 
process of nurture rather than a sudden change. His mother “framed Charles’s conversion not as part of an 
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time.”232 Regeneration for Hodge occurs in an instant, but the evidence and self-
awareness of that regeneration can only be confirmed over time. The broader processes 
of growth of faith, of sanctification, and of validation of regeneration are not 
instantaneous. This suggests the next aspect of conversion to be considered, the role of 
experience and how conversion is to be authenticated. 
 
The Authentication of Conversion  
 
For Hodge, the question of one’s regeneration is as basic as asking whether one is 
of God or Satan, of life or death, saved or lost. Thus, rationally speaking, it is an 
important question and one must not be indifferent to it.233 How does one determine 
whether one’s conversion is authentic? What standards should be used to recognize 
authentic conversion in others? First it must be noted that for Hodge judgments of 
authenticity cannot be derived from external standards such as church membership, but 
must use criteria that reflect the interior of an individual. Conversion must be judged 
“simply and solely by our inward state.”234 He also argues that at times it is easier to 
disprove than to prove the authenticity of conversion, that spiritual death is easier to 
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233 CP, XCI, “Evidences of Regeneration” (9/22/1860), 138. 
234 Hodge, CP, CXVI, “To be Carnally-minded is Death; but to be Spiritually-minded is Life and Peace,” 
(3/6/1865), 176. Elsewhere Hodge Hodge suggests that among the people of God there have always been 
two classes. He contrasts the carnal, those who rely on externals, and the spiritual, those who rely on 
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determine than spiritual life.235 Clear evidences against authentic conversion include 
having “a conscious aversion to Christ” or aversion to being a part of his visible church. 
This is evidence that conversion has not taken place, as is not putting oneself under the 
rule of God’s law or living for his glory.236 
Another clear evidence against regeneration is the presence of significant heretical 
beliefs, “the willful rejection of the leading doctrines of Scripture.”237 As was seen in the 
previous evaluation of the role of knowledge in conversion, knowledge plays a key role in 
Hodge’s understanding of conversion. Thus one aspect of the authentication of 
conversion involves the accuracy of the knowledge of the converted individual regarding 
Christ and Christianity. Conversely, an indicator that one has not experienced true 
conversion is the presence of significant heresy. Lacking the fundamental markers of 
Christian belief, one cannot be considered a Christian. However, Hodge does not simply 
rest on an evaluation of theological beliefs as verification of conversion and – as we saw 
above – he insists that accurate knowledge is no conclusive indicator of one’s conversion. 
It is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to indicate conversion. Furthermore, as we 
also observed previously, he does not speak of knowing in a narrow, speculative sense but 
in a much richer and broader way that involves all an individual’s faculties.238 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 See, for example, CP, CCXXVI, “Evidences of a Work of Grace” (n.d.), 341. 
236 Hodge, CP, XCI, “Evidences of Regeneration,” 9/22/1860, 138. 
237 Hodge, CP, XCI, “Evidences of Regeneration,” 9/22/1860, 138. In another talk he says, “heresy, or 
deliberate rejection of any fundamental doctrine of the Scriptures, is declared to be decisive evidence of 
spiritual death.” CP, CCXXVI, “Evidences of a Work of Grace,” (n.d.), 341. By this he means not simply 
error, but intentional, deliberate rejection of orthodox doctrines. 
238 Confessing to a particular Scriptural truth “without cordial assent to its truth” is “no evidence of a new 
birth. It is evident that the confession must be both intelligent and sincere to constitute it any evidence of a 
renewed state.” In all statements of Scripture regarding salvation through confessing Christ as Lord, 
intelligence and sincerity are “necessarily taken for granted. Verbal invocation, or mere formal confession, 
can no more save the soul than outward baptism. It is only when the heart corresponds with the language 
or the act, that the latter has any value in the sight of God.” Such confession cannot be done with natural 
human powers; it requires the Holy Spirit’s work on the heart. CHMC, folder 21:7, “But by the Holy 
Spirit,” 1/30/1848. The kind of deeper knowledge Hodge speaks of in the truly converted “is the fruit, and 
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Hodge often appeals to a general principle that those doctrines that result in the 
richest devotional life or piety are those that are most true. Those who truly believe 
particular authentic doctrines as a result will have deeper piety and richer devotional lives 
than those with flawed doctrines. Conversely, those with the deepest piety and richest 
devotional lives indicate the possession on some level of the most authentic doctrines. 
Experience, or what he also at times refers to as the universal consciousness of man, 
becomes an authenticator of doctrine, or of doctrines truly held.239 What is true generally 
for Hodge here is also true specifically as it applies to conversion. Hodge argues that 
authentic conversion is best verified by its fruits.240 The best evidence of conversion is to 
be found in the experiences that result from it over time. 
Hodge is not here simply suggesting that one’s feelings are changed as a result of 
conversion. Feelings have a decidedly mixed capacity to judge of one’s conversion. Hodge 
himself seems to waffle somewhat as to their value as evidence of conversion. In one talk 
he lists “the exercise of gracious affections” as one of three prominent characteristics of 
true conversion.241 Yet in what is more typical of his views, in another talk he asserts that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
therefore the evidence of regeneration. This knowledge is not speculative. It is not intuitive, but it is spiritual 
discernment, a divine illumination” regarding sin, Christ, the plan of salvation, the moral law, or eternal 
things. CP, XC, “Regeneration” (3/12/1854), 137. 
239 For example, in arguing against a particular theory of atonement, Hodge suggests that it is untrue as it 
goes against “the convictions of every man’s breast,” and the “universal consciousness of men,” as well as being 
contradicted by Scripture. “Beman on the Atonement,” 88. For someone who is at times vilified as a 
Biblicist, Hodge has a surprisingly large role allotted to experience in establishing doctrinal positions. 
240 “By their fruits ye shall know them.… A good tree bringeth forth good fruit. The only evidence of the 
indwelling of the Spirit is the fruit of the Spirit.” CP, CCXXVI, “Evidences of a Work of Grace” (n.d.), 340. 
241 CHP, folder 5:16, “Nature and Evidences of Faith.” Hand-numbered page 18. He expands on this. 
“When this heart is renewed by the grace of God, and brought by faith into immediate contact with the 
affecting objects of the Gospel, a new impulse is given to all its native sensibilities, and these objects 
impressively presented by the Holy Spirit naturally awaken in the bosom a train of spiritual emotions and 
affections, which being frequently exercised, and assiduously cherished, will grow and ripen into the 
permanent maturity of the ‘fruits of the Spirit.’” 19. “These affections and dispositions are the natural 
productions of the Spirit of Grace in the soul, and in proportion to their distinctness, constancy, and 
uniformity, will be his evidence of a gracious state, for when he discovers these in vigorous operation in his 
bosom, he is constrained to acknowledge the finger of God, and acquiesce in them as evidence of that faith, 
which works by love, which purifies the heart, which overcomes the world.” 20-21. 
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it is difficult to use changes in one’s affections or attitudes as evidence of regeneration 
because these exercises of one’s life are often weak, and “because it is so difficult to 
discriminate between gracious and natural affections, e. g., sorrow for sin may be from 
fear,” etc.242 Elsewhere he adds, “The Scriptures assume that a man may be deceived as 
to his spiritual condition” and in examining one’s own condition the “question cannot be 
decided by any analysis of our affections.” It is too difficult a task to determine whether 
feelings and affections are genuine or spurious. “Hence those who are always poring over 
their feelings and affections, to decide whether they are regenerated or not, never get any 
satisfaction.”243 Ultimately emotions are too uncertain a basis to authenticate reliably 
one’s conversion.244 
Those who are truly converted cannot help but be changed. Out of authentic 
conversion flows sanctification – holiness in the life of the converted, a living piety 
resulting in changed behaviors. Conversion results in union with Christ, which results in 
justification, and justification necessarily leads to sanctification. Hodge writes that 
justification is “inseparably connected” to sanctification. Those who would divide 
justification from sanctification misunderstand what has taken place in the life of the 
believer. Only those who are truly part of Christ’s body are justified, and “their 
sanctification is not the ground, but it is the evidence and effect” of one’s regeneration 
and justification.245 True faith results in sanctification.246 It is nonsensical for Hodge to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 Hodge, CP, XC, “Regeneration” (3/12/1854), 136. 
243 CP, CCXXVI, “Evidences of a Word of Grace” (n.d.), 341. 
244 In another talk Hodge suggests that one does not study one’s own emotions or affections to determine 
one’s regeneration, but instead look for “the general and habitual conformity of our mind to the mind of 
God,” for “the habitual conviction that Jesus is the Son of God,” and for “the habitual purpose and 
endeavor to overcome all sin and to live for Christ’s service and in obedience to his will.” CP, XCI, 
“Evidences of Regeneration” (9/22/1860), 139. 
245 Hodge, CP, XCVI, “Justification by Faith” (2/10/1867), 146. The objection that justification by faith 
“leads to licentiousness is declared by the apostle to be self-contradictory. It proceeds on an entire mistake 
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think that one could be converted and hence justified, and not demonstrate fruits of this 
change in one’s life. “What the Apostle argues to prove is not merely the certainty of the 
salvation of those that believe; but their certain perseverance in holiness. Salvation in sin, 
according to Paul's system, is a contradiction in terms.”247 Sanctification cannot be 
divorced from justification, and both flow necessarily out of authentic conversion. This 
being the case, “good works are the certain effects of faith.”248 
While stressing the fruits of conversion for authentication, Hodge also 
deemphasizes the importance of profession for authentication – either of doctrine (as we 
have seen above), or of experiences of conversion. He considers narratives of experience 
to be “comparatively of little account” compared to the fruits of the Spirit demonstrated 
in one’s life.249 He is especially critical of Finney, who was himself very critical of the 
church and clergy, representing most ministers as “carnal, unfaithful and unworthy of the 
sacred office.” Hodge responds that it is easy to criticize and profess true faith in 
opposition to others, but that “our piety is to be tested by our fruits and not by our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of our relation to Christ, through which our justification is secured. We are justified by his righteousness 
only because we are united to him, but if united to him, we are partakers of his life; and if partakers of his 
life, we live as he lives. It is impossible, therefore, that any unholy person, i.e., any one who determines to 
live in sin, or who does not strive to die unto sin and to live unto God, can have any scriptural hope of 
justification. God justifies only the members of Christ’s body.” 146. 
246 Hodge describes sanctification as one of the effects of faith in ST III, 108. 
247 Hodge, ST III, 112 (emphasis mine). 
248 Hodge, ST III, 110. Hodge makes this point on several other occasions as well. For example he writes, 
““The effect of faith is union with Christ. The effect of union with Christ is the participation of his life and 
of his Spirit. We are in him as the branch is in the vine. And this is the indispensable condition of holiness. 
And not only the condition, but the cause or source of holiness.” CP, XCVII, “Sanctified by faith that is in 
me” (4/7/1867), 148. He goes on to insist upon “the active effects of faith; how it acts in promoting our 
sanctification.” 148. Elsewhere he notes that the nature of the union with Christ that results from 
conversion is that of “partakers of his life.” This is “not a mere external or federal union, nor a union of 
sentiment and feeling, but such a union as exists between the branches and the vine, the members and the 
head of the body.” In such a dynamic and close knit relation, sanctification and its resulting works 
necessarily follow. Thus Hodge from this infers ““the folly of those who profess to be Christians and hope 
that they are so, if they are servants of sin.… They must not only desire and strive against it, but they must 
more and more overcome it.” CP, XCVIII, “They that are Christ’s Have Crucified the Flesh with the 
Affections and Lusts” (11/11/1856), 150. 
249 Hodge, CP, CCXXVI, “Evidences of a Work of Grace” (n.d.), 340. 
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professions.”250 Hodge goes on to describe the practical effects of the Oberlin teachings 
and vilification of the broader church, their censorious spirit, disregard of Sabbath and 
Lord’s Supper, disregard for conversion, disorderly church conduct, etc., which 
undermines professions of true faith.251 Professions are just another form of external 
criteria, and are unreliable indicators of authentic conversion. Only the fruits that flow 
out of the inner person indicate reliably the authenticity of their faith. 
The criteria by which one judges the credibility of one’s own conversion are the 
same by which one might judge the validity of the conversion of others, but there are 
some factors which complicate such judgments. For example, one cannot really know the 
hearts of others, or whether evidences of regeneration in their lives are the result of 
authentic internal change by the Holy Spirit or counterfeit faith. Although one is at times 
compelled to make such judgments in determining church membership, etc., one should 
error on the side of grace, since one lacks certainty in knowing another’s inner life. “We 
are often compelled to extend the hand of Christian charity, and the privileges of 
Christian communion to men whom God abhors, and will reject as deceivers and 
hypocrites.”252 Inversely, others may often attribute faith to an individual who is him- or 
herself very uncertain of his or her standing.253 But in either case the criteria for judging 
authentic conversions remain the same; only the degree of knowledge of evidences for 
that conversion varies. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 Hodge, “Finney’s Sermons on Sanctification,” 245. 
251 Hodge, “Finney’s Sermons on Sanctification,” 246-49. 
252 CHP, folder 5:16, “Nature and Evidences of Faith,” hand-numbered page 10. “Faith has its counterfeits, 
which produce effects not easily distinguishable from the genuine fruits of the Spirit.” 10. 
253 Evidence of faith, “though amply sufficient to satisfy others, will furnish in many instances very little 
evidence to ourselves, and hence it not unfrequently occurs, that satisfactory assurance is given to all around 
us, while we are waling in darkness and agitated with doubts and fears.” CHP, folder 5:16, “Nature and 
Evidences of Faith,” hand-numbered page 11. 
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On more than one occasion Hodge gives lists of evidences for regeneration that 
describe with slight variations the criteria above.254 In his book, The Way of Life, he 
summarizes these by suggesting that knowledge and piety are the two key determiners of 
authentic conversion. One who is authentically converted will come to a proper 
recognition of basic truths regarding Christ and Christianity, and will have outward fruits 
that reflect a living piety within. It is this latter point of fruits that is the most reliable 
indicator for Hodge, as it was for Jonathan Edwards before him. 
 
The Permanence of Conversion 
 
Is conversion reversible or does it result in a permanent state? Hodge addresses 
this question directly and indirectly in a variety of places. He confronts the question of the 
permanence of conversion directly in a conference talk titled, “Security of Believers,” 
from 1856. In it he argues that believers are entirely secure in their salvation, and also 
that there will be a correspondence between the true faith of a believer and the impact of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 In one example Hodge lists the evidences of regeneration as 1. “the Holy Ghost entering the soul and 
there abiding as a principle of a new life” which is indicated by “the presence of a source of light, of love, of 
power, of holiness, peace and joy.” 2. By the soul’s capacity to recognize truth, especially regarding Jesus 
and his person and work, 3. The power to conquer sin and obey God and live by his will. 4. “Peace and joy.”  
CP, XCI, “Evidences of Regeneration” (9/22/1860), 138-39. Similarly he writes elsewhere of “three great 
evidences of grace given in the Scriptures.” These are: 1. “The accordance of our inward apprehensions 
and convictions as to truth with the word of God.” 2. Changes in the purposes of the heart from sin to 
purposing not to sin and to grow in grace and in service to Christ. 3. “The outward fruits of holiness. If the 
tree be good the fruit will be good.” This is expressed in kindness, justice, etc., with others, with “strict 
morality in all that regards our duties to ourselves,” and a religious life – of prayer, Christian fellowship and 
worship, and promotion of religion. CP, CCXXVI, “Evidences of a Work of Grace” (n.d.), 341-42. In 
another example, he suggests that the fruits of regeneration are evidenced in three areas: knowledge, 
affections, and a new life purpose. Hodge, CP, XC, “Regeneration” (3/12/1854), 137. In the life of the 
regenerate individual life the guiding purpose is “one whose object is not self, not the world or creatures, 
but God. The definite fixed purpose is to glorify him.” He adds, “We seek our happiness in new objects” 
and “find the duties of religion a delight.” 137. In yet another example he lists three prominent 
characteristics of true conversion: 1. “the interesting light in which he contemplates spiritual objects,” 2. 
“the exercise of gracious affections,” 3. “his firm purpose to trust the Lord, and live to his glory.” CHP, 
folder 5:16, “Nature and Evidences of Faith.” The pages are hand-numbered, and the above three quotes 
are from pages 15, 18, and 21. 
 	  
389 
that faith on their lives, however imperfect. He distinguishes strongly between antinomian 
notions of security that are merely external forms, versus a security which recognizes 
God’s work on the inner person that can never be separated from true belief. As Hodge 
puts it, we cannot “live in sin and yet be saved; because the security of believers is a security from 
sin. This is the great distinction between the doctrine of perseverance and Antinomianism. 
As it is a contradiction to say that God saves the lost, so it is a contradiction to say that he 
preserves those who indulge in sin.”255 The grounds of the Christian’s security are in “the 
covenant of Redemption,” “the work of Christ,” “the indwelling of the Spirit,” and “the 
fidelity of God.”256 These grounds make one’s conversion immutably secure. Elsewhere 
Hodge affirms this. “If we belong to Christ,” Hodge writes, “… we are secure, here and 
hereafter, for time and eternity.”257 The special love of God to the redeemed is 
completely gratuitous, and was given while we were yet sinners. “It is therefore 
immutable. If founded on anything in us, it would continue no longer than our 
attractiveness continued. But if perfectly gratuitous, flowing from the mysterious fullness 
of the divine nature, it cannot change.”258 If in conversion a sinner is justified by Christ’s 
righteousness imputed to the sinner, then “there is no more probability of a sinner’s being 
condemned… than that Christ himself should be condemned. It renders the believer, 
therefore, absolutely and forever secure.”259 It would appear from such statements that 
there is no denying that Hodge sees conversion as a permanent state. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 CP, CXXVI, “Security of Believers” (9/2/1856), 188 (emphasis mine). 
256 CP, CXXVI, “Security of Believers” (9/2/1856), 188. 
257 CP, CXXXI, “Ye are Christ’s” (3/10/1861), 198. 
258 CP, CXXXV, Hope Maketh not Ashamed, Because the Love of God is Shed Abroad in Our Hearts by 
the Holy Ghost which is Given unto Us” (4/26/1857), 203. 
259 CP, CCIII, “The Unity of the Church” (1/13/1866), 306. He adds, “the third effect of this union to Christ, 
which pertains to the individual believer and to the Church as a whole, is security. No man can pluck them out of the 
hand of Christ. All given to him shall come to him, and he will raise them up at the last day.” 307. 
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However, there are in fact other occasions when Hodge seems to speak in such a 
manner as to indicate that salvation may be at risk or lost. For example, he discusses the 
battles that take place in a renewed individual between flesh and spirit, two antagonistic 
principles that coexist in the life of the believer and battle to the death. “If the flesh 
triumphs the result is death. If the Spirit triumphs the result is life.”260 He seems to 
indicate that in such a state of war there may be casualties. He adds that one “must take 
an active part” in this struggle between flesh and Spirit. “We must take sides with the one 
or with the other party. We cannot be neutral; we cannot be inactive; we cannot change 
from one side to the other.… Unless we are successful in actually slaying, putting to death 
the evil principle, we shall perish eternally.”261 Lest one assume that Hodge is describing a 
state of affairs before conversion takes place, he is in this talk clear in indicating 
otherwise.262 How can Hodge speak of a battle in the renewed individual that might be 
won by the flesh and result in death and not deny eternal security – the permanence of 
the converted state? 
In more indirect ways it is also difficult to make Hodge’s position on eternal 
security consistent with some of his other ideas on the original holiness of humans in 
creation. In discussing the original state of humanity, Hodge makes the argument that 
even a holy being could fall or be corrupted. But if an initial human being with a holy 
disposition chose to sin and thereby lost his or her original holy state, and if, as has been 
previously described, the nature of the change of conversion involves no change in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 CP, XCIX, “Mortify the Deeds of the Body” (11/17, no year given), 151. He adds, “By death is meant 
all that is included under the categories of spiritual and eternal death; and by life all that is included under 
those of spiritual and eternal life.” 151. 
261 CP, XCIX, “Mortify the Deeds of the Body” (11/17, no year given), 151. 
262 “In the natural man there is but one principle of life [the flesh]. In the renewed man there are two 
principles. These in Scripture are called flesh and spirit.” CP, XCIX, “Mortify the Deeds of the Body” 
(11/17, no year given), 150. 
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substance but only a change in disposition, then what is preventing a regenerated 
individual with a holy disposition falling again? What is different about the regenerated 
state over and against Adam’s? This is perhaps a rare occasion where Hodge’s renowned 
consistency fails him.263  
These conflicting statements are the exception rather than the rule in examining 
Hodge’s views on the permanence of conversion. They also never arise when Hodge is 
considering conversion directly. In those instances he invariably affirms the permanence 
of the change. He does, however, suggest in his Systematic Theology that there may be a 
form of faith that he terms a temporary faith, in which some may be impressed to believe 
for a time, but later fall away. He considers such a temporary faith to be the result of 
common grace only, and not a supernatural gift of special grace, and hence a faith that 
does not result in spiritual renewal. He contrasts it with saving faith, “which secures 
eternal life; which unites us to Christ as living members of his body…,” which “is fruitful 
in good works,” and is founded “on the testimony of the Spirit with and by the truth to 
the renewed soul.”264 
Hodge affirms the permanence of conversion because he always points away from 
the individual and his or her subjective state and toward the objective work of God as the 
basis for the change, and hence its permanent state.265 He sees such an emphasis as basic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 In my readings I never observed Hodge relating this topic to that of eternal security or permanence in 
conversion, so I can only guess how he might respond. One possible response would be that the work of 
Christ has paid for all our past and future failings and sins, that we are in an era of grace rather than law, 
and therefore the ramifications of our sins are now different. Another answer might be that the ongoing 
presence of the Holy Spirit in regenerate individuals makes a complete fall from grace impossible. But then 
what was the role of the Holy Spirit in Adam and Eve? How is that different? These are interesting avenues 
to explore, but take us too far afield of the current topic to meander down at this time. 
264 ST III, 68. 
265 Thus he writes in ST, “It will be seen that the Apostle does not rest the perseverance of the saints on the 
indestructible nature of faith, or on the imperishable nature of the principle of grace in the heart, or on the 
constancy of the believer's will, but solely on what is out of ourselves. Perseverance, he teaches us, is due to 
the purpose of God, to the work of Christ, to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and to the primal source of 
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to Reformed theology, in contrast to Arminian thought. “The doctrine that believers may 
fall from grace and perish, supposes an entirely different theory of the gospel.”266 Such a 
theory makes one’s salvation dependent “(a.) on whether he chooses to believe, and (b.) on 
whether he will persevere in his faith. Both depend upon himself.” By contrast, “the other 
[Reformed] theory supposes that the work of Christ secures the salvation of his people; 
that faith is God’s gift, and that its continuance depends simply on God’s fidelity.”267 This 
represents part of a deep divide that Hodge finds between Arminian and Reformed 
thinking. 
Ultimately for Hodge conversion is rooted in a supernatural work of God. As such, 
it is not at risk by any actions of the converted. There is no ‘falling away’ from such a 
change. “God knows his own work. And when he has wrought the great effect, when he 
has regenerated the sinner, there can be no mistake about it. The gracious result is 
produced and remains, no matter what the sinner’s thoughts and feelings may be 
respecting it.”268 In Hodge’s view, there are no backsliders. If one could adopt God’s 
perspective and see into the hearts of men and women, one would find there only those 
who have truly been converted and those who have not. There would be none who had 
been changed and then fallen away from the faith or somehow reversed their conversion. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
all, the infinite, mysterious, and immutable love of God. We do not keep ourselves; we are kept by the 
power of God, through faith unto salvation. (1 Peter i.5.).” ST III, 113. He also describes one of the effects 
of saving faith as “security, or, certainty of salvation.” ST III, 110. Hodge refers here not to assurance in a 
subjective sense, but to the perseverance of the saints. He supports his position with an expansive appeal to 
Romans 8, in which he finds the permanence of believers’ union with Christ, the principle of eternal life 
already within believers, their status in the present as sons of God, God’s accomplishment of his designed 
purposes in saving those who he calls, God’s love as grounds for perseverance, and the immutability of that 
love. 110-13. 
266 CP, CXXVI, “Security of Believers” (9/2/1856), 188. 
267 CP, CXXVI, “Security of Believers” (9/2/1856), 189. He continues, “The one supposes that God loves 
us because we love him, and so long as we love him. The other supposes that his love is gratuitous and 
infinite; that we love him because he loved us.” 189. 
268 Hodge, “Sabbath-School Children,” 24. 
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Authentic conversion is a permanent state, and there is nothing that can prevail in 
overcoming it. 
 
A Morphology of Conversion and the Ordo Salutis 
 
Previously, in discussing Edwards’ views on conversion, the Puritan notion of 
particular steps proceeding to conversion – what was termed a ‘morphology of conversion’ 
– was mentioned. Edwards saw those steps as one possible, but not definitive, route to 
conversion. Like Edwards, Hodge accepts that individuals can come to conversion in a 
variety of ways. For Hodge conversion can occur quickly, slowly, alone, in church, after 
much reflection or upon a sudden insight. Unlike the Puritans of earlier centuries, he 
seems to have no particular “morphology of conversion” or progression of common steps 
an individual should follow in coming to faith. While, as we have seen, he has some 
preferences for which processes are best in bringing individuals to faith – a gradual 
nurturing process is to be preferred over a sudden and emotional one – he acknowledges 
that the Spirit may use a variety of processes in bringing individuals to renewed life. For 
Hodge there is even a danger in describing particular steps. “So long as a man considers 
certain feelings as a necessary preparation for coming to Christ, he considers Christ as 
offered to none but those that have those feelings. But when he sees that the offer is 
perfectly gratuitous, that it is no matter whether he has those feelings or not, provided he 
is willing to be saved by Christ, that the only use of these feelings is to produce this 
willingness, then the great barrier is taken out of his way.”269 There is no preparation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Hodge, CHMC, Folder 21:28, “By Grace are Ye Saved,” 2/19/1860. He adds, “Men are not saved 
against their will, but if they are willing to be saved by the righteousness of Christ, they have nothing more 
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necessary for this gift of salvation; it is a free offer.270 The suggestion that there are 
required steps potentially undermines such an entirely gracious gift. 
In reading across his various writings one can see how theologically Hodge 
understands the ordo salutis, or order of salvation. Much of it can be inferred by our 
previous discussions above. For Hodge this order of salvation appears something like this: 
 
Election 
 
Regeneration 
 
Faith 
 
Union with Christ 
 
Justification 
 
Conviction of Sin/Repentance/Conversion 
 
Sanctification 
 
These steps are more logical than temporal. The gift of salvation is a supernatural 
act that is initiated not by human will, but by God’s election. Being at its core a work of 
God rather than humanity is what gives it its security, as has been seen above. It is God 
who elects and God who through his Holy Spirit supernaturally regenerates the sinner, 
who, being dead in sin, can in no way contribute to such a change. Regeneration consists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to do or to experience as a preparation for believing. Justification therefore is entirely of grace, not only 
because the price of our redemption has been paid by Christ, but because we have nothing to do but to 
submit to his righteousness and consent to be saved through him.” Elsewhere Hodge also comments on the 
idea of particular steps. In the article, “Means of Repentance,” Hodge [or an unknown author approved by 
Hodge] says that the path or steps to repentance are not the same for every person, due to varying 
circumstances and personality. See 115-16. 
270 “Christ has performed all that the law of God demands: if we refuse to put our trust in him we perish, if 
we confide in his righteousness we are saved.” Hodge, CHMC, Folder 21:28, “By Grace are Ye Saved,” 
2/19/1860. 
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in “communicating the life of Christ, his substance, to the soul, and this divine-human life 
comprehending all the merit, virtue, or efficacy belonging to Christ and his work.”271 
Regeneration brings with it a basic change to the soul’s disposition, and leads directly to a 
saving faith. Faith is “the first conscious exercise of the renewed soul,” just as “the first 
conscious act of a man born blind whose eyes have been opened, is seeing.”272 Faith leads 
directly to union with Christ and the benefits that this entails.273 Sharing in the benefits of 
union with Christ, one is then justified by the righteousness of Christ imputed to us.274 
Although much or all of this process thus far may be hidden, it comes to the surface with 
the conviction of sin and repentance and outward conversion that is produced as a 
result.275 For Hodge the visible signs of conversion are only apparent after much of the 
process of salvation is already complete. Hodge distinctly insists that faith precedes 
repentance, in contrast to some others. Faith “must precede repentance.”276 Hodge 
describes repentance as “the turning of the soul from sin unto God.”277 Unless this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 ST III, 25. 
272 ST III, 41. 
273 “The first effect of faith, according to the Scriptures, is union with Christ. We are in Him by faith. There 
is indeed a federal union between Christ and his people, founded on the covenant of redemption between 
the Father and the Son in the counsels of eternity. We are, therefore, said to be in Him before the 
foundation of the world.” ST III, 104. Hodge is thus a supralapsarian. 
274 Hodge describes justification in ST as the “second effect of faith” (after union with Christ). ST III, 105. 
Earlier in ST he writes, “Regeneration consisting in the communicating the life of Christ, his substance, to 
the soul, and this divine-human life comprehending all the merit, virtue, or efficacy belonging to Christ and 
his work, – regeneration involves justification, of which it is the ground and the cause.” 25. He argues that 
some (he lists the German Ebrard as one example) wrongly place repentance and conversion before 
justification. 23.  
275 There is a form of conviction of sin that some may have that is not a part of or evidence for conversion. 
This conviction of sin “includes a sense of helplessness…, that we can never atone for our sins,” or “cleanse 
ourselves from pollution.” CP, LXXIX, “Conviction of Sin” (11/18/1855), 122. These various forms of 
conviction “are all natural feelings. They may and often do precede regeneration. They are often 
experienced by those who never are renewed. They are nothing more than a higher measure of what every 
sinner from the constitution of his nature more or less experiences.” 122. Such conviction of sin is necessary 
to conversion, although “no evidence” of it. In this form it is the result of the operation of common, rather 
than special, grace. The means of gaining conviction of sin is the Holy Spirit. “Even in the unconverted it is 
the effect of his common grace. He is sent to convince the world of sin.” 123. 
276 ST III, 41. 
277 ST III, 41. In a conference paper he likewise describes the “essential act” of repentance as “turning from 
sin to God.” CP, LXXX, “Repentance” (2/26/1865), 124. 
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turning is “produced by the believing apprehension of the truth it is not even a rational 
act.”278 Repentance is “a fruit of regeneration, and a gift of the Spirit.”279 In an early 
sermon on repentance, Hodge notes that many who hear the call for repentance “are at a 
loss what exactly is to be done. They seem to wait in expectation of some strange work 
being wrought in their hearts without any exertion on their part: as though it was not an 
active duty which they are thus solemnly called upon in the word of God to perform.” He 
suggests that repentance involves first recalling our transgressions. “Secondly we must not 
only think of our sins, but we must condemn ourselves for them.” Third, we must gain by 
this a sense of our own deep “moral pollution” as compared to God’s great holiness and 
goodness. “Finally the command to repent includes the command to turn from our sins 
unto God.”280 If we know our true wickedness, the last thing we want would be to remain 
in them. Repentance is directed not only to those outside the church indulging in their sin 
with indifference, but also to the people of God, who sin daily and need to practice 
repentance daily. It is an ever-present act of faithful Christian living. 
The final step in this process is sanctification. As previously described, Hodge sees 
sanctification as closely tied to justification and a necessary outgrowth and evidence of 
regeneration. He calls sanctification at one point “a continued conversion,” adding, “If 
the sinner in conversion, under a sense of sin, throws himself in the arms of Christ, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 ST III, 41. This is an interesting comment. The movement of repentance is based on a rational response 
to the truth as it is encountered in the renewal of the person and the new spiritual knowledge that results in 
regeneration. The role of knowledge in conversion is again here affirmed. 
279 CP, LXXX, “Repentance” (2/26/1865), 123. Hodge in this article also notes that the term regeneration 
can sometimes be used in a wider sense for “the whole process of conversion,” as in everything that follows 
God’s gracious activity in regeneration. 123-124. Likewise, Hodge often uses the term “conversion,” as 
previously mentioned earlier, to describe all of the human response that follows God’s act of regeneration in 
the individual. In this way, “conversion is the result and evidence of regeneration.” Hodge, “Sabbath-
School Children,” 23. 
280 CHMC, Folder 20:13, “Repent Ye, for the Kingdom of God is at Hand,” Dec 1829. 
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believer must do it every day.”281 We daily take hold of the same grace by which we were 
converted.282 Although sanctification follows necessarily out of any authentic process of 
conversion, Hodge argues that it “is not, in this life, perfect, but progressive.” Hodge 
believes (with his fellow Princetonians) “that the Bible teaches that at regeneration the 
believer is wholly justified, while in this life he is but partially sanctified.”283 This puts him 
directly at odds with Finney, who argues for a form of Christian perfectionism in which a 
believer becomes wholly sanctified. 
 
The Location of Conversion 
 
By the location of conversion is meant the context in which it typically is obtained. 
Is it to be sought within the church or outside of it? Is it found primarily within a 
corporate experience, or is it an individual experience requiring no corporate Christian 
context? Is it primarily a public or private event or process? One does not find Hodge 
addressing these kinds of questions directly, but implicit in his various views are some 
indications of the direction in which his theology takes these questions. Those directions 
are not altogether consistent. 
Hodge is concerned with an overemphasis on revival as a means to conversion, 
and especially as a sole means. In criticizing revivalism he also criticizes the place of 
sermons and the pulpit as the sole instrument of conversion. In doing so he is not desirous 
to move the center of Christian life and conversion to a location outside of the church. He 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
281 Hodge, CHMC, Folder 21:28, “By Grace are Ye Saved,” 2/19/1860. 
282 “Spiritual life therefore is not maintained by the strength of any principle of grace communicated in 
regeneration; much less by any means of moral culture which the wisdom of men can prescribe on their 
own power as it is maintained by an influence from above, and inasmuch as that influence is graciously and 
gratuitously imparted.” Hodge, CHMC, Folder 21:28, “By Grace are Ye Saved,” 2/19/1860. 
283 Hodge, “Finney’s Sermons on Sanctification,” 236, 237. 
 	  
398 
is very committed to the church, and this is clear in many other comments he makes. He 
is, for example, very critical of Finney and others who criticize the established clergy and 
question their converted state. Further, along with Princeton generally, Hodge specifically 
is resistant to some of the democratizing forces at work within the church in his day. 
Hodge stresses the importance of a trained clergy against the rise of populist Baptist and 
Methodist clergy and lay leadership with little or no training.284 
Still, Hodge, even more so than Edwards, attempts to emphasize certain other 
means to conversion which, though closely related to church life, are not always to be 
identified only with what goes on at the pulpit or within the walls of the church. Hodge 
has a particular interest in spiritual formation and nurture, and believes that this takes place 
in a number of places and contexts. It certainly takes place under the preaching ministry 
of the church, but it also takes place in other arenas within and outside of the church. 
This can be seen especially in Hodge’s oft-stated concern for the religious development of 
children within (and sometimes outside of) the church. This development takes place in 
the teaching ministry of the Sunday School movement, for example. And within the 
Christian home Hodge believes that Christian nurture of children is crucial. As we have 
seen previously, he is even willing to praise the likes of Horace Bushnell on this point, in 
spite of their many significant differences. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
284 Gutjahr writes, “Standing stalwartly against the dangers of democracy run amok was Princeton 
Seminary with its rigorous standards of Presbyterian clerical training.” Hodge, 95. During this time the 
Methodists and Baptists grew enormously with their lower standards for clergy and lay activity. 
Presbyterianism moved from the second largest denomination (after the Congregationalists) at the time of 
the revolution to being bypassed by the Baptists, Methodists, and Catholics by 1850. Hodge, 95-96. Gutjahr 
notes that Princeton stood against such democratizing movements by the heritage of its early professors – all 
from well-established and cultured families, all Federalists of one or another form who believed the 
elite/educated/experienced were most qualified to lead the nation or the church. Its theology also worked 
counter to the cultural trend with an emphasis on God’s (kingly) sovereignty and providential control 
despite any actions of the masses. 
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Thus although Hodge indeed is extremely dedicated to the visible church, one 
cannot fail to notice that much of what he considers crucial to Christian nurture and 
development in fact takes place outside of the church’s formal ministries. Thus there 
almost seems to be two competing strains in Hodge’s perspective, one dedicated to 
Presbyterian polity, and a formal and structured ministerial operation, while the other 
emphasizing the role of nurture in the conversion of individuals in a way that somewhat 
undermines the centrality of visible church institutions and life as the center of conversion. 
The Sunday School movement itself is in many respects the seed of a parachurch 
movement that has blossomed enormously in the second half of the twentieth century. 
The Sunday School movement was a movement away from formal church structures and 
oversight. It melds well with the populist and individualistic overtones of American 
society in the nineteenth century and on into the twentieth. Hodge himself sides with 
parachurch concerns in his battles with the Southern Presbyterian theologian James 
Henley Thornwell at the onset of the Civil War. In the General Assembly of 1860 Hodge 
successfully opposes Thornwell’s arguments against any voluntary Christian societies 
outside of the church.285 
Nothing about the process of conversion for Hodge demands an institutional 
church context. Thus, although he opposes the flattening of church hierarchies by the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285 Thornwell’s credo, as quoted in Gutjahr, was “‘The Bible is our only rule, and that where it is silent we 
have no right to speak.’” Hodge, 291. Thornwell opposed any organized Christian activities outside of the 
church, or any views that lacked specific, positive biblical support. After losing his battle with Hodge, 
Thornwell left the American Presbyterian Church and went to the Presbyterian Church of the Confederate 
States of America, finding this a church more in line with the supremacy of Scripture and church purity. 
On their conflict, see Hodge, 288-291; Calhoun, Princeton vol. 1, 383-84. Unlike Thornwell, Hodge argued 
that there was not only one legitimate church polity. “As long as congregations held to the value of teaching 
God’s Word and emphasizing the Holy Spirit’s role in spiritual renewal, Hodge showed incredible flexibility 
in conceiving what forms different congregations might take.” Gutjahr, Hodge, 286. Holifield notes that 
although Hodge thought Roman Catholic ecclesiology the epitome of bad high church doctrine, he also 
resisted some powerful anti-Catholic forces, arguing against fellow Presbyterians Thornwell and 
Breckinridge that Roman Catholics (although not the papacy) could be seen as part of the visible church. 
“Hodge, the Seminary, and the American Theological Context,” Hodge Revisited, 121. 
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onset of Methodist and Baptist polities, and opposes the rise of lay leadership as a primary 
evangelistic force, there is nothing in how he understands the process of conversion 
theologically that discourages the rise of all these trends.  
Hodge’s ecclesiology only exacerbates this issue. Specifically, the ways in which 
Hodge stresses the invisible over the visible church feeds this same competing vision. For 
Hodge, much of the shift in the location of conversion away from the institutional church 
grows out of his strong distinction between the visible and invisible church. Hodge 
believes that the visible and invisible churches must be differentiated, and that the visible 
church is a church of the wheat and the tares. The visible church is made up of those who 
profess Christ, while the invisible church is made up of all who are truly in Christ. Only the 
invisible church is pure. Because of this Hodge stands firm against any forms of 
Romanism or episcopal views of the church as some form of repository of grace to be 
dispensed to its members, or that equate visible church membership with saving faith.286 
To associate salvation with membership in the institutional church involves a confusion of 
the visible and invisible churches. Only God knows the heart, and thus can distinguish 
with certainty true believers from unbelievers.287 “The external body of professors is not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286 Hodge is critical of views of the church “represented as a store-house of divine grace; whose treasures are 
in the custody of its officers, to be dealt out by them and at their discretion.” “Unity of the Church,” BRPR 
18, 1 (Jan 1846), 150. The problem is that “the unity of the church, according to this [ritual] theory, is no 
longer a spiritual union; not a unity of faith and love, but an union of association, an union of connection 
with the authorized dispensers of saving grace.” 150. E. Brooks Holifield discusses Hodge’s opposition to 
high church conceptions of the church as a storehouse of grace or sacraments as a primary means of grace 
in “Hodge, the Seminary, and the American Theological Context,” Hodge Revisited, 119-20. 
287 Hodge writes, “As God has not given to men the power to search the heart, the terms of admission into 
this body, or in other words, the terms of Christian communion, are not any infallible evidence of 
regeneration and true faith, but a credible profession. And as many make that profession who are either 
self-deceived or deceivers, it necessarily follows that many are of the church, who are not in the church. Hence arises 
the distinction between the real and the nominal, or, as it is commonly expressed, the invisible and the 
visible church.” “The Unity of the Church,” BRPR 18, 1 (Jan 1846), 141 (emphasis mine). Gutjahr 
comments that according to Hodge, “the visible church will always be a mixture of believers and 
nonbelievers, and it is not the duty of the church to discern every person’s heart, but to err on the side of 
inclusion. If a person demonstrated enough outward signs of faith, they could be included in the faith 
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the body of Christ, which consists only of believers. Transferring to the former the 
attributes and prerogatives which belong to the latter, is the radical error of Romanism, 
the source at once of its corruption and power.”288 It is of the essence of Protestantism 
that “we are in the church because we are in Christ, and not in Christ because we are in 
the church.”289  
Understanding the true church as the Apostles’ Creed defines it, as “the 
communion of saints,” Hodge turns the typical Catholic argument against Protestantism 
on its head. He argues that the Protestant church, far from being schismatic, is actually 
more catholic than that of Rome. Its unity exists across denominational lines, rooted in an 
inner spiritual unity created by the work of the Holy Spirit in common among all true 
Christians.290 Protestants thus recognize their Christian brothers and sisters in other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
community. Only God could ultimately judge who was a true member of his church and who was not.” 
Hodge, 211. 
288 Hodge, “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” 538. In the same article he warns that “parents and children 
may come to think that religion consists entirely in knowledge and orthodoxy; that they are safe because 
baptized and included in the church.” 515. 
289 Hodge, “Principle of Protestantism as related to the present state of the Church,” BRPR 17, 4 (Oct, 
1845), 628. “The great error of Rome” is “that men can only come to God through the church, or through 
the mediation of other men as priests, by whose ministrations alone the benefits of redemption can be 
applied to the soul. The reverse of this is true, and the reverse of this is Protestantism.” 627-28. Hodge deals 
extensively with definitions of the church and the standing of the Roman Catholic Church in his article, 
“Essays in the Presbyterian by Theophilus on the Question: Is Baptism in the Church of Rome Valid?” 
BRPR 18, 2 (Apr 1846), 320-344. While critical of the Roman Catholic Church, and especially with the 
papacy, Hodge insists that it be considered part of the visible church, defending his position against some 
other Presbyterian authors. “We admit that Rome has grievously apostatized from the faith, the order and 
the worship of the church, that she has introduced a multitude of false doctrines, a corrupt and superstitious 
and even idolatrous worship, and a most oppressive and cruel government; but since as a society she still 
retains the profession of saving doctrines, and as in point of fact, by those doctrines men are born unto God 
and nurtured for heaven, we dare not deny that she is still a part of the visible church. We consider such a 
denial a direct contradiction of the Bible, and of the facts of God’s providence.” 341. Hodge addresses 
similar themes of contrasting Protestant and Catholic notions of the church in “The Church–Its Perpetuity,” 
689-715. He is more critical of the Roman church in his articles in the 1850s, perhaps in response to very 
negative feedback and suspicion regarding his position on Roman Catholic baptism in the 1840s. The more 
critical tone can already be seen in his 1846 article, “The Unity of the Church.” Other key articles on these 
issues include Hodge’s two part series on “The Idea of the Church, Part One,” BRPR 25, 2 (Apr 1853), 
249-90, and “…Part Two,” BRPR 25, 3 (July 1853), 339-89, and his 1846 article, “Is the Church of Rome a 
Part of the Visible Church?” 
290 Multiple, visible expressions of the universal church are to be expected. But this multiplicity in 
Protestantism does not violate its catholic nature. “There is nothing, in independent organization, in itself 
considered, inconsistent with unity, so long as a common faith is professed, and mutual recognition is 
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denominations. It is those who declare that they are the only one true church that are the 
schismatics. The unity of the church is not in external forms or organization, but in an 
inner, spiritual reality.291 The visible church is thus merely an imperfect and fallen 
reflection of the true, universal church. Thus giving primacy to the visible institution of 
the church and considering membership in it as essential to salvation results in a deeply 
flawed Christian faith and church.292 
These same ideas are at the root of much of Hodge’s criticisms of the 
Mercersburg theology of Phillip Schaff and John Nevin. In his history of Princeton 
Seminary David Calhoun notes that although Hodge praised Schaff’s views on 
justification by faith, he “was disturbed… by Schaff’s ambiguity on the question of how 
we become Christians. Is it by faith or is it through the church?”293 Similarly, Hodge 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
preserved.” “Unity of the Church,” 144. “The unity of the church is not violated by such separation.” 144. 
Rather “as all really united to Christ are the true church, so all who profess such union by professing to 
receive his doctrines and obey his laws, constitute the professing or visible church. It is plain therefore that 
the evangelical are the most truly catholic, because, embracing in their definition of the church all who 
profess the true religion, they include a far wider range in the church catholic, than those who confine their 
fellowship to those who adopt the same form of government, or are subject to the same visible head.” 145. 
291 “The bond of union may be spiritual. There may be communion without external organized union. The 
Church, therefore, according to this view, is not essentially a visible society.” Hodge, “Idea of the Church, 
Part One,” 250. Union with Christ through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit is “an union far more real, a 
communion far more intimate, than subsists between the members of any visible society as such.” 250. He 
later details the characteristics of this unity. “The unity of the Church is threefold. 1. Spiritual, the unity of 
faith and communion. 2. Comprehensive; the Church is one as it is catholic, embracing all the people of 
God. 3. Historical; it is the same Church in all ages. In all these senses, the Church considered as the 
communion of saints, is one; in no one of these senses can unity be predicated of the Church as visible.” 270. 
292 “No sprinkling priest, no sacrificial or sacramental rite can be substituted for the immediate access of the 
soul to Christ, without imminent peril of salvation.” Hodge, “Unity of the Church,” 156. Wherever the 
Ritual church has prevailed, “it has perverted religion. It has introduced idolatry. It has rendered men 
secure in the habitual commission of crime. It has subjected the faith, the conscience, and the conduct of 
the people to the dictation of the priesthood. It has exalted the hierarchy, saints, angels, and the Virgin 
Mary into the place of God, so as to give a polytheistic character to the religion of a large part of 
Christendom.” 157. The ritual theory of the church “makes the church so prominent that Christ and the 
truth are eclipsed. This made Dr. Parr call the whole system Churchianity, in distinction from Christianity.” 
149-50. An even harsher assessment of the results of Roman ecclesiology is given by Hodge in “The Idea of 
the Church, Part Two,” 384. 
293 Princeton vol. 1, 309. Calhoun details Hodge’s responses to Nevin and Schaff and the Mercersburg 
theology on 307-12. Calhoun is mistaken, however, in attributing this ambiguity to Schaff. Hodge was in 
this regard responding to views of John Nevin (who apparently wrote the introduction and appendix to The 
Principle of Protestantism – as well as translating it), not Schaff. Although he says that Schaff fails to put 
justification by faith in proper opposition to notions of churchly mediation of grace, he singles out Nevin for 
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opposes Nevin’s high church ecclesiology. As Gutjahr puts it, “Nevin argued that the 
church itself, not the Bible, was the most important means to accessing God's grace. A 
Christian could not be a Christian unless they stood within the communion of the church 
for the simple reason that the church was ‘the continuation of the earthly life of the 
Redeemer in the world.’”294 He adds that in “Nevin and Schaff's view of the church… 
there was no distinction between the visible and invisible church, running completely 
counter to Hodge's own thinking.”295  
Hodge has a high view of the invisible church but is left with a low view of the 
visible church, in the sense that the requirements that are essential to being a true church 
do not involve either organization, the ministrations of the clergy, or the presence of the 
sacraments.296 Even though he himself, with his Presbyterian denomination, holds to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
his lack of clarity regarding becoming a Christian through the church. See Hodge, “Principle of 
Protestantism as related to the present state of the Church,” 628-29. 
294 Hodge, 242. Gutjahr is quoting Nevin from his section in Philip Schaff’s The Principle of Protestantism (1846; 
rpt. Philadelphia, PA: United Church Press, 1964), 220. 
295 Hodge, 243. Gutjahr quotes Nevin. “‘Christianity and the Church are identical.’” Hodge, 242, quoting 
Nevin, “Church” in The Mercersburg Theology, ed. James Hastings Nichols (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1966), 60.  Gutjahr notes that “Hodge held to the standard Calvinist belief that all Christians when 
taken as a whole were bound together and shared fellowship in an invisible, spiritual church.[7] In the eyes 
of the Mercersburg Theology, the invisible church was nothing but a worthless abstraction.” 243. Even in 
1845 Hodge is critical of this breakdown between the notion of a visible and invisible church, as is apparent 
in his review of Schaff’s book. There Hodge criticizes part of Schaff’s presentation for failing to distinguish 
properly between the true unity of the church universal (the invisible church that exists across 
denominations), and the unity of specific corporate bodies that form part of the visible church, such as the 
Roman church, Church of England, or Lutheran church of Germany. There can be unity in the invisible 
church across a multiplicity of evangelical denominational expressions of the visible church. “We do not 
suppose that Dr. Schaf denies this, but he constantly speaks as though he regarded external union, that is, 
union secured and expressed by outward bonds as far more essential to unity of the church than appears to 
us consistent with its true nature.” “Principle of Protestantism as related to the present state of the Church,” 
631. For more of Hodge’s thoughts on Nevin, see Hodge, “The Mystical Presence,” BRPR 20, 2 (Apr 1848), 
227-78.. 
296 “It is obvious,” Hodge writes, “that the Church, considered as the communion of saints, does not 
necessarily include the idea of a visible society organized under one definite form.” “Idea of the Church, 
Part 1,” 249. Hodge denies that any of these are essential to a church in his article, “Is Baptism in the 
Church of Rome Valid?,” 320-44. There he notes that “organization is not essential to the church.” 327 
(see also “Idea of the Church, Part One,” 277). It does not demand a structure or hierarchy to be valid. 
Also, even though he considers the ministry “a divine institution,” Hodge argues that the ministry (clergy) is 
not essential to the visible church, partly in reaction to the Roman Church. “We are very far from believing 
the Popish doctrine that the ministry is essential to the being of a church, and that there is no church where 
there is no ministry.” 330. In support of this position Hodge notes that first a church is formed, and then 
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more robust view of the visible church and considers clergy and sacraments vital, they are 
not essential, and as such he casts a broad net over what churches must be considered 
authentic. He insists that the only essential feature of membership in the church can be 
that which is required for one to become a Christian.297 Otherwise one could somehow 
be united to Christ in faith and yet be denied membership in the visible church, a clear 
contradiction of Scripture. In similar fashion, Hodge is compelled to recognize as valid 
any visible church that holds to “the fundamental doctrines of the gospel.”298 All such 
churches ought to recognize their brethren in other denominational bodies, regardless of 
their differences.299 
Hodge’s ecclesiological views have significance for the location of conversion in 
several ways. First, they remove any necessary connection between conversion and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
they call a minister. Are they not a church until they call the minister? 331. Likewise for sacraments, “to 
make them essential to the church is to make them essential to salvation, which is contrary to scripture.” 
332. “It is the doctrine of our church that baptism recognizes [sic], but does not constitute membership in 
the church.” 332. 
297 “It is absurd that we should make more truth essential to a visible church, than Christ has made essential 
to the church invisible and to salvation. This distinction between essential and unessential doctrines 
Protestants have always insisted upon, and Romanists and Anglicans as strenuously rejected.” “Is Baptism 
in the Church of Rome Valid?,” 329. 
298 “As in the case of the individual professor we can reject none who does not reject Christ, so in regard to 
churches, we can disown none who holds the fundamental doctrines of the gospel.” Hodge, “Unity of the 
Church,” 146. He adds, “You cannot possibly make your notion of a church narrower than your notion of 
a Christian. If a true Christian is a true believer, and a professed believer is a professing Christian, then of 
course a true church is a body of true Christians, a professing or visible church is a body of professing 
Christians.” 146. “It is only the plain fundamental doctrines of the gospel which are necessary to salvation,” 
and hence these same doctrines are the standard by which one judges a particular church body as to 
membership in the true church. 146. 
299 Hodge’s view of the visible and invisible church poses some interesting challenges. If one holds to a 
strong distinction between the visible and invisible church, must that always result in a low ecclesiology? 
Could one not make an argument that, although there can be no requirement further than what is 
necessary to become a Christian for membership in the universal church, in practice specific communities 
must and will always have further standards for membership? Is this not actually the case? Is what is 
essential to become a Christian all that is really essential to be a part of a visible, local church body? 
What does it mean to say that one is a member of the universal church by virtue of being a 
Christian, if one is by that same standard not capable of being a member of specific church bodies? Of what 
value is such a proposition in reality? Even Hodge’s own Presbyterian church would not allow one to enter 
fellowship as a church member without specific confessions of faith that certainly extend beyond 
fundamental church doctrines. If Hodge can recognize the Roman Catholic church as a valid visible 
expression, and the possibility of saving faith in what he considers its corrupt teaching, why is he not 
compelled to argue that the Presbyterian church should open its membership to those that hold to 
significantly corrupted views? 
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visible church. Conversion may occur in a wide variety of visible church contexts, but can 
just as easily occur completely apart from the church. Second, they result in a view of 
conversion that is strongly individualistic. “The gospel,” Hodge writes, “is a message from 
God to individual sinners.”300 The relation of conversion to corporate life and growth is 
much less definite. Third, and on a related note, they result in the legitimacy of 
conversion as a completely private affair. As the universal church is invisible, and 
professing Christians cannot with certainty be known to have experienced true conversion, 
conversion becomes a private affair of the heart. Whether or not Hodge intends to 
reinforce these aspects of the location of conversion, by virtue of his various theological 
emphases they become a readily available avenue in the progression of evangelical 
understanding of conversion.301  
 
Conclusions 
 
In sum, Hodge’s view of conversion is of a process initiated by the supernatural 
action of the Holy Spirit in regeneration. This regeneration marks the change from 
spiritual death to life. In this change the Spirit does not violate one’s human nature, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 Hodge continues, “The gospel is a message from God to individual sinners. It calls each man to 
repentance toward God and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. These are personal duties. They cannot be 
performed by one man for another; by the priest for the people. Every man must repent for himself, and 
believe for himself. And to all and every one, no matter who, or where he is, in the midst of a Christian 
community and within the pale of the visible Church, or a benighted heathen poring over the inspired page, 
with no other teacher than the Holy Spirit, to all, without exception, the divine promise is, ‘Whosoever 
believeth shall be saved.’” “Idea of the Church, Part Two,” 345. Hodge makes a similar point in part one of 
the same article series. “Holiness and salvation are promised to every member of the Church.… These are 
blessings of which individuals alone are susceptible. It is not a community or society, as such, that is 
redeemed, regenerated, sanctified, and saved. Persons, and not communities, are the subjects of these 
blessings.” Hodge, “Idea of the Church, Part One,” 282. 
301 One sees these developments in the location of conversion embodied in the ministry of D. L. Moody, a 
layperson working typically outside of formal church structures or direction who followed on the footsteps 
of Hodge in the nineteenth century. As a revivalist Moody was well-regarded and received by Princeton, 
unlike Finney. Examining his place in changing notions of conversion will be the work of a future chapter. 
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works through it, changing the disposition of the person to one oriented toward loving 
and pleasing God. Although the person plays no part in the initial act of regeneration, he 
or she participates actively in the broader process of conversion and subsequent 
sanctification by the Spirit, though all of the process reflects the gracious activity of God. 
Conversion is not solely an activity of the intellect, the emotions or affections, or the will, 
but involves all of these reflecting the unity of a person’s being, though new and true 
knowledge of Christ is vital to the process. Regeneration is an instantaneous event. 
However because humans lack the ability to determine precisely when such an event has 
taken place, it is often, though not always, better described as a process in one’s life in 
which one moves from unbelief to belief, from death to life, from the control of natural 
man to control by the Spirit. As such, it is a mistake in the evangelistic activity of the 
church to emphasize or require a point in time for one’s conversion, to emphasize 
revivalistic methods that reinforce such a view, or to emphasize a profession of one’s faith, 
as these often cause individuals to place a false confidence in a particular moment or 
feeling rather than the authenticating marks of a faith lived over time that reflects a 
changed person. And while the preaching activity of the clergy is important in bringing 
on conversion, no less important for children is their nurturing in the faith in Christian 
homes. Conversion is not confined to the actions of the visible church, but rather can 
occur in any context. Baptism has no direct relationship to conversion. It is a sign of the 
covenant for the visible church, but does not confer regeneration by its completion. 
Conversion involves a powerful, fundamental, and supernatural change to a person that is 
completely a gracious act of God and is not reversible but permanent. Those who appear 
to fall away likely did not experience an authentic conversion in the first place. It is God’s 
act of regeneration through the Holy Spirit that always initiates the salvific process. One’s 
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faith and repentance, justification, and ongoing sanctification are only possible because 
God first works graciously and savingly in the human heart. 
When one compares Hodge’s views with those of his mentor, Archibald 
Alexander, one finds that in virtually every significant respect, their respective views of 
conversion in its many aspects line up in a unified fashion. The only exception would be 
in their respective assessments of the merits and dangers of revivalism, and even this is 
more one of degree than substance. Alexander thought Hodge unduly harsh in his 
judgments of the authenticity or merits of certain periods of revival. He felt strongly 
enough about it to offer something of a counterpoint in print to that which Hodge had 
previously published.302 Even here, however, both would agree that some revival activity 
is the work of the Spirit and some is merely human effort or even manipulation. The 
disagreement was not about the substance of their views as much as their judgments in 
application of those views to specific revival activities, but the impact of those differences 
has the effect of moving Hodge’s views further afield from revivalist activity as legitimate 
means to conversion, which is viewed with some growing suspicion. Hodge also does 
differ from Alexander, however, in his tendency for more detailed theological exploration 
of these issues. He fleshes out his views more fully than Alexander, and relates them to a 
greater number of issues and contemporary figures in his era. 
Even though Hodge has provided a robust description of his views on conversion, 
it seems to me that there are some tensions inherent to his views. How, for example, can 
conversion be a supernatural occurrence and not in some form violate our human 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 For more on their differences, see Calhoun, Princeton vol.1, 253-55. Hodge’s more negative assessment is 
found in his book, The Constitutional History of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, 2 vols. 
(Philadelphia: William S. Martien, 1839, 1840). Alexander’s more positive “corrective” assessment can be 
found in his book, Biographical Sketches of the Founder, and Principal Alumni of the Log College, Together with an 
Account of the Revivals of Religion under Their Ministry (Princeton, NJ: J. T. Robinson, 1845). 
 	  
408 
nature? As has already been noted, how can one following Hodge’s approach preserve a 
robust commitment to the visible church alongside such a strong contrast with the 
invisible church? If regeneration is indeed a hidden event that from a human perspective 
is indeterminable, then why should one attend to it at all in one’s evangelistic efforts? 
Why should one not focus on calling on human decision and response to God’s grace in 
evangelism, and leave the hidden work of the Spirit in the heart in regeneration to God’s 
providence? 
The most prominent of these tensions, to my view, involve Hodge’s views on the 
role of knowledge and the intellect in conversion. Hodge insists that knowledge is a 
necessary component of conversion, but this raises a variety of questions that Hodge has 
mixed success in answering.303 Hodge, as we have seen, refuses to stipulate to what extent 
knowledge is required. Furthermore, the confusion of his notion of knowledge with fact is 
a near-constant irritation. Hodge has an express desire to describe knowledge in richer 
ways than merely rational facts and propositions, as a notion of knowledge that includes 
affective aspects and the will – the whole of a person. But too often he himself reverts to 
facts and propositions. Is a certain ‘head knowledge’ required, or only some deeper, but 
possibly unarticulated knowledge held in the heart of the individual? If one’s devotional 
life is more indicative of the heart knowledge that one possesses than one’s intellectual 
expressions, as Hodge at times suggests, this would seem to thrust a divide between 
conscious intellectual knowledge and intellectually inaccessible heart knowledge that 
makes any consideration of knowledge as it relates to conversion difficult. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 “No man can have the spiritual discernment of any truth which he does not know. The intellectual 
cognition is just as necessary to spiritual knowledge as the visual perception of a beautiful object is to the 
apprehension of its beauty.” Hodge, “Professor Park’s Remarks,” 342. 
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What is the role of knowledge that one cannot articulate? What is the required 
level of comprehension, if any, to salvific knowledge?304 We all believe some things that 
we cannot articulate, or articulate fully. How does one articulate fully the love for one’s 
spouse? Or again, I consent to the laws of physics, and believe them to be true, though I 
cannot articulate many of them accurately or explain them. I submit to those laws even 
though I do not understand them. Is comprehension vital to efficacious belief, or only 
submission? Does a failure to comprehend truths equate to denial of truths? These are, in 
adopting Hodge’s views, often difficult questions to sort out, and may represent 
weaknesses in his theology of conversion. It remains to be seen whether any other models 
of conversion overcome these weaknesses without the introduction of other more 
significant problems. 
The critical place of conversion in Hodge’s theology should be apparent. The 
many aspects of conversion are related to most other significant theological concerns (in 
soteriology, Christology, ecclesiology, pneumatology, anthropology, to name a few) such 
that changes to one’s views on conversion have a critical impact on one’s entire theology. 
It can result, as Hodge himself describes it when considering one of these theological 
points, in “another Gospel,… practically another system.”305 This becomes clear in the 
relation of Hodge’s views to those of Charles Finney.306  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 “In this complex state the cognition is the first and the governing element, to which the other [a 
corresponding feeling] owes its existence; and therefore, in the second place, the Scriptures not only teach 
that knowledge is an essential constituent of religion, but also that the objective presentation of truth to the 
mind is absolutely necessary to any genuine religious feeling or affection.” Hodge, “Professor Park’s 
Remarks,” 343. 
305 “New Divinity Tried,” 301. 
306 Hodge’s views on conversion are apparent in his interactions with others of his day. Hodge is delighted 
to make common cause with as diverse a figure as Horace Bushnell in Bushnell’s affirmation of conversion 
as a gradual process of nurturing over a sudden momentary experience, but Hodge parts company with 
Bushnell when Bushnell considers that process to be organic and naturalist – outside any special, 
supernatural work of God. Hodge lambasts Finney over the latter’s rationalistic tendencies, his insistence on 
revival as a result of human activity, the place of human agency, Finney’s virtual elimination of the work of 
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It was suggested in introducing this dissertation that models of conversion have a 
definitive effect on how one understands evangelicalism itself. Hodge’s differences with 
Finney on the subject of conversion are so stark that it becomes difficult to consider both 
figures to be representative of evangelical thought of the era. If they are, then there are 
two rather distinct forms of evangelical Christianity in existence at this time. This only 
begs the question of what the term “evangelical” can mean in such a context. This 
question will be revisited in the concluding chapter, as will the relation of Hodge to the 
other major figures of this dissertation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Holy Spirit, and his stress on a moment of conversion. On the other hand Hodge can affirm Moody’s 
revivalism as in a mold more compatible with Hodge’s own understanding of conversion. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
It should be apparent at this point that there is significant diversity in the 
conception of conversion among the various figures here considered, all of whom are 
typically placed within the borders of what is termed evangelicalism. The three models 
represented here – supernatural affective vision, immediate ongoing human decisionism, 
and transformative spiritual knowledge, display significant differences in various 
dimensions of their respective formulations of conversion and the gospel itself. This 
concluding chapter will first offer some further observations on the similarities and 
contrasts of the major figures of this study related to conversion, and some of the key 
issues at stake. After this some ramifications of this study for evangelicalism will be 
considered, including the significance of these varying models for definitions of 
evangelicalism, and how what has been learned of these models might relate to 
contemporary evangelicalism. 
In considering the figures of this study and their respective models one must note 
first some features they hold in common. All of them, certainly, saw conversion as a 
central and significant feature of Christian faith and doctrine. All of them featured it 
prominently in their respective theological outlooks, and none of them would have 
supported any theological framework that failed to do the same.  
Furthermore, all of these figures took the idea of sanctification seriously as a key 
authenticator of true conversion to Christ. If Finney took this to a greater extreme with 
his perfectionist tendencies, nevertheless all insisted that those truly converted would be 
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known by their fruits. Therefore a growing holiness was a mark of a Christian, and 
antinomianism was always seen as undermining any proper understanding of conversion. 
Additionally, none of our subjects stressed the importance of linking conversion to 
baptism, which further undermined what was also another common feature of their 
models – a relatively weak ecclesiology that often left the location of conversion outside of 
the church context. Certainly Finney did this most prominently, but weaknesses were 
present as well in various ways in both Edwards and Hodge. Although Edwards linked 
conversion to church membership, even finally rejecting the Half-Way Covenant, in his 
support for various revival practices of the Great Awakening he undercut (albeit not 
intentionally) this churchly, corporate emphasis. Hodge, even more than Edwards, also 
weakened evangelical ecclesiology.1 In spite of stressing the need for trained clergy over 
lay leaders, and actively supporting his Presbyterian organizational structures, Hodge also 
undermined the place of the church by his stress on the unity of an invisible church over 
the visible church. By emphasizing the invisible church so strongly over the visible church, 
the latter lost significance. Conversion then tended toward private, individualistic forms, 
or toward parachurch ministries, rather than being linked to visible church structures and 
ministries. Since most denominational features were not essential to the true identity of 
the invisible church, inner spiritual realities became elevated over external polity or 
profession. The weak ecclesiology that is paradigmatic of most of evangelicalism today 
was certainly encouraged by aspects of all three of these models, which pushed the 
location of the central event of conversion away from overt churchly contexts. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It is perhaps worth noting that Hodge had planned, but never completed, a fourth volume for his Systematic 
Theology that was to discuss ecclesiology. 
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All of the models here presented also insisted on no specific and necessary 
preparatory steps for conversion. Unlike Edwards and Hodge, Finney had no time 
whatsoever for any preparatory steps. Still, if Edwards and Hodge acknowledged that 
preparatory steps sometimes were a part of the process leading to conversion, they also 
would have agreed that none of these steps were vital and necessary to conversion. 
If all these models shared some prominent features relative to conversion, they 
were also separated by significant differences. We have already seen much in the previous 
chapters that demonstrate the theological separation that existed between Hodge and 
Finney. Traditional Calvinism in general and Princeton in particular were common 
targets of criticism for Finney, and Princeton certainly returned fire on several fronts. 
Unlike their relations to Edwards, these two parties clearly saw themselves as foes, and 
their theological positions, as will be seen later, largely support that opposition. Almost 
invariably where one or the other is mentioned, it is in a negative context. Some further 
comments will be made below. But what of Edwards? The relation of the two to Edwards 
is a somewhat more perplexing question. First considering Princeton, how should the 
relationship between Old Princeton and Edwards be characterized?  
Historians have given a variety of answers to this question. The relationship 
between Princeton and Finney is more easily ascertained than that of Princeton to 
Edwards. Some have suggested that Princeton was largely uncomfortable with Edwards 
and looked at him with disfavor out of concern for various issues. Brooks Holifield, for 
example, writes that, among other things, “Hodge disliked Edwards's metaphysical 
idealism, and he felt wary of the assertion – characteristic of Edwards – that religion 
consisted in holy affections.” He suggests that although Hodge “could draw on Edwards,” 
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ultimately Hodge “belonged in a different American tradition.”2 Bruce Kuklick asserts 
that “throughout Hodge’s writings on the will and on faculty psychology, disagreement 
with Edwards is the primary motivating force.”3 John W. Stewart writes that “Hodge's 
common sense and anti-Kantian assumptions were openly dissimilar from those of 
Jonathan Edwards.” Stewart suggests that “Hodge's Americanized nineteenth-century 
Reformed theology was a theological genre of its own.”4 
Others assert a more positive relation between the two. David B. Calhoun, author 
of a two-volume history of Princeton Seminary, states that Edwards “was much esteemed 
by the Princetonians.” He suggests that “Dr. Alexander and his colleagues saw themselves 
as traditional Calvinists but also as true followers of Jonathan Edwards.”5 Andrew W. 
Hoffecker writes of the dominance of the notion of beauty in the Princeton theology. “For 
Alexander and Hodge everything that God has made reflects beauty.” It seems to me 
here that their views are reminiscent of Edwards in holding to a theological orientation 
where, as Hoffecker puts it, “beauty is perceived not only because God is its Creator but 
because he has also opened the eyes of the believer to see it.”6 James Dahl argues that 
Hodge finds much to approve of in Edwards’ notions on regeneration.7 William Cooper 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 E. Brooks Holifield, “Hodge, the Seminary, and the American Theological Context,” in Charles Hodge 
Revisited, John W. Stewart and James H. Moorhead, eds. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 103-128, 
108, 110. 
3 “The Place of Charles Hodge in the History of Ideas in America,” in Charles Hodge Revisited, 63-76, 73. 
4 “Mediating the Center: Charles Hodge on American Science, Language, Literature, and Politics,” Studies 
in Reformed Theology and History, Vol. 3, No 1 (Winter 1995), 1-114, 113. 
5 Princeton Seminary, Vol. 1: Faith and Learning 1812-1868 (Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth Trust, 1994), 128, 215. 
He clarifies further, “Although they rejected Edwards's metaphysical idealism and distrusted some of his 
theological speculations, they stood with him on the major doctrines of the trinity, the imputation of Adam's 
sin, the bondage of the will, and the atonement.” 215. 
6 Piety and the Princeton Theologians (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1981), 93. 
7 Charles Hodge: Defender of Piety, Ph.D. diss., Trinity Seminary, 1996, 158-60. 
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considers the Princetonians “perhaps the truest followers of Edwards from a doctrinal 
stand-point.”8 
In my own reading of Princeton it is difficult to sustain the view that Princeton 
held Edwards in a feeling of general animosity. While they had their occasional 
differences with Edwards, in most circumstances Princeton looked on Edwards with high 
regard. The comments on Edwards that arise in various writings of Alexander and Hodge 
are generally favorable. In considering both their stated opinions of Edwards and the 
similarities between their models of conversion, it seems to me inaccurate to characterize 
their relation as anything like foes. They must be seen as theological allies, albeit even if, 
like most allies, they had occasional differences of opinion.9  
Consider, for example, the following thoughts on Edwards from Archibald 
Alexander and Charles Hodge. Alexander writes that there were few “who ever lived” 
besides Edwards, “this great and good man,” who “were better qualified to discriminate 
between true and false religion.”10 In Thoughts on Religious Experience Alexander suggests 
that Edwards is not sufficiently Christocentric, but otherwise praises him.11 Again calling 
him “this great and good man,” he concludes, “few men ever attained, as we think, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 William H. Cooper, Jr., The Great Revivalists in American Religion, 1740-1944 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & 
Co., Inc., 2010), 56. 
9 Holifield is justified, for example, in suggesting that Hodge was uneasy with certain metaphysical notions 
of Edwards. Hodge was always alert to ways in which philosophical or rationalistic notions might overtake 
biblical notions in one’s conception of Christianity. But this would not justify characterizing their 
theological relationship as a whole in the same manner. 
10 Thoughts on Religious Experience (1844; rpt. from 3rd ed., London: Banner of Truth Trust, 1967), 67. 
11 Regarding Edwards and his clear sense of delight in divine things at his conversion and following, 
Alexander writes “these views and exercises do not come up to the standard which some set up in regard to 
Christian experience, because they are so abstract, and have such casual reference to Christ, through 
Whom alone God is revealed to man as an object of saving faith. And if there be a fault in the writings of 
this great and good man on the subject of experimental religion, it is, that they seem to represent renewed 
persons as at the first occupied with the contemplation of the attributes of God with delight, without ever 
thinking of a Mediator.” Religious Experience, 27. Although he considers Edwards’ Religious Affections “too 
abstract and tedious for common readers,” Alexander still terms it “an excellent work.” 27. (He does wish 
Edwards perhaps had an editor! “His fourteen signs of truly gracious Affections might with great advantage 
be reduced to half the number, on his own plan.” 27-28. The same might be said of this dissertation.) 
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higher degrees of holiness, or made more accurate observations on the exercises of others” 
regarding “experimental religion.”12 
Alexander views certain aspects of conversion in ways remarkably similar to 
Edwards. With Edwards he denies a specified order in the process of conversion. He is 
open to the work of revival, though he realizes that there can be abuses. He demands that 
some form of knowledge or truth be present for regeneration. But, also like Edwards, he 
insists that this truth has no efficacy for the regeneration of a person apart from God’s 
action in making a new heart. Only then do divine truths as revealed in doctrinal 
knowledge have any power or influence in changing the nature and desires of the person. 
Apart from this even a person with correct doctrinal knowledge has no accompanying 
transformation. Knowledge alone is inefficacious apart from God’s transforming work on 
the inner person in regeneration. 
Charles Hodge is also likewise generally quite positive in his assessments of 
Edwards, and many of his views on conversion bear similarity to Edwards. His view of the 
disposition, for example, bears much resemblance to Edwards. “There are abiding states,” 
he writes, “dispositions, principles, or habits, as they are indifferently called, which 
constitute character and give it stability.” Hodge calls these “the proximate, determining 
cause why our voluntary exercises and conscious states are what they are,… what the 
Bible calls the heart.” The heart has “the same relation to all our acts that the nature of a 
tree, as good or bad, has to the character of its fruit.” Just as “the goodness of the fruit 
does not constitute or determine the goodness of the tree, but the reverse,” so also “it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Religious Experience, 27. 
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not good acts which make the man good; the goodness of the man determines the 
character of his acts.”13 Edwards could have written this himself. 
Elsewhere Hodge explicitly refers to Edwards in a most positive way in reference 
to regeneration. In his article, “Regeneration, and the Manner of its Occurrence,” Hodge 
references Edwards extensively and is in strong agreement with Edwards’ argument that a 
change in disposition is central to regeneration, and that it is one’s previous disposition 
that determines the moral nature of one’s choices. He writes of Edwards, “We have never 
met with a stronger, or more formal statement of the doctrine which we are endeavouring 
to support, than is found in this passage [from Religious Affections].” And this is an 
affirmation of something that Hodge himself recognizes to be at the core of Edwards’ 
theology. “It is a fundamental principle of his whole theology, as we understand it,” he 
writes. “Take this away, and his whole theory of original righteousness, original sin, and 
of the nature of holiness, and the nature of sin, and of the liberty of the will, go with it.”14 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (1871-72; rpt. London: James Clarke & Co., 1960); III, 32-33. 
14 “Regeneration, and the Manner of its Occurrence,” Biblical Repertory and Theological Review 2, 2 (Apr 1830), 
250-297, 269. Throughout this article Hodge quotes Edwards approvingly. Hodge says that Edwards’ view 
of original holiness is akin to his, and that a created predisposition does not make the acts flowing out of it 
less holy. 281-83. Sounding just like Edwards in Freedom of the Will he writes further, “The common feelings 
and judgment of men, therefore, do carry moral distinctions back of acts of choice, and must do so unless 
we deny that virtue ever can commence.” A sinner, Hodge claims, has freedom of the will in the sense that 
“he has unimpaired the liberty of acting according to his own inclinations” and that nothing outside of 
himself determines his choices. 283. He appeals to Edwards again in describing the way in which 
knowledge is saving. “The affections,” writes Hodge, “must have an object, and that object must be 
apprehended in its true nature, in order to be truly loved. It is obvious, therefore, that regeneration, to be of 
a moral character at all, must consist in such a change as brings the soul into a state to see and love the 
beauty of holiness. It matters not what the change be called; a ‘spiritual sense,’ or ‘a taste,’ or ‘disposition,’ it 
is as necessary as that an object should be seen in order to be loved.” 284-85. Later in the article Hodge 
suggests that if one locates morality in the acts alone, and not in one’s desires and dispositions that precede 
them, then one denies what is commonly understood to account for our moral character. What determines 
one’s choice is either indifference, which has no moral character, or some previous inclination, which 
Hodge (with Edwards) argues is the basis for how we understand individuals to be moral or not. 291. 
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Whatever differences the two have lie on the periphery rather then the center of their 
theological constructs.15 
The debate over the relation of Princeton to Edwards often turns on the degree to 
which historians perceive Princeton as intellectualist and/or caught up in the philosophy 
of Scottish Common Sense Realism. McClymond and McDermott, for example, mention 
both in contrasting Princeton with Edwards. The more one finds these notions dominant 
in Princeton, the further one is likely to place them in relation to Edwards. Not 
surprisingly, then, I find them to be closer allies than some, since, as I have argued in this 
dissertation, I believe the Princetonians to be voluntarists at their core rather than 
intellectualists, and that the impact of Scottish Common Sense Realism on them was 
limited in their understanding of conversion. 
When considering Princeton’s relation to Edwards, one must also distinguish very 
carefully between their assessment of Edwards, and their assessment of later 
‘Edwardseans.’ For while it is true that they were allies of Edwards, this was much less the 
case with those that were identified with the subsequent Edwardsean tradition, and 
especially the modifications of Edwards’ theology that resulted in Nathaniel Taylor’s New 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Numerous other examples of Hodge affirming Edwards or appealing to him for support could be 
provided. To list a few, Hodge appeals to Edwards in support of his views on the nurture of children and 
the supernatural character of conversion in “Bushnell on Christian Nurture,” Biblical Repertory and Princeton 
Review 19, 4 (October 1847), 502-39. He looks to Edwards in opposition to those adopting principles of the 
New Divinity, such as that morality must be grounded in voluntary exercises. “The New Divinity Tried,” 
BRTR 4, 2 (April 1832), 278-304. He also quotes Edwards favorably in support of his explanation of John 
Witherspoon’s theology, countering New School Presbyterian interpretations. “Witherspoon’s Theology,” 
BRPR 35, 4 (October 1863), 596-610. (This is one of any number of articles in BRPR for which the author is 
not clearly identified. As noted in chapter four, however, it is safe to assume that even if Hodge did not 
actually write the article, as editor it is at least generally representative of his views.) When Hodge is critical 
of Edwards, he often qualifies his assessment in ways that limit his disagreement. For example, although he 
suggests that Edwards’ views of necessity and liberty are contradictory, he also suggests that these are 
largely flaws of definition and word use, and hence correctable, and that in the whole his theory stands. It is 
not a core disagreement, but only one of semantics. “We are of the opinion that all that is wanted on this 
subject, is not a new theory, but greater precision in the use of language, and a clear distinction between the 
will and the other active powers.” Charles Hodge (?), “An Examination of President Edwards’ Inquiry into 
the Freedom of the Will,” BRPR 17, 4 (Oct 1845), 636-39, 639. 
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Haven theology. Douglas Sweeney notes that “many Old School [Presbyterian] leaders 
admired Edwards’s Calvinism, but detested what had become of New England Theology.” 
He points out further that it was “the Princetonians, especially, champions of Old School 
theology, sought to sever Finney, Park, Taylor, and others from Edwards’s legacy.”16 
David Calhoun points out that although Princeton argued tolerance for the New Divinity 
views of Samuel Hopkins and the like, believing them to be compatible with Reformed 
confessional standards even if they disagreed with some of their views, still “they believed 
that the New Divinity innovations were unnecessary and the New Haven views 
downright heretical.”17 Edwards must be held distinct from his later followers when 
considering these questions. 
Some consider Charles Finney to be among those later followers, as perhaps did 
Finney himself. We now return to the question of Edwards’ relation to Finney. As I 
mentioned earlier in this study, this relation is debated. Some, like Charles Hambrick-
Stowe, tend to tie Finney more closely to Edwards, while others, such as William 
McLoughlin, suggest a rather broad divide between the two. Here again one must take 
some care that one compares Finney to Edwards, rather than to forms of ‘Edwardsean’ 
theology that follow. Certainly Finney does adopt and even extend some of the 
modifications to Edwards’ theology made by his followers, and notably Nathaniel William 
Taylor and his New Haven theology and their demand that responsibility requires a free 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Douglas A. Sweeney, “Evangelical Tradition in America,” in The Cambridge Companion to Jonathan Edwards, 
ed. Stephen J. Stein (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 228, 229. 
17 Princeton vol. 1, 215. Sweeney quotes Hodge’s successor at Princeton, Benjamin B. Warfield, who quipped, 
“‘It was Edwards’ misfortune that he gave his name to a party; and to a party which, never in perfect 
agreement with him in its doctrinal ideas, finished by becoming the earnest advocate of (as it has been 
sharply expressed) a set of opinions which he gained his chief celebrity in demolishing.’” 229, quoting 
Warfield as found in The Princeton Theology 1812-1921 (1983; rpt. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2001), 
314. 
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will. In fact, he extends some of these ideas in ways that even his nineteenth century New 
School allies cannot accept. 
Finney himself likely believed, perhaps even more self-consciously than did any 
Princetonians, that he was following in the tradition of Edwards. In his view, although 
certain modifications were needed, on the whole he also held Edwards in high regard, 
and showed a respect for him that he did not give to the Princeton school. Edwards was, 
after all, an enormous figure of importance for the history and support of revivals, and 
this alone would make it difficult for Finney to oppose Edwards strongly. He instead 
believed he could adapt Edwards’ theology to the times.  
It seems, however, quite unlikely that Edwards would have seen Finney’s theology 
as anything like Edwards’ own. In both their substance and their methodology they were 
set apart. Their understandings of God’s sovereignty and interaction with human activity 
were quite different. Although they shared a desire for revivals, Edwards certainly never 
would have dreamed of claiming the kind of control over the means of revival that Finney 
did, and was far more comfortable with the depth and mystery of spiritual realities than 
was Finney. Edwards also held high several central and historic Christian doctrines to 
which Finney gave little heed. Finney did not compare in the depth or creativity of his 
theology, and was always a practitioner more than a thinker. Finney’s uses of reason and 
persuasion were altogether different from Edwards, who forthrightly denied that 
persuasion was central to bringing on conversion in preaching. Finney’s intellectualist 
understanding of and belief in the efficacy of reason was in contrast to Edwards. Further, 
what for Edwards was the source of morality – one’s character and disposition – is that 
which for Finney eliminated the possibility of moral behavior, since for Finney this meant 
that consequent choices flowed out of some existing substance or preference in an 
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individual, instead of being freely chosen. Most essentially, the core doctrines or 
principles at the heart of Finney’s system regarding the nature of moral government and 
human freedom were in direct opposition to definitive aspects of Edwards’ own 
theological understanding of Christianity. These differences are forcefully present in their 
respective models of conversion. If Finney considered himself an Edwardsean, he did so 
while denying what was one of the most cherished and central notions of Edwards’ 
theology. He fundamentally altered Edwards’ view of the will. Therefore in whatever 
other debatable smaller ways Finney adopted Edwardsean language or ideas, this alone 
makes it difficult to consider him as anything like Edwards’ legacy. 
The Princetonians certainly did not see Finney as a true descendant of Edwards’ 
theology. Charles Hodge himself suggested that Finney should not be linked closely to 
Edwards. In his assessment, “the views of ability entertained at Oberlin are Pelagian and 
not Edwardean.” This was the case, he determined, because Finney’s views “avoid all 
recognition of the distinction between natural and moral ability,” and because “not only 
is truth the sole instrument in regeneration and sanctification, in Mr. Finney’s opinion, 
but men have the ability to resist it when wielded with the utmost energy of the Holy 
Ghost.”18 
In answering the question of whether either Finney or Princeton (or neither) are 
best seen as following in the tradition of Edwards let us now consider a closer comparison 
of the three in terms of their models of conversion. Although all three embrace revivals 
(Hodge with much more reserve), they differ on the nature of revivals. Whereas Edwards 
and Princeton see it as the work of God, for Finney it is simply the outcome of the correct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Hodge, “Finney’s Sermons on Sanctification, and Mahan on Christian Perfection,” BRPR 13, 2 (Apr 
1841), 234-35. 
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use of means, and as such controllable by humans. This follows from his related view of 
conversion itself as the human result of means, rather than something necessarily 
grounded in a supernatural work of God, a view shared by Edwards and Princeton. All 
three suggest a role for the Holy Spirit in conversion, but for Finney this amounts to a 
resistible effort at persuasion, whereas for both Edwards and Princeton the Holy Spirit is 
the sole initiator of conversion. Hodge sees the denial of a role for the human in the 
initiation of conversion to be a key theological dividing point (by which he accepts Samuel 
Hopkins and the New Divinity, and rejects Nathaniel Taylor and the New Haven 
theology – as well as Finney). Finney believes the nature of the change in conversion 
consists essentially in a change of mind, of moral choice and intention that is (and can 
only be) total – but must constantly be maintained or is reversed, whereas both Edwards 
and Princeton suggest in various expressions the notion of a permanent change of one’s 
disposition or heart, wrought by God, that leads to changes in one’s choices and desires. 
Thus far in all these aspects generally Edwards and the Princetonians display a common 
Calvinist heritage.  
All three consider some form of knowledge critical to conversion, one which 
moves beyond the intellect and into the heart, causing some form of emotional response, 
but these emotions are the secondary result, and not the source, of conversion. For Finney 
this comes via rational affirmations of reason; for Edwards knowledge does not persuade, 
but can prepare for conversion. Knowing with a sense of the heart is critical and life-
changing, but such knowledge cannot be brought about by persuasion, but only revealed 
by the divine light. Princeton is similar to Edwards. Faith involves embracing truth in 
transformative fashion, perceiving it affectively as well as intellectually. Some spiritual 
truths are supra-rational; to deny this leads to rationalism. In Edwards’ view the will 
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cannot be indifferent, but is always oriented more or less toward good or evil. One is free 
if one can do what one desires, even if one’s disposition results in a continual desire to sin. 
Sinners do not want to follow God. There is a primacy of the will over knowledge 
(voluntarism), although Edwards stresses the inner unity of a person’s functioning that 
make such distinctions somewhat difficult. Finney’s view of the will is virtually opposite 
that of Edwards’ view. The will must be indifferent, and a person must be free from both 
external coercion and internal disposition in choosing sin or holiness. Conversion consists 
essentially in that choice, founded in knowledge and engendered via persuasion. Finney 
maintains a strong faculty psychology that distinguishes sharply between internal aspects 
of a person. Hodge aligns more closely here with Edwards, and believes morality is not 
judged solely by one’s actions, but by one’s inclinations or disposition. Both Alexander 
and Hodge reject strong notions of separate faculties within individuals. 
All three agree that the means of grace are natural rather than supernatural, but 
they differ on how those means operate and which means are to be emphasized. For 
Edwards the means of grace include reading and hearing the Word of God, prayer, 
sacraments, and so on, through which God may choose to work supernaturally for 
conversion. Means are opportunities for God. Alexander considers the gospel to be the only 
right means to conversion, and communicating gospel knowledge is key. Hodge looks to 
Word, sacraments, and prayer as primary means, but also stresses that they have no 
inherent efficacy. God uses these means, but not in a manner that violates natural human 
faculties. Finney stresses that means are to ends as causes are to effects. God provides 
various means, and when humans use them properly they will always bear results. Means 
are flexible, but the most important means is persuasion by the truth. Good means are 
those that work. Finney’s views are here rather sharply distinguished from the others. 
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All are similar in writing little of the importance of baptism, nor do any of them 
maintain a strong tie between it and conversion. Finney minimizes it the most, even 
suggesting that there are possible substitutes for it such as the anxious bench, but none 
stress it or suggest any direct link to conversion. 
Finney is most insistent of the three in viewing the timeframe of conversion as 
instantaneous. Conversion is always an immediate option, and there is never reason to 
delay. Both Edwards and Hodge distinguish between regeneration and conversion, and 
suggest the former always happens in some particular moment, but that moment is rarely 
known to us, and thus conversion overall is typically more of a process, though it can 
appear immediate. Even more than Edwards, Hodge emphasizes a gradual conversion 
process that runs contrary to some revival practices. Regardless of the timeframe, all 
agree that the authenticity of conversion is revealed by the fruits of one’s life. Signs of 
sanctified and holy living are the mark of a true Christian, and for Finney not just signs, 
but complete obedience (perfection) is the expectation since there can be no mixture of 
sin and holiness in an individual. All three in some form believe that perseverance in faith 
is the ultimate authentication of true conversion, but Finney suggests that even one truly 
converted can become lost again, and thus conversion must be both immediate and also 
ongoing. Justification itself relies on obedience for Finney. Thus when one considers the 
order of salvation, Finney’s places sanctification before justification, a characteristic 
distinctly outside of all central Reformation traditions. Some suggest that Edwards also 
places sanctification above or alongside justification in his order of salvation, but because 
of his stress on supernatural regeneration this dispute becomes less relevant to his overall 
understanding of conversion. Hodge suggests that repentance follows and is a sign of 
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regeneration and faith, and offers a typically Reformed view of justification preceding 
sanctification – the latter of which is never (contra perfectionists) complete in this life. 
All three figures, but especially Finney and (surprisingly) Hodge, push the location 
of conversion away from a distinct church context. Finney’s minimalist and somewhat 
anti-clerical low church ecclesiology is readily apparent to any careful reader. Hodge, 
however, by virtue of his strong emphasis on the invisible church, tends to disconnect 
conversion from the visible church, and in this way shifts toward private, individualistic 
forms of conversion. He does not consider most denominational features to be essential to 
the church. 
In sum, if conversion is definitive of one’s understanding of Christianity, then it 
must be said that there is serious disagreement as to the nature of Christian faith between 
these figures. Those disagreements are less significant between Edwards and the 
Princetonians, without question, but when Finney is brought into view the use of 
conversion as a defining feature does more to divide than to unite these groups under any 
supposed common conception of evangelicalism. These differences are not minor. In 
some respects the differences could not be more pronounced.  
One might construe Finney’s relation to Edwards and Princeton as just another in 
a long line of Arminian versus Calvinist clashes. However it would not be accurate to call 
Finney an Arminian. Arminian theology typically exhibits a number of characteristics not 
present in Finney, most notable among them some kind of notion of a prevenient grace. 
Finney could be just as dismissive of such a generalized grace as he could some kind of 
supernatural special grace for conversion. He denies that any general initial grace can be 
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necessary in responding to the gospel, and considers any such doctrine “an absurdity.”19 
In related fashion Finney altogether rejects any notion of original sin, a doctrine accepted 
by Wesley, among others.20 Even though Arminian theology, like Finney’s, gives a greater 
role to the human will than Calvinism, it still often has a different understanding of what 
happens at conversion, and a greater place for the supernatural action of God through 
the Holy Spirit in the change of conversion (and previous to conversion) than Finney 
would accept. Finney’s theology is, in fact, a much more stripped down and lean structure 
resting on very few central principles, and in this way does not resemble Arminian 
theology all that much. One could debate how appropriately Arminian and Calvinist 
traditions could be united meaningfully under one common banner of evangelicalism, but 
to place a position such as Finney’s under it is to stretch that banner far more thinly. His 
model is not an appropriate test case for such a question. 
Finally there can be no middle ground. Either Finney has misconstrued the heart 
of the gospel, or the respective forms of Calvinism represented by Edwards and the 
Princetonians have. Their gospels, in both theory and practice, bear little resemblance to 
each other. The differences are so basic, so fundamental, to their conceptions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Finney’s Systematic Theology: New and Expanded 1878 Edition, ed. Dennis Carroll, Bill Nicely, and L. G. 
Parkhurst, Jr. (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House Publishers, 1994), 323 (further citations as LST). 
20 Finney’s rejection of original sin (as well as total depravity) and his denial of any theory of what he terms 
“gracious ability” are closely related. Original sin renders humanity constitutionally (in some form) inclined 
to sin, which for Finney is precisely the reason why such a doctrine excuses humanity of moral responsibility. 
Finney declares that without the atonement, in this view humans would not have the capacity to sin, 
because they would not be moral agents – since they had not the power to obey. Finney suggests that by this 
logic fallen angels and even the devil himself are no longer moral agents, and there can be no sin in hell 
itself. LST, 323-25. Acknowledging original sin then requires acknowledging that in some fashion God’s 
grace must restore the human capacity to respond to God’s goodness and gospel message. Although 
Arminians and Calvinists have different ways of accounting for how this is done, both insist that some form 
of grace is necessary. On Wesley’s view of original sin, see his sermon 44 on original sin. He there strongly 
affirms the doctrine, and considers it a key dividing line between Christianity and heathenism. He writes 
that “all who deny this, call it original sin, or by any other title, are put Heathens still, in the fundamental 
point which differences Heathenism from Christianity.” John Wesley, “Sermon 44,”  Sermons on Several 
Occasions. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/wesley/sermons.v.xliv.html#v.xliv-p0.3. Accessed 5/15/15. 
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Christianity, that there are whole bodies of supposed believers that each would deny. 
Finney would term those resting in a Calvinist view of the gospel deceived by a false 
gospel. Calvinists in the Princetonian cast would find in Finney merely a form of 
Pelagianism that denies the reality of grace. Given Finney’s beliefs about the core of the 
gospel message, his considerable animosity toward any form of Calvinism is completely 
understandable if not justified. Their respective versions of the gospel are mutually 
incompatible.21 Having spent considerable time now reading Finney, I find my earlier 
opinion of Hambrick-Stowe’s thesis untenable. It is very difficult to place Finney in the 
stream of Edwardsean thought or the Reformed tradition. His is not simply a movement 
within that stream, but a divergence so significant as to leave its banks altogether. 
 
Defining Evangelicalism 
Accepting this thesis, how can one define evangelicalism via conversion? What do 
these three models of conversion contribute to a discussion of how evangelicalism is to be 
defined? After the in-depth consideration of these models it seems to me that the 
conceptions of conversion in use in evangelical history describe notions of Christianity 
more distinct than are Lutherans from Catholics. We have no difficulty recognizing the 
uniqueness of their traditions, but we seem unable to recognize the distinctiveness of a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 It is true that there was some cooperation, or at least toleration, between Finney and some nineteenth 
century Calvinists, and one could debate who qualified as a “true” Calvinist among the New School 
Presbyterians, New Divinity, and Taylorite camps. Calvinism was not a simply unity in nineteenth century 
America, and certainly Hodge and others were even more greatly disturbed that some who called 
themselves “Calvinists” could embrace some perspectives similar to Finney. However most of these groups 
modified more classical forms of Calvinism and Reformed thought, especially regarding their views on free 
will, which allowed for greater compatibility with Finney. Further, although as an evangelist (who brought 
success in revivalism) Finney enjoyed the cooperation of some who might be termed Calvinists, as Finney 
later developed his views on perfectionism more fully, he created a divide with virtually all of these groups 
as well. Finney himself seems to have this same conscious understanding of opposition to Calvinism as 
something quite in contrast to his views. He rarely if ever qualifies his criticisms for what he understands as 
Calvinism, so perhaps he did not view those New School Presbyterians and others with whom he 
cooperated as true Calvinists either. 
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variety of theological conceptions all considered to be evangelical, instead opting for an 
illusory, unified evangelical history. 
Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that there has been something of a long-running 
identity crisis within evangelicalism. It is difficult to overstate this problem. The term 
evangelical is a curious classification, a notoriously slippery word used seemingly 
everywhere – from the mainstream media to religious publications, in academic 
scholarship and in church pronouncements, from some of the most conservative to some 
of the most liberal, across the ecclesial spectrum as well as the political one. In the midst 
of evangelical growth and attention in the last several decades has come even greater 
confusion about what evangelicalism is. Almost everyone, it seems, enjoys using the term, 
but few have any precise notion about that to which it refers, and those who do often 
have conflicting standards. Whatever unity evangelicalism once possessed (and this 
dissertation indicates that it may have been less than what one expected), it has diversified 
into an entity so difficult to define that one might almost give its lack of definition as a 
central feature of the movement. 
So the first order of business for many books and articles on evangelicalism, and 
for more than one of them the only order of business, has been to define what is meant 
when speaking about evangelicalism. Pick up any book on evangelicalism from the past 
few decades and you will find struggles and disagreements about exactly what it is.22 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Even a quick survey of some of the literature of evangelicalism will indicate what a quandary it is to arrive 
at a definition. One of the first books to confront this crisis of identity was the 1975 edited volume, The 
Evangelicals: What They Believe, Who They Are, Where They Are Changing, in which several essays addressed the 
question of definition. David F. Wells and John D. Woodbridge, eds. (New York: Abingdon Press, 1975). 
“No single volume has yet appeared which has sought comprehensively to define what evangelical belief is, 
from whence it has arisen, what is the numerical strength of its following, what is the sociological makeup of 
the community adhering to it and how it now relates to the intellectual concerns of the day, to culture, and 
to society.” From the Introduction by the editors, 17. In his 1983 book Donald G. Bloesch contemplated 
The Future of Evangelical Christianity, but before he could proceed he had to first confront “The Problem of 
 	  
429 
the first six words of his 2004 book on evangelical theology Roger Olson quips, 
“Evangelical is an essentially contested concept.”23 James Davison Hunter summarizes the 
situation. “Perhaps the most fundamental question about Evangelicalism is simply What 
is it?”24  
In fact, the problem has become so great that some argue that the term 
evangelicalism has little or no value, that it obfuscates rather than clarifies American 
religious and church history, that it distorts any discussion of so-called evangelicals in 
contemporary Christianity, and that the term should be done away with completely. 
Notable among these critics is D. G. Hart.25 According to Hart, the term evangelicalism 
is largely a creation, on the one hand, of the so-called neoevangelicals of the 1940s and 
50s who sought to distance themselves from fundamentalism and claim the mantle of a 
broad Protestant orthodoxy from the nineteenth century, and on the other hand, of the 
leading evangelical historians of the 1970s and beyond such as George Marsden and 
Mark Noll, who made a new historiography to suit this growing neoevangelical surge. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Evangelical Identity.” The Future of Evangelical Christianity (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1983), 
8-22. Robert K. Johnston wanted to address the evangelical impasse over biblical authority but first had to 
pause to answer the question in his opening pages, “Who are Evangelicals?” Evangelicals at an Impasse 
(Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1979). Carl F. H. Henry asked the same question in a volume of essays on 
Evangelical Affirmations, noting that “confusion persists over precisely what ‘being an evangelical’ means. 
“Who Are The Evangelicals,” in Evangelical Affirmations, eds. Kenneth S. Kantzer and Carl F. H. Henry 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 1990) 69-94, 72. (This was not Henry’s first foray into 
the problems of definition. Among his other efforts, several years earlier this leading evangelical theologian 
had turned his gaze inward on the movement in his book, Evangelicals in Search of Identity (Waco, TX: Word 
Books, 1976).) In that same volume Nathan O. Hatch, in responding to Henry’s efforts at definition, 
suggested that “in truth, there is no such thing as evangelicalism,” although he then goes on to give advice 
to this illusory creature. “Response to Carl F. H. Henry,” in Evangelical Affirmations, 95-101, 97. Derek J. 
Tidball pondered the meaning of the term even as he explored its history and diversity in his 1994 volume, 
Who Are the Evangelicals? (London: Marshall Pickering, 1994).  
23 Roger E. Olson, The Westminster Handbook to Evangelical Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2004), 1. 
24 American Evangelicalism: Conservative Religion and the Quandary of Modernity (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
University Press, 1983),7. 
25 Hart is not alone in suggesting we do away with the term. Donald W. Dayton, for example, suggests that 
“the category ‘evangelical’ has lost whatever usefulness it once might have had” and that “we can very well 
do without it.” “Some Doubts about the Usefulness of the Category ‘Evangelical,’” in The Variety of American 
Evangelicalism, Donald W. Dayton and Robert K. Johnston, eds. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 
1991), 245-51, 245. Carl Trueman also concludes there is no evangelicalism. See 430, fn. 26 below. 
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Hart sees the movement from church history to religious history that occurred in the 
same timeframe as well-suited to produce this historiography, because it emphasized 
broad, informal, personal aspects of faith over institutional, formal, churchly features 
which were less congenial to the descriptive power of a term like evangelicalism. In his 
provocative book, Deconstructing Evangelicalism, he writes, “instead of trying to fix 
evangelicalism, born-again Protestants would be better off if they abandoned the category 
altogether. The reason is not that evangelicalism is wrong in its theology, ineffective in 
reaching the lost, or undiscerning in its reflections on society and culture. It may be, but 
these matters are beside the point. Evangelicalism needs to be relinquished as a religious identity 
because it does not exist.”26 Hart argues that it is better to understand the varied streams of 
evangelicalism in their individual confessional and denominational histories rather than 
lumping them all together as if they really reflected a common unity that is ultimately a 
mirage.27 
For Hart this combination of various streams of evangelicalism is not only a 
mistaken effort at a false unity, but a very damaging development for historic Christianity. 
Evangelicalism is historic Christianity stripped of much of its substance. 
 
This book offers an explanation as to why evangelicalism as currently 
used became a useful category for journalists, scholars, and believing 
Protestants. But it is more than simply an account of a specific word’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 D. G. Hart, Deconstructing Evangelicalism: Conservative Protestantism in the Age of Billy Graham (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 16 (emphasis mine). 
27 Carl Trueman reaches a similar conclusion in his book, The Real Scandal of the Evangelical Mind (Chicago: 
Moody Press, 2011). He writes, “When Mark Noll declared that the scandal of the evangelical mind was 
that there was no mind, he meant to criticize the lack of cultural and theological engagement among 
evangelicals. I agree there is a scandal involving the evangelical mind, though I understand the problem in 
the exact opposite way. It is not that there is no mind, but rather that there is no evangelical.” 37. Trueman 
argues that relating to one another through respective denominational and confessional identities yields a 
more honest and fruitful dialogue than referring to some supposed common evangelicalism, and that 
evangelicalism is doomed to failure in the coming years due to outside pressures and internal lack of 
theological identity.  
 	  
431 
usage. It is also an argument about the damage the construction of 
evangelicalism has done to historic Christianity. As much as the 
American public thinks of evangelicalism as the ‘old-time religion,’ 
whether positively or negatively, this expression of Christianity has 
severed most ties to the ways and beliefs of Christians living in previous 
eras. For that reason, it needs to be deconstructed.28  
 
 
When I first encountered D. G. Hart’s provocative arguments I was skeptical. It 
seemed ridiculous to dismiss or deny a phenomenon as large and recognized as 
evangelicalism. I myself, with some caution due to the term’s ambiguity, have identified 
with evangelicalism for most of my life. It seemed to me that in arguing that the term 
evangelicalism was essentially manufactured and applied errantly to a diversity of 
traditions, Hart failed to recognize that it was not the creation but the recognition of a 
common or shared religious identity rooted in the historic fundamentals of the Christian 
faith that made the term meaningful. It was a term that recognized a common unity of 
faith amidst diversity. 
The work of historians seemed to support this conclusion. For example, in his 
2005 book on nineteenth century evangelicalism, The Dominance of Evangelicalism, David 
Bebbington writes, “It remained true at the end of the period, as at its beginning, that the 
main body of the evangelical movement possessed a self-conscious unity.” He adds, “the 
evangelical denominational groups were but regiments in a single army,” and that “they 
knew that they shared the same gospel.”29 That notion of a shared gospel largely 
continues among large groups of evangelicals today, and distinguishes them from a much 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Hart, Deconstructing Evangelicalism, 19. 
29 David W. Bebbington, The Dominance of Evangelicalism: The Age of Spurgeon and Moody (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2005), 262. See also 263. Bebbington notes elsewhere that “the [evangelical] movement 
possessed a high degree of unity across the world.” (20) and cites the example of the Evangelical Alliance, 
formed in 1846, in which “The Bible, conversion and redemption were cardinal articles in the evangelical 
creed.” 22. 
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more theologically diverse mainline collection of churches, in some of which traditional 
expressions of Christianity have been modified or jettisoned. 
But there is a part of me that, upon further reflection on this project and its 
implications, thinks perhaps he is right after all. Perhaps here is where we encounter the 
limits of historically-based definitions of evangelicalism. It seems that the term 
evangelicalism has some utility historically, but much less so as a theological category. So yes, 
some groups we call evangelicals emphasized conversion, as in talking about it much and 
insisting on its priority in a way somewhat distinct from other religious or Christian 
groups, e.g. Unitarians. But that does not end up saying all that much about how these 
groups might be distinguished theologically. It is clear that for Edwards, Finney, Hodge, 
and Alexander conversion was important. In this sense Bebbington’s definition suffices, 
but it does not provide much depth in understanding what united or separated these 
various ‘evangelical’ traditions. The term reflects a significant loss of the particularities 
involved. Every generalization does this to some extent, but then the broadest 
generalizations are often of the least value.30 
Whatever its worth as an historical category, as a theological classification the 
term evangelicalism cannot be of much value. Various streams of evangelicalism attach such 
varied understandings to their notions of conversion that they cannot be considered of a 
common class. In this regard perhaps D. G. Hart is right. Without a shared common 
theological core, such evangelical alliances are indeed illusory.31 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Even though I am making a broad generalization in saying so! 
31 Evangelicalism serves a purpose of classification if for no other reason than that in fact a large segment of 
American Christians have self-identified with it and have united across denominational lines. As an 
observation this is accurate, but it finally does not say too much. Today evangelicals are measured as the 
largest single Protestant category in the United States. How much does that really tell us? What do they all 
really have in common besides self-identification? Evangelicalism seems to be more about perceived identity 
than actual reality. 
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In considering the potential of conversionism as a chief defining characteristic for 
evangelicalism, one has some choices. One can view evangelicalism through an historical 
lens alone, abandoning its theological significance. Used in this way one can observe 
some of the common interests historically of various groups, without expecting the term 
actually to describe theological realities. Using conversion as a characteristic in this way 
we can, to a large degree, place all our historical figures, and many present day groups, 
together under the category evangelical. One can also use a theological lens in wielding 
the term evangelicalism. In this case, as it relates to conversion, our historical figures 
cannot be united under the one banner of evangelicalism. 
A third way is to strive to do both, to ask what was characteristic of the theology of 
these historical groups, not merely in external emphasis, but in the structures of their 
theologies. In this way one might be true to historical realities without ignoring 
theological realities. But to have significance theologically one must move beyond mere 
history of ideas and make value judgments. In reality, even the most dedicated historical 
approaches, if they are to be meaningful, must introduce theological elements, or at least 
some form of value judgments. Otherwise one is left merely with a running discourse on 
what happened in history with no interpretive grid or applied meaning. Whether one 
considers the origins of evangelicalism in the eighteenth century awakenings, seventeenth 
century pietism, the Reformation, or some other combination of factors, no one would 
deny that certain biblical notions were believed to be at the heart of the movement for 
these early evangelicals, and continued to drive the center of the movement over a long 
period of time. If those elements have now been or are in the process of being lost, can 
the resulting enterprise still be considered the same movement? Those who would ignore 
any sense of theological responsibility or oughtness seem to violate essentials that defined 
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the movement at its roots as that of recovery and reinvigoration of a Reformation and 
even New Testament faith. Some theological component, and not merely observations of 
the characteristics of a group over time, is appropriate. 
Applying such a theological lens to our figures, one must acknowledge that it is 
Finney who diverges most from this center, however loosely defined. And he does so not 
simply because he does not represent Calvinist theology, but because he does not even 
represent a much broader centrist notion of what has been essential to most forms of what 
might be termed evangelical theology – whether one turns back to the Reformation, to 
the Puritans, to Edwards, or to Wesley.32 Thus it is Finney who, from a theological 
perspective, should be considered outside of the evangelical tradition. 
If the differences that come to the fore in analyzing Edwards’, Finney’s, and 
Princeton’s respective views of conversion fail to provide a basis for maintaining their 
alliance under any broader definition of evangelicalism based on conversion, some of 
their theological similarities have been passed on to contemporary evangelicalism. What 
conversion does reveal in common among our historical figures is a rather low-church 
ecclesiology, or at the very least a trajectory in that direction. Thus if one would choose to 
define evangelicalism theologically as a low-church affair, one could find some historical 
basis for that amidst our figures.33 Such an ecclesiology does seem to be characteristic of 
most evangelicals today, together with a high degree of comfort in non-denominational 
and parachurch activities and organizations. Those evangelicals that hold to a higher 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 David L. Weddle, for example, in the title of his study, approvingly characterizes Finney’s approach to be 
The Law As Gospel (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1985). Such a confusion of law with gospel 
would be theologically revolting to the reformer Martin Luther. Weddle writes that “Finney was doing 
nothing less than shifting the basis of theology from mystery to law.” 5. 
33 The degree to which conversion has been separated from baptism, both in the figures here considered 
and in contemporary evangelicalism, is in quite striking contrast to the New Testament accounts in which 
they were held so closely together, and further reflects a low-church ecclesiology. 
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church view seem often not to remain in the evangelical camp, instead migrating toward 
Anglican, Catholic, or Orthodox church bodies. This phenomenon is relatively well-
known.34 Meanwhile most typical evangelicals, if after all that has been said we can use 
the word “typical,” look askance at highly structured or liturgical practices, and those 
church bodies which would seem to have much in common theologically with 
evangelicals, for example Missouri Synod Lutherans, seem quite uncomfortable with the 
suggestion that they be considered part of any evangelical movement. Not coincidentally, 
these are groups with some degree of sacramental theology and higher-church views. 
Hart would be supportive of the low-church view as definitive of evangelicalism. 
In an earlier book, That Old-Time Religion in Modern America, Hart defines evangelicalism as 
“any Protestant who emphasizes the subjective and ethical aspects of Christianity, rather 
than its official and churchly characteristics.”35 Thus “what matters most to born-again 
Protestants is what occurs not inside the church but in their own personal affairs,”36 
making evangelicalism “essentially a low-church expression of Protestantism.”37 He adds, 
“in effect, the evangelical movement of the late twentieth century replaced the church 
with the parachurch, and it developed forms to match.”38 Evangelicalism is, for Hart, 
supremely individualistic, since it stresses individual experience over corporate church 
experience. For Hart no movement with such an individualistic base at its core can be the 
basis for a shared religious identity. In my view, this low-church perspective has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 See, for example, Robert E. Webber and Lester Ruth, Evangelicals on the Canterbury Trail: Why Evangelicals 
Are Attracted to the Liturgical Church. Revised ed. (New York: Morehouse Publishing, 2012); Thomas Howard, 
Evangelical is Not Enough: Worship of God in Liturgy and Sacrament (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, Inc., 1984); 
Todd D. Hunter, The Accidental Anglican: The Surprising Appeal of the Liturgical Church (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 2010). 
35 D. G. Hart, That Old-Time Religion in Modern America: Evangelical Protestantism in the Twentieth Century, 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2002), 9. 
36 Hart, That Old-Time Religion, 10. 
37 Hart, That Old-Time Religion, 9-10. 
38 Hart, Deconstructing Evangelicalism, 30. 
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characteristic of evangelicals, but it extends even beyond those emphasizing the subjective 
and ethical. Even those of a confessional orientation can potentially embody this 
characteristic, as does Hodge to some extent by his emphasis on the invisible church. 
In some ways this whole study brings to mind deep difficulties and differences in 
ecclesiology that cannot be settled here. What kinds of alliances, formal or otherwise, are 
appropriate across denominations?39 What is the proper role of the parachurch? How 
should one relate to and prioritize notions of the visible and invisible church? This latter 
question certainly seems to be a key issue in the discussion, and one in which our 
historical figures were sometimes less conscious of their positions, which they had often 
not worked out as clearly as one would hope. John Nevin of Mercersburg seemed most 
conscious of the depth of ecclesiological differences in the nineteenth century, but he has 
been largely ignored by evangelicals, and few so-called evangelical bodies have prioritized 
questions of ecclesiology in the past century, although there are signs that this is changing 
in some circles. 
We began this dissertation with a discussion of the defining features of 
evangelicalism, and the issue of changing notions of conversion and their impact on the 
definition of evangelicalism itself. Looking back over its history after this study, one can 
see that indeed conversion is a legitimate defining feature of the movement in the sense 
that for every figure considered in this study conversion played a critical role. Yet we have 
also seen that important features of that conversion varied considerably between the 
figures. If anything has become apparent after all these pages, it is that conversion has 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 What are the kinds of ties that are proper in uniting Christians across denominational lines? In what ways 
should/can those bonds be considered in some way definitive? And finally, if we do really confess one holy, 
catholic, apostolic church, then are we not actually expressing core commitments about what makes one a 
Christian in forming or refusing those ties? 
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many dimensions, and views of conversion can be compared and distinguished in a 
variety of ways – some of which are rarely considered in discussions of conversion. The 
diversity that the central figures of this study exhibited is emblematic of the diverse 
meanings attached to evangelicalism. This dissertation supports evangelicalism as a 
historical category that is, in part, characterized by an interest in conversion. As a 
theological category, however, locating the identity of evangelicalism by way of 
conversion is both not useful and misleading, as this dissertation has demonstrated. If we 
are to arrive at a satisfactory definition of evangelicalism, it does not appear that it will be 
accomplished through any common understanding of conversion found throughout its 
history. 
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Appendix I – Future Research 
 
 
In moving this research forward there are several gaps that could be filled to 
describe more comprehensively the theological history of conversion in evangelicalism. 
When this project was originally conceived I had anticipated including a Methodist figure 
(Daniel D. Whedon (1808-1885)), famed later nineteenth century evangelist Dwight L. 
Moody (1837-1899), Billy Graham (b. 1918), and possibly Benjamin B. Warfield (1851-
1921). Moody was, along with Finney, the most successful evangelist of his century and by 
both his theology and practices introduced important modifications to notions of 
conversion. To the extent that Moody had a theology, it differed from Finney’s in 
important ways, and made for a form of evangelism and a view of conversion also 
somewhat different, and influential for evangelicals that followed. Whedon represented 
the explosion of Methodism in the nineteenth century and the modifications it brought to 
conversion. Warfield completed the nineteenth and began the twentieth century story of 
Old Princeton, and had several writings – particularly related to perfectionism – of special 
interest in this history. Graham brings the study into more contemporary focus as the best 
known evangelist of the twentieth century who played a significant part in the rise of the 
“new” evangelicals in the 1950s. 
As the size of this project grew it became apparent that it would not be possible to 
explore fully the entire history. The Methodist component was difficult as it was a broad 
movement without prominent representative figures that could represent that tradition. 
Whedon seemed like a good candidate, but there was no one repository of his letters and 
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papers available, which together with space considerations left him outside the final form 
of the project. But either Whedon or some other Methodist figure(s) would benefit the 
study. Given the amount of material available on Hodge, Warfield was dropped for space 
considerations, but would be a beneficial future addition. Moody was the last to be 
dropped, and I had already begun some research, collecting material from two different 
archives for his inclusion. His addition in the future would be beneficial, as he does 
provide some contrasts. It is interesting, for example, to note that while Finney was 
strongly opposed by Princeton, Moody later gained a fairly warm welcome. Graham was 
always intended as a kind of bookend to relate the content more directly to recent 
evangelicalism, but a fuller analysis of his views on conversion would also be valuable and 
enlightening, especially as so many different groups claim him as one of their own. With 
whom historically does he most closely align? 
Though not a part of the design of this dissertation, I also have anticipated that in 
a later published form this study would benefit greatly by the inclusion of a chapter on the 
holiness movement (perhaps Phoebe Palmer), and a chapter on Pentecostalism. Due to its 
diversity the latter could present difficulties, but it is too significant of a phenomenon at 
this point to be left out. Finally, a study of views on conversion among leading 
evangelicals in recent decades might bring home the reality of evangelicalism’s varied past 
to its diverse present as related to conversion. 
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Appendix II 
Summary of Edwards, Finney, Princeton On Each Conversion Category
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m
ila
r 
to
 J
E
. C
H
 –
 n
ot
 ju
st
 
ex
te
rn
al
 r
ef
or
m
at
io
n 
or
 c
ha
ng
e 
of
  o
pi
ni
on
. 
O
ut
w
ar
d 
ch
an
ge
s 
on
ly
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
“a
n 
in
w
ar
d,
 
ra
di
ca
l c
ha
ng
e 
of
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
,”
 e
ss
en
ce
 o
f w
hi
ch
 is
 
ch
an
ge
 o
f d
is
po
si
tio
n.
 A
ls
o 
a 
ch
an
ge
 o
f o
ne
’s
 
su
bj
ec
tiv
e 
an
d 
ob
je
ct
iv
e 
st
at
e 
be
fo
re
 G
od
. C
H
 
de
ni
es
 th
at
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
m
od
ifi
es
 th
e 
so
ul
’s
 
su
bs
ta
nc
e,
 o
r 
ov
er
ri
de
s 
hu
m
an
 n
at
ur
e.
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!
sc
en
de
nt
al
 o
r 
su
pe
rn
at
ur
al
 c
ha
ng
e 
(P
er
ry
 M
ill
er
). 
I 
ar
gu
e 
so
m
e 
fo
rm
 o
f s
up
er
na
tu
ra
l e
le
m
en
t 
pr
es
en
t i
n 
JE
 (n
ot
 m
er
el
y 
na
tu
ra
l).
 T
he
 c
ha
ng
e 
is
 
su
pe
rn
at
ur
al
 b
ut
 p
er
ha
ps
 n
ot
 m
et
a-
ph
ys
ic
al
, a
 
ch
an
ge
 in
 o
ne
’s
 r
el
at
io
n 
to
 G
od
 a
nd
/ 
or
 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n 
an
d 
us
e 
of
 o
ne
’s
 n
at
ur
al
 fa
cu
lti
es
. 
Ro
le
%o
f%
K
no
w
le
dg
e/
%
In
te
lle
ct
%
K
no
w
le
dg
e 
es
se
nt
ia
l t
o 
co
nv
er
si
on
. T
w
o 
fo
rm
s 
(s
im
ila
r 
to
 e
ar
lie
r 
Pu
ri
ta
ni
sm
: s
pe
cu
la
tiv
e 
(n
ot
io
na
l) 
an
d 
se
ns
e 
of
 th
e 
he
ar
t (
in
co
rp
or
at
es
 
af
fe
ct
io
ns
). 
N
ot
io
na
l k
no
w
le
dg
e 
no
t a
de
qu
at
e 
fo
r 
di
vi
ne
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
(c
on
tr
a 
de
is
ts
). 
H
ea
rt
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
of
 G
od
 is
 li
fe
-c
ha
ng
in
g 
kn
ow
le
dg
e,
 
ne
ce
ss
ita
te
s 
w
or
sh
ip
, c
ha
ng
es
 e
m
ot
io
ns
 (s
ee
 n
ex
t 
se
ct
io
n)
. B
ec
au
se
 s
pe
cu
la
tiv
e 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
is
 
in
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
he
re
, c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
is
 n
ot
 a
 m
at
te
r 
of
 
pe
rs
ua
si
on
 o
r 
m
or
al
 tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n.
 T
hr
ou
gh
 h
is
 
Sp
ir
it 
G
od
 tr
an
sf
or
m
s 
no
tio
ns
 in
to
 s
pi
ri
tu
al
, 
he
ar
t k
no
w
le
dg
e.
 N
ot
io
ns
 d
o 
no
t p
er
su
ad
e, 
bu
t 
m
ay
 p
re
pa
re
 fo
r,
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n.
 
R
at
io
na
l a
ffi
rm
at
io
ns
 o
f r
ea
so
n 
ar
e 
cr
iti
ca
l. 
N
o 
bl
in
d 
fa
ith
 a
si
de
 fr
om
 w
ha
t r
ea
so
n 
ca
n 
sh
ow
. 
C
an
no
t b
el
ie
ve
 w
ith
ou
t u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
. A
ss
en
tin
g 
vs
. h
ea
rt
 k
no
w
le
dg
e.
 S
tr
on
g 
fa
cu
lty
 p
sy
ch
ol
og
y 
di
st
in
ct
io
ns
. T
ru
th
 a
n 
in
st
ru
m
en
t o
f c
on
ve
rs
io
n.
 
M
or
e/
be
tt
er
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
– 
co
nv
er
si
on
 m
or
e 
lik
el
y.
 
A
A
 –
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
fo
r 
co
nv
er
si
on
, a
 
“b
el
ie
f o
f t
he
 tr
ut
h.
” 
Fa
ith
 h
as
 a
n 
ob
je
ct
, w
hi
ch
 
m
us
t b
e 
kn
ow
n.
 M
or
e 
th
an
 in
te
lle
ct
ua
l a
ss
en
t, 
em
br
ac
in
g 
tr
ut
h 
in
 tr
an
sf
or
m
at
iv
e 
w
ay
, p
er
-
ce
iv
in
g 
it 
no
t o
nl
y 
in
te
lle
ct
ua
lly
 b
ut
 a
ffe
ct
tiv
el
y.
 
O
ne
 c
an
no
t s
ay
 h
ow
 m
uc
h 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
is
 n
ee
de
d.
 
C
H
 –
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
fo
r 
co
nv
er
si
on
, 
si
m
ila
r 
to
 A
A
. F
ai
th
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
tr
us
t a
nd
 a
ss
en
t, 
bo
th
 o
f w
hi
ch
 r
eq
ui
re
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
– 
es
pe
ci
al
ly
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
of
 C
hr
is
t. 
Su
ch
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
m
or
e 
th
an
 
ra
tio
na
l a
ss
en
t, 
a 
sp
ir
itu
al
 k
no
w
le
dg
e,
 w
ith
 m
or
al
 
an
d 
af
fe
ct
iv
e 
as
pe
ct
s.
 P
ri
or
ity
 is
 o
n 
ra
tio
na
l 
el
em
en
ts
, o
ut
 o
f w
hi
ch
 th
e 
af
fe
ct
iv
e 
co
m
es
 
(B
us
hn
el
l i
nv
er
ts
 th
is
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p)
. T
hi
s 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
ne
ed
 n
ot
 b
e 
pe
rf
ec
t o
r 
co
m
pl
et
e.
 C
H
 
de
cl
in
es
 to
 s
pe
ci
fy
 e
xa
ct
ly
 h
ow
 m
uc
h 
is
 n
ee
de
d.
 
H
is
 c
on
ce
pt
io
n 
st
re
tc
he
d 
m
os
t w
he
n 
co
ns
id
er
in
g 
sa
lv
at
io
n 
of
 in
fa
nt
s 
(r
eg
en
er
at
io
n 
ca
n 
an
te
da
te
 
in
te
lle
ct
ua
l c
om
pr
eh
en
si
on
). 
In
te
lle
ct
 s
ta
nd
s 
un
de
r 
au
th
or
ity
 o
f S
cr
ip
tu
re
. T
he
re
 a
re
 s
up
ra
-r
at
io
na
l 
tr
ut
hs
 b
ey
on
d 
hu
m
an
 c
ap
ac
ity
 (b
ut
 n
ot
 
ir
ra
tio
na
l).
 D
en
yi
ng
 th
is
 le
ad
s 
to
 r
at
io
na
lis
m
. I
t i
s 
po
ss
ib
le
 to
 h
av
e 
he
ar
t k
no
w
le
dg
e/
tr
ut
h 
on
e 
liv
es
 
ou
t c
on
tr
ar
y 
to
 o
ne
’s
 in
te
lle
ct
ua
l b
el
ie
fs
. C
H
 n
ot
 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 h
er
e;
 a
t t
im
es
 in
si
st
in
g 
in
te
lle
ct
ua
l 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
pr
ec
ed
es
 a
ll 
he
ar
t k
no
w
le
dg
e.
 
Ro
le
%o
f%
Em
ot
io
ns
/%
Af
fe
ct
io
ns
%
T
ru
e 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
of
 G
od
 a
lw
ay
s 
in
vo
lv
es
 th
e 
he
ar
t, 
th
e 
af
fe
ct
io
ns
. T
he
 e
m
ot
io
ns
 a
re
 n
ot
 th
e 
ba
si
s 
of
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n,
 b
ut
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
of
 tr
ue
 
en
co
un
te
r 
w
ith
 th
e 
di
vi
ne
. S
pi
ri
tu
al
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
le
ad
s 
to
 c
ha
ng
ed
 a
ffe
ct
io
ns
/w
or
sh
ip
, a
nd
 th
us
 
th
es
e 
em
ot
io
ns
 a
re
 n
ot
 ir
ra
tio
na
l. 
A
ffe
ct
io
ns
 ≠
 
em
ot
io
ns
. T
he
 fo
rm
er
 a
re
 p
ri
m
ar
y 
lif
e 
pa
ss
io
ns
 
an
d 
de
si
re
s;
 th
ey
 m
ay
 e
nc
om
pa
ss
 (o
r 
co
nf
lic
t 
w
ith
) b
ut
 a
re
 b
ro
ad
er
 th
an
 e
m
ot
io
ns
. R
el
ig
io
us
 
af
fe
ct
io
ns
 fo
cu
se
d 
ou
tw
ar
d,
 n
ot
 to
w
ar
d 
se
lf-
in
te
re
st
. L
ov
e 
fo
r 
G
od
 a
nd
 d
iv
in
e 
th
in
gs
 a
t c
or
e 
of
 C
hr
is
tia
n 
af
fe
ct
io
ns
. A
ffe
ct
io
ns
 m
ot
iv
at
e 
pe
rs
on
s 
to
 a
ct
io
ns
, r
el
at
ed
 to
 w
ill
. 
C
F 
no
t m
uc
h 
of
 a
n 
em
ot
io
na
lis
t. 
H
e 
do
es
 n
ot
 
pr
ea
ch
 to
 th
e 
fe
el
in
gs
, b
ut
 fu
lly
 e
xp
ec
ts
 fe
el
in
gs
 to
 
fo
rm
 a
 p
ar
t o
f k
no
w
le
dg
e 
tr
ul
y 
he
ld
 in
 th
e 
he
ar
t. 
K
no
w
le
dg
e,
 p
ro
pe
rl
y 
en
ga
ge
d,
 a
lw
ay
s 
m
ov
es
 th
e 
he
ar
t. 
E
m
ot
io
ns
 a
re
 s
ec
on
da
ry
. 
A
A
 –
 E
m
ot
io
ns
 p
ar
t o
f r
es
po
ns
e 
to
 tr
ue
 s
pi
ri
tu
al
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e,
 a
nd
 n
or
m
al
 p
ar
t o
f c
or
po
ra
te
 
w
or
sh
ip
 a
nd
 r
ev
iv
al
, b
ut
 c
an
 a
ls
o 
de
ce
iv
e 
so
m
e 
if 
su
bs
tit
ut
ed
 fo
r 
tr
ue
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n.
 F
oc
us
 in
 r
ev
iv
al
 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
pr
ea
ch
in
g 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
on
 th
e 
go
sp
el
, n
ot
 
in
du
ce
m
en
t o
f e
m
ot
io
na
l r
es
po
ns
es
.  
C
H
 –
 tr
ue
 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
of
 G
od
 in
vo
lv
es
 e
m
ot
io
ns
. C
on
ve
r-
si
on
 in
vo
lv
es
 c
ha
ng
e 
of
 e
m
ot
io
ns
, b
ut
 d
oe
s 
no
t 
oc
cu
r 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
em
. A
cc
ur
at
e 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
w
ith
ou
t r
eq
ui
si
te
 e
m
ot
io
ns
 is
 n
ot
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
of
 
co
nv
er
si
on
. R
el
ig
io
us
 a
ffe
ct
io
ns
/e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
ro
ot
ed
 in
 c
og
ni
tio
ns
 o
f t
ru
th
. W
ro
ng
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
le
ad
s 
to
 m
is
gu
id
ed
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e/
em
ot
io
ns
. A
 la
ck
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!
of
 p
ie
ty
 le
ad
s 
to
 h
et
er
od
ox
 b
el
ie
fs
. R
ej
ec
ts
 s
pe
cu
-
la
tiv
e 
th
eo
lo
gi
ca
l k
no
w
le
dg
e 
an
d 
un
gr
ou
nd
ed
 
em
ot
io
na
l e
xp
er
ie
nc
es
. A
ffe
ct
iv
e 
he
ar
t 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
ne
ed
ed
. M
us
t “
fe
el
in
gl
y 
be
lie
ve
.”
 
Ro
le
%o
f%t
he
%W
ill
%
W
ill
 =
 c
ho
os
in
g.
 T
o 
do
 a
s 
on
e 
w
ill
s 
is
 to
 d
o 
as
 
on
e 
pl
ea
se
s,
 th
e 
ve
ry
 m
om
en
t o
r 
ac
t o
f w
ill
in
g/
 
ch
oo
si
ng
 (n
o 
L
oc
ke
an
 d
is
tin
ct
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
w
ill
in
g/
de
si
ri
ng
). 
N
ec
es
si
ty
/c
er
ta
in
ty
 n
ot
 
co
nt
ra
di
ct
or
y 
to
 li
be
rt
y.
 L
ib
er
ty
 is
 th
e 
po
w
er
 to
 
do
 a
s 
on
e 
w
ill
s.
 R
eg
ar
dl
es
s 
of
 w
hy
 w
e 
ch
oo
se
 
w
ha
t w
e 
do
, r
eg
ar
dl
es
s 
of
 ca
us
es
, i
f w
e 
do
 w
ha
t w
e 
w
an
t, 
w
e 
ar
e 
fr
ee
. M
or
al
 n
ec
es
si
ty
 (a
bi
lit
y)
 –
 
fa
ct
or
s 
w
ith
in
 a
ge
nt
; n
at
ur
al
 n
ec
es
si
ty
 –
 fa
ct
or
s 
ou
ts
id
e 
of
 th
e 
ag
en
t’s
 c
on
tr
ol
. F
re
ed
om
 o
f t
he
 
w
ill
 is
 n
on
se
ns
ic
al
. A
 w
ill
 w
ill
s; 
it 
is
 n
ot
 fr
ee
 in
 th
e 
se
ns
e 
of
 in
de
te
rm
in
at
e 
or
 n
eu
tr
al
 (i
nd
iff
er
en
ce
). 
In
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
un
de
rm
in
es
 th
e 
ve
ry
 fo
un
da
tio
n 
of
 
ho
w
 w
e 
co
ns
id
er
 a
 p
er
so
n 
m
or
al
ly
 g
oo
d 
or
 b
ad
. 
T
he
 m
or
e 
in
cl
in
ed
/l
es
s 
in
di
ffe
re
nt
 o
ne
 is
 to
w
ar
d 
th
e 
go
od
, t
he
 b
et
te
r 
th
at
 p
er
so
n 
is
, o
pp
os
ite
 o
f 
A
rm
in
ia
n 
po
si
tio
n.
 J
E
 r
es
po
ns
e 
to
 A
rm
in
ia
ni
sm
: 
th
e 
w
ill
 is
 n
ev
er
 in
di
ffe
re
nt
 in
 th
e 
ac
t o
f w
ill
in
g,
 
an
d 
w
er
e 
th
is
 p
os
si
bl
e 
it 
w
ou
ld
 e
m
pt
y 
th
e 
ac
to
r 
of
 a
ny
 m
or
al
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
, e
ve
n 
G
od
 h
im
se
lf.
 W
e 
ac
t i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 w
ith
 w
ho
 w
e 
ar
e 
an
d 
w
ha
t w
e 
w
an
t. 
Si
nn
er
s 
do
 n
ot
 w
an
t t
o 
fo
llo
w
 G
od
. 
Fr
ee
 a
nd
 u
ne
nc
um
be
re
d 
w
ill
 a
t c
en
te
r 
of
 h
is
 
co
nc
ep
tio
n 
of
 h
um
an
ity
, a
nd
 c
en
tr
al
 to
 h
is
 id
ea
s 
on
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n.
 C
on
ve
rs
io
n 
co
ns
is
ts
 o
f h
um
an
 
ch
oi
ce
. S
in
 a
nd
 h
ol
in
es
s 
ar
e 
vo
lu
nt
ar
y 
st
at
es
. N
o 
fr
ee
 w
ill
 =
 n
o 
m
or
al
 r
es
po
ns
ib
ili
ty
. 
Fo
re
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
an
d 
el
ec
tio
n 
co
m
pa
tib
le
 w
ith
 fr
ee
 
hu
m
an
 w
ill
. D
en
ie
s 
an
y 
di
st
in
ct
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
na
tu
ra
l a
nd
 m
or
al
 a
bi
lit
y.
 
A
A
 –
 T
he
 w
ill
 p
la
ys
 n
o 
pa
rt
 in
 o
ne
’s
 in
iti
al
 
re
ge
ne
ra
tio
n.
 C
H
 –
 a
ffi
rm
s 
T
U
L
IP
. I
n 
na
tu
ra
l 
st
at
e 
th
e 
w
ill
 is
 b
ro
ke
n/
de
pr
av
ed
. C
an
no
t w
ill
 
co
nv
er
si
on
 w
ith
ou
t G
od
’s
 p
re
vi
ou
s 
re
ge
ne
ra
tio
n.
 
Fo
r 
C
H
, l
ik
e 
JE
, l
ib
er
ty
 c
on
si
st
s 
in
 th
e 
po
w
er
 to
 
do
 a
s 
on
e 
de
si
re
s 
w
ith
ou
t o
ut
si
de
 c
oe
rc
io
n.
 
In
ab
ili
ty
 d
oe
s 
no
t w
ea
ke
n 
ob
lig
at
io
n.
 M
or
al
ity
 is
 
no
t j
ud
ge
d 
so
le
ly
 b
y 
on
e’
s 
ac
tio
ns
, b
ut
 b
y 
on
e’
s 
in
cl
in
at
io
ns
 o
r 
di
sp
os
iti
on
, c
on
tr
a 
C
F.
 C
H
 w
ill
in
g 
to
 a
lly
 w
ith
 B
us
hn
el
l i
n 
af
fir
m
in
g 
th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f 
ch
ar
ac
te
r 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t o
ve
r 
tim
e 
in
 c
om
m
un
ity
 
ve
rs
us
 a
n 
in
di
vi
du
al
is
tic
 a
nd
 d
ec
is
iv
e 
m
om
en
t i
n 
w
hi
ch
 o
ne
 w
ill
s 
a 
ch
an
ge
 to
 o
ne
’s
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
. 
U
ni
ty
%o
f%
Pe
rs
on
s%
St
re
ss
es
 e
ss
en
tia
l u
ni
ty
 o
f p
er
so
ns
, r
at
he
r 
th
an
 
em
ph
as
iz
in
g 
di
st
in
ct
io
ns
 o
f w
ill
, i
nt
el
le
ct
, e
tc
. 
T
he
 w
ill
 d
oe
s 
no
t a
ct
, t
he
 p
er
so
n 
do
es
, i
n 
al
l o
f 
on
e’
s 
va
ri
ou
s 
as
pe
ct
s.
 
D
isu
ni
ty
 o
f p
er
so
ns
, s
tr
on
g 
fa
cu
lty
 p
sy
ch
ol
og
y 
di
st
in
ct
io
ns
. 
A
A
 s
ay
s 
lit
tle
 a
bo
ut
 w
ill
 d
ir
ec
tly
, b
ut
 e
m
ph
as
iz
es
 
un
ity
 o
f i
nd
iv
id
ua
ls
 in
 r
es
po
nd
in
g 
to
 g
os
pe
l. 
R
ej
ec
ts
 fa
cu
lty
 p
sy
ch
ol
og
y 
di
vi
si
on
s 
as
 a
rt
ifi
ci
al
. 
“T
he
 s
ou
l i
s 
no
t d
ep
ra
ve
d 
or
 h
ol
y 
by
 d
ep
ar
t-
m
en
ts
.”
 C
H
 –
 s
im
ila
r;
 r
ej
ec
ts
 fa
cu
lty
 p
sy
ch
ol
og
y 
an
d 
st
re
ss
es
 in
di
vi
si
bi
lit
y 
of
 h
um
an
 p
er
so
ns
. 
Fa
cu
lti
es
 “
ne
ith
er
 in
de
pe
nd
en
t n
or
 d
is
tin
ct
.”
 
T
ru
e 
ge
ne
ra
lly
 a
nd
 in
 r
eg
ar
ds
 to
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n.
 
M
ea
ns
%o
f%
Co
nv
er
si
on
%
T
he
re
 a
re
 m
ea
ns
 o
f g
ra
ce
, b
ut
 th
es
e 
do
 n
ot
 im
pl
y 
on
e 
ca
n 
co
nt
ro
l G
od
’s
 s
av
in
g 
ac
tiv
ity
. T
he
 m
ea
ns
 
of
 g
ra
ce
 a
re
 n
at
ur
al
 s
uc
h 
as
 h
ea
ri
ng
 (p
re
ac
hi
ng
) 
an
d 
re
ad
in
g 
(s
tu
dy
in
g)
 th
e 
W
or
d,
 s
ac
ra
m
en
ts
, 
pr
ay
er
, e
tc
., 
th
ro
ug
h 
w
hi
ch
 G
od
 m
ay
 c
ho
os
e 
to
 
w
or
k 
su
pe
rn
at
ur
al
ly
 in
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n.
 M
ea
ns
 a
re
 a
n 
“o
pp
or
tu
ni
ty
” 
fo
r 
gr
ac
e.
 
M
ea
ns
 to
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
ar
e 
es
se
nt
ia
l a
nd
 n
ev
er
 to
 
be
 ig
no
re
d.
 N
ot
 s
up
er
na
tu
ra
l. 
M
ea
ns
 to
 e
nd
s 
lik
e 
ca
us
es
 to
 e
ffe
ct
s.
 M
ea
ns
 o
f c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
ar
e 
no
 
di
ffe
re
nt
, n
at
ur
al
 r
el
at
io
n 
of
 m
ea
ns
 to
 e
nd
s.
 G
od
 
pr
ov
id
es
 th
e 
m
ea
ns
; h
um
an
s 
us
e 
th
e 
m
ea
ns
. 
M
os
t i
m
po
rt
an
t m
ea
ns
 is
 p
er
su
as
io
n 
by
 th
e 
tr
ut
h.
 
O
th
er
 m
ea
ns
 in
cl
ud
e 
pr
ea
ch
in
g,
 p
ra
ye
r,
 n
ew
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
(m
ea
ns
 a
re
 fl
ex
ib
le
). 
G
oo
d 
m
ea
ns
 a
re
 
th
os
e 
th
at
 w
or
k!
 
 
A
A
 –
 T
he
 g
os
pe
l i
s 
th
e 
on
ly
 r
ig
ht
 m
ea
ns
 to
 
co
nv
er
si
on
. C
om
m
un
ic
at
in
g 
go
sp
el
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
is
 
ke
y 
to
 th
e 
m
ea
ns
. K
no
w
le
dg
e 
es
se
nt
ia
l t
o 
co
m
in
g 
to
 fa
ith
 a
nd
 to
 g
ro
w
th
 in
 fa
ith
. C
H
 –
 G
od
 u
se
s 
m
ea
ns
, b
ut
 th
ey
 d
o 
no
t v
io
la
te
 n
at
ur
al
 h
um
an
 
ca
pa
ci
tie
s.
 C
on
ve
rs
io
n 
do
es
 n
ot
 d
es
tr
oy
 o
r 
cr
ea
te
 
fa
cu
lti
es
. P
ri
m
ar
y 
m
ea
ns
 o
f c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
ar
e 
w
or
d,
 
sa
cr
am
en
ts
, a
nd
 p
ra
ye
r.
 N
o 
in
he
re
nt
 e
ffi
ca
cy
. 
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!
Re
la
ti
on
)o
f)
Co
nv
er
si
on
)to
)
Ba
pt
is
m
)
B
ap
tis
m
 a
 m
ea
ns
 o
f g
ra
ce
; c
ov
en
an
ta
l 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
in
g 
as
 s
ig
n 
of
 e
nt
ra
nc
e 
in
to
 c
ov
en
an
t 
co
m
m
un
ity
 a
nd
 s
ea
l o
f H
ol
y 
Sp
ir
it 
of
 G
od
’s
 
sa
vi
ng
 g
ra
ce
 to
 e
le
ct
 in
fa
nt
s.
 N
ev
er
 ex
 o
pe
re
 o
pe
ra
to
. 
N
o 
di
re
ct
 li
nk
 o
f b
ap
tis
m
 w
ith
 r
eg
en
er
at
io
n.
 
V
ir
tu
al
ly
 s
ile
nt
 o
n 
ba
pt
is
m
 (r
ef
le
ct
in
g 
lo
w
 
ec
cl
es
io
lo
gy
). 
B
ap
tis
m
 e
ve
n 
se
em
s 
to
 b
e 
so
m
e-
w
ha
t i
nt
er
ch
an
ge
ab
le
 w
ith
 o
th
er
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 li
ke
 
th
e 
an
xi
ou
s 
be
nc
h;
 b
ot
h 
in
si
st
 o
n 
a 
pu
bl
ic
 
de
cl
ar
at
io
n 
of
 fa
ith
 a
s 
a 
sc
re
en
 fo
r 
in
si
nc
er
e 
pr
of
es
si
on
s 
of
 fa
ith
. 
A
A
 –
 r
ar
el
y 
sp
ea
ks
 o
f b
ap
tis
m
 in
 c
on
ju
nc
tio
n 
w
ith
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n.
 C
H
 –
 b
ap
tis
m
 s
ig
n 
an
d 
se
al
 o
f 
en
tr
an
ce
 in
to
 c
ov
en
an
t c
om
m
un
ity
, b
ut
 n
o 
di
re
ct
 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
to
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n.
 C
H
 o
pp
os
es
 b
ot
h 
L
ut
he
ra
n 
an
d 
C
at
ho
lic
 fo
rm
s 
of
 b
ap
tis
m
al
 
re
ge
ne
ra
tio
n,
 a
nd
 h
ig
h 
ch
ur
ch
 s
ac
ra
m
en
ta
lis
m
. 
Sa
cr
am
en
ts
 n
ev
er
 o
pe
ra
te
 ex
 o
pe
re
 o
pe
ra
to
. C
H
 
w
ri
te
s 
of
 a
du
lt 
ba
pt
is
m
 m
uc
h 
le
ss
 o
fte
n 
th
an
 
in
fa
nt
; i
t a
ls
o 
no
t r
eg
en
er
at
iv
e,
 a
nd
 r
ef
le
ct
s 
co
nf
ir
m
at
io
n 
of
 a
du
lt 
re
ce
pt
io
n 
of
 fa
ith
. 
Ti
m
ef
ra
m
e)
of
)
Co
nv
er
si
on
)
Fr
om
 G
od
’s
 p
er
sp
ec
tiv
e 
re
ge
ne
ra
tio
n 
is
 
in
st
an
ta
ne
ou
s.
 T
he
re
 is
 a
 m
om
en
t w
he
n 
on
e 
m
ov
es
 fr
om
 d
ea
th
 to
 li
fe
.  
Fr
om
 th
e 
hu
m
an
 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e,
 h
ow
ev
er
, r
eg
en
er
at
io
n 
an
d 
co
nv
er
si
on
 a
pp
ea
r 
m
or
e 
as
 a
 p
ro
ce
ss
, s
in
ce
 it
 is
 
ne
ve
r 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 a
pp
ar
en
t i
n 
th
e 
m
om
en
t 
w
he
n 
th
at
 in
ne
r 
ch
an
ge
 o
cc
ur
re
d.
 O
ne
 m
ig
ht
 s
ay
 
th
at
 r
eg
en
er
at
io
n 
is
 in
st
an
t, 
co
nv
er
si
on
 a
 p
ro
ce
ss
, 
an
d 
sa
nc
tif
ic
at
io
n 
an
 o
ng
oi
ng
 p
ro
ce
ss
. 
C
on
ve
rs
io
n 
is
 im
m
ed
ia
te
 a
nd
 to
ta
l. 
T
he
re
 is
 
ne
ve
r 
a 
re
as
on
 to
 d
el
ay
, s
in
ce
 w
e 
al
l h
av
e 
th
e 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 to
 r
es
po
nd
. 
A
A
 –
 n
o 
se
t t
im
ef
ra
m
e 
fo
r 
co
nv
er
si
on
, c
an
 b
e 
su
dd
en
 o
r 
gr
ad
ua
l (
A
A
 p
re
fe
rs
 g
ra
du
al
). 
Su
dd
en
 
co
nv
er
si
on
s 
ca
n 
be
 r
es
ul
t o
f l
on
ge
r 
hi
dd
en
 
pr
oc
es
s.
 A
lth
ou
gh
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
m
ay
 a
pp
ea
r 
gr
ad
ua
l t
o 
hu
m
an
s,
 r
eg
en
er
at
io
n 
is
 a
lw
ay
s 
in
st
an
t 
– 
ev
en
 if
 h
id
de
n 
to
 u
s.
 C
H
 –
 s
im
ila
r 
to
 A
A
. 
C
on
ve
rs
io
n 
ca
n 
be
 in
st
an
t, 
bu
t C
H
 e
m
ph
as
iz
es
 
gr
ad
ua
l c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
oc
es
s 
co
nt
ra
 m
an
y 
re
vi
va
l 
m
et
ho
ds
. R
eg
en
er
at
io
n 
al
w
ay
s 
in
st
an
t. 
G
ra
du
al
 
nu
rt
ur
e 
in
 th
e 
fa
ith
 th
e 
no
rm
al
 p
ro
ce
ss
 fo
r 
ch
ild
re
n;
 th
ey
 n
ev
er
 k
no
w
 a
 ‘b
ef
or
e’
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
pe
ri
od
. G
ra
du
al
 p
ro
ce
ss
 m
ir
ro
rs
 C
H
’s
 o
w
n 
lif
e.
 
Ex
pe
ri
en
ce
)a
nd
)
th
e)
Au
th
en
ti
ca
ti
on
)
of
)C
on
ve
rs
io
n)
A
ut
he
nt
ic
at
io
n 
a 
cr
iti
ca
l q
ue
st
io
n 
in
 th
e 
co
nt
ex
t 
an
d 
af
te
rm
at
h 
of
 th
e 
G
re
at
 A
w
ak
en
in
g.
 J
E
 
be
co
m
es
 m
or
e 
sk
ep
tic
al
 o
f c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
ex
pe
rie
nc
es
 
as
 ti
m
e 
go
es
 b
y 
an
d 
m
or
e 
in
cl
in
ed
 to
 ju
dg
e 
co
nv
er
si
on
s 
so
le
ly
 b
y 
th
e 
fr
ui
t o
f o
ne
’s
 li
fe
 o
ve
r 
tim
e.
 T
he
re
 is
 n
ev
er
 c
er
ta
in
ty
 fr
om
 a
 h
um
an
 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e 
in
 a
ut
he
nt
ic
at
io
n 
of
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n.
 J
E
 
cr
iti
qu
es
 m
an
y 
fa
ls
e 
si
gn
s 
of
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n.
 H
e 
in
si
st
s 
th
at
 a
ny
 k
in
ds
 o
f e
xp
er
ie
nc
es
 th
ou
gh
t t
o 
in
di
ca
te
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ju
dg
ed
 b
y 
Sc
ri
pt
ur
e 
ra
th
er
 th
an
 p
er
so
na
l c
ri
te
ri
a.
 
K
no
w
n 
by
 o
ne
’s
 fr
ui
ts
. T
ru
e 
C
hr
is
tia
ns
 o
be
y,
 
an
d 
ob
ey
 c
om
pl
ete
ly
, n
o 
m
ix
tu
re
 o
f s
in
fu
l w
ith
 h
ol
y 
st
at
es
. I
t i
s 
al
l o
r 
no
th
in
g.
 T
hi
s 
ob
ed
ie
nc
e 
is
 
re
fle
ct
ed
 in
 b
ot
h 
ex
te
rn
al
 a
ct
io
ns
 a
nd
 in
te
rn
al
 
in
te
nt
io
n/
di
sp
os
iti
on
 to
w
ar
d 
ho
lin
es
s/
be
ne
vo
le
nc
e.
 C
al
vi
ni
st
 n
ot
io
n 
of
 
in
ab
ili
ty
 c
au
se
s 
pa
ss
iv
ity
 in
st
ea
d 
of
 a
ct
io
n,
 
m
is
le
ad
s 
pe
op
le
 in
to
 th
in
ki
ng
 o
be
di
en
ce
 n
ot
 
ne
ed
ed
. L
og
ic
al
 c
on
cl
us
io
n 
of
 a
ll 
th
is
, w
hi
ch
 C
F 
co
m
es
 to
 te
ac
h,
 is
 p
er
fe
ct
io
ni
sm
 (e
nt
ir
e 
sa
nc
tif
ic
at
io
n)
. Y
ou
 h
av
e 
th
e 
m
ea
ns
 a
nd
 c
ap
ac
ity
 
to
 o
be
y;
 th
er
ef
or
e 
tr
ue
 C
hr
is
tia
ns
 w
ill
 in
 fa
ct
 
ob
ey
 in
 a
ll 
th
in
gs
. 
A
A
 –
 a
ut
he
nt
ic
at
io
n 
by
 h
um
an
s 
ne
ve
r 
ce
rt
ai
n.
 
E
xp
er
ie
nc
es
 n
ev
er
 a
 r
el
ia
bl
e 
in
di
ca
to
r.
 P
ro
bl
em
 
w
ith
 r
el
ig
io
us
 e
nt
hu
si
as
ts
 is
 th
at
 th
ey
 tr
us
t/
se
ek
 
th
es
e 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
s.
 A
A
 m
or
e 
tr
us
tin
g 
of
 g
ra
du
al
 
co
nv
er
si
on
s 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 a
re
 le
ss
 s
us
ce
pt
ib
le
 to
 
tr
us
tin
g 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 h
um
an
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
es
 a
s 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f c
on
ve
rs
io
n.
 B
es
t t
es
t i
s 
in
 fr
ui
t o
f 
on
e’
s 
lif
e 
ov
er
 ti
m
e.
 T
ho
se
 w
ho
 fa
ll 
aw
ay
 w
er
e 
ne
ve
r 
tr
ul
y 
co
nv
er
te
d,
 a
nd
 m
an
y 
la
st
in
g 
co
nv
er
ts
 
ca
nn
ot
 n
am
e 
th
e 
tim
e 
of
 th
ei
r 
co
nv
er
si
on
. C
H
 –
 
ex
te
rn
al
 c
ri
te
ri
a 
(c
hu
rc
h 
m
em
be
rs
hi
p,
 e
tc
.) 
ca
nn
ot
 a
ut
he
nt
ic
at
e 
co
nv
er
si
on
. M
us
t j
ud
ge
 b
y 
in
w
ar
d 
st
at
e.
 E
as
ie
r 
to
 d
is
pr
ov
e 
tr
ue
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
th
an
 to
 r
el
ia
bl
y 
au
th
en
tic
at
e 
it.
 B
es
t p
ro
ve
d 
in
 
fr
ui
ts
/e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
ov
er
 ti
m
e.
 S
an
ct
ifi
ca
tio
n 
al
w
ay
s 
fo
llo
w
s 
tr
ue
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n.
 C
an
no
t 
au
th
en
tic
at
e 
by
 m
ea
su
ri
ng
 fe
el
in
gs
/a
ffe
ct
io
ns
. 
Pr
of
es
si
on
s 
al
so
 d
ee
m
ph
as
iz
ed
 a
s 
un
tr
us
tw
or
th
y.
 
Pe
rm
an
en
ce
)o
f)
Co
nv
er
si
on
)
Pe
rs
ev
er
an
ce
 is
 th
e 
ul
tim
at
e 
au
th
en
tic
at
io
n 
of
 
tr
ue
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n.
 P
er
se
ve
ra
nc
e 
is
 a
 n
ec
es
sa
ry
 
re
su
lt 
of
 tr
ue
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n;
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
 is
 
ir
re
ve
rs
ib
le
. T
ho
se
 w
ho
 le
av
e 
th
e 
fa
ith
 w
er
e 
ne
ve
r 
tr
ul
y 
co
nv
er
te
d 
in
iti
al
ly
. 
A
 m
ix
ed
 v
ie
w
. T
he
 d
om
in
an
t v
ie
w
, a
nd
 th
e 
on
e 
w
hi
ch
 fo
llo
w
s 
lo
gi
ca
lly
 fr
om
 h
is
 o
th
er
 te
ac
hi
ng
s 
is
 
th
at
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
is
 n
ot
 n
ec
es
sa
ri
ly
 p
er
m
an
en
t; 
it 
ca
n 
be
 lo
st
. F
ur
th
er
m
or
e,
 it
 is
 lo
st
 e
ve
ry
 ti
m
e 
a 
C
hr
is
tia
n 
fa
lls
 in
to
 s
in
. J
us
tif
ic
at
io
n 
re
lie
s 
on
 
A
A
 –
 tr
ue
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
al
w
ay
s 
pe
rm
an
en
t. 
In
ne
r 
su
pe
rn
at
ur
al
 tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n 
is
 n
ot
 r
ev
er
si
bl
e.
 
C
H
 –
 li
ke
w
is
e,
 tr
ue
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
al
w
ay
s 
pe
rm
an
en
t. 
Sh
ou
ld
 c
or
re
sp
on
d 
w
ith
 im
pa
ct
 o
f 
fa
ith
 o
n 
on
e’
s 
lif
e.
 “
T
he
 se
cu
rit
y 
of
 b
eli
ev
er
s i
s a
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!
ob
ed
ie
nc
e.
 B
ei
ng
 in
 a
 s
ta
te
 o
f s
in
 is
 in
co
m
pa
tib
le
 
w
ith
 fa
ith
; t
he
re
fo
re
 a
 s
in
ni
ng
 C
hr
is
tia
n 
is
 in
 
sa
m
e 
st
at
e 
as
 a
n 
un
co
nv
er
te
d 
si
nn
er
 a
s 
co
nc
er
ns
 
sa
lv
at
io
n.
 T
hi
s 
is
 w
hy
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
is
 b
ot
h 
im
m
ed
ia
te
 a
nd
 o
ng
oi
ng
. C
F 
al
so
 a
rg
ue
s 
fo
r 
pe
rs
ev
er
an
ce
 a
nd
 e
le
ct
io
n,
 b
ut
 u
lti
m
at
el
y 
an
y 
ro
bu
st
 n
ot
io
n 
of
 p
er
se
ve
ra
nc
e 
is
 in
co
m
pa
tib
le
 
w
ith
 C
F’
s 
ot
he
r 
vi
ew
s.
 
se
cu
rit
y 
fro
m
 si
n.
” 
O
pp
os
es
 a
nt
in
om
ia
ni
sm
. S
av
in
g 
gr
ac
e 
no
t d
ep
en
de
nt
 o
n 
ou
r 
ac
tio
ns
, b
ut
 o
ur
 
ac
tio
ns
 r
ef
le
ct
 it
s 
re
al
ity
. C
H
 a
ls
o 
di
sp
la
ys
 s
om
e 
in
co
ns
is
te
nc
ie
s 
th
at
 s
ee
m
 to
 in
di
ca
te
 th
e 
po
ss
i-
bi
lit
y 
th
at
 s
al
va
tio
n 
co
ul
d 
be
 a
t r
is
k 
or
 lo
st
. 
E
ls
ew
he
re
 h
e 
te
rm
s 
so
m
e 
fa
ith
 “
te
m
po
ra
ry
 fa
ith
” 
ba
se
d 
on
 c
om
m
on
, n
ot
 s
av
in
g,
 g
ra
ce
. S
al
va
tio
n 
se
cu
re
 s
in
ce
 g
ro
un
de
d 
in
 G
od
’s
 a
ct
io
ns
, n
ot
 o
ur
s.
 
M
or
ph
ol
og
y)
of
)
Co
nv
er
si
on
)
an
d)
th
e)
O
rd
o%
Sa
lu
ti
s))
R
el
at
io
n 
to
 e
ar
lie
r 
Pu
ri
ta
n 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
ni
sm
 is
 
am
bi
gu
ou
s 
at
 ti
m
es
, b
ut
 J
E
 c
le
ar
ly
 r
ej
ec
ts
 a
ny
 
re
qu
ir
em
en
t t
ha
t o
ne
 fo
llo
w
 c
er
ta
in
 s
te
ps
 to
 
co
nv
er
si
on
, a
nd
 m
ay
 c
on
si
de
r 
th
os
e 
pr
ep
ar
at
or
y 
w
or
ks
 th
at
 a
re
 p
ar
t o
f t
he
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
of
 s
om
e 
to
 
be
 w
ro
ug
ht
 a
s 
pa
rt
 o
f t
he
 S
pi
ri
t’s
 s
up
er
na
tu
ra
l 
sa
vi
ng
 w
or
k,
 r
at
he
r 
th
an
 b
y 
th
e 
hu
m
an
. P
re
se
nc
e 
of
 th
es
e 
st
ep
s 
is
 n
o 
ce
rt
ai
n 
si
gn
 o
f s
av
in
g 
gr
ac
e,
 
ho
w
ev
er
, e
ve
n 
if 
th
ey
 a
re
 c
om
m
on
ly
 a
 p
ar
t o
f 
th
at
 p
ro
ce
ss
. T
he
 s
te
ps
 b
ec
om
e 
sig
ns
 o
f 
co
nv
er
si
on
 r
at
he
r 
th
an
 a
 p
at
h 
to
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n.
  
In
 th
e 
or
de
r 
of
 s
al
va
tio
n,
 m
os
t i
m
po
rt
an
t f
or
 J
E
 is
 
th
at
 c
on
ve
rs
io
n 
is
 G
od
’s
 g
ra
ci
ou
s 
ac
t a
lo
ne
. 
So
m
e 
di
sp
ut
e 
re
la
tio
n 
of
 ju
st
ifi
ca
tio
n 
w
ith
 s
an
ct
i-
fic
at
io
n 
in
 J
E
, b
ut
 b
el
ow
 s
ee
m
s 
m
os
t a
cc
ur
at
e.
 
 E
le
ct
io
n 
Il
lu
m
in
at
io
n/
re
ge
ne
ra
tio
n 
Fa
ith
 
U
ni
on
 w
ith
 C
hr
is
t 
Ju
st
ifi
ca
tio
n 
Sa
nc
tif
ic
at
io
n 
 
Im
m
ed
ia
cy
 m
ea
ns
 n
o 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
ni
sm
, n
o 
st
ep
s.
 
M
os
t s
tr
ik
in
g 
fe
at
ur
e 
of
 h
is
 o
rd
o 
is
 th
e 
or
de
ri
ng
 o
f 
sa
nc
tif
ic
at
io
n.
 A
ls
o 
pr
es
en
t/
pe
rm
an
en
t 
di
st
in
ct
io
n.
 C
F 
do
es
 n
ot
 a
dd
re
ss
 o
rd
o 
di
re
ct
ly
; 
m
us
t b
e 
de
du
ce
d 
fr
om
 o
th
er
 v
ie
w
s.
 E
le
ct
io
n 
is
 
br
ac
ke
te
d 
be
ca
us
e 
al
th
ou
gh
 C
F 
pu
ts
 it
 in
 th
is
 
fir
st
 p
os
iti
on
, i
ts
 n
ec
es
si
ty
 in
 h
is
 s
ch
em
e 
is
 
qu
es
tio
na
bl
e.
 
 [E
le
ct
io
n]
 
R
ep
en
ta
nc
e 
R
eg
en
er
at
io
n/
C
on
ve
rs
io
n 
Fa
ith
 
Pr
es
en
t S
an
ct
ifi
ca
tio
n 
Pr
es
en
t J
us
tif
ic
at
io
n 
Pe
rm
an
en
t S
an
ct
ifi
ca
tio
n 
(P
er
fe
ct
io
ni
sm
) 
Pe
rm
an
en
t J
us
tif
ic
at
io
n 
A
A
 –
 T
he
re
 a
re
 ty
pi
ca
l s
te
ps
, l
ik
e 
co
nv
ic
tio
n,
 b
ut
 
th
ey
 a
re
 n
ot
 r
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